



Regenerating Africa: Bringing African Solutions to African Problems

Mammo Muchie
Vusi Gumede
Samuel Oloruntoba and
Nicasius Achu Check (eds)

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Foreword

By Mammo Muchie

Why African Solutions to Africa's Main Problems?

The series of conferences on African unity for renaissance have provided a new opportunity to create a paradigm shift, in order to work on how to bring into reality the unity of Africans, regardless of the diverse ways they try to construct institutions, systems and governance in different parts of Africa. There is a need to identify the principal problems Africans share and to find African solutions that endure and sustain the multiplicative well-being of all Africans by starting at the grassroots bottom level of the pyramid.

It is indeed fitting that all the partners that are involved in producing this book deserve full, sincere and honest appreciation. It is rare to see more than 10 partners working so closely together with humility and reflecting the values of caring and sharing, so as to promote education and help in understanding the intimidating complexities Africa continues to experience. It is remarkable to have been able, with all the partners working together, to run the annual conferences successfully for the past five years without relying on any donor funding.

The time to address the principal problems that Africa continues to experience is long overdue. What are these principal problems? The task of finding real African solutions to these problems remains unfinished. Palaeontologists confirm that Africa is the origin of humanity. Africa has also experienced the commodification of its humanity. The African continent has been influenced by a *mélange* of races, cultures, religions, ethnic nationalities making the project of how the differences can be managed to forestall conflict and promote the enduring African security community and well-being a very primary African problem that requires African solutions. In fact, the key question to finding a lasting solution is how to Africanise those who originated from Africa and those who became settlers with different racial, cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic variations. How to manage inter-African relations? How the settlers from the colonial legacy, the apartheid legacy, the Arabs in Africa and the varied tribes within Africans can all share being Africanised above all else is a real challenge to ensuring lasting solutions. It is important to go deeper and understand all the sources that generate conflict, in order to find ways to manage the different conflicts for a better future. To do so it is important that the past is courageously confronted, and the truth should be told, however unpleasant it may be. The ying and yang of the African persistent problems to find solutions need to be brought out to find remedies for building a shared

future. What features of the past live in the present? Africa's tortured history needs to change to the era and future of the happy history. The era of political instability and religious, racial and ethnic divisions needs to end. A new era of political stability and religious, ethnic and racial harmony should be welcomed. African solutions to African problems should bring a grand paradigm shift from war to peace, from conflict to reconciliation, from poverty that subtracts well-being to prosperity that contributes to additive and multiplicative well-being, from unemployment to full employment and from persistent inequality to equality.

There is a real need to look back and recognise, appreciate and unearth the rich knowledge; spiritual, struggle, legal, religious and liberation heritage of Africa. When it comes to African identity, it is not static or fixed. Being African is above all recognising being human. We also need to identify what factors are relevant in defining an African identity. Africans can and bear many identities, but there is a need to share African-ness and humanity as the number one organising identity project to promote new Africa with unity and renaissance. The challenge is how to find a solution to construct these two principal identities from the many diverse identities, by making sure that all agree and realise that expressing African-ness does allow the free expression of all other identities as part of the human rights they all share together.

Today, more than ever, Africa needs a new pan-African and Renaissance manifesto to learn and put an integrated African development agenda. Africans should recognise, appreciate and promote whatever differences exist amongst Africans, they should always and prioritise to celebrating African similarity with trust and solidarity in order to mobilise diversity positively as an asset and not liability to construct collaboratively African unity. Africa needs to build as the primary identity African-ness that escapes being trapped by race, colour, language, tribe, ethnicity and religion whilst being open and driven by the shared belief, culture, history, philosophy and civilisation in the form of a project identity anchored deeply with Ethiopianism, Afrikology, Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

The African unity for renaissance conference series continues to explore through research, knowledge and education how to excavate the African heritages. This scholarly book is an important contribution to knowledge production, and it deals with a fundamentally critical question: how to find African solutions to African problems.

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The African Journey to Provide African Solutions to African Problems

*Mammo Muchie, Vusi Gumede, Samuel Oloruntoba
and Nicasius Achu Check*

The need for a home-grown approach to tackling the intractable challenges Africa has faced since independence stems from the failure of strategies devised outside of Africa to ameliorate the continent's socioeconomic and political conditions. It is imperative to assert African agency in diagnosing, understanding and devising the right mix of locally sensitive strategies to address problems and forge solutions. Asserting African agency on the tortuous path to renaissance and transformation is informed by an understanding that power politics and the primacy of national interest leave little or no room for an external party to facilitate development in African countries. Indeed, since their countries gained political independence, African leaders, in spite of their failures, have made spirited efforts to devise home-grown development strategies geared toward the transformation of the continent.

According to Adedeji,¹ these include:

- The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (1980-2000) and the Final Act of Lagos;
- Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (1986-1990) (APER), which was later converted to the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAARD) (1986);
- The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989); and
- The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF (1991).

To these we can add the Abuja Treaty of 1991, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) of 2001 and the nascent AU Agenda 2063. These

strategies recognise and emphasise the need for self-reliance, industrialisation, regional integration, and active involvement of the state in enhancing people's welfare and fostering participatory governance.

However, as Adedeji laments, 'every attempt that has been made by Africans to forge their future and to craft their own indigenous development strategies and policies has been pooh-poohed by the international financial institutions (IFI) with the support, or at least, the connivance of the donor community'.² In the place of these endogenously crafted development strategies are exogenously designed ones, which according to Adedeji fall under the Development Merchant System (DMS). Under this framework, foreign-crafted economic reform policies have been turned into a new kind of special goods that are largely and quickly financed by the operations of the DMS, regardless of the negative impact of such policies on African economies and politics.

Beyond the fatalistic belief of African leaders in the rhetoric of global partnerships, the evidence of history shows us that contemporary neo-imperial powers and the institutions that they control have little or no incentive to help Africa develop. Adedeji captures the contradictions between the expectations of African leaders who seek partnership with Western countries and the realities of failure when he asserts that:

[t]here is always a child-like naivety among African leaders and policy makers that rhetoric and reality are the same and that claiming ownership [is] tantamount to having ownership. It is the Africans who are claiming that they are forging a partnership. The other side will no doubt continue to see it as a donor-recipient relationship.³

In recent years, particularly after the coming to power of Thabo Mbeki in South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Algeria, the call for a united and prosperous Africa has become more urgent. The first step these champions of African unity took was to revamp the institutional infrastructure of continental organisations to respond to pressing needs of the time. In this regard, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union (AU) and NEPAD was created. The purpose of these institutional changes was to harness Africa's resources and agency to facilitate much-needed development.

Despite the noble objective that informed these initiatives, their results in terms of transformation of the socioeconomic conditions of the continent have been limited. This is due to several factors, two of which are the dependence on foreign donors and on individual political actors. As Bach argues, a recent survey of Africa's regional organisations shows that their efficiency heavily depends on interpersonal relations between heads of state, who are prone to acting as individuals rather than as representatives

of a political system.⁴ Thus, when such Pan-Africanist leaders complete their terms, the momentum towards African unity and cooperation always appears to slacken.

The expectation that the success of NEPAD is contingent on access to external aid of US\$ 65 billion per annum has also been criticised as overly optimistic in the light of the prevarication of the so-called development partners to meet their commitment to assist the continent financially. Such dependence on external donors also informs the neo-liberal bent of some of the provisions of NEPAD.⁵

It should be noted that the African journey since the 1960s has been complex, varied and at times intriguing. It is complex because of the route thus far travelled, varied because of the contradictory directions African states have followed and intriguing thanks to the approaches some leaders have adopted to achieve the unity of which Nkrumah and his peers preached in 1963. Of particular concern to the current generation is the idea of maintaining African colonial boundaries during negotiations for the formation of the OAU. This singular policy direction, which balkanises African nations, has proven to be the nemesis of the drive for unity and progress on the continent.

Similarly, since 25 May 1963 when the OAU was launched, African political elites have been pursuing the dream of a united Africa. The journey towards a united Africa did not start at the conclusion of the past century; many have championed the united Africa spirit at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Books have been written, revolutions started and declarations made – but true unity has not been forged. In reality, fragmentation prevails.

This fragmentation emanates from a mismatch of ideas about the manner in which a united Africa should be brought into being. While some call for an immediate formation of a union government for Africa, others see a more urgent need to unite Africans at the grassroots and subregional level before a continental union is contemplated. The divergent viewpoints put forward by African leaders during the Accra summit of the AU in July 2007 are a clear indication that there is still a long way to go to achieve a united Africa. This is because unity on the continent is still very much a rhetorical exercise and Africa remains dominated by fragmented state entities established by colonial powers.⁶ In view of the salience of power that defines Africa's relations with other parts of the world, the unity of the continent remains a *sine qua non* for total liberation, autonomous development and renaissance. There is therefore an urgent need for agreement among African states on how to achieve continental unity.

In recent decades, African leaders have been preoccupied with trying to reclaim agency in providing solutions to African problems. This has been

a rocky road, involving positive declarations but little actual realisation of unity. The other trajectory retains the infamous 'divide and rule' imperial-colonial logic and continues to undermine African unity. How to realise unity and overcome fragmentation is the principal challenge to the 'African solutions to African problems' (ASAP) approach that all Pan-Africanists have been advocating. While some propose an immediate, pragmatic approach to unity, others argue for a more gradual, methodical approach. Neither of these narratives is externally narrated, nor indeed are they part of the ASAP philosophy. The questions remain: When will Africans stand together in advocating for unity? When will the continent address the fragmented narrative of African futures? When will Africa assert its agency?

As non-Africans observe, Africa is rising. But who in Africa is rising and how is the rising being measured? Does it include real development, reconstruction, employment of youth, eradication of poverty and a drastic reduction of inequality? The current 'Africa rising' narrative can easily return to a narrative of failure and despair. Let us take this positive narrative as a provocation to reaffirm and focus on why African unity should not be delayed. In a fragmented Africa this narrative will not do any good if it is not matched by credible initiatives to address poverty, inequality and unemployment.

ASAP require, first and foremost, that Africans must construct their own unity-for-renaissance narrative on the foundation that Africa has stood up for itself and is fully exercising its agency. Africa has held a series of Pan-African congresses; it founded the OAU in 1963 and the AU in 2002; it has experienced powerful and inspiring African liberation movements; and it has won many battles against imperialist powers.

However, full economic and political independence and freedom remain a difficult challenge. Since 1963 the need for African unity has been declared formally by meetings and protocols of heads of state and their ministers, but there has not been any systematic implementation towards this goal, not even in a few areas such as African trade and investment. Unification is an ongoing process. Substantive commitment requires that action be taken to implement the vision of unity. The people in Africa must be involved in creating African unity for renaissance. Both history and the African narrative are made by the people and the people of Africa alone.

The positive heritage of liberation struggles from every part of Africa urgently needs to be excavated, recorded, studied and resurrected in order to educate generations of Africans about the continent's history of finding solutions to its problems. The negative, destructive period of African history must be taught with a full appreciation of those positive examples of African liberation struggle and resistance so that the legacy of colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, neocolonialism and other kinds of oppression no longer

affects the way Africans think, work and see themselves in the world. They must overcome negative thinking to become fully African: proud, dignified, self-reliant, self-confident, free and united.

African futures are built with imagination and knowledge of the constructive liberation struggles, history and heritage by learning and overcoming the remaining risks and dangers from the legacy of colonialism, imperialism and apartheid. The future will be made by appreciating and learning from the liberation struggles about how Africans tried to come together when attacks were directed at them. Africa needs a new narrative that is anchored on Pan-African unity, dignity, self-reliance and independence, in order to learn and put structural transformation on an integrated African development agenda.

In addition, Africans should celebrate their similarity by appreciating whatever differences exist among them with trust and solidarity in order to mobilise diversity positively and construct enduring collaboration for African unity in order to build a greater future for all in Africa and even the rest of the world. Africa needs to build as its primary identity an African-ness that escapes being trapped by race, colour, language, tribe, ethnicity and religion, while being open and driven by the shared belief, culture, history, philosophy, values, principles, morality and civilisation in the form of a project identity anchored deeply with the three-in-one and the one-in-three African-centred thoughts: Ethiopianism, Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

In essence, African values, traditions and knowledge should be the foundation on which a united Africa should be anchored. African philosophies such as Ubuntu, *ujamaa*, *harambee* and *Maát* should be valorised. Moreover, Ubuntu and *Maát*, inherent in Africa's strong, richly philosophical values, can demonstrate a universal bond of caring and sharing. With these values, which should be used to connect not only Africans but all humanity, Africa could change the current unpredictable global order into a humane new world order. The Africa the imperialists rejected could be the cornerstone of a humane civilisation by removing the current global organised hypocrisy.

ASAP also needs to address the epistemological injustice that Africa has faced over the last 500 years and more. Knowledge and inventions from Africa have not been recognised and appreciated. We need the approach of ASAP to redress this epistemological injustice that imposes cognitive violence on Africa. There are many inventions that Africans have made, but this fact has been hidden from Africa and the world. It has not been recognised that science, mathematics, astronomy and engineering evolved in Africa. It is long overdue for us to bring out all the positive inventions made by Africans in order to promote positive cognition and practice.

Africa had a rich past before the Africans were dehumanised. It is high time that not just the destructive but the positive past is resurrected, for the sake of Africa and the rest of the world. The more Africans learn to unite, the greater the opportunity to create positive narratives about the continent's achievements and make constructive transformation a reality. In the realm of knowledge production, Africans should exercise epistemological disobedience to the hegemony of the West. The grand inspiration of creating African unity for Africans must incorporate the true inspiration of realising the future and moving forward and onward.

Pan-African unity will reposition Africa to compete with the rest of the world on equal terms. It will provide an opportunity for Africa to promote a civilisation that will help reconstruct a sustainable global order. The world is still in need of a new world order that is founded on new principles, values, philosophies and civilisation. An alternative to the current Western-dominated world order was suggested during the first stage of African independence, but the actual establishment of equitable arrangements never materialised. The quest for African unity could also go hand in hand with the objective of creating a new world order, in which all have a voice and no one gets hurt. The current dysfunctional world order needs Africa, African philosophies and values to save it.

The role of intellectuals and civil society in contributing to the debate on the best strategy to self-rediscovery, transformation and development on the continent cannot be overemphasised. One of the ways through which this is done is organising conferences. It is in recognition of the contributions of the intelligentsia to finding African solutions to African development that the Africa Institute of South Africa has been organising the African Unity for Renaissance Conference since 2010. Chapters in this volume were presented at the fourth African Unity for Renaissance Conference in Gauteng, South Africa, May 2014. It was aptly themed 'African solutions for African problems'.

Contributors to this volume address the myriad challenges which the continent faces. The volume opens with the chapter, by Chris Landsberg, which focuses on African renaissance as an ideological force that is underpinned by the reassertion of pan-African agency. The author places these two concepts in their historical, theoretical and policy positions within the continuum of the search for Africa's solution to African problems. Landsberg argues that whereas classic Pan-Africanism focused on the quest for the political emancipation of colonised and dominated peoples of Africa and African descent, African renaissance is concerned with restoring African agency in world affairs, achieving the socio-economic emancipation of African states, and placing squarely on the agenda the question of integration in Africa. With the African renaissance notion, the former President of

South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and his partners prioritised the need for Africa to take ownership of its peace and security, governance, co-operation, and development agendas.

The author also opines that African renaissance can be described as a pan-African foreign policy doctrine, one which speaks to politics, economics, culture, power and influence, as well as African identity. It is an attempt to give Africa agency and voice, both continentally and abroad. As an indigenously owned narrative, African renaissance seeks to empower Africa with its own narrative for political, economic, social and indeed psychological emancipation and advancement. A crucial aspect of African renaissance, which the author alluded to, was the imperative of challenging the fallacy of racism and negating the illogic of its stereotyped belief that Africans cannot govern themselves. In this regard, Landsberg argues that the African Renaissance, as a variant of Pan-Africanism, sets out to challenge white supremacy and restore the dignity of African peoples in the world. With the Renaissance doctrine, Mbeki challenged arrogant white superiority complexes. Given the local and global realities of arrogant display of racist predispositions of the Europeans against Africans, the realisation of African Renaissance remains a compelling force that Africans must pursue at the intellectual, policy, economic and political levels.

Second is a chapter by Samuel Oloruntoba and Vusi Gumede, examining the role regional hegemony in the search for developmental integration in Africa. They argue that although post-independence political elites in Africa have championed the idea of regional integration and continental unity as complementary strategies toward achieving development, several factors (domestic and international) have limited the realisation of these objectives. Despite this, the authors argue that regional integration is fundamental to the realisation of development objectives on the continent. Given the lack of political will on the part of many political elites, who feel more comfortable at the national levels, the authors recommend that regional hegemony such as Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya should take the lead in fostering a more pragmatic approach to integration on the continent. As leaders in their respective sub-regions, Nigeria and South Africa have played active roles in restoring political stability in the neighbouring countries. The roles that they have played and the resources at their disposals generally predisposed them to carrying the burden of underwriting integration efforts. Regional integration is a very costly exercise. Consequently, the authors argue that the two countries should make conscious efforts to spearhead and finance the cost of integration just as Germany did in the process of integrating Europe.

Nkhensani Valoyi and Philipppian Taku's chapter on youth unemployment and social development discusses how Africa is reportedly the world's

youngest and poorest region, with most of its population below the age of 15 and living on less than US\$ 2 per day. It has been argued that most Africans have little or no skills and are largely excluded from the job market. This explains the continent's runaway unemployment rate, rampant violent crime and why it is a breeding ground for poverty.

Clearly, it is time for African leaders to start guiding the youth on issues of continental development and establishing a clear and sustainable mandate for improvement. This mandate will foster social cohesion and establish more inclusive and progressive social development. The authors suggest that an Afrocentric approach to the quality and quantity of education, and laws preventing early marriage and abuse of all kinds, are long overdue. They recommend the teaching of African values and the spirit of Ubuntu in fostering transformation and a communal lifestyle, instead of the current borrowed commercialisation and materialistic urban lifestyle, which is closely associated with the categorisation of the human race into classes.

Kimani S. K. Nehusi's chapter raises critical issues in the ongoing debate on the African Renaissance. Much of this discussion has taken place within the context, implied and stated, of the imperatives of African development and building Pan-Africanism as the way towards African unity and the African Renaissance. The chapter begins with the recognition that the new Africa implied in the discussion is not possible without the new African, who must both bring it about and inhabit it. The indispensable new African will not materialise from nowhere. While some attention has been given to the necessary systems of education and socialisation, as well as a desirable curriculum that will deliver the new Africa, there has not been much focus upon what kind of person this new African must be. Yet Africans have answered this question to a great extent through their concern with the ideal person and personality – from ancient to modern times. In fact, from the earliest times, Africa developed indigenous systems of socialisation and education to ensure the development of the ideal African. This discussion examines how the person and personality were constructed in Kemet (ancient Egypt), one of the earliest African societies on record, the most influential society in the ancient world and one of the most influential in the modern world. It also outlines some continuity with living Africa. It raises important questions about the new African, who is indispensable to the present and the future and is clearly implied by the idea of the African Renaissance.

The next set of chapters deal with conflict management in the light of ASAP. The chapter by Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya and Osinimu Femi-Adedayo discusses the imperative of the AU's intervention in the crisis of democratic institutionalisation in Egypt. Using secondary data sources in its analysis and interpretation of the current situation in Egypt, it argues that increasing

levels of violence indicate that governance by force and with the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood will escalate the crisis and pose a risk to the stability of the region. The chapter calls on the AU to provide strategic leadership in resolving the crisis. The chapter suggests that in doing this, the AU should ensure that the process is founded on unambiguous, predictable conditions and strong institutions that are supported by popular participation.

Similarly, Bolaji Omitola's chapter argues that the increasing militarisation of African states by the West under the guise of fighting terror wars has further undermined Africa's march to more stable democratic governance. This development is, however, not unconnected with the deployment of state-centric measures (especially physical security) that not only disregard basic rights, but neglect the vital issue of human security, defined as the socioeconomic and welfare needs of the people on the continent. Thus, as a means of distancing Africa from fighting the proxy wars of the West against international terrorism, as well as addressing the root cause of current insurgency, there is an urgent need for fashioning a homegrown security policy.

Taking Nigeria as a reference point, the chapter assesses the participation of ordinary people in the activities of vigilante groups and former militia groups in the war against terror. The chapter argues that these groups are becoming more relevant as they make up for a noticeable government deficit in providing security in the country. The chapter concludes that while it is possible for such groups to be susceptible to exploitation by the powerful to promote personal and selfish agendas, a bulwark can be created through supervision by a non-partisan body comprising government agencies and other stakeholders within the community. Such supervision will be purely for coordination, regulation and control purposes, and must not lead to assimilation into the orthodox security system, which could employ their services for sectarian ends.

Narrowing the debate further, William Mpofu's chapter highlights the ways in which types of violence are portrayed, described, explained and rationalised. The main concern is the Gukurahundi genocide that occurred in Zimbabwe. The chapter underscores why the forgetfulness and silence regarding this genocide cannot be ignored.

Douglas Munemo argues in the next chapter that there was wide expectation that solutions would be found to a host of problems afflicting Africa and retarding its development, including conflict, poverty, corruption, lack of democracy and ethnicity as colonialism draws to an end. Many outsiders have prescribed solutions to these problems, but little success has been seen, leading to the thinking that perhaps the best solutions to African problems could be found in Africa.

Despite the rise of the ASAP paradigm, conflict in Africa has remained resistant to resolution. The chapter, premised on Anibal Quijano's concept

of coloniality, argues that obstacles to ASAP within the realm of conflict are primarily located in coloniality – the continuation of forms of domination that define power, economy, identity, being and knowledge that linger long after the end of formal colonial administration. The chapter calls for the adoption of African solutions premised on decoloniality as the answer to conflict-related African problems.

Morgan Ndlovu's chapter analyses the question of whether the non-Western subject can innovate or invent anything new in the age of Western-centred modernity. This is an important issue to the discourse on ASAP because the advent of Western-centred modernity between the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century brought about a condition of coloniality that constrains rather than enables the indigenous peoples of the non-Western world to imagine another world outside of that constructed by the Western subject. The chapter contains a decolonial critique of the predicament of the African subject within the spatio-historical temporality of Western-centred modernity, whose 'darker side' of coloniality has condemned the peoples of the non-Western world to the realm of the subhuman and non-human. The chapter argues that the idea of African solutions to problems faced by the peoples of Africa cannot succeed without an understanding of how the presence of the so-called 'modern world system' (which through different forms of colonial situation brought about many of the problems Africa faces today) curbs the release of an 'African Genius'.

John W. Forje's chapter discusses what the most dramatic developments in the twenty-first century are. It is the entry of African women into economic and political spheres previously occupied almost exclusively by men. Although African women are making progress in eliminating gender disparities, they still lag behind men in the workplace, in the halls of government and in the corridors of power. African women were at the forefront of liberation struggles, but after the attainment of independence they fell by the wayside due to cultural taboos and male chauvinism. We cannot talk of ASAP when more than 50 per cent of the female gender are excluded from policy formulation and decision-making processes. Gender inequality, the chapter argues, is a notable feature of all nations of the world, but it is more pronounced in Africa.

Forje argues that in order to achieve a more balanced Africa, the male-dominated continent must remove disincentives and expand opportunities for women to work and be in positions of decision making. The chapter does not advocate a women-only solution, but suggests the Ubuntu spirit of sharing; that gender balance is a silver bullet for achieving sustained growth and stability, as well as improving the livelihood of people.

Nicasius Achu Check argues in his chapter that development economists have yet to come up with a workable and sustainable economic model for

the African continent. The failure of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the subsequent neo-liberal orthodoxy have not alleviated the plight of people on the continent. To compound matters, African-inspired models, such as the African communitarian approach preached by Kwame Nkrumah, *ujamaa* and villagisation in Tanzania or *harambe* in Kenya, equally have not achieved the desired results of taking Africa to the next level of economic development. The chapter examines the reasons why these models failed, with particular emphasis on obstacles to development in the Central African subregion. It is argued that the various economic models that have been contemplated on the continent since independence have been generated from elsewhere in the world, putting into question the legitimacy and ownership principle.

Samuel O. Oloruntoba, Tendayi Stihole and Akhona Nkenkana's chapter discusses the place of Africa within the context of the global politics of knowledge production. The authors argue that the configuration of the global (the Euro-North American hegemon) is the presence that makes Africa absent, and the more Africa affirms its presence, the more the global makes Africa absent. The global politics of knowledge production creates a problematical situation in which African subjectivity is excluded from the realm of knowledge production and what is considered an African development trajectory remains an oxymoron, insofar as it is something that is determined outside Africa.

This is fundamental, because Africa's 'lack of place' needs to be diagnosed in relation to epistemic violence and the lack of development as processes of subjugation. There cannot be genuine African knowledge production and African development if Africa is at the receiving end of subjugation and, in part, when African subjects are not at the forefront of the decolonial project. Epistemic violence and the lack of development have made African subjects placeless in comparison with their counterparts in other parts of the world. This is true in the realm of knowledge production and development, and when they assert agency in response they are disciplined to follow the dictates of the Euro-North America hegemon. Epistemic disobedience will be deployed as the imperative for an epistemic revolt against this hegemony, in order to chart a way forward for decolonial horizons and futures.

John Trimble's chapter on a Pan-African approach to science, technology and empowerment argues that science and technology must be used to advance the theory and practice of transforming society into a more democratic, egalitarian and humanistic reality. The chapter is particularly concerned with how science and technology can be used to advance the thinking and strategy of the Pan-African movement. The theoretical tools used are historical materialism and categorial conversion.

Policy, at a state and international level, is established to support those in control of the state and international organisations. Currently, under capitalism, a small minority controls the state, its economic apparatus and all related institutions. The application of historical materialism and categorical conversion to socioeconomic reality provides a roadmap for action to attack this power imbalance and redress capitalist inequality in a revolutionary fashion. This plan includes confronting finance capital, controlling African resources and eliminating colonial borders. The milieu recommended for addressing this activism is African Liberation Day and the university campus. The chapter recognises the importance of promoting the study of appropriate technology across the university. These technology studies should be directed to empower the most disadvantaged in order to foster democracy and humanism, and the chapter focuses accordingly on the potential of e-governance.

Boru Shana Gufu's chapter examines the current factors increasing the vulnerability and challenging the resilience of the Borana pastoral system. Employing qualitative and quantitative methods (observation, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, case studies and household surveys), the chapter interprets empirical results using a sustainable livelihood framework. The chapter details how the Borana pastoral system is becoming more vulnerable due to an interplay of social and ecological factors, including unsuitable governance, weakening of customary institutions, changes in drought patterns, expansion of noxious bushes, outbreaks of disease, market risk and population pressure. Socio-political factors are the major cause of this increasing vulnerability.

The chapter explains how resource poverty is increasing as pastoralists' access and control are limited through disenfranchisement, and trade-offs are becoming impossible. It is argued that the main causes of reduced resilience are institutional failure, the power dynamics involved in mediating access to resources, capacity deficiency, lack of willingness, and an absence of a common domain for collective influence. Resilience is further weakened by declining livestock holding and an inability to diversify livelihoods and invest in positive livelihood strategies. It is noted that the Borana social structure is marked by a dismissal of old sources of novelty and a lack of creativity. The chapter concludes that external sources of innovation are shock-focused rather than concerned with devising new tactics to adapt to long-term stresses.

Eric Blanco Niyitunga's chapter emphasises that scholars of international mediation continue to ponder why Burundi relapsed into political unrest after the African Union (AU) brokered Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) in 2000. He notes that more widely, from Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia and Libya, through to Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the

Congo in central Africa and Zimbabwe and Madagascar in southern Africa, it would appear that neither AU peacekeeping missions nor AU-negotiated peace agreements have succeeded in clearing pathways to democratic governance and sustainable peace.

The chapter contends that the AU's peace settlement for Burundi in 2000 is acknowledged as a case that dealt with the conflict in an African way. The Burundi settlement, he notes in this instance African mediators offered an African solution to an African problem. The chapter opines that the recurrence of political violence in Burundi, triggered by President Pierre Nkurunziza's bid for a third term in power and the way the AU is currently handling the crisis, is evidence that the AU mediated a 'peace postponed' rather than durable peace.

In the last chapter Ferdinand Ottoh notes that African leaders are beginning to rekindle the old spirit of Pan-Africanism which opposes colonialism, imperialism, racism and exploitation. The chapter contends that leaders are no longer comfortable with the overbearing influence of Western powers in their internal affairs. This re-awakening consciousness among African leaders is a demonstration that Africa has come of age and thus that it should be able to solve its own problem without relying on Western powers. However, the paradox of Africa as a continent strategically located on the globe with abundant natural resources is that it lacks capacity to manage these resources. In the words of Ali Mazrui, 'Physically, Africa is the most central of continents in geographical location, but politically and militarily it is probably the most marginal. The chapter concludes that the decolonisation lay in Africa's ambition to be its own policeman. The chapter notes that in conceptualising Pax Africana, 'it is not enough that Africa should have a capacity to police itself; it is also vital that Africa should contribute effectively towards policing the rest of the world'.

The ASAP mantra can be traced to the Pan-African ideals of self-worth, self-reliance, independence and African ingenuity and creative imagination. Its most recent expression has been in relation to conflict management and the security issues besieging the continent. The notion cannot be said to have been clearly defined and its implementation has been anything but consistent. While the West was invoking this approach in the case of the genocide in Rwanda and Darfur, there was hardly any reference to it when it came to dealing with regime change in Libya or the problems in Cote d'Ivoire and Mali. While committing itself to the idea and trying to appropriate it using institutional mechanisms such as the Peace and Security Council and the African Stand-by Force of the AU, Africa failed dismally to utilise the approach to address the Libyan situation.

Nevertheless, on the whole, African problems remain Africa's. Solutions to these problems should therefore be found in Africa's resilience to

challenges and adversity. While the notion of ASAP is indeed a major change in policy orientation, it still lacks a clear methodology to operationalise it. This is manifested in the manner in which Africa is accommodated within the globalisation debate. The recent BREXIT vote therefore calls for new ways in which Africa can effectively engage with other parts of the globe. This is the spirit which the African Renaissance series of conferences intends to take forward – understanding that Africa's problems need African approaches to resolving them.

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The African Renaissance as Pan-African Agency

Some Conceptual Implications of an African Solutions Doctrine

Chris Landsberg

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the view held by some ‘intellectuals’ that policy analysis is a technicist endeavour, earmarked for those technocrats concerned just with the implementation of decisions by elites who hold formal political office, it is a powerful arena for the exercise of agency or influence in politics and other spheres.

Policymaking is an avowedly political process, and has at its heart the contestation of ideas over the handling of power and resources in society and world affairs. It is about how power is managed, distributed and appropriated. It is about who gets what, when and how. The notion of an African Renaissance in Africa was given currency in the mid-1990s and it has been analysed mainly from the point of view of an attempt at intellectualisation by South Africa’s former president, Thabo Mbeki. It has not yet been analysed from the perspective of policy discourse and agency, and the conceptual and theoretical implications of the idea for African agency and positioning have yet to be teased out.

The influential idea of an African Renaissance during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became centrally associated with Thabo Mbeki. Some six years after Mbeki was recalled by the African National Congress-led government, the new ruling elite in Pretoria-Tshwane under the leadership of Mbeki’s erstwhile friend-turned-foe, Jacob Zuma, tried to distance themselves from this idea. But no sooner had the African National Congress (ANC) done this than the twentieth Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 2012, deemed it necessary to re-embrace the concept. It urged the African Union Commission (AUC) to expedite preparations to celebrate 2013 and 2014 as years commemorating Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance.

This was indeed a novel and long overdue idea, for it was the first time that at official continental level an explicit recognition was given to the continental importance of the idea, and that an explicit link was made between 'Pan-Africanism' and the 'African Renaissance'.

Francis Kornegay and I have likened the African Renaissance to a twenty-first century variant of Pan-Africanism.¹ Whereas classic Pan-Africanism focused on the quest for the political emancipation of colonised and dominated peoples of Africa and African descent, the new variant is concerned with restoring African agency in world affairs, achieving the socio-economic emancipation of African states, and placing squarely on the agenda the question of integration in Africa. With the African Renaissance notion, Mbeki and his partners prioritised the need for Africa to take ownership of its peace and security, governance, cooperation, and of course development agendas.

In South Africa, there had been ambivalence for a long time about the concept of Africanism, mainly on the part of Mbeki's detractors. The concept was closely associated with the former South African President, dating from when he was still Deputy President of the Republic. Precisely because it was steeped in policy currency and ideational power, those who tried to distance themselves from the idea of the African Renaissance found it difficult to do so. They felt very uncomfortable with the idea being so closely associated with Mbeki, but this did not make it easy to dispose of such an attractive construct.

It is important to recognise that for Mbeki it was not just an intellectual position but a powerful policy idea. It contained principles, priorities and views about what the continent needed to do to claim the twenty-first century as the African century, an aim Mbeki himself propagated. In this sense, the African Renaissance set out to bolster African agency in world affairs.

The African Renaissance can be described as a Pan-African foreign policy doctrine, one which speaks to politics, economics, culture, power and influence, as well as African identity. It is an attempt to give Africa agency and voice, both continentally and abroad. It seeks to empower Africa with its own narrative for political, economic, social and indeed psychological emancipation and advancement. It has come to be regarded as an emerging foreign policy doctrine, and is considered as an article of faith, like a belief or a creed. It combines a view and philosophy of Africa with a set of foreign policy goals and domestic styles of politics. It can be regarded, furthermore, as a late twentieth-century variant of Pan-Africanism that seeks to confront the challenges of globalisation in a Western-dominated international order.²

Therefore, as a foreign policy strategy, the concept and the process of African renaissance cannot be reduced into an 'either/or' discussion: it is a multiplicitous construct. Certainly for Mbeki, the African Renaissance was a

conceptual tool for the political, economic, social, cultural and educational analysis of the African continent. It sought to move beyond academic discussion and bring about a renaissance in all those spheres.

To be sure, Mbeki did not invent the concept of 'African renewal' or 'renaissance'. But it did take time for him to develop it into a policy concept that could influence African politics and help to set the continental agenda. The concept has a long history and has varied in form at different historical stages. At a conference of African leaders and foreign businessmen held in Uganda on trade and investment in Africa, considerable time was spent deliberating on the notion of the African Renaissance. The late Mangaliso Sobukwe once said to a graduating class at the University of Fort Hare: 'Let me plead with you, lovers of my Africa, to carry with you into the world, an African reborn, an Africa rejuvenated, an Africa recreated, young Africa. We are the first glimmers of a new dawn'.³ President Mbeki too spoke of 'a reawakening', 'rebirth', 'restoration', 'revival' and 'reappearance' in Africa.⁴ So, the idea is not just the ANC's. African nationalists from other parties and political persuasions have also contributed to its development.

The central idea of African renewal can be identified in the writings of other prominent African leaders of the time. These include Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Steve Biko. As an emerging foreign policy doctrine, the African Renaissance seemed set to reach the same lofty heights as the Nkrumah-esque Pan-Africanism. The primary focus of African rejuvenation in the past was on decolonisation, ending apartheid and racism, and promoting the grand and overly ambitious idea of creating a 'United States of Africa'. The present-day variant is much less ambitious, more realistic and practical, as it seeks to help crafting a community of African states that would act according to the contours of a Union, sharing common values, systems and institutions.

This more recent version also seeks to facilitate Africa's reintegration in the Western-dominated global economy and promote 'good governance' and democratisation.⁵ However, it wishes to do these things on the basis of African agency and African ownership, not the prescripts of foreign dictates. One of the mantras guiding it is 'African solutions to African problems'.

Hence, the question that confronts us is: What does the African Renaissance mean today? We would suggest that a more appropriate question to pose is: Where the renaissance has begun, what is needed to sustain it, and where it has not, what is needed to bring it about? These questions should include the investigation of factors and conditions that can enhance, or derail, the progress of the renaissance. As for the foreign policy dimensions, the following two questions seem very central: What kind of partnership between Africa and the West can advance or reverse the renaissance? How can financial assistance be utilised to advance the renaissance?

THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

On the one hand, the African Renaissance corresponds greatly with Pan-Africanism of decades gone by, from which it borrows heavily and with which it identifies closely. On the other, it departs from Pan-Africanism, at times radically so.

Just like the African Renaissance, Pan-Africanism was a much debated ideal espoused by many African intellectuals, Africanists and blacks in the Western world from around the turn of the twentieth century. It was very much in vogue until about the mid-1960s when most African states gained their independence. Pan-Africanism helped to spur on many nationalists who fought for the independence of their respective countries. It was concerned with the well-being of black people in particular and oppressed people in general. Pan-Africanists propagated the ideal of all African states amalgamating into one unified African grand power. They believed that there existed enough commonality on political, economic and cultural fronts for Africans to realise this goal.

However, reality was starker than these ideals had suggested. There were rivalries, and political, social and cultural differences, that frustrated and ultimately derailed progress towards the 'United States of Africa'.⁶ In Africa there were too many states and factors that complicated Pan-Africanism. In the end, Pan-Africanists had to settle for little more than a weak confederation of sovereign, post-colonial states. The state became a prized possession, which African leaders would not easily give up, having won it after such a long struggle and at such a heavy cost of life.

Thus, Pan-Africanism had a mix impact. It was successful in affirming African independence from foreign rule, but was soon hampered by various factors, including neocolonialism, corruption, civil wars and the Cold War context, which contributed significantly to the militarisation of Africa. The result was underdevelopment and numerous *coups d'état* – in short, a lack of democracy.

Although Pan-Africanism attracts little attention today and even seems moribund, the African Renaissance has emerged to fill the void and is even making a comeback. It is not as grandiose in its intent. Instead of promoting the bold idea of a United States of Africa, it seeks to respond to the structural changes in the international system and the renewed wave of democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s.

Several of these transitions led to optimism and laid the foundation for the rallying cry of the African Renaissance. The last colony in Africa, South Africa, was freed and became a democracy. Its relatively high economic level of development and its revival of a civil society ethos gave hope for other democracies. The end of the Cold War precipitated the emergence

of an economic preoccupation rather than an obsessive military agenda in Africa. Africans would now be able to seek economic development free of the influence of Cold War dynamics. These were the changed conditions under which the new phase of the African Renaissance came to be defined by the late 1990s.

Taken at face value, the African Renaissance is a process directed towards achieving various strategic goals, including political, economic, social and cultural ones. A deeper consideration shows that it takes seriously a number of important policy initiatives for Africa: consolidation and deepening of democracy; peace, stability and order; economic vitality; education; and the self-assertion of Africans defined in terms of cultural, traditional, spiritual, linguistic, philosophical and other inclinations. In short, it is the quest not for a 'United States of Africa' but a stable, democratic and prosperous Africa, and for a Union of African States (UAS) in which African states live by a common set of norms, values, rules and institutions.

As a result of the contemporary global economic dominance, the current phase of the African Renaissance is contextualised in terms of economic success. It reflects a vision of extricating Africa from the margins and placing it in the mainstream of the world economy and development. Various views are advanced in this chapter with regard to the attainment of this goal. Let us examine one – the value system for the nation.

In an article published in *Business Day*, the Chief Executive for the Council of South African Banks (COSAB), Bob Tucker, makes strong argument for the 'rebuilding' of a national value system. The article's subtitle reads, 'South Africa's primary challenge is one of rebuilding the value system of the nation'.⁷ He sums up his argument as follows:

Well-developed institutional fabric is, itself, merely the manifestation of a value system and horizontal relationships within the community. Trust, respect, and cooperation within a community result in societal structures which facilitate economic activity and good government and 'empower' the individual.⁸

While this is an important observation, Tucker fails to identify the necessary value system. However, if the process involves 'rebuilding it', this can only mean involving the values of Ubuntu or a large measure of them. Ubuntu is a normative value shared by the majority of South Africans. Given that workers spend the largest percentage of their time at the workplace, it becomes imperative that Ubuntu be practised in this environment. The idea is that Africa should replace the culture of aggression that was so common during the apartheid and colonial eras with a new culture of cooperation

and neighbourliness. The challenge is for Africa to avoid war and conflict in addressing its problems.

It is important that the process of social and economic development not alienate workers, as this is not conducive to smooth industrial operations and economic productivity. The division between 'us and them' in the workplace must be avoided. While Ubuntu is not necessarily a panacea to the economic problems facing South Africa, it is worth a try. Ubuntu may mark a departure in our industrial relations from the current confrontational approach to a more cooperative and competitive one of managing survival issues.

Without suggesting that conflict will disappear, this is a new way of creating a creative dialogue aimed at finding joint solutions. Arguing for Ubuntu within the industrial environment, Boon suggests, 'We should be allies in the fight for wealth creation and happiness'.⁹ For Mbeki, Africa had to build solidarity and unity, starting with cooperative and efficient strategies to foster teamwork in organisations.¹⁰ We have to work at constructing a new identity as a continent, a new identity which will transcend the ethnic divisions that haunt us.

The underlying factor here is that both the economy and democracy stand to flourish if the majority of South Africans, and the rest of Africa, feel that they are part of and actually identify with the institutions and activities of their society. Hence the argument that the renaissance involves the reassertion and reassumption of an African ethos and its cultures and traditions. This is basically a reference to the African way of life, but it has been interpreted quite uncritically as a conservative move and inherently retrogressive. It has been contrasted with some of the high government officials' pronouncements on the renaissance that focus on economic growth. However, there is no dichotomy between the two: these dimensions are mutual and complementary.

The main point here is that the means for economic growth will have traction only if they take into account the participation and contribution of the larger section of the population. Also, democratic consolidation will bear fruit if it enjoys the participation of society at large. These two processes need to be made compatible with people's lives. Thus, the process of 'going back' to an African ethos becomes important as it helps to create a common identity and foster collective action for a common purpose.

One of those common purposes is economic growth and prosperity. As such, there is no contradiction between a focus on a revival of African values and one on economic growth. That being said, economic growth has the potential danger of laying strong emphasis on 'foreign investment' and thus subconsciously creating a dependency mentality in African societies – the belief that someone from the outside will come and develop their country.

THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE ACCORDING TO PRINCE MBEKI

International affairs had long been a special concern of Thabo Mbeki. He had been instrumental in international affairs work for the ANC at least since 1971. In fact, between 1971 and the early 1990s he served as the then ANC president Oliver Tambo's foreign policy adviser. During this time, he was in charge of efforts to raise the ANC's profile and standing in Africa and abroad. It often took him to road shows throughout the world, and he was a chief protagonist of the ANC's efforts to ostracise the apartheid state during the anti-apartheid years. He almost single-handedly masterminded an alternative foreign policy for South Africa's government in waiting.

Mbeki placed a stress on non-alignment, solidarity, African unity, self-determination, genuine partnership, and the idea of 'African solutions for African problems'.¹¹ One of his toughest tasks was to sell the ANC to the Western powers at a time when many such powers regarded it as little more than 'a terrorist organisation'. During this time, he visited Moscow, 'Third World' capitalists, the Nordic countries, centres of Western political power, and of course African countries.¹² When the ANC was flirting with the negotiated option in the late 1980s, Mbeki was the mediator between the ANC, Organisation of African Union (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 'united nations' were his oyster, as it were.

As early as 1978 Mbeki spoke of 'The African Claims', that is, the African version of the Atlantic Charter, explaining it as an African version of international peace and order.¹³ He spent considerable time trying to give meaning to concepts like 'nation' and 'African'.¹⁴ In his statement on behalf of the ANC on the occasion of the adoption by the Constitutional Assembly in May 1996, Mbeki rendered his now famous 'I am an African' speech, saying 'I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever changing seasons that define the face of our native land'.¹⁵

Alluding to George Orwell, in this speech Mbeki recounted how '[a]t times I wondered whether I should concede equal citizenship of our country to the leopard and the lion, the elephant and the springbok, the hyena, the black mamba and the pestilential mosquito'. This was a clear reference to South Africa's deep racial divisions and diversity.¹⁶ He went on to say, 'I know that none dare challenge me when I say: I am an African!'.¹⁷

Mbeki busied himself with what many regard as his 'Africanist project'.¹⁸ He believes in 'concrete expression to the sentiment we share as Africans and will defend to the death, that people shall govern'. He was a strong proponent of 'the situation in which all our people shall be free from fear, including the fear of the oppression of one national group by another, the

fear of the disempowerment of one social echelon by another, the fear of the use of state power, to deny anybody their fundamental human rights, and the fear of tyranny'.¹⁹ He thus clearly expressed the politics of democratisation through African Renaissance discourse.

He sought to assert both a South African identity and his own continental heritage when he said:

I am born of the people of the continent of Africa. The pain of the violent conflict that the people of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria experience is a pain I also bear. The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my continent is a *plight* that we share.²⁰

This was a clear attempt by powerful South Africa to grapple with its identity crisis in relation to similar experiences of other African states. In 1995, for example, Mbeki urged that South Africa 'should place itself within the context of the Southern African region and define its place on the continent of Africa and the world'. During his presidential inauguration speech on 16 June 1999, he was even more emphatic about South Africa's African identity when he vowed that '[i]t is no longer possible to falsely define South Africa as a European outpost in Africa'.²¹ He firmly regarded the Republic as 'an African nation in the complex process simultaneously of formation and renewal'.²²

Instead of being paternalistic about South Africa's purported 'miracle', Mbeki also wanted Africa to share in the happiness of 'South Africa's Renaissance'. In May 1995 he said that 'our country is going through a revolution. It is experiencing a national renaissance'.²³ He went on to say that:

[w]e have the noble responsibility to defend the unity and integrity of the new South African state. We must encourage the vibrancy of its democracy. It should be a democracy where neither race, ethnicity, gender, religion nor creed, performs any discriminatory role in the individual or collection pursuit of human fulfillment.²⁴

In his attempts to highlight the good that could come out of Africa, Mbeki celebrates the ability of Africans to rise above complex problems. In 1995 he posed this question:

Were we not, as Africans, the ones who had caused humankind to triumph when we defeated the system of apartheid, despite all that had been said and predicted: that we would need a divine and miraculous intervention to defeat so vicious and powerful a conspiracy?²⁵

He answered the question by deploring the fact that 'our continent is and has been victim to a litany of human catastrophes which have included bad governance, war and violent strife, the absence of development, and hunger on an enormous scale'.²⁶ With this reference, Mbeki points out that the causes of Africa's ills lie not only with foreign and colonial powers but with Africans themselves.

From a policy point of view, Mbeki was not shy to put the question of democracy, democratisation and 'good' governance and human rights on the agenda in Africa. He reminded Africa's political elites that:

The millions of Africans throughout our continent continued to dream of peace and stability, of democracy, of respect for human rights, of freedom from hunger and ignorance, of a future when the continent would no longer be the object of humanitarian assistance and the charitable attention of the rest of the world.²⁷

Peaceful resolutions to conflicts and war were a central tenet of South Africa's foreign policy. Mbeki rejected war as a means to resolve issues. He never shut the door on dialogue, nor did he avoid speaking truth to power. Mbeki encouraged 'peaceful negotiations as regards political and social conflicts in the Southern African region'.²⁸ If the renaissance is to succeed, then 'the region needs a radical expansion of the frontiers of democratic participation if it is to tap the initiative and intellect of its citizens, limit any tendency towards arbitrary rule and accelerate the integration of their regional economy into the economy of the world'.²⁹

South-South cooperation and the reconfiguration of relations between developing countries featured as a key element of Mbeki's Renaissance project. Africa had to learn to relate to countries from the South. Mbeki was of the opinion that 'South Africa possess some advantages which can make it act as a bridgehead of development in the region'. He viewed the country as 'a bridge in South-South trade and general socio-economic interaction'. He saw the South as providing the possibility of bringing together, in a mutually beneficial way, the aspirations of the developing world (especially southern Africa) and technological developed economies of the world.

Mbeki believed that southern Africa, 'for many years affected by years of liberation, civil wars and campaign of aggression and destabilisation by apartheid South Africa', should 'move towards establishing peace for itself'.³⁰ The African Renaissance was not antithetical to democracy and democratisation. For example, Mbeki said the southern African region should transform 'itself into a zone of peace, building stable democratic systems, positioning itself productively to exploit its considerable human

and natural resources, and organising itself to make a contribution to the challenge of peace, democracy, development and stability in the rest of our continent'.³¹

Contrary to the views that Mbeki was an 'AIDS denialist', he had placed the challenge of trying to combat HIV and AIDS firmly on the agenda. He said that:

Studies in a number of African countries suggest that, at current rates of infection, AIDS will be one of the major impediments to sustained growth and prosperity. The scale of our problem is only just becoming known and requires serious attention and action.³²

The simple point he was making was that, where poverty thrived, so would pandemics like HIV and AIDS. Mbeki did not openly support Nkrumah's 'high command' and 'United States of Africa (USAf)'. Instead, he believed in Julius Nyerere's 'step-by-step', incremental, 'brick-by-brick' approach to regional integration. He believed in a 'community of states' approach. During his presidency he said his government was committed to the strengthening of the Southern African Customs Unions (SACU) and SADC.

With his African Renaissance philosophy, Mbeki had a constant quibble with white supremacists and Afro-skeptics and racists. He held that Afro-pessimism is pejorative and smacks of a racist misconception of the continent. He denounced it as an attitude of saying, 'After all, look at the rest of Africa', the kind of outlook of those who subscribe to the theory of 'the white man's burden'.³³ He hoped that the 'political, constitutional, economic and social success we achieve will help to push back the negative assumptions that some make about the African continent'.³⁴ As early as 1995 Mbeki said he wanted South Africa to contribute 'to ending what has been described as "afro-pessimism", according to which the larger part of the continent is seen as an area afflicted by endemic conflict, permanent underdevelopment and military rule'.³⁵

The African Renaissance, as a variant of Pan-Africanism, set out to challenge white supremacy and restore the dignity of African peoples in the world. With the Renaissance doctrine, Mbeki vehemently challenged arrogant white superiority complexes. He challenged the racist mindsets of white South Africans who have 'proclaimed that the colour of our skins, the shape of our noses, the thickness of our lips and the texture of our hair bespoke an animal form which they judged was not yet, not quite, not theologically human'. He argued that it is imperative that whites turn their backs 'on racism and racial domination'. He challenged the mindset of those who believed 'that it cannot be that a majority black government can properly manage an economy as sophisticated as ours'.

An aspect of Mbeki's worldview involved constantly proving white detractors and racists, who believe Africans and blacks are inherently incompetent, wrong. He was determined to prove to them that Africans can also be great, convinced that 'Africa needs a stable and prosperous South Africa'. He said that:

All of us in this region must work towards greater regional cooperation, towards our economic integration. This we must do in a manner that will contribute to balanced regional development in the interest of all our countries, including South Africa itself.³⁶

Mbeki was keen on promoting 'business opportunities for trade and investment that the challenges of reconstruction and development in South and Southern Africa afford the enterprising and farsighted business person'.³⁷ He viewed the region as 'a market of at least 100 million people', and the policy idea of a regional markets for trade and economic interactions figured large in his analysis.³⁸ As President he also punted the idea of 'African renewal' as a strategy that should focus on improving 'intercontinental communication'.³⁹ He said the G-7 members and other developed countries 'cannot ignore the position, the needs and role of the developing world'.⁴⁰

Mbeki worked to bring the developing world 'in a practical way' 'into the global debate on the information society'.⁴¹ He stated that '[r]egional integration [...] must also encompass the area of information and communication'.⁴² Indeed, Africa could not hope to 'claim the 21st Century' as the 'African century' without working on ways to exploit the information technology revolution. Here, the idea came to the fore that the African Renaissance entails modernisation: in essence, it was a modernising strategy for Africa.⁴³

In April 1997, during his celebrated address, 'Africa's time has come', delivered to the Corporate Council on Africa in the US, Mbeki started explicitly to promote the idea of an African Renaissance.⁴⁴ He began by denouncing Afro-pessimists: '[O]utside our continent, the perception persists that Africa remains, as of old, torn by interminable conflict, unable to solve its problems, condemned to the netherworld'.⁴⁵ He went on to challenge Afro-pessimists directly:

Those who have eyes to see, let them see. The African Renaissance is upon us. As we peer through the looking glass darkly, this may not be obvious. But it is upon us.⁴⁶

For Mbeki, a new generation of African leaders, which Gilbert Khadiagala called 'the Renaissance' coalition, put in place a structure for cooperation, good governance, stability, development and peace and security.⁴⁷ They were

determined to take ownership for Africa's renewal and not allow outsiders to dictate to them what their plans had to be.

In terms of democratic governance, there were also clear policy contours. The African Renaissance as a policy project was not merely an old rendition of an outdated Pan-Africanism. It was infused with important notions of democratisation and democratic governance. In seeking to give democratic content to the renaissance he was witnessing, Mbeki was highly revisionist in his tone: 'What we have been talking about is the establishment of genuine and stable democracies in Africa, in which the systems of governance will flourish because they derive their authority and legitimacy from the will of the people.' He was also attempting to break with the African culture of brother-do-not-attack-brother when he said that in Africa 'the one-party states and the military governments will not work'.

In 1997 Mbeki introduced the idea of a particular kind of African society that should flourish throughout the continent. State-society relations featured prominently as a concern, as he wanted to see in Africa 'the centrality of the concept of a people-centred society'.⁴⁸ By that he meant 'the affirmation and entrenchment in our politics of the view that the purpose of politics and policy is the promotion of the genuine all-round interest of the people rather than the acquisition of power by the social elite'.⁴⁹ For Mbeki, democratisation in Africa is hence part of the Renaissance project, since it 'raises the question of accountable government and, therefore, the critical importance of the need to entrench democracy and human rights throughout our continent'.⁵⁰ He located the African Renaissance firmly in the context of 'South-South cooperation' that should become 'an article of faith'.

In 1998 Mbeki again emphasised the importance of African solutions for African problems when he spoke about the 'determined efforts' by Africans 'to take charge of our lives so that life for every citizen becomes better'.⁵¹ The first rebellion in Zaire was testimony for him of the drawing to a close of the era of neocolonialism. He said 'the departure from the African political stage of personalities such as General Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire symbolises the end of a dark era of neocolonialism in Africa'.⁵²

Mbeki was campaigning for 'a new indigenous and energised African movement for the liberation of the continent'.⁵³ He stressed the importance of a new wave of cooperation between African states: in the political sphere the African Renaissance is 'inspired both by our painful history of recent decades and the recognition of the fact that none of our countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest and that none of us can truly succeed if the rest fail'.⁵⁴

The African Renaissance doctrine was clear: Africa could not hope to make progress if it only relied on cooperation with and largesse from the outside world. Inter-African cooperation had to become *primus inter pares*.

One of the dominant themes of Mbeki's Renaissance renditions is his belief in the need to challenge the modern versions of Afro-pessimism which is current internationally; as such, he urges 'that we deal as decisively and as quickly as possible with the perception that, as a continent, we are condemned for ever to depend on the merciful charity which those who are kind are ready to put in our begging bowl'.⁵⁵

Mbeki is punting a renaissance that would alter old practices and ideologies in Africa. Africans, he said,

[We] must resist all tyranny, oppose all attempts to deny liberty by resorting to demagoguery, repulse the temptation to describe African life as the ability to live on charity, engage in the fight to secure the emancipation of the African women, and reassert the fundamental concept that we are our own liberators from oppression, from underdevelopment and poverty, from the perpetuation of an experience from slavery, to colonisation to apartheid, to dependence on alms.⁵⁶

WHAT DOES THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE MEAN TODAY?

After Mbeki's departure from office in September 2008, the ANC-led government of Jacob Zuma tried to distance themselves from many things associated with Mbeki, including the African Renaissance. In recent years, something of a bifurcated process has been seen to be playing out: while the ruling ANC has distanced itself from the concept because it was so closely related to Mbeki as an individual within the party, the AU and other continental actors have simultaneously been reclaiming the doctrine. This tendency has also revealed itself in Nigeria after the departure of former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The disturbing thing is that President Zuma and his coterie of ministers and officials distanced themselves from the idea for personal political reasons, most notably because of the in-fighting in the ANC that led to the battle of Polokwane as spearheaded by the 'coalition of the angry' and the consequent recall of Mbeki as president in September 2008. In fact, this personalisation of African politics is not unique to South Africa and is a phenomenon that has bedeviled many African states.

The AU has embraced the idea of the African Renaissance and linked it to its much-vaunted Agenda 2063. Even though Agenda 2063 is simply a vision statement, the fact that the AU saw it fit to embrace the concept suggests its continued currency. However, beyond South Africa, there is still a tendency to disown the African Renaissance discourse and all programmes associated with it, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and

the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This tendency to move away from African-crafted ideas and plans only serves to diminish Africa's already feeble continental agency in world affairs.

CONCLUSION

With the Renaissance project, Mbeki was interested in the politics of transformation at four levels: national, regional, continental and international. In all four instances the emphasis has been on restoring African ownership, agency and transformation of global power relations. International financial institutions had to be transformed, and the African Renaissance vision did not shy away from 'liberation of trade, the reform of financial, commodity and other markets, the functioning of multilateral institutions, developed to the developed world'.⁵⁷ Mbeki wanted these matters and policy concerns to be addressed 'in an atmosphere which recognises the legitimate interests of the poor'. He stated, for example, that 'the most important growth sectors of African economies, can no longer be the preserve of companies from outside the continent'.⁵⁸

African ownership and challenging Western hegemony on the continent are vital for the success of the Renaissance, as understood by Mbeki. He emphasised that 'the African Renaissance, in all its parts, can only succeed if its aims and objectives are defined by Africans themselves, if its programmes are designed by ourselves and if we take responsibility for the success or failures of our policies'.⁵⁹

One cannot fully understand the African Renaissance as a doctrine if one does not appreciate the centrality of the notion of partnership in Mbeki's thinking. Part of his strategy was to put Africa higher on the international agenda. He argued 'that the international community should agree that Africa constitutes the principle development challenge in the world'.⁶⁰ Mbeki and his continental partners were interested in the principle of African ownership and determined to jettison the old style, paternalistic donor-recipient relationships; he wanted genuine partnership on the basis of 'mutual accountability and mutual responsibility'.⁶¹ This includes the push for measures on debt relief, larger inflows of capital into the continent, and improved political and economic reforms.

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Regional Hegemons as Catalyst for Continental Integration

Nigeria and South Africa in Africa's Integration and Development

Samuel Oloruntoba and Vusi Gumede

INTRODUCTION

The desire to find a lasting solution to the intractable challenges of underdevelopment in Africa has necessitated experimentation with different types of strategies following the attainment of political independence by African countries. Most of these strategies have been adopted in response to the prevailing orthodoxy of the 'best practice' in development process. Consequently, following the European experience of regionalism, which started with the Paris Treaty of 1951 and established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), African countries have embarked on one form of regional integration or another as part of their overall development plans in the years since independence.

From the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) through to the Abuja Treaty (1991) establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (2001), it has always been the view of political elites and other Africans that integration on a continental basis could drive economic growth and bring about improvement in African people's standard of living. As Shivji put it, '[The] alternative frameworks have underlined the need for a holistic approach to Africa's development [and] called for a continental programme of regional integration'.¹

The current effort towards achieving full economic integration on the continent by 2017 is cast as a way of improving the welfare of the continent.² However, despite the various declarations and integration arrangements in Africa, which Bhagwati (1995) describes as a 'spaghetti bowl', the results of regional integration have been mixed. It is safe to say that these arrangements have not been reflected noticeably in the volume of intra-Africa trade, which is barely 11-12 per cent of the total volume of trade in the region.³

The need for continental integration remains compelling, though, especially in the light of a global trend in which regional governance of trade is

fast replacing multilateral governance. The recent upbeat, top-level discussion of the prospect of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union⁴ underlines the necessity of ensuring that the vision of continental integration is realised sooner rather than later.

This chapter argues that Nigeria and South Africa have the capacity, and probably the willingness, to serve as regional hegemon in promoting integration, not only in their immediate locations (as they have been doing for years) but in Africa as a whole. The need for regional hegemon to take the lead in fast-tracking integration on the continent stems from the half-hearted attitude or political wrangling of most African leaders, their dependence on foreign countries for economic survival, the lack of any one country's leadership in sustaining the tempo of integration and, importantly, the high costs involved in the process.

Following this introduction, the next section interrogates the continental integration objectives of Africa and the challenges militating against their realisation. The following section examines the theoretical premises of the chapter's argument, that is, hegemonic stability theory and its relevance and applicability to the two countries under study. The fourth section examines the roles of Nigeria and South Africa in regional integration in their respective subregions and the challenges they face. The last section concludes with recommendations on how the two countries can push the agenda for African integration further by redefining the model, its focus and its pace and, importantly, through setting a leadership example by improving relations between themselves.

AFRICA AGENDA FOR CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION: BETWEEN OPTIMISM AND REALITY

The pursuit of regional integration in Africa has both political and economic underpinnings. Politically, it was part of the strategies used in the struggle for decolonisation, especially in the context of southern Africa. For instance, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formed to promote liberation and cooperation and build loyalty among countries opposing the apartheid regime in South Africa. Economically, regional integration has been conceived as a strategy for industrialisation, economic diversification and development of regional infrastructure in Africa.⁵ The most ambitious agenda for full integration of Africa for the purpose of economic development was laid out in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) and the AEC as contained in the Abuja Treaty of 1991.

To underscore the importance that African states attach to integration on the continent, they are all signatories to the various charters and treaties drafted by the erstwhile Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the AU, in the furtherance African integration. Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the AU states the objective of integration in Africa as being to:

- achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member states;
- accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human and People's Rights; and
- promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.⁶

The Abuja Treaty also contains provisions highlighting that the pursuit of continental integration is a high priority for African leaders. For instance, its Article 2 shows, *inter alia*, that it aims at the following:

- the strengthening of regional economic communities and the establishment of other communities where they do not exist;
- the conclusion of agreements aimed at harmonising and coordinating policies among existing and future subregions and regional economic communities; and
- the promotion and strengthening of joint investment programmes in the production and trade of major products and inputs within the framework of objective self-reliance.

Other objectives relate to the harmonisation of national policies of member states, removal of barriers to trade, adoption of a common trade policy, and removal of obstacles to free movement of persons, goods and services.

Had African leaders fully identified with these objectives and pursued them to their logical conclusion, the story of integration in Africa today would have been markedly different. However, as argued elsewhere, various factors, including leadership ego, narrow nationalism, domestic problems, multiplicity of integration schemes in the form of free trade agreements and the influence of external powers, have combined to compromise the achievement of the objectives of integration in Africa.⁷

Notwithstanding the limitations in implementing various agreements on regional economic cooperation, it appears that African leaders are committed to making an ongoing effort to gear their countries towards integration. For instance, in 2012, African heads of state and government further agreed to an African Union Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade and fast-tracking the evolution of the Continental Free Trade Area by 2017.⁸ There are concerns that despite the various integration arrangements in Africa, inter-African trade remains marginal compared to trade relations with advanced economies. Several factors account for this trade pattern. The most prominent of these is the form of economic structure bequeathed to Africa by former colonial masters and the skewed ways in which African economies were integrated into the global capitalist system.⁹

Although the World Trade Organisation's World Trade Report of 2011 estimated intra-African trade to be 12 per cent of the total merchandise exports, a new study by Christopher Stephens and Jane Kennan of the Overseas Development Institute shows that intra-African trade forms about 16 per cent of total merchandise exports in Africa, which translates to about US\$57 billion at the end of the last decade.¹⁰ The study also shows that much intra-African trade is in manufactured goods rather than commodities, which is the dominant trade item with the outside world.

It is on the basis of the continued search for the best method to achieve continental integration that this chapter explores the direct engagement of two leading regional hegemonies in facilitating integration on the continent. The next section examines the theory and its application to the discourse.

REGIONAL HEGEMONS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Although scholars have advanced many theories to explain the trajectories of regional integration in Africa and elsewhere, hegemonic stability theory speaks in particular to the roles of regional hegemonies in creating a conducive environment for international trade among member countries.

The theory was developed by Joseph Nye Jr to explain the need for a global hegemon to act as a leader in facilitating a liberal international economic order. It was developed as a response to the global economic depression of the 1930s, which was caused by wide-scale protectionist practices among major world economies such as Britain, Germany, France, Japan and the United States (US). As Gilpin argues, hegemonic stability theory is based on the assumption that a dominant power is necessary for the emergence of a liberal international economy.¹¹ The argument is that Britain served as the global hegemon in the nineteenth century and the US as the hegemon in the twentieth, especially after the Second World War.

The theory posits that the leader or hegemon in the international system helps to facilitate international cooperation and prevents defection from the rule of the regime through the use of payments (bribes), sanctions, and/or other means, but can seldom, if ever, coerce reluctant states to obey the rules of liberal international order.¹² The theory also maintains that there can be no liberal international economy unless there is a leader that uses its resources and influence to establish and manage an international economy based on free trade, monetary stability and freedom of capital movement.¹³

Writing in support of the theory and its relevance to the maintenance of order and stability in the international system, Kindleberger notes that a hegemon is needed, even in times of crisis, to perform the following functions:

- maintain the flow of capital to poor countries;
- provide some order in foreign exchange rates, at least among the key currencies; and
- arrange for at least moderate coordination of macroeconomic policies.¹⁴

According to Gilpin, these are the main functions of a global hegemon.¹⁵

In his explanation of the theory and its relevance, Grumberg argues that 'by linking the economy's structure and evolution with the international distribution of power, the hegemonic stability theory combines political factors and economic outcomes and therefore satisfies the need for a truly political international economics'.¹⁶ He explains furthermore that the theory holds that cooperation and a well-functioning world economy are dependent on a certain kind of political structure, one characterised by a single actor.

Implicit in the theory are the issue of interest and the provision of public good. While the hegemon may act to stabilise the global order based on the perceived benefits that it can derive from such a system, the possibility that other members of the global community can derive benefits in the form of public good, such as higher volume of trade or higher inflow of capital, can be Pareto-optimal both in the short and long run. Given such scenarios, other countries can cooperate with the hegemon. Although various critics have written against the feasibility of this theory, especially in the context of a decline in the economic position of US and a rising multipolar configuration of the world economy,¹⁷ hegemony can be deemed a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous global order.

A corollary to the global hegemon is the regional hegemon, which refers to a dominant country exercising power over subordinate neighbours. According to Myers, regional hegemons are 'states which possess sufficient power to dominate [a] subordinate state system'.¹⁸ This definition,

according to Prys, is based on a realist approach, which neglects both the internal workings of such a regional order and aspects such as acceptance, followership and the role of ideas central to most other understandings of hegemony.¹⁹

Mearsheimer defines a regional hegemon as the dominance of the area in which the great power is located.²⁰ In his view, there can only be one regional hegemon in the world at a particular time. To this extent, he rejects the notion of multiple locations of regional power. This view is limited in application because in a multipolar world there could be various sites of regional powers. In the current global capitalist system, China, Russia, Brazil and, to a great extent, India have exercised influence on issues of global concern, which shows that their views cannot be taken for granted. For instance, as Alexander argues,

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, the USA and to a lesser extent the European Union, have all the leverage at their command in order to compel virtually all states to toe the line; China and India, to a lesser extent Brazil, are simply too huge for such compulsion to work without unleashing the danger of a destabilising reaction.²¹

Prys argues that regional hegemons play a dual role at the nexus of regional and global politics and thus have to accomplish at least two main tasks: the exclusion of external actors from their 'sphere of influence' as well as the accommodation of the same actors in order to achieve both their global and regional foreign policy goals.²²

The realist perspective on regional hegemons is that they assume their responsibility in expectation of the gain that will accrue to them in the regions. The subordinate states defer to the hegemon in expectation of public good, which could take the form of security, trade or investment benefits. The capacity and willingness of regional hegemons to underwrite the costs of promoting international trade is also key to understanding the role they play.

Despite the apparent relevance of hegemonic stability theory to regional integration in Africa, its application is limited. This is because of its focus on the promotion of a liberal international environment. As various scholars have argued, the liberal international environment that global hegemons such as the US, Britain and Japan have been promoting since the end of the Second World War has served to advance only their interests rather than those of other countries globally.^{23, 24}

Also, while the theory is primarily concerned with promotion of international trade, the peculiar economic conditions of African states require a regional integration programme that goes beyond trade promotion to

include drivers of development such as investment in infrastructure, industrialisation, improving relevant skills, innovation and relevant institutions at both regional and continental level.

NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS REGIONAL HEGEMONS IN AFRICA

At the subregional level, Nigeria and South Africa have played prominent roles in fostering regional integration, both having been involved in the formation and maintenance of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). This chapter considers the two countries to be critical to the achievement of full continental integration. Following Joseph Nye's hegemony stability theory, we argue that South Africa and Nigeria can and should, given their respective spheres of influence, resources and vantage positions, serve as catalysts for full economic and political integration in Africa. We contend that the current challenges to the realisation of this objective can be surmounted. Indeed, experiences of continental integration from Europe show that anchor states such as Germany and France are essential to bearing costs that weak members of the union may not be able to bear, while also providing the required leadership in terms of political manoeuvring, coordination and policy direction.

There is no doubt that South Africa's economy is the most sophisticated in the subregion and one of the best in Africa. However, the long-term development and sustainability of the economy is inextricably linked to the health, progress and stability of other countries in the subregion. The importance of integration to the realisation of the development objective of South Africa, in particular, was emphasised by Habib and Selinyane:

Stability in the region and, as a result, development and democracy, will only be achieved when a regional hegemon is prepared to underwrite these objectives. So long as that does not happen, South Africa's economic goals will remain compromised. For, as President Thabo Mbeki has often stated, the fate of democratic South Africa is inextricably bound up with what happens in the rest of the continent.²⁵

Integration is an important step towards achieving peace, stability and development in Africa, and so regardless of the costs, compromises and complexities that may be involved in facilitating regional and continental integration, ultimately regional hegemons such as Nigeria and South Africa would derive substantial benefit from its success. Given the natural tendency of people to migrate to zones of comfort and good prospects, a

developed South Africa surrounded by poor countries will continue to experience pressure from migrants from these neighbouring countries.

A recognition of this dynamic and the historical roots neighbouring countries share has informed South Africa's policy of promoting integration in the subregion and Africa as a whole since the end of apartheid. The country has made significant progress in regional integration by enlarging the membership of the SADC to include countries such as Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This large membership, according to Hart and Padayachee, 'makes SADC potentially the largest regional economy in Africa'.²⁶

By virtue of their location, military capacity, human and material resources, and volume of economic activities, Nigeria and South Africa jointly occupy distinct positions of advantage and influence in Africa. With an estimated population of 160 million people, Nigeria is home to one of every five black people. The population of the country is greater than that of the other 15 countries in the West African subregion combined. As a regional power, the country also boasts sophisticated military hardware and expertise, which has been previously deployed in addressing conflict and security problems in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire. Nigeria's sheer size has evoked some fears of domination in smaller countries in the subregion.²⁷ Concerns that Nigeria may exercise undue control over former French colonies in West Africa probably explains France's part in running the internal affairs of these countries even after they gained political independence.

Over the past five decades, Nigeria has performed various functions in West and wider Africa that have clearly positioned as a regional hegemon. While some of the responsibilities the country has taken upon itself can be said to be functional, others are structural and relational in the sense that they bear eloquent testimony to what Bach called the 'manifest destiny' of the country.²⁸ In fact, from it Nigeria has taken it as a project to be the leader of Africa. This idea was advanced by various foreign policy clichés and projects, such as the concepts of 'medium power' within the context of the country's relations with its immediate neighbours and the wider continent.

Nigeria's bitter experience during its civil war, especially its disappointment by foreign powers such as Britain and France, makes regional and continental integration high priorities on its Afrocentric agenda. It was in the context of this agenda that the Yakubu Gowon-led administration (1966-1975) initiated the processes that led to the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States in 1975.²⁹ To date, Nigeria contributes one third of the annual budget of the 16-member organisation, houses the Secretariat, places facilities at the disposal of ECOWAS,

and provides bilateral assistance to member states.³⁰ Nigeria's role in the formation and funding of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which in no small measure helped to bring peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone, has been duly acknowledged in the literature.³¹ The country has played a similar role in bringing stability to beleaguered countries like Mali, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

Although the member countries of ECOWAS have not been able to live up to the various treaties that the Commission has established, it has achieved some milestones in the areas of 'institution building, the harmonisation of norms and the construction of regional transport and communication infrastructures'.³² Nigeria's huge oil and gas deposits as well as its population have clearly put it in a leadership position in the subregion.³³ Has the country acted as a hegemon that mainstreams its national interest into foreign policy objectives, or has it simply been a benevolent leader acting in the interests of members without any commensurate returns? The latter seems to be the case.

If Nigeria is to leverage on its size, resources and influence to bring about much-needed continental integration, it must be able to factor its national interests into foreign policy objectives in the subregion. Obi agrees when he notes that 'perhaps, the key lies in practically demonstrating that there is a commonality of interest binding Nigeria and other member states of the ECOWAS-survival in a globalised world'.³⁴ It is the ability to link the national interest with a regional integration agenda that will help in generating the needed support from the people.

This will depend, however, on the country's ability to address the numerous domestic problems that have frustrated the realisation of its huge potential over the past few years. These include corruption, inept leadership, ethnic and religious bigotry, and now terrorism. The problems are not irremediable. What is required, in the words of Duncan Green, are active citizens and effective states.³⁵ With democracy comes the potential for inclusive and participatory development, institutional reforms and optimal utilisation of resources. As soon as Nigerians can take more than a passing interest in the governance of their country and deploy technology for mobilisation in electioneering, the country may be able to realise its 'manifest destiny' both as a regional power and an influential member of the global community.³⁶

South Africa occupies a historic position and exerts great influence in its neighbourhood. Post-apartheid South Africa has embarked on massive investment and trade promotion across Africa. To a great extent, it has exercised hegemony in its neighbourhood and increasingly in Africa. South Africa has promoted regional cooperation through organisations such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC. According to Alden and Soko,

the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the longstanding customs union made up of South Africa and the BLNS states – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – represents the most institutionalized expression of South African hegemony; the Southern African Development Community (SADC), comprising 14 states where South Africa's economic dominance is contested; in Africa north of the Zambezi river, the expansion of South African business interests and attempt to assert itself diplomatically are the main expressions of South African hegemony.³⁷

South Africa has acted both as a malevolent and benign hegemonic power in the SACU, given that it has led the process that eventuated in the design of a customs union allowing mutual benefits for its members.³⁸ As Alden and Soko observe,

South Africa has emerged as the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa in recent years. South African direct investment in the 13 SADC countries exceeded US\$5.4 billion by 2000 ...³⁹

South Africa has used its position to bolster a higher level of integration and development of inter-country institutional networks in terms of infrastructure such as roads and ports. Development Corridors have been established through which the economic performance of various countries has been boosted.⁴⁰ South Africa also has investment in other countries outside the region. For instance, the mobile telecommunication company MTN is the leading communication company in Nigeria. In recent times, retail outlets such as Shoprite have been making in-roads in other parts of Africa. The foreign economic policy of post-apartheid South Africa places a premium on Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance because, as former President Thabo Mbeki poignantly observed, the fate of South Africa is inextricably tied to the destiny of Africa as a whole.⁴¹ As Alexander notes,

[L]ike most of the leaders of the ANC before him, President Mbeki too is driven by the original vision of Edmund Blyden, who, like most of the first Pan-Africanists was from the Caribbean diaspora, and one of the first black people to define the meaning of the Pan-African vision. His stress on racial pride and on acknowledgement of the humanity of people of African descent laid the foundation of the subsequent anti-racist ideology which has characterized the approach of virtually of all the most prominent leaders of Pan-Africanism.⁴²

South Africa's involvement in promoting development in Africa is not limited to the economic sphere. It has engaged, too, in the promotion of peace,

security and political stability in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa Republic, Sudan and Zimbabwe.⁴³

Among other African leaders, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and South African president Thabo Mbeki were instrumental in changing the continental organisation's nomenclature from Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to African Union (AU). The duo, with the former president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, was also active in establishing NEPAD. One of the core objectives of this pact is the promotion of continental integration and the reenactment of the African Renaissance.^{44, 45} Such political commitments suggest the two countries are genuinely interested in promoting integration on African continent.

It is instructive that post-Obasanjo Nigeria and post-Mbeki South Africa witnessed certain levels of rivalry and undue competition. Such unfortunate developments, which reflect more on their successors, slowed the progress towards African renaissance and integration. As Adebajo argues, the relationship between the two countries has always 'represented a mix of cooperation and competition'.⁴⁶ Such a phenomenon, Adebajo notes, is a regular occurrence among other regional powers such as China and Japan, Brazil and Argentina, and Germany and France.

Several cases, not the least the contest for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, have exposed the mutual distrust and suspicion between the two countries. The anxiety over who becomes the leader of Africa remains a distracting one. Political leaders from various strata of society who believe in the African project should downplay these issues and focus on the core objective of a Pan-African agenda for development.

Given the historic roles these two countries have performed in their respective subregions, how can they leverage their successes to enhance the realisation of integration in Africa? We offer some recommendations in the next section.

AFRICAN INTEGRATION: WHAT ROLES FOR NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA?

The first and the most practical approach to enhancing the roles of these two countries in promoting integration on the continent is for their political leadership to ensure that they address the domestic challenges they are currently facing. In Nigeria, poverty and insecurity seem to be the two main challenges. South Africa also needs to attend to the issue of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Charity, as the saying goes, starts at home. In as much as serving as a catalyst for continental integration requires substantial resources from both countries, the needed buy-in for the agenda from the citizens will be easier if the citizens' welfare is guaranteed.

Secondly, the two countries must be committed to the objective of integration at the level of political leadership. This is necessary before they can effectively persuade other countries on the continent to fully cooperate for the realisation of the integration objective. The current divergence in opinion between the two countries on the date for full integration should be quickly reconciled. Nigeria's indecisiveness about the possibility of achieving a Continental Free Trade Area in 2017 should be replaced with a firm commitment. Nigeria and South Africa's political leaders should also be more pragmatic in implementing the terms of their Bilateral Commission. This is imperative for several reasons, not least the huge volume of trade between them, estimated at more than \$2 billion. The volume of investment between the two countries is also growing.

The Bilateral Commission established between the two countries contains lofty objectives that indicate mutual commitment to serving not only their own interests but those of Africa as a whole. Consequently, competition between them should be healthy, spurring accelerated development rather than destructive rivalry. Political leadership in the two countries should ensure full implementation of the agreements included in the Commission, and regular summits should be held to monitor the progress made.

Since they are the two most important economies in Africa, there are windows of opportunities for investment in infrastructure, power generation and agriculture. Given the advantage South Africa has in these areas, cooperation in this regard would be mutually beneficial. It is also important for the countries to work more assiduously to strengthen regional integration in their respective regions.

As such, Nigeria should show more commitment to ensuring the full implementation of the revised ECOWAS Protocol. South Africa in turn should work harder to ensure full integration of the SADC, at the same time addressing the concerns of smaller member countries about the distribution of the benefits of integration in the subregion. Given the historical ties that bind South Africa to other countries in the subregion in terms of linguistic and cultural affinities, geographical contiguity and the cross-national loyalty formed during the struggle for decolonisation, no effort should be spared in achieving greater developmental integration in the SADC. As a more pragmatic step towards showing commitment to continental integration, South Africa and Nigeria can lead the way in proposing and working towards integration of ECOWAS with the SADC. The involvement of the SADC in the Tripartite alliance with the Eastern African Community and The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa is an indication of the possibilities that lie ahead for full integration on the continent.

Thirdly, the two countries should strive to coordinate other members of the various regional economic communities to work towards the full

harmonisation of institutions and tariff regimes and development for continental integration. Lastly, the two countries must craft a developmental approach to regional integration that, unlike the current market-based approach, is conversant with the particularities of the African condition. The developmental approach to integration on the continent is concerned with building infrastructure such as railways, ports, airports, road and communication networks. It also involves massive support for industrialisation, as opposed to the current preoccupation with market-oriented integration which focuses on market access, especially for goods and services from Europe and other advanced economies.

The problem of multiple integration arrangements, particularly with advanced economic blocs like the European Community and countries like the US and China, remains pertinent. While African leaders are talking about continental integration, they are also either negotiating or signing new trade agreements with advanced economies.

One such negotiation is the European Union-African, Caribbean and Pacific (EU-ACP) Economic Partnership Agreements. As Asante has argued, this proposed regional trade agreement has the strong potential to undermine integration of African countries.⁴⁷ For Asante, the Economic Partnership Agreements are nothing but a 'Trojan Horse'. The best they can achieve is to integrate African economies more deeply into the global capitalist system, which has proved to be detrimental to the economic interest of the continent.⁴⁸ Essentially, as argued in Gumede,⁴⁹ it is important that African economies (or Africa as a whole) pursue its own socioeconomic development policies and a comprehensive vision for the African economy.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the quest of African leaders for African integration over the past five decades. Specifically, it examined the roles of Nigeria and South Africa in driving the integration process on the continent, within the context of their potential leadership roles as regional hegemons. We argue that by virtue of the respective positions of these countries and the roles they have played in integration processes in their subregions, they are well capable of driving the integration process in Africa. What is required, though, is genuine commitment by the political leadership, pursuit of African unity, the building of infrastructures and institutions, and the resolution of domestic challenges.

The motivation for a radical departure from the gradualist approach to integration is the realisation that protective nationalism, with its narrow interests, has slowed down continental integration in Africa. In order to

achieve continental integration, the 'bondage of arbitrary and artificial boundaries' which the imperialists created through the 'curse of Berlin'⁵⁰ and sustained through colonial and post-colonial designs, must be undone and fundamentally altered.⁵¹ Given the enormous resources at the disposal of Nigeria and South Africa, these two countries should lead the way in championing progressive change.

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Youth Unemployment and Social Development

Nkhensani Valoyi and Philipppian Taku

INTRODUCTION

This chapter investigates youth unemployment and social development in Africa. As a continental problem, youth unemployment is an integral part of development and cannot be dealt with entirely separately from wider questions about the enhancement of survival and well-being. The term 'youth' itself is complex and context-specific, meaning different things to different people, organisations and societies. For instance, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) defines 'youth' as 'a transitional period between dependence of childhood to adulthood's independence'. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a youth is a person of pre-adult age,¹ whereas the African National Congress (ANC), the continent's oldest political organisation, understands a youth to be a politically inexperienced person between the ages of 15 and 35 years. It assumes that persons within that age range need political preparation and can be guided towards full individuality and membership of the party organisation.

These definitions raise a question: Where does the even younger child or teenager, who is dependent and unproductive, fit in socially and economically? One may argue that, in the African context, these ideas are misleading to an extent, because if youths are thought of as dependent and immature, and are excluded from decision-making processes and public life, it suggests they live under a dictatorship. However, in the light of the technological advancements that have put information in the hands of the youth through social media and other digital platforms, it would no longer be politically, economically, culturally and socially correct to regard today's youths as dependent, unproductive and immature.

Indeed, it makes sense for the youth, particularly African youth, to be part and parcel of decision-making processes that affect their livelihood and development. The distortion of Africans' historical narrative by industrialists

and colonialists is partly to blame for the ignorance about the contribution African youth can make to the continent's development. For instance, the generation of youth from Soweto in 1976 made a decisive contribution to South African society, one that should never be overlooked when considering the impact youth can have on social and economic development. The meanings of the word 'youth' as understood in 1976 by the powers of the day have kept changing over time, with the result that the term has become a shorthand for a complex set of political, economic, social, cultural and institutional transformations.

Nevertheless, these changes have arguably not been to the benefit of African youth. Those who advocated for youth participation in daily economic and social life have shifted the goalposts and reduced the youth to voting fodder to keep themselves in power and in control of resources that are used to marginalise and brutalise the same youth, cases in point being the behaviour of South Africa's militarised police force and the corruption which is rampant in all spheres of government. More widely, the readiness and capacity of African youth to contribute to building a sound economy and to political reform have met with powerful resistance, as is evident from the uncontrolled youth unemployment on the continent. For instance, the introduction of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), discussed in depth later in this chapter, has had damaging consequences for Africa's development. As one source notes, 'SAPs often result in deep cuts in programmes like education, health and social care, and the removal of subsidies designed to control the price of basics such as food and milk. So SAPs hurts the poor the most'.²

African youth understood the implications of the SAPs, but their protests were countered with lethal force from the so-called security agencies of their own countries: in the African context, a youth is not a 'dependant' but a person in the process of learning and responding to problems associated with the massive developmental deficits brought about by the continent's current systems; moreover, powerful outside forces are influential in Africa's political processes, and manipulate circumstances and situations to suit their own interest.

Let us examine these situations and circumstances, as documented by Caffentzis and Silva in democratizing the global economy.³ As illustrated by the three brief cases below, the work is an investigation into what happens when societies repress internal debate and outside forces' impact on Africa.⁴

Nigeria:

- In May 1986, about 20 students and bystanders were massacred by state security forces at Ahmadu Bello University for protesting against the implementation of the SAP.

- More students were killed in further protests the next day at Kaduna Polytechnic, the University of Benin and the University of Lagos.
- In 1988, 33 universities took to the streets in reaction to fuel price hikes required by the SAP.
- In May and June 1989, dozens of people were killed and hundreds arrested in riots and strikes against the SAP in Lagos, Benin City and Port Harcourt. The government was forced to introduce the welfare programme 'SAP Relief Package', establish a mass transit scheme and a 'People's Bank', and review the minimum wage.
- In March–May 1990, students and faculty at campuses nationwide protested against the government's decision to accept a US\$150million university restructuring loan from the WB, one requiring the closure of many departments and programmes. The military government staged armed assaults, hundreds were arrested, and hundreds more expelled from universities.
- In May 1992, students at the universities of Ibadan and Lagos protested against the SAP, blaming it for the deterioration of campus facilities and university programmes as well as increases in transport fares. Police opened fire, wounding at least five protesters. In Lagos, clashes between demonstrators and police left three dead and hundreds injured.
- Despite the upheaval, the Nigerian government continued with the SAP implementation, insisting there was no alternative to it. The then president, Ibrahim Babangida, defended it as a well-thought-out policy aimed at increasing domestic production in every sector of the economy, creating more jobs and reducing foreign debt.

The Republic of Algeria, 1988:

- Algerians youth rejected the SAPs for same reasons as Nigerian youth⁵ did; they were met with maximum force from the military and police, and more than 200 died for seeking to participate in decision-making processes that affected their lives and livelihoods.

The Republic of Benin, 1989; Sudan, 1987; and Niger, 1990:

- In terms of the SAP,⁶ subsidies to university students were cut and grant funds dried up. Youth from the University of Cotonou in Benin went on a strike that paralysed the economy for six months in 1989. Teachers were dismissed, and thousands of students arrested and imprisoned.

There are many more instances of police brutality against youth protesting against decisions that stood to harm their lives. Combinations of factors

lead to this form of institutionalised violence against youth, whom most African leaders perceive as immature and vandals.

A good case in point to examine is South Africa. Democratically, it is within their rights and the country's norms for citizens (including youths) to protest peacefully as a means of voicing their grievances to the powers that be. However, Africa's democratic societies are seeing an increase in the criminalisation of peaceful protest, along with a collapse of political leadership. It is being forgotten that protest was a powerful tool during the days of apartheid and that the ANC benefited strongly from it; indeed, the famous Freedom Charter was declared during a protest match, and remains the pillar of the democratic dispensation in South Africa.

Protests and demonstrations, in other words, were factors that helped dismantle a segregated system and unite a nation. The ANC strongly believed it was wrong for the police to open fire on peaceful, unarmed and defenceless protesters. The case was legitimate: the police officers were then mainly whites, and police brutality was viewed as racist. South Africa today has a black-majority government and a black-controlled police service, yet, for all, the latter is heavily militarised, poorly recruited and trained, demoralised and ineffective, particularly in crowd-control situations, where brutality is meted out to citizens protesting in the name of valid social causes.

In 1976, the youth felt aggrieved by the Bantu education system and protested against it. The result changed the course of South Africa's history and fundamentally altered the political landscape, helping to end a segregated system and laying the basis for a free and democratic society. By contrast, in 2012 protests by miners led to the Marikina massacre in which 44 unarmed, defenceless and peacefully protesting workers were killed by state security forces. It was a clear indication of a huge vacuum in political leadership and exposed the toxic relationship between capital and politics, one which is reinforced by institutionalised police brutality.

However, it is important for leadership to view protest as a means for voicing grievances and to take advantage of it to initiate dialogue rather than criminalise protesters to the extent of deploying armed security forces. By extension, youth protests too should be seen as an invitation for dialogue. For instance, service delivery protests against municipal managers, mayors and councillors should be an opportunity for these elected members of society to meet with communities and discuss the difficulties they are facing in rendering the required services.


Armed police in protests are seen as the protectors of perpetrators, which points to the need to strategise in order to avoid violence. Most, if not all, such protests come as a last resort when all other avenues have failed. When government officials become arrogant and a law unto themselves, refusing to meet members of the community to discuss grievances, this

raises tensions, with the police being seen as an extension of the same government that does not wish to enter into dialogue. Clearly, then, sending a heavily armed tactical response team to deal with an angry but unarmed group of youths who are appealing for the delivery of basic services such as water, sanitation and primary health care is not a good strategy.

As such, the current police force needs to be transformed into a public-order and law-enforcement service that is well trained and motivated to serve the general public rather than the interests of a few highly connected politicians. African states need to invest in training the general population about sound and manageable popular government. Over and above that, the minds of African police officers should be decolonised. In his account of the sufferings of previously colonised territories, Fanon refers to what he calls a ‘double dimension’.⁷ This ‘double dimension’ is clearly visible in South Africa, where institutionalised police brutality works on the basis that the life of a black person does not matter and enables the police to act with impunity.

Figure 3.1 depicts a short case study demonstrating how power can corrupt and lead to the following types of behaviour: undermining the rule of law; disregarding accountability; disrespecting human dignity, exploiting state authorities and institutions for individual benefit; and widening the gap between government and the governed.

Figure 3.1 South Africa sliding into a dictatorship



Source: Authors

Figure 3.1 presents a model depicting South Africa's leadership as corrupt, pro-capital, uninspiring and failing to set an example as a role model.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines 'unemployment' as a situation in which a person who is able to work and is actively seeking work is unable to find work.⁸ It can also be a situation experienced by a person who is older than 16 years, skilled, and willing, ready and actively wishing to work but unable to find a job. 'Underemployment' is the term used to describe the situation of those who are able to find employment only for shorter-than-normal periods, for example, part-time workers and seasonal workers. It also describes the condition of workers whose education or training suggests they are over-qualified for a particular or available position.

Statistics on unemployment are collected and analysed by government labour offices in most countries, and are considered an important indicator of economic health. Since World War II, full employment has been a stated goal of many governments. Full employment is not necessarily synonymous with a zero unemployment rate. According to an estimate by the International Labour Organization (ILO), there are about 232 million international migrants in the world: 50 per cent of them are believed to be in the active labour force, and one out of eight are between 15 and 24 years old.⁹

There are various causes of unemployment around the world, but in Africa unemployment seems to be a systemic problem. Most of the manufacturing companies are mechanising their production processes and reducing the number of workers used by replacing them with technology. There is an absence of policies that encourage employment, because Africa's governments are always making a business case for capital – hence, policies are pro-market. This explains rampant unemployment and violent crime. In such conditions, Africa becomes a breeding ground for poverty and underdevelopment, including social underdevelopment.

In South Africa, talk over the past 20 years about inclusive social transformation has not worked. What is required now is a youth salvage project, and this must be accomplished if the country is to centre around showing Africans their own history, society, conventions and quality of life, as opposed to showing them supposedly matchless white quality of living, European history, language and culture, and so on. South Africa is one of the 20 countries in Africa identified by the IMF as being resource-rich, but it still has a high rate of unemployment, poverty and illiteracy. Moreover, despite having commemorated its twentieth year of democracy, the country's state administration is weak, its leadership lacks vision and the youth exist

in misery. They are regularly told they are the future, yet the leaders are unable to develop practical African-based arrangements that can give them hope and motivation.

If we look at South Africa, then, what is it that is still lacking? Those who have managed to become part of the workforce still suffer the consequences of apartheid, racism being one of them. According to the United Nations Development Programme, South Africa's human development index is second-last in comparison with the other BRICS countries, India, Russia, Brazil and China. Recent South African statistics have indicated that in a population of 51,7 million people, about 41,4 per cent of South Africans live below the poverty line and about 15,6 million receive a grant or pension support, with the average household income being R103 204.¹⁰ While the proportion of the population living below the poverty line decreased between 1994 and 2009 from 59,3 to 41,4 per cent, this progress is not enough. It has been almost 20 years since democracy, but the question at hand is: Are the youth really free, or are they still chained?

Numerous projects and programmes have been implemented to transform the youth of South Africa, but youth unemployment levels remain unacceptably high. During 2013, unemployment decreased from 25 per cent in the second quarter to 24,7 per cent in the third, with half of the people concerned being youth. Given these decreased rates, the unemployment figure was still high. The thought leaders of this continent, then, need to come up with sustainable ways to decrease unemployment consistently.

According to African Economic Outlook, South Africa's labour laws are seen by some as unnecessarily inflexible with regard to hiring and firing employees; the implication would seem to be that businesses care little about workforce representivity or strengthening their employees. Information from the Global Competitiveness Report of December 2012 indicates that for a minimum wage for a 19-year-old worker, the ratio of the minimum wage to the value added is almost three times the average for other BRICS countries. Perhaps, then, radical land reform is overdue in South Africa.

With regard to salaries and wages, South Africa seems to be lagging behind. Clearly, the government needs to review its employment and labour policies carefully and formulate more labour-friendly policies to address the current inequalities in salaries and wages between whites and black, especially the differences in salaries between lower echelons and company executives, where a black BCom Graduate in Accounting earns less than R6000 net per month, compared to a white colleague who, with only a matric, earns about R19000 per month in the same position. Hence, even when black people have graduated and have certificates and experience, they still remain poor and do not occupy management positions. Private companies

should be bound by law to compensate people in a fair way. South Africa thus needs to assess its labour policies to ensure they are fair to everyone, are competitive, and benefit educated youth. No educated person should be unemployed in South Africa.

Small businesses continue to fail in South Africa due to illiteracy, a lack of creativity in the implementation of models, and a lack of support. Organisations like the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) were formed to assist small business entrepreneurs, yet not much success has been seen. According to *Entrepreneur Magazine*, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob Davies, confirmed that five out of seven new businesses fail in South Africa. This is a frightening statistic that will not motivate people to start their own businesses.

Moreover, many within the official opposition in South Africa, have alleged that the NYDA is corrupt and that it fails to deliver on its mandate as a result, with the government indicating that the agency had missed 95 per cent of its targets.

Ntuli went on to observe that the NYDA had failed the youth of South Africa. Indeed, the problem is not that no effort is being put into youth development in South Africa; it is that the corruption of our leaders has stolen our future. Our leaders are not chosen carefully, and a political system is used to choose leaders who do not genuinely hold the people's interests at heart; they serve their own interests and do not consider how this will enchain the next generation or impact on poverty. South Africa, like many countries in Africa, needs leaders who understand the fundamentals of the continent's challenges so that they can be part of the solution rather than aggravate the problems.

Our leaders are breeding a psychological environment that leads poorly educated people to assume it is acceptable to take from the poor. It is a situation that will continue until we have leaders with a clear positive vision beneficial to the ordinary person, and when funds that are otherwise abused and misappropriated are directed towards helping the population in general and youth in particular to attain economic independence in their lives, families and communities at large.

POVERTY

Poverty, according to Hennie Swanepoel and Frik de Beer,¹¹ is sub-divisible into two kinds: individual poverty, which is a situation where an individual or his or her family experiences hardship or deprivation; and societal poverty, which is deprivation amongst many people or awhile community. However, while individual poverty is bad, it is much better than societal

poverty, because it is easier to solve. For example, in African communities that practice Ubuntu one will never go hungry; when it is a community or country that is hungry, this is a multi-faceted problem. It contributes to:

- physical weakness, due to a lack of food, to growth stunting and malnutrition, which leads to a low immune response to infection, and to inability to obtain or pay for health services;
- isolation, because of an inability to pay for schooling, to buy a radio or a bicycle, to afford to travel to look for work, or to live near the village centre or a main road;
- vulnerability, because of a lack of assets to pay large expenses or to meet contingencies; and
- powerlessness, because lack of wealth goes with low status – the poor have no voice.¹²

Poverty is like heat – you cannot see it, you can only feel it, and therefore, according to a poor person living in Ethiopia, ‘to know poverty you have to go through it’.¹³ Can it be said that if this experience carries on for a while, the eventual psychological consequence is greed or selfishness? Poverty is real in South Africa, and while our leaders are thinking of corruption, there are many people who are sleeping hungry and not enjoying the desired infrastructure, schools and psychological environment.

A typical example of societal poverty in South Africa is Diepsloot. Figure 3.2 was adapted from an online resource. Approximately 70 per cent of the Diepsloot population lives below the United Nations (UN) estimated poverty line of US\$1 a day, and there are many other settlements like Diepsloot in South Africa. Its racial composition is predominantly black, along with people of colour and a few foreign nationals from various African countries. Social ills are common in Diepsloot, including crime, illiteracy and poor health, phenomena that often accompany severe man-made poverty. Diepsloot is a ticking time-bomb, and if left to explode, it would cost the government far more to address it after the fact than to do so now.

Despite the efforts made by the government and non-governmental organisations, then, the development gap in Diepsloot is enormous; as with similar municipalities, there is also an increasing gap between those in power and the realities of Diepsloot. Due to poverty and an absence of political will to involve communities in their own development, service delivery protests occur in South Africa almost daily, with most of them turning violent and leading to casualties. The level of poverty in the country is cause for great concern, yet a small grouping within South Africa’s minority population (whites) appear to beat ease with the reality on the ground.

Figure 3.2 Demographic profile of Diepsloot

Case Study:

The demographic profile of Diepsloot

The township's location is exceptional for low-income settlements in South Africa, which are typically located in marginalised areas far from social and economic facilities and employment opportunities. Although Diepsloot was previously marginalised, it is now well located within Johannesburg, thanks to the explosion of the city and decentralised development opportunities towards the north of the city.

Diepsloot is located some 30 km from Johannesburg's Central Business District (CBD) and 20 km from Sandton, and is well-connected to the city through road network infrastructure, such as the Mogale/Tshwane Highway (N14), bordering Diepsloot to the north; William Nicol Drive (R511) to the east; and the Ben Schoeman Highway (N1) to the west.

Diepsloot is ideally positioned along the Johannesburg-Midrand-Tshwane growth corridor, and is nestled between the high-income residential areas of Dainfern, Northgate, Fourways and Sunninghill. As a dense, unplanned and impoverished settlement, Diepsloot is starkly contrasted with its surrounding land uses, which are high-income private-sector residential and commercial developments such as estate housing projects, business parks, shopping centres and office developments. Diepsloot was formally established as a township in 1994, originally as a resettlement and relocation project for residents of Zevenfontein. After the first resettlement took place, Diepsloot expanded through further relocations of squatters from Johannesburg's northern townships.

DIEPSLOOT	
Population size	85 165 inhabitants (Urban Landmark, 2005 Stats-SA, 2001)
Racial composition	Mostly black African and coloured
No. of households	21 000 (RSDF, 2006) up to an estimated 23 000 (Urban Landmark)
Household size	Average 3,4 members per household
Employment status	54% unemployed (among the potential labour force)
Poverty indicators	Approximately 70% live below poverty line (less than US\$1 per day) (Development Programme for Diepsloot, 2007) Average annual income = R19 100 per annum

Source: http://www.alhdc.org.za/static_content/?p=1227

The overall situation is partly an inherited legacy of apartheid, and partly reflective of bad judgement on the part of the current government. According to the 20-Year Review, the apartheid economy was built on systematically enforced exclusion on the basis of race. The apartheid state deliberately excluded black people from opportunities in the labour market and from direct ownership of businesses and land. It limited investment in infrastructure and services in black communities, and black entrepreneurs were denied access to industrial and retail sites as well as to credit.

Poverty remains a dominant narrative in South Africa today, especially among Africans. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the country's economy improved dramatically with the transition to democracy and that it has been reasonably robust and stable throughout the democratic era. The economy grew at 3,2 per cent a year on average from 1994 to 2012, with 2012 having the latest-available full-year figures. This resulted in South Africa's transformation from a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US\$136 billion in 1994 to a GDP of US\$384 billion in 2012. Furthermore, the South African Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Report, 2013, suggests that the number of people who report experiencing hunger decreased from 29 per cent in 1994 to 12,9 in 2013, and that the proportion of the population living below US\$1 a day decreased from 11,3 per cent in 1994 to 4 per cent in 2013.

However, the Diepsloot case study contradicts the MDG report and even indicates that South Africa's achievements in respect of the MDGs are inaccurate, in that the statistics did not take certain areas into account. Besides its implementation of the MDGs, South Africa had already implemented programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a socioeconomic policy framework developed by the ANC government of Nelson Mandela in 1994.

The ANC's primary aim in developing and implementing the RDP was to address the immense socioeconomic problems brought about by the consequences of the struggle against its predecessors under the apartheid regime; specifically, it set its sights on alleviating poverty and addressing massive shortfalls in social services across the country. This is not to disregard the MDG progress, but the question is: What is it that was implemented that led South Africa to be where it is today?

In the aforementioned scenario, Africa will see no development for the next 60 years. What is imperative perhaps is an Afro-centric approach to the quality, quantity and results-driven nature of the educational system and the laws preventing early marriage and abuses of various kinds. What is also needed is teaching African values, the spirit of Ubuntu in fostering transformation, and an African communal lifestyle rather than the materialistic urban lifestyle associated with the division of people into classes.

Furthermore, African governments require massive investments in social entrepreneurs' initiatives. Governments should encourage small emerging entrepreneurs, include practical skills in the education curriculum, motivate young people to take part in policy decisions, contribute to programmes aimed at youth development, and even drive services aimed at youth continentally.

Tunisia reduced the proportion of people living on less than US\$1 per day from 5,9 per cent in 1990 to 1,4 per cent in 2005 – a 76,3 per cent drop. Most of our deliberations on Ubuntu principles can do even better than if the Ubuntu model is used in rural development in conjunction with the Tunisian model, including bringing multinational corporations on board, taking into consideration the number of volunteer youths for skill development that they (multinational corporations) would absorb. Following these guidelines, sub-Saharan Africa will go a long way in terms of social and economic development.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

'Social development' refers to an alteration in the social order of a particular community at a given time. It entails a process of, and commitment to, putting people at the centre of development processes, making quantitative and qualitative achievement in emotional maturity inevitable. According to Günther,

social development is a process that results in the transformation of social structures to improve the capacity of a society in order to fulfil its objectives. The aim is specifically in developing power to elevate the expansion of human activity.¹⁴

THE AFROCENTRIC APPROACH TO PROBLEM-SOLVING

'Foresight Africa' states, 'For Africa to achieve transformative progress, policy solutions MUST come from African sources'.¹⁵ This is a powerful statement indicating that Africans are capable of driving towards their own destiny. There are more than enough institutions and quality scholars on the continent that can support national, regional or continental policymakers with reputable, high-quality research, expertise and innovative solutions to promote Africa's economic development. If the required resources are made available and a collaborative research partnership is formed to coordinate research at national and regional levels, this would automatically create a

stronger African voice within mainstream policy debates, particularly those to do with Africa's well-being.

Without such African initiatives, the continent will remain a net receiver of policy recommendations, recommendations that benefit only non-Africans while Africa itself perishes. However, in view of current technological innovations, twenty-first-century information and communication technology, and the explosion of social media, there is enough people-power and knowledge on the continent to launch these initiatives. Only an all-African-perspective policy will produce informed and sound African-initiated development activities capable of driving economic growth for the people of Africa.

The implementation of 'African solutions to African problems' (ASAP) should not be seen by others as excluding their valuable contribution to finding solutions. Indeed, one must agree with Walter Rodney that African economies form part of the global economy, even though their integration is predominantly to the advantage of the developed North.¹⁶ Regarding globalisation, this is a fashionable notion and one which is certainly debateable, given how one-sided the relationships are between dominant metropolitan centres and their dependent satellites.

Since these relationships will not end anytime soon, the ASAP approach implies simply that Africans should create their own destiny and stop waiting for aid to come from others. In implementing the approach, Africa would be more proactive with regards to the capitalists, for instance, by accepting aid only on certain conditions, by becoming a price-maker rather than price-taker for its own natural-resource extraction, and by engaging internationally for equal and favourable terms alongside the other regions of the world.

A RADICAL SHIFT IN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

An opportunity for African youths to participate fully in the economy and daily public life will register massive improvement in a short time. Equally, it will encourage and promote healthy and responsible behaviour, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Achieving this, however, will be a daunting task, because current continental policies are pro-capital and anti-African. This is perhaps the biggest challenge Africa is facing.

For instance, the celebrated 2013 African Economic Outlook is not an African product. Arguably, this document, like many others, is the brain-child of the UN and its agencies, and therefore cannot work in favour of Africa. Its special emphasis is on 'structural transformation and natural resources in Africa', but who is 'transforming' what and for whom? Africans themselves should conduct discussions about foreign aid to the continent,

and the relevant terms must be results-driven. A paradigm shift is required, and Africans cannot be dictated to any longer if they are seeking economic enhancement.

In her damning assessment of the continent's failure to develop in six decades of independence, Moyo lays the blame for this squarely on Africa's addiction to foreign aid, arguing it is time for Africa to find alternative methods of funding and ways of achieving meaningful social and economic development.¹⁷ Crucially, donor countries face political and economic problems of their own and may not act indefinitely as donors. For example, with the emergence of extremist organisations and terrorist activities around the globe, Western nations are concerned with their internal security, further to which they are rechanneling funds into counter-terrorist attacks and themselves engaging in illegal wars or attacks on sovereign nations.

In the process, Western nations are also entering into military agreements that favour their interests but work to the detriment of the continent. Why are African countries signing such agreements? We are not at war: what Africa needs instead is, among other things, infrastructural development, access to affordable, sustainable medical care, and access to meaningful markets for its resources.

WHY IS THERE NO TANGIBLE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT?

Africa has been robbed by and trapped in the colonial system: the continent embraces dependency, though often not by choice. The means of production are owned by monopoly capital, which protects white supremacy and creates classism. In these circumstances, social development cannot be achieved, resulting in massive unemployment in Africa. The emergence of thought leaders and people-oriented leadership serving the best interests of Africa is what will perhaps pave the way for social development in Africa.

To address these points in more detail, 'economic dependency' may be defined as a condition arising from a limited ability and capacity to control the means of production in an economy. Africa does not control or own the means of production and has a leadership deficiency that makes it controllable by the powers that be. Countries that are regarded as dependent on developed economies are often resource-rich but economically poor. Most Third World countries, particularly African ones, fall in this category.

Andre Gunder Frank,¹⁸ one of the earliest dependency theorists, maintained that underdevelopment is in large part the result of historical and present-day economic and other relations between satellite economies and metropolitan countries; furthermore, he held, these relations are an essential part of the global capitalist system.

According to this view, the latter system has enforced a rigid international division of labour, which is responsible for underdevelopment in many parts of the world. The dependent states supply minerals, agricultural commodities and cheap labour; they are also a source of surplus capital repositories. Former French colonies, in particular, are still levied colonial taxes, and remain a dumping ground for obsolescent technologies and sub-standard manufactured goods. The economies of dependent states thus serve to enhance the economies of developed ones: goods and services flow into dependent states, but the allocation of their resources is determined by the economic interests of the dominant states rather than their own.

Africa depends, then, on other countries and borrowed policies for its development. With all its natural resources, it could be self-sufficient, yet the beneficiation of its huge mineral deposits is owned and controlled by non-Africans and works for their interests. Moreover, SAPs have done irreparable damage: How can Africa even begin to pay its debt to the Bretton Woods institutions of the WB and IMF?

According to Wisegeek.com,¹⁹ a SAP is a plan implemented by the WB and the IMF in a developing nation to try to develop a more productive economy. The goal of such a programme is to help the borrowing nation pay off its debts and grow an economy that can sustain the country into the future. A programme may be implemented as part of an initial agreement to lend money, or it may be brought in later as part of the terms under which the borrowing nation receives a lower interest rate on past loans.

As the discussion earlier in this chapter has indicated, the SAPs are highly contentious. Some maintain that since borrowing nations are usually in dire straits, they have no choice but to comply with whatever plans are laid out, this in order to receive funds necessary to keep them functioning. Poverty and economic dependence remain an integral part of the present political and economic world order, which perpetuates inequality between developed and developing countries. Africa is blessed with natural mineral deposits and precious metals, but its economy is largely export-based, in addition to which the scarcity of value-added and marketing industries leads to job losses and deficiencies in infrastructural development. At the international level, global economic recovery is unlikely in the near future.

Historically, Africa has suffered dire hardships, having experienced slavery, colonialism, imperialism and, latterly, globalisation. What distinguishes each of these stages from one another is the intensification of the suppression and exploitation of African countries by the economically developed West. Africa has strived to be a developed continent, but with little real achievement in the past few decades. Those achievements could have been significant if the current economic framework was meant to assist

Africans positively: from all the indications in the 1950s, Africa could have been developed by now, which is why economists question the framework employed on the continent.

In this regard, Africa still depends on the MDGs that were agreed upon at a summit meeting held by the UN in 2000. However, the MDGs amounted to talk shops rather than credible development goals. The UN, WB and IMF spent more funds organising MDG Conferences than they invested in tangible development projects in Africa, even though the MDGs captured a great deal of attention for these institutions and bilateral aid agencies in their dealing with low-income countries.²⁰

The question, then, is why does Africa still depend on the UN to develop? Does the UN know what Africa really needs? Did it involve the communities from each country when it started to implement the goals set for us? Does the UN know Africa better than Africans do? From an African perspective, the answers will largely be no. There is no tangible reason to suggest that someone else from outside Africa will understand the problems and challenges facing the people of Africa.

The MDGs are nothing but an extension of the structural adjustment programmes, and like the latter, make African states further indebted. The MDGs have been more successful in conference papers than on the ground. African people are still largely marginalised by the world systems, inequality and poverty have intensified, and African debts to these Bretton Woods institutions have trebled while the latter and their host countries become wealthier and more developed by the day.

Africa's leaders and, to a degree, its elites should carry some, if not all, of the blame for the continent's developmental shortcomings. They signed up for Bretton Woods projects and programmes without any proper understanding of them or consultations with the people on the ground. As previously discussed, youths in Nigeria, Benin and elsewhere protested against the SAPs but were suppressed; and while the MDGs were developed to tackle poverty and promote health, education and literacy, it seems as if few African countries have met them. Here, it is strange that they have not been met in countries like Ethiopia, which show steady sustainable growth.

CASE STUDY: ETHIOPIA

Encouraging progress has been registered in most economic and social sectors in Ethiopia. A 10-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) was developed in 2010. With double-digit growth in the economy, poverty fell from 44 percent in 2001 to 29 percent in 2010.

However, poverty reduction and economic growth strategies are not complementary. There are low levels of income in Ethiopia, and hence spending and savings are low. Agriculture and food processing industries are absent. Structural food security and environmental degradation remain common, particularly in the rural areas. The industrial sector, inflation and macro-economic stability are major challenges in the face of a growth in unemployment, as indicated in the country's MDG Report. The absence of irrigation negatively impacts on small-scale subsistence farmers, making them vulnerable to changes in climate patterns.

Structural transformation should be encouraged to enable the achievement of the SDGs in 2030 as planned a year ago. UN targets for Ethiopia have been unrealistic, but the country is moving in the right direction. Primary school enrolment is on the rise, though the education sector faces major challenges due to its low quality and limited resources. The health sector has made major gains and will strengthen. The promotion and provision of preventive and primary health care services are improving, and will curb the current high maternal and child mortality rate.

However, rapid population growth continues to pose a challenge to the government due to the absence of resources to acquire human and technological capacity for dealing with periodic droughts. Situations like these lead to the government's relying on the UN and developed economies for assistance when there is a need for humanitarian aid, such as emergency medical and nutritional assistance.

Moreover, Transparency International ranks Ethiopia as among the most corrupt states in Africa, one with high capital flight. Research by the University of Massachusetts²¹ revealed that Ethiopia has lost US\$25 billion to capital flight in the last decade. Similarly, a human rights report in 2010 alleged that development aid to Ethiopia is politicised, rechannelled into government projects, or siphoned off altogether. The government is said to manipulate social and economic development indicators for political reasons.

Ethiopia has a highly polarised political system rooted in ethnic division and characterised by the absence of multi-party democracy and a tangible, long-term development project. The masses are marginalised; a sustainable state has not emerged; freedom of speech is non-existent, forcing educated Ethiopians into political exile around the world; and ethnic politics are entrenched in the country's federal constitution.

As a result of these factors, Ethiopia lacks good governance and inequality is increasing. Reducing poverty is essential for mitigating the suffering of millions and creating the basis for long-term economic development. A review of land ownership is required; similarly, preserving water and natural resources and enhancing food security are critical for curbing Ethiopia's dependency on foreign aid. Improved coordination of the latter will help in

the achievement of the MDGs, recently extended into Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

More widely, political will, a people-oriented policy framework, and the transformative implementation of policies would enable economic advancement for the masses. The need for Afro-centric mechanisms that give local communities a clearer voice in addressing the problems they face remains paramount.

THE DESIRABILITY OF AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS

Africa is culturally diverse, yet its multiplicity of cultures are people-oriented, stressing humanitarian values, communal well-being and the preservation of nature. The African economic system, however, is based on massive wealth accumulation by individuals or the select few at the expense of the many. In other words, the principle of capitalism cannot work, and has not worked, in the African cultural context.

According to Herbert,²² it has been argued that globalisation would enhance the livelihood of all people worldwide; yet instead it has benefited only a few nations and multinational corporations, while impoverishing the masses even further, especially the working class in sub-Saharan Africa. Herbert notes that '[a]t the start of the nineteenth century the ratio of real incomes between the world's richest and poorest countries was three to one (3:1). By 1990, it was 10 to one (10:1); by 2000 it had risen to sixty to 1 (60:1)'.²³ Fourteen years later, the figures were even worse, being estimated at 80 to 1 (80:1).

Globalisation has enabled the financialisation of the monetary system, concentrating ownership of global capital in the hands of the few and creating a new world order. Within this new world order, even governments are globalised and weakened by a highly and efficiently structured financial system that controls almost everything from a centre-point. 'This new world order', Herbert writes,²⁴ 'feeds on the environment; it generates social apartheid, encourages racism and ethnic strife, undermines the rights of women and often precipitates countries into destructive confrontations between nationalities'. Indeed, the more resources are discovered, the more violent these confrontations become, as the examples of Egypt and South Sudan show. Citizens take up arms rather than engage in dialogue with each other to find consensus. The spirit of Ubuntu prioritises humanity and finding common ground; that is to say, violent conflict has no place in African cultures – these are conflicts manufactured in boardrooms in the West. Africa should not embrace advice from those knowing little to nothing about Ubuntu.

Globalisation is part of a Western agenda to induce Third World countries with huge resources to open up their economies for exploitation by transnational corporations. Herbert argues that those who refuse to do so in the name of globalisation are almost certainly confronted with a planned and carefully executed onslaught, directly or indirectly, by the WB, IMF and World Trade Organisation. These organisations use the levers of loan conditions, aid and, in conjunction with the North American Treaty Organisation (NATO), military threats to secure cooperation.

THE UBUNTU PERSPECTIVE

Wikipedia defines Ubuntu²⁵ as ‘a southern African ethic or humanist philosophy that focuses on people’s allegiances and relations with each other’. It is a concept that stresses unity, the spirit of sharing, and uplifting each other to win. Ubuntu is a core of African values that implies that ‘I am what I am because of who we all are’.

African solutions, as stated above, lie within the heart of Africanism, in a way of thinking that has been distorted in favour of Western concepts. Africans are made to believe that what comes from the West is the best, and it is through the use of this perception that Western solutions are packaged and sold to Africans. However, Africans need to re-adapt African brotherhood and understand the consequences of corrupt leadership and of self-enrichment in the allocation of resources. Most importantly, Africans need to come up with ways and means that will motivate people to foster peaceful transformation while celebrating African unity in diversity.

SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE

Speaking with one voice is the most important part of problem-solving in Africa. If all African states shared their problems, a lot would be achieved. Africa’s cultures are well-known for their communal attributes and selflessness: living together, mourning their deaths together, celebrating successes together and developing solutions to problems together.

By contrast, all secret deals undertaken with foreign countries, especially with Europeans and Americans, are Western practices and influenced by the growing trend towards self-enrichment at the expense of the masses. Colonisation is real, alive and present in Africa. African leadership must be united, be strong and stand its ground when it comes to the interests of its people. This voice needs to be proud and loud enough to be able to turn things around.

THERE IS MONEY IN AFRICA

Many countries dwell on the assumption that Africa needs aid for its development. In the course of time, between the implementation of the SAPs to their extension into MDGs and then SDGs, development in Africa has not impacted effectively upon the lives of the masses yet the continent's debt has just kept rising. Once again, we have been indoctrinated into thinking that Africa does not have money. It is endowed with abundant natural resources, resources that have kept it in the global spotlight and which the world needs, and it has agricultural products that could foster transformation among the poor.

As much as one does not disregard the fact that Africa is still dependent on international donors for its development, the Bretton Woods institutions have been less concerned with the continent's development than with their own self-interest. There is enough economic potential in Africa for it to drive its transformation itself, but a crucial problem in this regard is the need for equitable management of resources. With so many resources available, wealth can be created in abundance and be sufficient for all; however, African leaders and other major stakeholders have to put in place a strategic management model reflecting the African perspective. Below is an indication of Africa's levels of debt.

Table 3.1 What Africa owes the WB: External debt trends in 2015
(in US\$ billions)²⁶

Regions	2014 Estimates	2015 Estimates
East Asia and Pacific	1817	1726
Europe/Central Asia	1025	1075
Latin America/Caribbean	1347	1330
Middle East/North Africa	187	197
South Asia	613	670
Sub-Saharan Africa	403	430

Source: WB Debtor Reporting System

Table 3.2 Adapted from the WB debtor reporting system statistics
(in US\$ billions)

Regions	Debt outstanding, 2011	Debt outstanding: Export, 2011
Sub-Saharan Africa	15	44,5
Middle East and North Africa	24,8	62,5
Total	39,8	107

Source: WB 2013

AFRICAN POLICIES AND STATISTICS

Africa must now utilise all the systems that have been created to make sure that sustainable policies are implemented. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is one of the frameworks the African Union (AU) has initiated to foster the adaptation and formulation of policies. The APRM was initiated in 2002 and fully established in 2003 by the AU in the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The APRM's objectives are:

- primarily to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration, through experience-sharing and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and proper assessments of the requirements for capacity-building.

HOW DOES THE APRM WORK?

Structurally, the peer review mechanism is constituted in the following manner:

- The Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government (APR Forum) is the highest decision-making authority of the APRM.
- The AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities, chaired by the former United Nation Secretary General, His Excellency Kofi Annan, oversees the review process with the purpose of ensuring integrity, considers reports and makes recommendations to the APR Forum.
- The APRM Secretariat provides secretarial, technical, coordinating and administrative support to the APRM.
- The Country Review Mission Team (CRM Team) visits member states to review progress and produce an APRM Report on the country.

The APRM process looks at four focus areas:

- **Democracy and good political governance.** This area focuses on ensuring that member state constitutions reflect the democratic ethos, provide accountable governance and promote political representation, allowing all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment.
- **Economic governance and management.** Good economic governance, including transparency in financial management, is an

essential prerequisite for promoting economic growth and reducing poverty.

- **Corporate governance.** This area focuses on promoting ethical principles, values and practices that are in line with broader social and economic goals to benefit all citizens. It works to promote a sound framework for good corporate governance.
- **Socioeconomic development.** Poverty can only be effectively tackled through the promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and security, as well as the development of human and physical resources.

The Peer Review Mechanism is an African project created and run by Africans. Its objectives are to encourage the correct implementation of development-oriented policies across the continent. It therefore acts as a platform of interaction and monitoring of progress in policy implementation. The APRM has a responsibility to also hold leaders accountable for corruption. As such, it stands to provide a platform for strengthening ethical practices and a favourable environment for government officials and leadership across the board to discharge their public duties without fear or favour.

FOCUS ON SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISE (SME) DEVELOPMENT

Africa's growth has been hindered by various factors, many of which have had to do with looking outside for help or blame. Although justifications can be found for this, it remains a fact that African problems will ultimately require African solutions. This is the only solution sustainable in the long run. Only when Africans realise a messiah will not be coming to solve their problems and take full responsibility for their path will they be in a position to address their plight. This responsibility must begin at the individual level and spiral to communities. The contribution that SMEs have made to economic growth, for example, has been immense, and it is one approach that could change the fortunes of Africans, if implemented properly.

The entrepreneurship path as an economic model offers the greatest hope for Africa's development. This model has been in practice for many years, achieving a lot in poor communities. It is also the case that government has not come to the party. One way in which it could do so is to invest in SMEs across sectors. If this is done properly and ethically, African development could skyrocket to levels as high or higher than those in other regions of the world.

A simple shift in perceptions, attitudes and approaches remains a key factor. There is a need for Africans to adopt strategies that are favourable to them and not implement strategies simply because they have been

recommended or prescribed to them. When Africans take the initiative to advance their cause, these initiatives will raise confidence among communities, and this will form the beginning of a conscious move to self-sufficiency and sustainable development. Current and future generations will then be inspired to follow a proactive people-oriented and results-driven African path.

It has been widely observed that Africans have generally become selfish in their quest for a better life. This is apparent from the family level all the way up to the national level. As long as Africans do not see the connectedness of individual behaviour and choices, it will be difficult to rid themselves of greed and selfishness. This is not helping Africa's cause and it is against the spirit of Ubuntu, which has helped us achieve successes and provided us with a sense of identity.

Whilst it is generally agreed that African governments have failed their people in many areas, particularly service delivery and empowerment support, they have an opportunity to redeem themselves if they work with the people to create solutions. This begins by putting aside foreign concepts and going to the people to craft strategies that are home-grown and more practical. It entails building trust and regaining the confidence that has been lost. It will not be easy, but it is possible and the only way to go about developing Africa in a more meaningful way.

One approach that has not been fully exploited, but that will have a lasting impact on the journey towards Africa's entrepreneurial growth, is that of making Ubuntu the heart and soul of entrepreneurship and business. This will help steer people towards sharing resources, adopting best business practices and working collectively in developing successful ventures. One way to go about this is to begin at the small-group level: small business owners could form business clans that meet on a weekly basis. Every individual in the group would carry the responsibility of assisting other members to gain a better understanding of managing a small business and improving their networks as well as generating more business leads. The problem of small businesses collapsing within a few years of their existence would have been addressed, and a sustainable path to African economic growth and development would have been paved.

One major area these groups could look at would be that of formulating business strategies. Collectively, the members would look into each other's businesses and formulate working strategies for growth and sustainability. They would draw wisdom from each other's experiences and pass it on to the other group members. The result would be the readiness of each member to tackle day-to-day challenges as well as maximise the many business opportunities that would otherwise be left unharnessed, due to a lack of preparedness.

A huge benefit of the Ubuntu groups would be that of networking. The frequency of the meetings, coupled with the close proximity of the members, would result in strong relationships being formed. This will, of course, be made possible only by the adoption of a common culture that places great emphasis on growing win-win relationships. Given the importance of relationships in business, the benefits to be acquired from the networking activities are numerous.

The group would also ensure that marketing opportunities are provided. This happens through interaction, which results in each member getting the word out about the others. In an ideal scenario, each member of the group is on the lookout for business opportunities for him- or herself as well as every member of the group. In meeting prospective clients, the group member would also hand out the business cards of other group members.

One area that has played a major role in the failure of African business ventures is that of management and leadership. The group can address it by taking responsibility for improving each other's leadership and management skills. There are various ways of doing this, depending on the skills of the group members. For instance, they could adopt the practice of reading management and leadership books in their meetings and considering how they could adopt these practices in their businesses.

Vocational training is a critical area that has been overlooked but which holds the potential to develop Africans in business and entrepreneurship. The more skilled artisans we have, for example, the more people we have to perform crucial services where trained people are scarce. Vocational training is best implemented from an early age, as in the past when fathers trained their sons to take over their trade eventually. Policies that emphasise vocational training in schools and institutions of higher learning will go a long way towards achieving significant growth in entrepreneurship and the business environment.

The role of women in policies cannot be ignored, especially in policies that address the business environment. Businesswise, African women are making immense contributions in various sectors. The common African philosophy of togetherness should be translated into initiatives that advance the continent rather than ones that emulate borrowed principles and turn the business world into a male-dominated sector. There can be meaningful progress only if women play an equal role. This is best achieved when a culture is developed of including women socioeconomically from an early age. Women have proven to be extraordinary entrepreneurs and businesspeople, so one can only imagine the heights they would scale if given the necessary support and acknowledgement.

A platform for dialogue between the youth and leadership is required within the continent. Perhaps the phrase 'our youths are tomorrow's leaders'

should not just be spoken but given practical effect. It is perhaps time too for Africa's leaders to initiate dialogue with the youth. In turn, the youth cannot afford to wait to be called on by current leadership; they have to find a way of positioning themselves, or initiating dialogue, around areas that affect them. Engaging the youth, particularly in policy formulation, is part of good governance, and can translate into viable social cohesion and stability. This is a major step towards establishing all-inclusive and progressive social development, paving the way for job creation and serving to address runaway unemployment in Africa.

The call is for radical change in policies now. As a case underlining the urgent need for it, Bisong points out that in 2009 Cameroon had a population estimated at 19,8 million people, 13 million of whom were skilled and employable youths; of them, only one million were employed.²⁷ In a follow-up study, Bisong found that the number of the employed had dropped below one million, describing the situation as a ticking time-bomb for the country. Radical change is called for, then, not reform: the problem with reform is that the same people remain in leadership, and experience shows that bad leadership cannot be reformed. What is required is change in both policies and leadership.

On 10 February 2011, university graduates in Cameroon woke up to an announcement that the government was aiming to recruit into the public services 25 000 skilled and employable young persons with at least a university degree. Cameroonians applied in their hundreds of thousands. At the time of writing, however, not a single youth is employed or has been interviewed, nor has follow-up information been provided by the presidency, any ministry or any other part of government.

This is a typical display of African leadership, where leaders, once elected into a position of power, become the masters of the masses, who are untouchable, immune to laws and invincible – and arrogantly so. In most cases, African leaders become a law unto themselves, which provides confirmation that they have assimilated the teaching of white supremacy and have become a supreme white in a black skin. This leadership model is seen across the continent.

As such, the concerns Africa's freedom fighters and liberation movements had about white colonisers have not gone away. A new form of oppressor has emerged post-independence or post-democratisation. African leaders are the new oppressors and obstacles to Africa's advancement in all areas of development. Police brutality and arbitrary killing in the name of state security continue to rise; service delivery is in constant decline; primary health care is almost worse than in the 1960s, except that the number of malfunctioning health centres has increased; and false political statements are framed to please the masses with false hope.

CONCLUSION

This chapter set out to investigate youth unemployment and social development in Africa. Although some countries have fared better than others, youth unemployment is a fundamental problem at continental level. It is the case equally that Africa is contending with a system unfavourable to its development and in need of change. Poor leadership, corruption, nepotism and maladministration are among the key factors hampering Africa's development. Closely related to weakness of leadership is another crucial factor, namely the involvement of powerful nations and multinational corporations in the affairs of the continent; their involvement is also a major cause of armed conflicts in Africa.

It is hence time for the continent to begin formulating and implementing home-made policies that encourage and embrace transformation. The determination of Africa's destiny should be guided by African values and pro-poor, people-oriented solutions. In this regard, developing a continental platform that can enable the emergence of thought leadership for Africa's renewal is non-negotiable and long overdue; crucially, too, youth need to be engaged in decision-making, particularly in matters affecting their daily lives.

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The Construction of the Person and Personality in Africa

Kimani S. K. Nehusi

INTRODUCTION THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY

Life asks only one fundamental question of everyone who has lived, is alive and will live: Who are you? Failure to know and live the answer fully manifests itself as an inability to know the difference between the self, family, friends and allies and to understand the genuine interests of the individual or group – the consequence being a catastrophic failure to defend and advance those interests.

Implied in any discourse about society, and at the heart of socialisation and education, is the individual human being, the person. She or he is to live in society, that is, in association and interdependence with other humans. This chapter focuses on the individual person who lived in, and was conceptualised and represented by, the society of Kemet (ancient Egypt), which provides the earliest detailed record of African culture and society.

Long before anyone else, Africans developed and elaborated a theory and practice of the person and personality. As may be expected, the person and personality in Africa is different from all others, though there are of course some similarities. It is a different model to that affirmed in Eurocentric social theory and social science research.¹ African normality can therefore be achieved only when Africans live within African traditions, as agents of their own culture, rather than attempting to ‘be like’ Arabs or Europeans or any other human cultural group different to them. As this chapter demonstrates, it is equally important to recognise Kemet’s continuities with later African societies.

The conceptualisation of the individual in Kemet, the first known representation of the individual in history, constitutes one of the earliest known parts of a tradition of representation of the self in African philosophy and

practice. This native tradition is distinctive and has existed from before Kemet to contemporary Africa and its diasporas. The people of Kemet represent both the figure of the African and the figure of the first human being who invented civilisation and gave to humanity its humanity.

This attempt to recover the ancient African understanding of the person and personality is not new. There is great significance in the fact that W. E. Blyden, Kwame Nkrumah, Amílcar Cabral and other leading fighters for African liberation were concerned with rediscovering the African personality, as one aspect of their struggle to triumph over the impositions of Arab and European colonisation. More recently, African-centred scholars and activists have shared this concern. However, although African-centred movements know about the construction of the person in Kemet, their approaches have generally not traced African history back to its roots in Kemet. Consequently, the resulting concept was not informed by the highly developed theory of the people of Kemet, did not incorporate it fully, and was not clarified and validated by the continuities and discontinuities with this tradition, which is thousands of years old.

The concern with the African personality has been occasioned by the deconstruction and fragmentation of African national identity and the oppression of Africans by foreign powers with very different creeds and cultural ideals. In the contemporary era, which has been termed the African Renaissance, there is a need for African unity and the reconstruction of African national identity. This is necessary both as a way of repossessing the African self and constructing the New African, who is indispensable for the envisaged New Africa.

It is necessary to reconstruct the ancient Egyptian conception of the person for a variety of reasons. First, such a reconstruction provides the basis for understanding this important society. Kemet is important to all Africans because it was an early high-point of African achievement. The construction of the person in Kemet provides the oldest model of the human being in an African tradition that may be (re)possessed with some certainty. Moreover, there are clear continuities of this tradition of the individual with later African traditions, including those in contemporary Africa and African communities abroad.

The task of reconstructing the African personality thus is much clearer when we know our beginnings or when we can get as close to those beginnings as possible. This reconstruction is ultimately of the greatest importance to all Africans, for Africans continue to suffer from the distortion and destruction of the African personality by Arabs and Europeans. For all these reasons, the concept of the person developed by the people of Kemet is the surest basis from which to begin the necessary task of re-imagining and rebuilding the African person and personality.

SOME LIMITATIONS

It is imperative to recognise the critical importance of change upon the person and personality that is briefly reconstructed here. The agents of such change are not difficult to identify. Historically, the first has been natural evolution, that is, adaptation over time to various environmental factors. Hence, although conservatism was the dominant of the two opposing tendencies, a measure of dynamism (as will be shown in this chapter) was present in the concept and practice of the person and personality throughout the social history of Kemet.

A second, and far more problematic, factor is the impact of Arab and European colonisation during the *Maafa* or *Maangamezi*. This has correctly raised discussion, debate and theorisation about the processes, results and significance of cultural resistance, capitulation and accommodation, all of which have been unfolding in African society more or less since the first foreign incursion. However, there is not enough space in this chapter for a proper discussion of assimilation, the *evolvé*, *assimilado* or the 'accepted', the Afro-Saxon, double consciousness, false consciousness, 'othering' and objectification, Caliban and Prospero, the subaltern, post-coloniality, neo-colonialism and other concepts and processes that have arisen from the critique of the colonial encounter in Africa and its diasporas.

Similarly, only cursory recognition can be given to the current Chinese presence in Africa, which has drawn growing criticism for its many similarities with colonial domination, notwithstanding its significant differences. A similar process of description, interrogation and assessment must be applied to technology and modernity, neither of which Africa must confuse with progress.

The project to reconstruct, to change where necessary, and to revitalise the African person and personality cannot proceed without encountering these sources of change and assessing their impact and meaning. The central question seems to be whether or not Africa can absorb whatever is useful to it from these encounters while preserving the African person and personality. However Africans change, Africans also need to remain Africans. It is the African person and personality that must incorporate and absorb outside influences – not the other way around. The current predicament of the distorted and confused or lost African personality offers enough of a warning in this regard.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSON AND PERSONALITY IN KEMET

The tendency in many ancient and modern societies has been to conceptualise the human being as made up of two parts: a physical body and a non-physical aspect which is usually termed a spirit or a soul. The ancient Egyptians possessed a far more complex understanding of the person – generally more complex and sophisticated even than that of modern Africa. The construction of the person is not a subject that has received extensive investigation in the literature on Egyptology, where it is characterised by many passing references.^{2,3,4} Nevertheless, it is a sign of its importance that references to this subject are scattered across this field.

This concept of the person did not arrive suddenly, complete and stable in the consciousness of the people of Kemet. The number and meanings of the terms for various parts of the person were not static over the long history of that society: some evolved. It is also true that there is no known grand statement of this theory, in which all the details are elaborated in a single place in the writings of the people of Kemet. Nevertheless, a more or less complete statement may be recovered through synthesis, analysis and evaluation of the numerous references in the writings of the people of Kemet, as well as in modern writings based upon these ancient sources.

In the most developed and elaborate statement of this theory of the person, every individual is composed of nine different indispensable elements or aspects, each of which is termed a *kheper* (plural *kheperu*) or mode of existence.⁵ Of these nine aspects, the  : *hꜥt*, *khat* or physical body may be regarded as purely physical. In addition, the aspect termed the  : *ib*: *ib* or heart, may at first sight be related to this category, but as is shown below, such an interpretation is profoundly limiting and therefore misleading.

The other category, that is, the non-physical or non-biological aspects of the person, is further subdivided into seven different parts – in fact eight aspects when the *ib* or heart is included. Here, the  : *rn*: *ren* or name, the  *s*chu or spiritual envelope around the person, the  *sekhem* or potential of the individual and the  : *šwt*: *shut* or shadow are embodiments of the individual's essence or unique personality, although of course there are shared elements with all other persons who existed, exist and will exist within the culture of Kemet and Africa in general. The  : *kꜣ*: *ka* or vital force is fundamental to every created being and thing and the  : *bꜣ*: *ba* is the individual soul of each human being.

The eight and ninth aspects of the person are communal. These are the *ib*, which is the location of consciousness and morality, and the  (variations include  ,  ,  and ): *ꜣḫ*: *akh* (plural *akhw*) or revered spirit that is passed down from ancestors. It was important to preserve each of these aspects of the person. For the ancient Egyptian, this was

achieved in various ways, from mummifying the *khat* (and so preserving it through eternity), to reciting the name to make it live and feeding the *ka*. Each of these events and processes of preservation was accompanied by appropriate rituals.

THE : *ḥꜥt*: OR PHYSICAL BODY

The people of Kemet were very clear that the material body, which they called the  : *ḥꜥt*, *khat*, was not the only aspect of a person. They recognised it as the material part that housed the non-material aspects of the person. In the spiritually conscious African community today, for example among the Rastafari, the physical body is often referred to simply as 'the physical' or as 'the temple' of the person. It is a very perceptive ascription, with tremendous implications for our understanding of the person and personality. The physical aspect or *khat* housed the spiritual aspects (*ka*, *ba*, *shut*, *sahu*, *sekhem* and *akh*) and social aspects (*ren* and *ib*).

It is the location of these other non-physical aspects in the *khat* or physical body that makes each of us into a person. Each of these adds an invisible but living dimension to the physical form that houses them all in life. In this profound way, a *khat* is only a *khat* when the other aspects are housed within it. It is not what remains when *ib*, *rn*, *ka*, *ba*, *swt*, *sahu*, *sekhem* and *akh* have all left. Then it is dead. Looked at in this way, death is the reversal of life and serves to illuminate these aspects in the life of every individual. Keeping the dead physical body intact is also of great importance in later Africa. The dead are therefore not cremated in African tradition.

THE : *kꜣ* OR *ka*

The  : *kꜣ* (*ka*) aspect is best thought of as a 'double', alter ego or guardian spirit of the person.⁶ In ancient Egyptian art, it was represented as an exact copy of the individual who owned it. This aspect of the person was passed on from parents to children. Yet it was also the personal possession of each individual, and so an element in the construction of personality. After death, it remained in the tomb and its nourishment was the immediate objective of the food offerings that were standard in ancient Egyptian spiritual practice.⁷

At some point in the evolution of these notions of the person in Kemet, a royal *ka* was developed. This was separated from the other aspects of the individual, as well as alienated from the mass of people. It was a special *ka* that had developed along a unique trajectory inherited only by the pharaohs, who came to share this royal *ka* that was inherited. The possession of the royal *ka* legitimised each heir as Pharaoh.

 : *b3* OR *ba*

In the estimation of Taylor, the  : *b3* or *ba* is ‘the nearest equivalent to the modern notion of the “soul”’.⁸ It represented the personality of the individual to a significantly greater extent than the *ka*. It was a part of its owner throughout life. However, after death, it acquired a special importance. Most often represented as a human-headed bird, it had the ability to leave the tomb during the day, but was compelled to return and be united with the dead body during the night.

The interpretation of both the *ka* and the *ba* poses a challenge to European scholars, chiefly because there are no equivalent concepts in modern European thought. The evolution of these two concepts as the history of Kemet unfolded adds to the challenge in interpreting them accurately. Terms such as ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’ are inaccurate; ‘life force’ or ‘vital force’ less so.

THE   : *3h*: *Akh* OR SPIRIT

  : *3h*: *akh* or spirit (variations include   ,  ,  and ). The appropriate rituals transformed the deceased person into an *akh* or ‘transfigured spirit’ or ‘blessed dead’: one who successfully negotiated the judgement ritual indicated by the weighing of the heart and the ascription of the title of *Maa Kheru*. The *akhu* were normally benevolent ancestral spirits. They were venerated at the tomb and in the home in the form of sculptured busts and stelae depicting these ancestors. However, they could become troublesome, usually due to neglect or other indiscretions by living relatives. Bad spirits were termed *mutu*, ‘the damned’. These were the spirits of those who failed the judgement of the heart, discussed below.

THE  : *ib* OR HEART

Though the  : *ib* is literally the physical ‘heart’ of an individual, this aspect is best placed among the non-biological parts of the person. The reason is that the term refers to the ancient Egyptians’ belief (from the time of the Middle Kingdom onwards) that this organ was really the seat of consciousness, intelligence and morality – the mind, in modern translation. Part of the evolution of this concept is described by Assman:

In clear opposition to the Old Kingdom concept of man, where man seems to act exclusively on royal orders, where the king seems to monopolize initiative, planning and motivation and where the notion of ‘heart’ is in the biological inscriptions, the Middle Kingdom biographies present a concept where man is inwardly directed by his heart as the seat of character, virtue,

principles, competence, motivation, and will. If he serves the king, it is his heart guiding him to do so.⁹

The people of Kemet thought that the heart and the head were necessary for preservation of the individual and the ability to enjoy the afterlife. Only the heart, of all the internal organs, remained intact during mummification. It was this organ that was weighed against a feather during judgement. The meaning here is clearly that it was the person's conscience and morality, as expressed through her or his actions in life, that were judged. It was therefore critical to the ideas of judgement and the afterlife, and therefore of morality, which was expressed principally through the notion of maintaining *Maat* (universal order, righteousness, justice, reciprocity, truth, harmony and balance)^{10, 11} by adherence to the Declarations of Innocence.

The centrality of morality to the ancient Egyptian conception of the person should be noted. It was adumbrated through the relationship among central concepts such as *Maat*, the Twelve Virtues and the Forty-Two Declarations of Innocence. The influence of these concepts on the spiritual system, law, socialisation and education in Egyptian society was significant, constituting a value system that was the basis of every social institution.

THE :rn: *ren* OR NAME

The  : rn: *ren* or name announces both the individuality of the person and her or his clan or national identity. A name often provides such details as circumstances in the family or community at the time of birth, family and clan origin and association, ancestors, a quality, a virtue or a value shared by the community, and so a declaration of life's mission; hence also social orientation.

The role of the  as an agent of socialisation functioned through reinforcement of one's mission in life, whether it relates to 'becoming' at one with a particular divinity or to some other idea or ideal thought by the people of Kemet to have been worthy of a lifetime's pursuit or attainment at a particular point in life. Throughout their history, the people of Kemet held firmly to a system of ideas and practices about names. As with the other aspects of the person, considerations of space preclude full elaboration here, but these may be rendered in outline:

- A person comes into existence only when that person's name is pronounced.
- Names are divine.
- Names live.

- A name is one of the basic aspects of a person and is integral to the person.
- A name expresses the (social) direction of a person.
- Knowledge of a name is the same as knowledge of the owner of the name.
- It is of the utmost importance to preserve the name of a person (that is, in the terminology of the *Medew Neter*, to ‘make his/her name live’) and so ensure that he or she does not experience cosmic or eternal death. This is achieved by pronouncing the name regularly. The converse is also true, for to not pronounce someone’s name was to ensure that that person did not survive into the afterlife. Worse, erasing the name of someone ensured the cosmic death of that individual.^{12, 13, 14}

THE : šwt OR SHADOW

The  : šwt: *shut* or shadow was often associated with the *ba*, possessed similar freedom of movement and the same ability to leave and re-enter its owner’s tomb.

THE : sekhem OR POWER OR FORCE

This aspect of the person may be regenerative and therefore constructive, or destructive, or both simultaneously. This is really the potential of the person.

THE : s^chu: SAHU

The sahu is the spiritual envelope around the physical body of the person.

The terms outlined above were not static through the long history of ancient Egypt. The first two mean much more than ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’, which is how they are often translated. The notion of ‘vital force’ is less inaccurate but still does not describe all the implied possibilities.^{15, 16, 17, 18} Together, these aspects make up the personality of each individual. The different emphases, combinations and other variations of these aspects account for differences in personality among individual human beings. The fact that everyone in a particular cultural group possesses all of these, in historically and culturally specific ways, means that each group has a collective personality. Therefore, every individual has two selves: one individual and one collective. The two are inseparable; both at the concrete or operational level of reality and in the way our ancestors conceptualised and articulated that reality.

An understanding of the construction of the person and personality in Kemet cannot be limited to an examination of the nine aspects of the individual described in this chapter. Consideration of the writings of the scholars of Kemet shows that in their concept of the person and personality, the related notions of androgyny and gender were as important as any of the nine elements. It is therefore important to consider these two concepts, especially because of continuities with the contemporary African world.

SEX

There is no known direct statement that the people of Kemet held it as fact that a human being is composed of both male and female aspects, and, further, that in males the male aspects dominate and that the female aspects dominate in females. Yet ancient Egyptian representations of and statements about the individual proceed from and therefore imply just such assumptions. For example, there is a very clear recognition of both female and male aspects in the post-mortem reconstitution and regeneration of the female person.^{19, 20} This provides evidence of the most decisive kind, for the records were unselfconscious: they were not trying to prove this as a fact and it was common knowledge among the ancient Egyptian scholars. The same principle must have applied to males, for in the ancient Egyptian construction of humanity, females and males were opposites as well as complementary.

All of this is demonstrated in the conception of circumcision, which is discussed briefly below. Western science, which often poses as the sum total of human knowledge, did not discover the existence of X and Y chromosomes and their roles in determining biological sex until some thousands of years after these first assertions on the nature of the human being in Kemet.

But that was not the end of the story. Initiation at puberty renders the individual an adult male or an adult female. The implications are enormous. Each individual, male or female, is incomplete and unbalanced by herself or himself and needs a relationship with a member of the opposite sex to be complete and in balance. Without the other, either one cannot reproduce, that is, cannot perpetuate the species, which would soon become extinct – a sure way of ensuring cosmic death. Offspring make the unit formed even more complete and secure, as does the clan and the nation.

This is why, in Kemet and all other succeeding African societies, it is important, even imperative, for the individual to become mature, get married and procreate. Refusal or inability to achieve any of these important objectives in the life-cycle was, and still is, severely frowned upon – to put it politely.

The notion of androgyny could only mean the possession of *both* male and female biological attributes within a single individual – a conclusion substantiated by the Egyptians themselves. For example, the term constructed to represent a pre-puberty person, that is, a child, did not distinguish gender. The graphic representation of the ancient Egyptian idea of a boy was  : *id*; that of a girl was  : *idyt*.²¹ A child was represented as  : *hrd*. All of the variations in writing this word contain the determinative or sense sign , which indicates childhood, a term that was itself written with the same sign:  : *nhnt*.^{22, 23} The determinative or sense category is the same for all children.

Hence it appears that all the words for child, whether male or female, and childhood, were governed by this gender-neutral idea conveyed by this determinative or category sign. In this language, there is one determinative single category for all persons who have not yet reached puberty, been circumcised and so been determined as being male or female. Socially, no separation into male and female has yet occurred, thus the language faithfully represents this condition.

A logical consequence of this condition of androgyny is the need to ritually separate female from male at the point of initiation, which, significantly, occurred at the point of sexual and social maturity. This ritual clarification of sex (biology) and simultaneous allocation of (socially constructed) gender roles was especially important in a society in which the difference between sex and gender was strongly marked. This clarification recognised that sex is biologically determined while gender is socially constructed.

This cosmology and cosmogony invites us to think differently about the ancient Egyptians and ourselves. Let us restate what was learnt from this examination of the facts. There is something male in each of us, and there is something female in each of us; the male attributes outweigh the female attributes in males and the female attributes outweigh the male attributes in females.

These aspects of the person and personality in the  *Medew Neter*, the language of Kemet, define the parameters of the individual person and personality, and go some way towards defining the collective person and personality in this specific part of the African experience of being during the era of about 3000 BCE to 525 CE, an African time-space configuration normally referred to as  : Kemet or ancient Egypt. These different aspects of the individual are, therefore, simultaneously the fundamentals that constitute the personality of an individual human and a specific human group. They are dynamic and change over time and space, always in the process of socialisation and always in a specific historical and cultural context.

The result of this interaction of personality (the peculiar combination of the different aspects of humanity possessed by each individual human being) with history/tradition and culture is identity. This is inescapably individual and collective, since the individual personality is developed in this process and that development, at least in part, inculcates certain values, attitudes and behaviours that are shared with other members of the social and cultural group, through determining and moderating institutions, rituals and other collective practices.

Socialisation, including education, is the ordering of the development of the entire individual, that is, all aspects of her or him, to achieve predetermined goals desirable to the individual and the group, that is, to society. That these goals are predetermined does not necessarily mean that the individual was placed in some social straitjacket in which individualism was stifled; but it does mean that things were so arranged that the chances for excessive and detrimental individualism to exist were remote.

It is the combination of each of these aspects of humanity in a particular individual that amounts to individual difference – that ceaseless joy and wonder of reality in which no two individuals are ever exactly alike, even though humanity continues to reproduce itself hundreds of millions of times over vast measures of time and space. Those who belong to a distinct culture retain their individuality while sharing cultural aspects that render them simultaneously more like each other – and so members of the same distinctive group – as well as unlike all others. It is the influence of tradition and culture upon all of these, including the rituals, ceremonies and processes in which each may convey that culture, which amounts to the collective personality of the group that shares a particular culture.

The understanding of the person and personality held by the people of Kemet led them to the recognition that no one is devoid of personality, which is that specific combination of human characteristics that renders each of us different from everyone else, and each group of us to be also different from every other group. It is that understanding that led to the famous instruction, 'Know yourself!'. This instruction is an urgent command to all Africans. Its proper fulfilment has been made more challenging and even more necessary by the *Maafa/Maangamezi*. The continuing destruction of identity and disablement of African people is the living reason for its great urgency.

It is imperative for a proper understanding of the person that we retain the idea that a person is all of these things simultaneously, that is, the sum of her or his parts, with the capacity to be more. In this African land, it was the social ideal that a person would indeed become more, that is, continue to grow and become more accomplished as she or he progressed through life. The African ancestors therefore recognised the importance of nurturing and developing the *khat* as well as some of these non-material

- say*, 'intelligent souls', and its reflection made up of a comparable couple, *kikinu bummone*, 'errant souls';
- c) four 'sex souls' grouped like the preceding ones;
- d) a composite vital force (*nyama*); and
- e) the symbol of the basic foods placed in the clavicles, composed of two granaries, each containing four seeds.³⁴

However, unlike this Dogon example, in much of later Africa the number of categories into which the individual in Kemet is rendered is often significantly contracted, generally into two or three aspects. These are sometimes covered, to varying degrees, by the notion of the 'spiritual double' or 'multiple selves',^{35, 36, 37, 38, 39} thereby maintaining the idea held in Kemet that the individual is a multifaceted being.

Attention should be paid here to the way in which male/female twins are present in the cosmology of the Kemet and the Dogon. The nature and meaning of the concept of twins here suggests a single and simultaneous origin (creation), as well as duality, division, equality and complementarity of opposites. Once more, we are led to the egalitarian and complementary nature of African society.

Consistency in terminology between Kemet and living Africa also appears, at a glance, to exist in many details. For example, the ancient Egyptians referred to the revered departed spirits as  : *šhw*: *akh* (singular *akh*). It is the identical term among the Jukun of northern Nigeria today. The speakers of the Twi language, mainly in Ghana and Ivory Coast, as well as the Aucaners and some of the other Maroons in Suriname, employ the term *kra* for what the ancient Egyptians termed the  : *k3* or *ka*. The term  : *k3* is also present in African languages in its secondary meaning, that is, big.


The proliferation of the ontological notion  : *b3* (*ba*) in living Africa also deserves attention. In Kemet, it is a singular noun. Today, in a great part of Africa it is a plural prefix indicating those intangibles held in common by a group of people that make them simultaneously both distinctive from others and recognisable as themselves in their uniqueness. There are a huge number of groups, large and small, whose names begin with this prefix. Bantu is perhaps the largest. 'Vital force' would not be an inaccurate rendition of this ontological idea in English.

These amount to far from a full listing of the similarities and continuities between Kemet and the rest of Africa. They are neither accidental nor isolated instances of cultural continuities preserved in language; they are parts of and attest to a common or considerable convergence of cosmology and cosmogony across the African world. This is evidence, often found at a very deep level, of an underlying cultural unity of Africa, derived either from direct inheritance from Kemet or from an ancestor common to Kemet

and the rest of Africa. But much of this evidence lies buried under layers of history, particularly the history in Africa of conquest and domination by Arab and European societies.

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Away from the Brink

The AU Intervention in the Crisis of Democratic Institutionalisation in Post-Arab Spring Egypt

Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya and Osinimu Femi-Adedayo

INTRODUCTION

The optimism that characterised the Arab Spring of 2011 has begun to sour as reality sets in. The legacy of the Arab Spring includes more than 110 000 Syrian deaths, insecurity in Libya, military control in Egypt, and renewed instability in Algeria.¹ A further consequence has been the increasing institutionalisation of participatory and multi-party democracies in the Arab world. After decades of autocratic monarchies and dictatorial regimes, democratic elections were held in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, while electoral reforms in Saudi Arabia saw the granting of political and voting rights to women.

While the institutionalisation of democracy in post-Arab Spring Libya, Tunisia and Yemen seems to have been successful, albeit with some challenges, the reverse has been the case in Egypt. Growing public concern and grievances regarding the dictatorial tendencies of the then newly elected President, Mohamed Morsi (who assumed more constitutional powers than necessary) have led to military intervention.

The reason for this seemingly unsuccessful democratisation process is not difficult to pinpoint. Attempts at democratic institutionalisation in Egypt were, from the outset, confronted with challenges such as the absence of a formal constitutional framework, weak political institutions and electoral system, the crisis of religion in a secular state, and an excessively powerful military institution. Unfortunately, the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional governance bodies were more intent on enthroning democracy at all costs than ensuring that the democratisation process was founded on unambiguous, predictable conditions and strong institutions supported by popular participation. The outcome has been a botched democratic process that has resulted in a political and security crisis, raising fears that the gains made during the Arab Spring may be diminishing.

In the context of the 'African Solutions to African Problems (ASAP)' approach, this chapter examines the imperative for the AU to intervene in the crisis of democratic process in Egypt. It also points out specific areas and issues for this intervention.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The literature and scholarship on the crisis of democratic institutionalisation in post-Arab Spring Egypt has generated a substantial body of theorisation. These include:

- the theory of uncertainties of democratisation process, by Khemis Mohamed;²
- the theory of crisis of leadership, by James Baker;³
- the theory of homogeneity of initiators, by Micheline Ishay;⁴ and
- the economic theory of democratisation, by Stephen McNerney et al.⁵ and Zubair Iqbal.⁶

Using Yemen, Egypt and Libya as case studies, Khemis Mohamed⁷ developed the theory of the uncertainties of democratisation process. The latter is premised on two major assumptions: 'the existence of uncertainties are the key elements to the possibility of successful democratic transition'; and the transition process assumed to be elite led, or even under the presence of repressive elite that has interests to liberalise and democratise during transition period'.⁸

In another study, James Baker⁹ notes that the challenges of democratic institutionalisation in Egypt are due to what he described as 'a crisis of leadership'. According to him,

leaderless movements of the Arab uprisings – fuelled by news outlets and social media – that contributed to the ousting of dictators in the Arab world ... prevented the manipulation of the uprisings and allowed for a people's revolution.¹⁰

However, he observes that recent trends in Egypt have shown that the crisis of leadership associated with such 'leaderless movements' results in the inability of the people to agree on a common course of action to take. The consequence is usually disagreement among the disparate groups that make up the movement and the parties that assume political leadership.¹¹ Such disagreement builds up and results in divided group interests, a crisis of confidence and a struggle for group supremacy, which ultimately leads to the group's inability to achieve its objective.

In the context of this study, it is evident that the Arab Spring in Egypt, which saw the end of 30 years of Mubarak's regime, was organised by leaderless groups of secular, pro-democracy activists who were later joined by Islamists, liberal political parties, labour unions, and ordinary citizens who desired change. Unfortunately, these groups did not find a middle ground for discussion. According to Stephen McInerney et al., '[W]hile protestors were united in their desire to bring down despots, they were much more uncertain about what should come next'.¹²

Consequently, the Islamists emerged victorious at the polls, controlling the presidency, the upper house and the Constituent Assembly, which had to draft a new national constitution. This prompted concerns that the Islamic Brotherhood could build itself into a monopoly and thereby guarantee its supremacy. As a result, politics in Egypt assumed a violent, zero-sum game character, creating room for the massive protests that in turn led to military intervention.

As valid as the theory of 'crisis of leadership' may seem, it fails, however, to explain why democratic institutionalisation in Tunisia, which had a similar situation to Egypt, seems to have been successful. Notwithstanding this point, the theory has provided us with an understanding of the crisis of democratic institutionalisation at least in Egypt.

In his analysis of democratic transition in post-Arab Spring countries, Micheline Ishay propounded the theory of homogeneity of initiators, which is predicated on three basic assumptions:

- First, the same conditions and forces favourable to revolution may serve to impede efforts at post-revolutionary consolidation.
- Second, one can assess prospects for consolidation based on the capacity of prospective hegemonic parties to achieve several inter-related objectives: developing a shared worldview among disparate segments of the population, delivering social and economic goods, and establishing order.
- Third, while democratisation is a home-grown process, it may require particular forms of limited intervention to off-set anti-democratic forces.¹³

Considered in the context of the Arab Spring countries, especially Egypt, the basic assumptions of the theory hold true. For instance, in all these countries, including Egypt, unfavourable economic conditions, dictatorial and tyrannical leadership and political exclusionism were some of the factors that brought together the disparate groups spearheading the uprisings. However, regarding the theory's first assumption, it can be noted that after the elections the same socioeconomic and political conditions existed, resulting in mass protests that instigated military intervention.¹⁴

As for the second assumption, it provides a prism through which one can view the hegemonic and dictatorial tendencies of the ruling Muslim Brotherhood and its failure to develop and provide 'a shared worldview' among the disparate groups that would enable them to achieve common objectives. The third assumption, that the democratisation process, although home-grown, requires a particular form of limited intervention to offset anti-democratic forces, lends credence to our position here, namely that intervention by the AU as a regional governance body is a necessity in the crisis of democratic institutionalisation in Egypt.

McInerney et al.¹⁵ argue that the crisis of democratic institutionalisation in Egypt arises from the fact that the military institution under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – which is made up of senior military officers and has been managing the transition – has sought to protect its extensive economic and political interests by carving out domains of power beyond the oversight of elected officials. This attempt to protect its economic and political interests explains the interference seen in many aspects of the transition, such as and the delay in holding elections and the delay in the writing of the constitution. Using the old policies of co-option and coercion, the SCAF has also been ineffective but brutal in its handling of sectarian unrest.¹⁶

While this economic theory of democratisation adequately explains the crisis of democratic institutionalisation, especially in Egypt, it fails to account for other explanatory variables, such as 'the deep schisms that exist between secular groups and the Muslim Brotherhood and the seeming reluctance of young activists – particularly those who helped to spearhead the revolution – to engage in traditional party politics'.¹⁷ This weakness notwithstanding, the theory provides a convincing explanation of the crisis in post-Arab Spring Egypt.

Undoubtedly, the crisis of democratic institutionalisation in Egypt from the time of the Arab Spring cannot be fully understood without considering the role of the military institution. As Mehari Maru has argued, although both mainstream Islamists and their secular opponents were favourably disposed to Egypt's being governed by a democratic political system, the military was opposed to it. It skilfully pitted the Liberals against the Islamists, stripped the new Islamist-dominated parliament of any real power, removed President Morsi from office, cracked down on his supporters, and arrested senior leaders of the ruling party.

Maru concludes that 'without the active involvement and grand design of the armed forces, President Morsi would have remained in power'¹⁸ and Egypt's democracy would have been saved. The military's reluctance to embrace the change that the uprising portended was informed by their many vested economic interests in Mubarak. Thus, members wanted to advance

their personal interests rather than those of the Egyptian populace.¹⁹ This study is anchored on the economic theory of democratisation, given its analytical utility.

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN PRE-ARAB SPRING EGYPT

Egypt's modern political history dates back to July 1952, when the Free Officers Movement, led by General Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, launched a coup d'état against King Farouk I. This started what is now known as the Egyptian Revolution, even though political independence had come earlier in 1923 after a sustained campaign for independence between 1919 and 1922. In the 30 years between the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution and the 1952 Free Officers Revolution, Egypt had operated as a constitutional monarchy. According to Laurel Miller et al., the introduction during that 30-year period of an elected parliament into the decision-making process was one of the earliest experiments with elements of democracy in the Arab world. Egypt's political system, although far from the modern democratic ideal, allowed personal freedoms, the creation of civic organisations, and multi-party politics. However, the power of the King far outstripped that of the legislative authority.²⁰

In the same period, however, Egypt became a fierce state in which surveillance and repression substituted for legitimacy gained through participation in public life, the development of institutions, and adherence to the rule of law. The state resorted to extra-legal measures, such as its attempt to neutralise the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s and early 1970s, and Mubarak's use of broad powers, granted under the emergency law, after President Anwar Sadat's assassination.²¹ This notwithstanding, Michael Barnett asserts that political leaders in Egypt derived a degree of legitimacy and popular support from their promotion of ideology (Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism under Nasser). Examples include their prosecution of the 1973 war, which most Egyptians see as an historic victory and a step toward reclaiming the territory and dignity lost in the 1967 *naksa*; and their ability to hold the country together, despite a sizeable Coptic minority and a low-grade Islamist insurgency in upper Egypt in the 1990s.²²

Although the validity of this assertion may be challenged on several grounds, another way of putting it is that Egypt's political leadership has adopted a variety of strategies to perpetuate itself and has created a very complex socio-political and economic system. This may well explain why the military in Egypt has successfully exercised political power in the country for more than five decades, including the nearly 30 years in which President

Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak reigned the country.^{23, 24} According to Laurel Miller et al., these strategies produced a veneer of democratic institutions, along with an expanded civil society that coexisted with state repression and the use of extra-legal measures. In addition, the leadership offered, and many Egyptians accepted, a social contract that featured a large public sector, affordable housing and subsidised staple goods, together with selective economic liberalisation.²⁵

Most importantly, these strategies enabled the ruling class in Egypt to consolidate its hold on political, bureaucratic and institutional powers. Consequently, during the revolution of 2011, which came to be known as the Arab Spring, the protesters in Egypt met with opposition from the ruling class. The latter had much invested in Mubarak and wanted to further their personal interests rather than those of Egyptian nationals. As a result, they did not support the protests.^{26, 27}

The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were the quickest to take shape, despite the apparent control and strength of their ruling classes and the latter's allegiance and connections to the institutions providing security for the regimes.²⁸ The speed of these revolutions was due to a combination of political and economic factors, including issues such as dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, government corruption, economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors (such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth in the population).

In its 2012 report, the African Development Bank (AfDB) noted that the political and economic origins of the Arab Spring are straightforward: Egypt, Libya and Tunisia all failed to develop pluralistic and open political systems. Regarding economic matters, the AfDB asserted that governments in the region failed at job creation, especially for the young, and that the economic policies which formed the basis for inclusive growth after independence had started to unravel.²⁹ The AfDB further noted that for more than three decades North Africa's economies failed to grow fast enough to create sufficient good jobs. Between 1980 and 2010, per capita income in the region averaged only 0,5 per cent per year. Unemployment averaged about 12 per cent over the past two decades – the highest of any region in the world.³⁰

Laurel Miller et al. also assert that economic grievances were clearly one driver of the discontentment that fuelled the Arab Spring in Egypt. Unemployment, which officially sat at a manageable 7,3 per cent in 2000, reached 10 per cent in 2009, with joblessness being particularly acute among university-educated youth. Egyptians also saw an erosion of their economic position due to an increase in inflation. In the first four years (2000-2003) of the last decade, the consumer price index (CPI) in Egypt

registered an average increase of 3,25 per cent, whereas in the last six years of the decade that figure had climbed to 10,5 per cent. Significantly, much of this inflation was driven by a rise in the price of foodstuffs.³¹ Annual statistics prepared by the Egyptian Central Bank for the 2009-2010 fiscal year show that the year-on-year rise in the cost of food and beverages was 18,5 per cent, compared with an overall rise in CPI of 10,7 per cent.³²

The foregoing assertions are supported by data collected from the Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG),³³ which indicates that although welfare in Egypt was rated relatively high between 2000 and 2010, there was a high rate of human rights violations and political exclusion in the country, with an average score of 32,7 points. In addition, while human development was high, at 74,4 points, sustainable economic opportunity was average (59,6 points). In other words, the level of human development was higher than the available sustainable economic opportunities (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2, and Figure 7.1). This may well explain the high rate of unemployment in the country, which has remained a source of social tension.

Table 7.1 Selected socioeconomic and political indices for Egypt: 2000-2010

Year	Human Development	Sustainable Economic Opportunity	Participation and Human Rights	Safety and Rule of Law
2000	69,3	56,2	30,1	62,8
2001	74,9	57,5	30,8	62,3
2002	75,1	56,2	27,4	62,0
2003	75,1	56,2	32,4	62,0
2004	75,4	56,3	28,7	62,1
2005	75,3	57,0	33,9	61,8
2006	75,5	56,9	34,8	61,1
2007	76,2	60,5	37,9	64,0
2008	76,5	61,7	33,6	64,5
2009	72,6	67,9	36,0	64,2
2010	72,6	68,7	34,2	61,8


Source: IIAG (2012).

Table 7.2 Selected socioeconomic and political indices for Egypt:
2000-2010 averages

S/No	Socioeconomic and Political Indices	Average (2000-2010)
1	Human Development	74,4
2	Sustainable Economic Opportunity	59,6
3	Participation and Human Rights	32,7
4	Safety and Rule of Law	51,4

Source: IIAG, 2012.

Figure 7.1 Selected socioeconomic and political indices for Egypt:
2000-2010 averages



Source: IIAG, 2012.


Data from the Corruption Perception Index,³⁴ produced by Transparency International, are also consistent with the findings of IIAG. The Corruption Perception Index indicates a high level of official corruption in Egypt from 2000 to 2010. Corruption in Egypt increased in 2008. Although some effort was made to reduce it in 2010, the score of 3,1 in that year does not show a significant departure from the average score over the period 2000-2010 (see Table 7.3 and Figure 7.2).

Table 7.3 Corruption Perception Index for Egypt for selected years

Year	Score	Rank
2000	3,1	63/90
2002	3,4	62/102
2004	3,2	77/146
2006	3,3	70/163
2008	2,8	115/180
2010	3,1	98/178
Average	3,15	—

Source: Adapted from Ogbonnaya (2013)³⁵

Figure 7.2 Corruption Perception Index for Egypt



Source: Adapted from Ogbonnaya (2013)³⁶

From the foregoing, it is evident that, before the Arab Spring, the state of Egypt had failed to guarantee its citizens' socioeconomic and political well-being – thus, there was a revolution.

CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONALISATION IN POST-ARAB SPRING EGYPT

According to David Sorenson, democracy grows best when initiated and incubated in a country with supportive institutional mechanisms such as acceptance of the rule of law, a functional civil society and culture, impartial administrative bodies, open news media, and a viable education system.³⁷

Prior to the Arab Spring, however, conditions in Egypt were, according to Eva Bellin, antithetical to the formation and development of democracy: due to many years of political exclusionism and dictatorship, civil society organisations were weak and thus ineffective champions of democracy, while labour unions were empty shells. Literacy rates were low, economic control was in state hands, Islamism was intolerant of democracy, and the northern African region in particular and Arab world in general were remote from the mainstream of democratisation.³⁸ Consequently, attempts at democratic institutionalisation in Egypt were confronted at the outset by an array of challenges, including the absence of a formal constitutional framework; weak political institutions and electoral system; the crisis of religion in secular state; ideological polarisation; and an excessively powerful military institution.

Despite these challenges, parliamentary elections were held in late 2011 after the Arab Spring. This was followed by presidential elections in June 2012, which brought to power an Islamist majority controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of President Mohammed Morsi. The challenges were not addressed, and the result has been a botched democratic process and a lingering political and security crisis which is leading to a state of anarchy.

It can be said, then, the failure of the democratic experiment and the ensuing crisis in Egypt stems from deep political and social divisions underlying the Arab Spring of 2011. For instance, the uprising was organised by loose groups of secular pro-democracy activists^{39, 40} that were later joined by Islamists, liberal political parties, labour unions, and ordinary citizens. However, unlike in Tunisia, where a similar uprising against dictatorship resulted in a coalition of Islamist and secular parties, Egypt's political parties could not find common ground. Thus, at the polls, the Islamists in Egypt emerged victorious. The Islamic Brotherhood's political party – the Freedom and Justice Party – won the majority at the parliamentary polls in 2011 and its candidate won the presidential election in June 2012, hence giving it control of both the presidency and the upper house. It also controlled the Constituent Assembly, which had the task of drafting a new national constitution.

The extent of the Muslim Brotherhood's power as Egypt's dominant party raised concerns that it could build on it to establish a monopoly over the system. These concerns were amplified by President Morsi's decree on 22 November 2012 that placed him above oversight of any kind, including that by the courts.⁴¹ His reaction to criticisms recalled the repressive practices of the former regime and lent credence to the fear that democracy in Egypt could take on a non-liberal quality and replace one form of dictatorship with another. The consequence was that politics in Egypt assumed a violent, zero-sum game dimension, creating room for the massive protests that provided leeway for military intervention.

Another root cause of the crisis in Egypt and the ultimate failure of the democratic experiment is the role of political Islam in the country. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties were in control of the political system at a formative stage. This proved worrisome for liberal and secular groups in Egypt. Groups that had actively participated in the uprising and the eventual ousting of Mubarak were excluded from the constitution-drafting process and the rest of the democratic process. Concerns that an Islamic government would be hostile to liberal democracy or roll back fundamental freedoms led to protests against the Muslim Brotherhood-led government, protests that represented a struggle between competing visions for Egypt's future.⁴²


Another issue that contributed significantly to the botched democratic process in Egypt was the ailing state of the economy. Since the revolution in 2011, Egypt's economy has regressed significantly. For instance, real Growth Domestic Product (GDP) slowed to 2,2 per cent in the second quarter of 2012/2013 after going up to five per cent in the third quarter of 2011. Annual inflation (Urban Consumer Price Index) accelerated in 2013, from 6,3 per cent in January to 8,7 per cent in February.⁴³ Unemployment rose to 13,6 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2013, compared to 12,4 per cent in the same quarter in 2011 (see Table 7.4 and Figure 7.3).

Table 7.4 2013 Unemployment rate in Egypt (%)

Quarter	Percentage
Q1	13,2
Q2	13,3
Q3	13,4
Q4	13,6

Source: www.tradingeconomics.com & CAPMAS, Egypt (2014)⁴⁴

Figure 7.3 2013 Unemployment rate in Egypt (%)



Source: Compiled with data from www.tradingeconomics.com & CAPMAS, Egypt (2014)

According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egypt's total labour force in 2013 amounted to 27,2 million, a 4,2 per cent increase compared to the same quarter in 2010. The report also mentions that youth constitute 70,8 per cent of the total unemployed, with around 10,6 per cent aged between 15 and 19, and 20,9 per cent aged between 25 and 29 years old. The majority of the unemployed youth were found in the 20- 24-year-old age bracket, of which 39,3 per cent were jobless.⁴⁵ While it can be asserted that some of the economic problems in post-Arab Spring Egypt were inherited,⁴⁶ additional challenges caused by the revolution have exacerbated them, leaving a bleak prospect for future growth.⁴⁷

Ideological polarisation amongst the elite of Egypt's society has also played a fundamental role in undermining the democratic experiment. As succinctly stated by Primož Manfreda, after the general elections, the lack of coherent political programmes became all too apparent. With no quick solutions for unemployment and corruption, the ruling Islamists became embroiled in a bitter dispute with the secular opposition over the role of Islam in the constitution. Public enthusiasm for the transition waned dramatically. The increasingly chaotic situation presented an opportunity for the remnants of the Mubarak regime to stage a partial comeback. Senior judges, high-ranking civil servants, members of the security apparatus and businessmen worked to protect their interests. Moreover, the judiciary infuriated the ruling Islamists by disbanding the parliament and placing limits on the president's authority, thus depriving the new government of any real executive power.⁴⁸

Finally, democratic institutionalisation in Egypt ran into crisis because of the presence of an excessively powerful military. Like most African countries, Egypt has been ruled by successive authoritarian governments since the 1950s, and, before 2012, all presidents – Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwa Sadat and Hosni Mubarak – have come from the military. Thus, the military in Egypt has dictated the political environment and played a prominent role in the national economy for more than five decades. Consequently, despite the fact that both the mainstream Islamists and their secular opponents were generally of the view that Egypt should be governed by a democratic political system, with a government chosen through a free and fair popular election, the military was opposed to this. It skilfully pitted the Liberals against the Islamists and stripped the new Islamist-dominated parliament of its real power. Eventually, the military removed President Morsi from power in July 2013, arrested the senior leaders of the ruling party, and cracked down on supporters of Morsi.

Although it has been argued that growing instability under President Morsi and the threat of civil strife between secular and Islamist groups

appeared to have instigated the military intervention,⁴⁹ Mehari Maru has advanced the contrary argument that ‘while both the anti-Morsi and pro-Morsi camps have broad-based support, nonetheless, without the active involvement and grand design of the armed forces, President Morsi would have remained in power’⁵⁰ and Egypt’s democracy would have been maintained. Consequently, Egypt is today a military dictatorship, and despite promises by the military to return the country to democratic governance as soon as the country is stable enough to hold democratic elections, the future of democracy in Egypt remains a bleak one with the military in control.

THE IMPERATIVE FOR AFRICAN UNION INTERVENTION

Despite assumptions that military intervention in Egypt’s looming political crisis has enjoyed popular support, the tragedy is that, apart from securing its material privileges and possibly safeguarding Egypt’s secular character, the military seems to lack any clear long-term programme for ensuring a return to democratic governance and its maintenance in Egypt. This calls for the AU to intervene in the crisis. The intervention is considered imperative, and the reasons for this are discussed below.

Given that the AU is a body obliged to ensure peace, security, safety and the well-being of African citizens and the stability of African states, it has the responsibility and duty to ensure that Egypt, in particular, and Africa, in general, do not return to the era of political crises and instability that characterised it until the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Experience shows that solutions for political, socio-cultural and economic problems in Africa are better provided by the African people through African regional governance institutions, which the AU typifies. This was demonstrated in, for example, the fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa; the Economic Community of West African States’ efforts in resolving the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises; and recently the Sudan-South Sudan imbroglio. Thus, the AU, more so than any other body, is in the most advantageous position to provide the necessary leadership, human and material resources, and good offices for ensuring the resolution of the Egyptian crisis. In this globalised twenty-first century, isolationism and a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of nation-states is no longer a practical option in international relations: the implications are too grievous to contemplate.

The most pressing consideration of all is that, since the ousting of President Morsi by the military, Egypt has been thrown into chaos. Clashes between security forces and supporters of the ousted president have turned increasingly violent, amid a brutal, ever-widening state crackdown on the

Muslim Brotherhood movement and rallies. This has occasioned a security crisis. The death toll since the beginning of the clashes in July 2013 is estimated at thousands, and includes civilians and security operatives; several thousands have also been injured.^{51, 52, 53} If the trend remains unchecked, the crisis is likely to descend into guerrilla warfare characterised by the assassination of key national figures on both sides of the divide, drive-by shootings and indiscriminate bombing. Already, four bomb explosions, targeting state security outfits and the civilian population, have occurred at different sites in Cairo, killing at least six people and injuring more than 80 others.⁵⁴

The AU's constitution empowers it to ensure peace and stability of member states, especially in humanitarian situations. With over a thousand deaths recorded and no end in sight, the situation in Egypt is gradually deteriorating into a humanitarian crisis. A quick and early resolution of the crisis in Egypt is imperative. If it is allowed to go on unabated, the chances are that global terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda, which have a growing presence in Africa, may exploit the opportunity to advance their cause and escalate insecurity and the humanitarian crisis in northern Africa as well as other parts of the continent. The consequences at that stage will be too catastrophic for the AU and other regional governance bodies to deal with.

As has been observed, the ousting of the Morsi-led government by the military was a blow to democracy in Egypt and elsewhere in the post-Arab Spring world, one that could jeopardise the legitimacy of all democratic elections in the region. Thus, the crisis in Egypt is testing the definition of the Arab Spring and the views on its role as breeding ground for democracy in the Arab world.⁵⁵ As Egypt is one of the leading Arab states, the ultimate results of its transition will undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping the future of the broader Arab political environment in general and North Africa in particular.⁵⁶

Our faith in the AU's intervention in Egypt is based on a number of considerations. First, of all the global governance institutions, only the AU has unequivocally categorised the ousting of President Morsi as an unconstitutional change of government. Thus, it has suspended Egypt from participation in all AU activities, including the Peace and Security Council, until constitutional order is restored.⁵⁷

Secondly, in the spirit of African solidarity and the search for ASAP the AU has worked assiduously to ensure the resolution of the crisis in Egypt. For instance, on 8 July 2013, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, announced the appointment of the AU High-Level Panel in Support of a Peaceful and Inclusive Transition and the Restoration of Constitutional Order in Egypt. The Panel consists of: Alpha Oumar Konaré, former President of the Republic of Mali and former Chairperson

of the AU Commission, as the Chairperson of the Panel; Festus Gontebanye Mogae, former President of the Republic of Botswana; and Dileita Mohamed Dileita, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Djibouti.

They will be assisted by a group of experts and are mandated with the responsibility of 'interacting with the ruling authorities and other Egyptian stakeholders to establish a constructive political dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, as well as to contribute their efforts as they work towards a transition that would lead to an early return to constitutional order, preserve the gains of the January-February 2011 revolution and consolidate the democratic process in the country'.⁵⁸ Since 27 July 2013, the Panel has undertaken several consultative tours of Egypt, where it has met with different Egyptian political stakeholders in an attempt to resolve the crisis.^{59, 60, 61, 62}

ISSUES FOR AFRICAN UNION INTERVENTION IN EGYPT

The foregoing indicates, therefore, that the AU has shown a high level of objectivity and commitment in appraising and resolving the post-Arab Spring crisis in Egypt. However, resolving the crisis of democratic institutionalisation in Egypt goes beyond the AU setting up panels and commissions to undertake diplomatic overtures. It requires a gradual and perhaps a protracted process. Thus, the AU must develop a working timetable and various alternatives on how to ensure the institutionalisation and consolidation of democratic governance in Egypt.

However, of immediate importance to Egyptians in particular and Africans in general is the restoration of normalcy and stability in Egypt, and an end to the killings, the destruction of lives and violation of the fundamental rights of the people by the interim government under the guise of ensuring stability in Egypt. In this regard, the AU must intensify its negotiations with the government and other stakeholders in Egypt to ensure the immediate restoration of stability and peace in the country. In the event of non-compliance by the interim military regime, the AU may consider sanctions that are more stringent as a means of compelling compliance.

Secondly, the AU should work with the military-led interim government and other stakeholders to develop a feasible, all-inclusive and broad-based electoral programme that aims at returning Egypt to a democratic system within the shortest possible time. It must be noted that any electoral programme in the present that seeks to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from the process, as the interim military government is planning, will result in an escalation of the crisis and will be a very risky undertaking in terms of the stability of Egypt and the region at large.

In doing so, the AU and other sub-regional governance bodies must be less focused on enshrining democracy at all costs than on ensuring that the process is founded on unambiguous, predictable conditions and strong institutions supported by popular participation. This will avoid a relapse into crisis, as has been the case in Mali. The failure by the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to ensure that the electoral process in Mali was founded on unambiguous conditions and popular participation has resulted in a resurgence of hostilities in the northern area of the country.⁶²

Beyond the immediate restoration of stability and the re-establishment of democracy through elections in Egypt, the AU must work with the government and people of Egypt to create an environment that is conducive for the sustenance and growth of democracy through the following reforms:

Political reform

- The creation of an inclusive participatory political system that supports a multi-party electoral process;
- The development of an independent electoral commission charged with the responsibility to conduct elections and deriving its power directly from the constitution rather than from the presidency; and
- The development of an independent and autonomous legislature elected through universal adult suffrage.

Legal reform

- A review of Egypt's national constitution through a broad-based process, with a view to producing a people-oriented constitution that will guarantee the rights of every citizen, irrespective of ideological and political inclinations; and
- The creation of an independent and autonomous judiciary and judicial system.

Security sector reforms

- The devolution of the powers of SCAF;
- Security-sector reforms and the reconstitution of Egypt's national security; and
- De-politicisation and professionalisation of the military, with a view to subordinating the military establishment to civilian leadership and authority.

Policy and economic reform

- Institutionalisation of poverty-reduction programmes and job creation; and

- The introduction of an inclusive economic development agenda that is geared towards a public sector-driven economy in Egypt.

However, in order for the proposed reforms to be implemented successfully, the AU must bring together and initiate dialogue among the disparate groups in Egypt that seek to influence the direction of the transition and the future of the government and people of Egypt. In doing this, the AU can leverage the experience these disparate groups used together in the past to oust President Mubarak. Emphasising issues of common interest to the groups may prove useful.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The ousting of President Mohammed Morsi by the military has again brought to the fore the crisis of democratic institutionalisation not just in Egypt but the African continent at large. As a governance body with an obligation to ensure peace and stability on the continent, the AU is under an imperative to provide the necessary strategic leadership and good offices in resolving the current crisis in Egypt.

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War on Terror in Africa from Below

Challenges and Prospects of People's Participation

Bolaji Omitola

INTRODUCTION

The increasing militarisation of African states by the West, under the guise of fighting a war on terror, has hampered Africa's progress towards more stable democratic governance. This development is, however, not unconnected with the deployment of state-centric security measures, a heavy reliance on military strategies, and limited regard for basic human rights. Such an approach to military security often neglects the crucial issue of human security, a form of security that has been undermined by severe deprivation, malnourishment, disease, poverty and other socioeconomic crises ravaging the continent.

There is thus an urgent need for fashioning a home-grown security policy which would serve to distance Africa from involvement in a proxy war for the West against international terrorism as well as to engage with the root cause of insurgency. Such a policy, formulated within the paradigm of 'African solutions to African problems' (ASAP), could address the issues of terrorism and insecurity in such a way as to keep the door open for negotiation with insurgents. This would be a positive development, since the absence of such a politics of compromise has tended to encourage extremism among a number of insurgent groups on the continent.

This chapter takes Nigeria as a reference point for examining popular participation in vigilante and former militia groups. It argues that these groups are relevant in that they fill a noticeable governmental gap in the provision of security in the country. In this regard, their activities help to build confidence among the local people and offer a sense of protection from criminal and terror groups. The chapter concludes that the involvement of vigilante and former militias in providing security should be guided so that it is not exploited to promote the self-interested agendas of powerful members of society. It is therefore suggested that a non-partisan body

comprising government agencies and other stakeholders within the community be established to play a supervisory role.

The chapter is structured in seven sections. This introductory part is followed by a theoretical section that examines some concepts of interest. The third section discusses trends in the current war on terror in Africa. The fourth interrogates the conditions necessitating former militant and vigilante groups' involvement in the war on terror in Nigeria, while the fifth profiles these groups. This is followed by an examination of the challenges and prospects of these groups' involvement, and the chapter's conclusion.

OF TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY SOME LINKS

Terrorism is a concept that attracts controversy, especially as there is no agreement among scholars regarding the definition of a terrorist. For instance, in the West there is an association of terrorism with extreme and ruthless destructive method employed by revolutionary organisations intent on overthrowing the state.¹ However, this view has been challenged by the argument that terror perpetrated by the state is often historically antecedent to revolutionary terrorism.²

The United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines 'terrorism' as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.³ The attempt to spell clearly the audience in the above definition takes us to the definition given by Chomsky that 'terrorism is the use of coercive means aimed at civilian populations to achieve political, religious or other aims'.⁴ However, terrorism is not sharply demarcated from other types of individual or collective violence. Terrorism is intimidation with a purpose: the terror is meant to cause others to do things they would otherwise not do. Terrorism is coercive intimidation. In this definition, terrorism is a subcategory of violence in general and of political violence in particular.⁵

The strategies employed by terrorists include aircraft hijacking, kidnapping, destruction of property, hostage-taking, bombings, assassination and – a new concern – bioterrorism using undetectable germs.⁶ Identifying the cause of terrorism has been an arduous task, as there are diverse causal factors ranging from the economic and political to the religious and sociological. Other approaches to understanding include focusing on psychological or structural factors, with the emphasis on relative deprivation as a cause of the frustration that often triggers violence action. The

rational or organisational approach sees terrorism and violence as a result of a rational choice on the part of a terrorist group, while the psychological approach focuses on the features of an individual perpetrator or terrorist group.⁷ These approaches provide different ways of understanding terrorism, but they fail to reach consensus.⁸

Since it would be a futile exercise to identify particular factors that provoke a terrorist attack, this chapter adopts a framework that will allow us to identify the conditions in which terrorism is most likely to emerge. The chapter thus adopts the argument that terrorism can be regarded as a form of conflict stemming from social and ethnic conflict.⁹ This framework identifies three sets of factors that could predispose individuals or groups to violent terrorism. They are, in the first place, the structural-motivational preconditions for conflict, including differences between groups or individuals in terms of language, culture, religion and social organisation. These describe the background conditions for terrorism.

Second are precipitants or accelerators of conflict, which include economic development, modernisation, urbanisation, social mobilisation, population growth, and migration. Also included here is impoverishment consequent on a regime of economic liberalisation, debt and adjustment, and the dominance of market forces. Relevant too are the stresses of environmental and human insecurity; the pressures of democratisation; the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which forced millions of people to become migrants and refugees/asylum-seekers; the explosion of social identities everywhere; and demonstration effects of all these via global communication.

The third set of factors are the 'triggers or catalysts', which are the more immediate variables. These include events or circumstances triggering major conflicts or terrorist activities. Such triggers may arise from obscure and unforeseen sources, such as the death of an important conflict group leader, the assassination of a ruler or political leader, or a mere shooting incident. Even a series of chance incidents could be responsible.

Thus, for any counter-terrorism strategy to be effective, there is a need to take cognisance of the above conditions that lead to terrorist acts. In other words, military strategy for arresting immediate conflicts that trigger terrorist acts must be balanced with a human security strategy that could address the structural and socio-economic conditions that give rise to terrorism. This has become necessary, given that what constitutes national security – which is the goal of effective counter-terrorism – has changed over time.

National security, as a concept, is predicated initially on physical security as measured by military force. However, overwhelming military strength does not always result in security for states possessing such strength. This is exemplified in the various wars by the US, the former Soviet Union and

Israel against Vietnam, Afghanistan and the Arab nations in the Middle East, respectively.¹⁰ Although there is often a legitimate military dimension to national security, it must be emphasised that national security cannot be measured by military parameters alone. It is also a function of economic strength, political cohesiveness, social equity and integration, cultural outreach, racial harmony and environmental soundness. National security is diminished if the populace lacks adequate housing, food and medical care.¹¹ This informs the following observation:

The narrow perspective of national security has given way to a more comprehensive and broad definition that reflects the multi-dimensional nature of security, and takes cognizance of economic, cultural, technological, political, environmental and military variables.¹²

The following definition captures the essence of national security:

the freedom from danger or absence of threats to the multidimensional elements that may affect the nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and national interests, as much as promote and boost the well-being of its peoples.¹³

In other words, the people must be central to any counter-terrorism or security strategy in order for it to be sustainable. Arguing this is the thrust of the present chapter, which seeks in particular to understand the situation of local people within the war on terror.

TRENDS IN THE WAR ON TERROR IN AFRICA

The current war on terror in Africa, as in most parts of the world, is driven by the West under the leadership of the US. Thus, the threat of terrorism and insecurity in African states has attracted the attention of the US. For instance, in 2002 it established the combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. It responded to the Islamic Court Movement's seizure of power in Somalia by supporting Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia.¹⁴ The Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative was also established, involving North African and Sahelian states. Finally, the establishment of the United States African Command brings all its programmes in Africa under one umbrella, an inevitable outcome after the attacks of 11 September 2001 intensified America's war on terror.

A focus on military action, then, has been the cornerstone of the US response to terrorism. Over time, military efforts variously entailed the

following: large land wars in Afghanistan; the use of raids by elite special operation troops; covert training of local forces in foreign countries to enable pursuit of terrorists; and, more recently, precision strikes by unmanned drones.¹⁵ US officials would deny this, however, by insisting that efforts are under way to use developmental assistance to nip in the bud factors causing terrorism.¹⁶ This remains largely a publicity campaign to stem the tide of anti-US sentiment regarding counter-terrorism activity.¹⁷

The futility of the US anti-terror war is evidenced in its intervention in countries like Iraq, Libya and Yemen, where, in the words of G. Johnsen, commenting on the US war in Arabia, 'The US doesn't seem to have good human intelligence [in Yemen]. It's essentially bombing and hoping, which is neither sustainable nor wise'.¹⁸ France supported the US in the war on terror in Africa with its long-established pattern of mingling in the affairs of its former colonies. The most recent intervention occurred in Mali in response to insurgency against the state by various groups, including Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Another recent intervention took place in the Central African Republic in 2013.

One can observe that war on terror waged by the US and other countries signals an increased militarisation of African space by Western powers. However, only a sustained attack on the root causes of terror and violence – poverty, authoritarianism, discrimination and weak states – will combat such threats effectively. Any strategy that relies heavily on physical security alone will encourage authoritarian practices and undermine Africa's move towards more democratic governance.¹⁹

This realisation informed the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which is based on four pillars:

- measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terror;
- measures to prevent and combat terrorism;
- measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism; and
- measures to develop respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.²⁰

It has been observed that the United Nations (UN) strategy requires popular support for its achievement, including the cooperation of civil society organisations.²¹ The United Nations Secretary General High Level Panel on United Nations Civil Society Relations defines 'civil society' as including:

- associations of citizens (outside their families, friends and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies;

- organisations such as professional associations, social movements, indigenous people's organisations, religious and spiritual organisations; and
- academic and public benefit non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The term does not include profit-making organisations (the private sector) or government (the public sector).²²

The next section examines the conditions that necessitate the involvement of militias and vigilante groups in the war on terror in Nigeria. This is done within the context of the UN recognition of people's roles in combating terrorism.

CONDITIONS NECESSITATING THE INVOLVEMENT OF MILITIAS AND VIGILANTES IN THE WAR ON TERROR

The argument for militias and vigilante groups' involvement in the war on terror, especially in Nigeria, stems from the realisation of the peculiar nature of terrorism in the country and the need for a home-grown and sustainable solution.

One of the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria, and by extension Africa, lies in the socioeconomic situation and welfare needs of the general populace. These include severe needs for the provision of basic public amenities such as a good health system, education, water, electricity and roads. The needs remain unsatisfied in spite of a high increase in revenue accruing to the country from increased global oil prices.

One of the factors contributing to this development is the pattern of centralised political economy inherited from the military era. In this arrangement, the federal government appropriates 50 per cent of the revenue accruing to the federation, whilst the rest is shared by the state and local government. The general poverty level is reflected in the statistic that more than 70 per cent of Nigerians are currently living below US\$2 per day.²³ A manifestation of deprivation can be seen in the reported *Almajiri* phenomenon: children of school age are not in school but seen wandering the streets in the northern cities. In fact, the minister of state for education confirmed that there are 10 million *Almajiri* children in Northern Nigeria. These children are often recruited by Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.²⁴

Another problem breeding terrorism in Nigeria is a security situation that has been aggravated by the way policing is conducted. In spite of reforms in the current democratic dispensation, the police force is still highly centralised, non-responsive, corrupt, ineffective, inefficient and reliant on obsolete

and deteriorating equipment. Since the advent of ethno-religious conflicts, some states (including Lagos and other southern states) have demanded state control of Nigeria's police or the outright formation of state police. In terms of structure and operations, the police system in Nigeria faces numerous challenges, including alienation from the people whom police officers are meant to protect. This is a result of posting police officers to areas where there are different ethnic groups or areas where they are not familiar with the culture and the terrain. Thus, it is difficult for them to develop the trust of the people necessary for gathering intelligence for security purposes.

Other challenges facing the police include a high level of corruption, political interference in the discharge of their duties, and extra-judicial killings. Indeed, Boko Haram has consistently referred to the spate of arrests and killing of its members as reasons for its attacks, demanding the arrest of government functionaries for 'betrayal' (including the former governor of Borno state, Alhaji Sheriff).²⁵ This is attested to by the international Christian-Muslim delegation on the current state of insecurity in the country, which observed that 'corruption, mismanagement, land disputes, and lack of aid for victims and punishment for trouble-makers are responsible for the high level of insecurity in Nigeria'.²⁶

The demand for Sharia rule in the 12 Muslim-dominated states in the North also contributes to the uniqueness of the terrorist challenge in Nigeria. The Sharia project is more political in nature than religious. In other words, the emergence of this most recent threat to the existence of Nigeria can be traced to the activities of the enforcers of the Sharia legal system who double as political thugs. Thus, political Sharia created the objective conditions for the growth of Boko Haram and its entrenchment in the fabric of northern Nigerian society.

The next condition has to do with the historical links, in terms of culture and religion, of some parts of Nigeria with Mali, Chad and other Sahelian countries, where terrorism and terrorist networks have gained a foothold. This historical linkage of Northern Nigeria to the Sahel (cultural affinity and Islam) is being exploited by Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Somalia (Al Shabaab), in search of outposts in Nigeria.²⁷ The evidence can be seen in the support, training and other assistance given to Boko Haram from inside Mali. For instance, the kidnappings in Bauchi and Northern Cameroon – in the area close to the Nigerian border and the Ansaru and Boko Haram element – cannot but be linked to the crisis in Mali.²⁸

The same can be said of the influence of the Libya crisis, since the activities of defeated and fleeing fighters loyal to Ghaddafi forces feed directly into the Boko Haram insurgency through the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the area. This has been made possible by a combination of internal and external factors, such as Nigeria's porous borders, corrupt

immigration officers, inadequate records of immigration, and the ease with which people of the same culture and religion cross the borders of the country, disregarding the artificial restrictions of a colonially drawn map.

Flowing from the various factors highlighted above, it would not be wise for Nigeria to support the Western-led war on terror without some reservations. Following Western nations' example in the war on terror could lead more Nigerians to become sympathetic to the cause of terrorists. Thus, Nigeria needs to develop a platform for the war on terror that draws on the involvement of former militias and vigilante groups to help ensure its sustainability. This strategy would also involve a wide spectrum of people participating in seeking their own security.

PROFILE AND TRENDS OF MILITIA AND VIGILANTE GROUPS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

This section examines the activities of organisations that have goals similar to the mandate of civil society groups, as defined by UN and noted in the previous section. The activities of these groups are geared towards combating insecurity and terrorism in Nigeria. The groups include the various erstwhile militias which are now involved in activities closely connected with making societies better for all, and, in addition, non-governmental vigilante groups supplementing government efforts to combat the threat of terrorism.

Since the reintroduction of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, the country has witnessed the emergence of different ethnic and religious militias. Various scholarly works have documented the activities of these groups. Harnischfeger provides a summary:²⁹

- Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in southwest Nigeria, commonly seen as a Yoruba militia, has repeatedly clashed with members of other ethnic groups. However, some of its members are also involved in vigilante activities, such as patrolling the streets and arresting criminals.
- Hisbah groups operate in 12 states of northern Nigeria to try to enforce Islamic law and morality. As vigilante organisations, they were formed on a voluntary basis, but have come increasingly under the control of state governments.
- Among the Igbo in southeast Nigeria, the largest group propagating ethnic self-determination – the Movement for the Actualisation of

a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) – is not involved in fighting crime. The most famous crime-fighters in Igboland, a vigilante group called the Bakassi Boys, were not intended to act as an ethnic militia. Yet, in an emergency situation when communal tensions heightened, the Bakassi Boys attacked members of other ethnic groups, demonstrating that they might turn into the nucleus of an ethnic army. Such a transformation has already occurred in other parts of Nigeria, where vigilantes have merged with ethnic and religious militias in times of communal crisis.

- In the Niger Delta, ethnic militias have splintered into rival gangs. Instead of protecting their communities, they fight each other for control of oil resources. A considerable number of studies have criticised the activities of these groups, pointing out excesses of theirs that involve, *inter alia*, discrimination against members of other ethnic groups; extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses; serving the partisan interests of political godfathers as thugs during electioneering; political assassinations; arson; religious riots; and even insurgency against the state.³⁰ All these factors have led different governments in the country, the federal government in particular, to ban their activities. The various groups were banned in the run-off to the 2003 general elections by the Obasanjo administration.

However, in spite of the federal government's banning order and the arrest of their leaders in September and October 2006, the groups recorded an increase in membership – contrary to the prediction of Harnischfeger.³¹ For instance, the activities of the OPC became more accepted among the Yoruba of the southwest as the group transformed into a cultural organisation. The group combines this with providing security and serving as informants to security agencies. It is also involved in protecting some of the petroleum infrastructure that has been installed throughout the southwest.³²

The Bakassi Boys were banned in 2002; however, the Abia state government signed a bill in 2006 to re-establish the group in the state in defiance of a federal government directive. At this point, the federal government had to draft the military to states where the groups were operating (including Anambra) to ensure compliance with its directive. The federal government onslaught against the groups led to their transformation, however, rather than their eradication.

The withdrawal of the Bakassi Boys has impacted negatively on the crime situation in the southeast of Nigeria, as there has been an upsurge in criminal activity, including armed robbery and kidnapping. The decision to ban the Bakassi Boys is perceived as largely politically motivated rather

than a reaction to the group's excesses.³³ This argument must have led the Anambra state government, under Peter Obi, to empower community vigilante services as a way of reducing the crime rate in Anambra.³⁴ Since then, the group has been instrumental in curbing crime in that highly commercial, densely populated state. This is confirmed by a report in *Leadership Newspaper*, which said that, due to the efforts of Chief Kenneth Okonkwo (the coordinator and Police Consultant on vigilante matters), the police had been partnering effectively with members of vigilante groups.³⁵

In the north, the Hisbah vigilante groups have also been operating unhindered. For instance, as a way of demonstrating the support vigilante groups enjoy among the people, a senator stated that 'the people had lost faith in the ability of the police to protect them and their property'.³⁶ The senator further accused the police of complicity in some of the robbery cases and killings in the state. He stated this while supporting the motion to allow the Governor of Zamfara, northwest Nigeria, to arm the vigilante groups in that state.

Vigilance Youth Group (VYG), otherwise known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), has proved invaluable in the military operation against Boko Haram terrorists in the area. Apart from providing intelligence on the hide-outs of the terrorists, the group has been involved in arresting them, given that the terrorists live among the people.³⁷ The extent of this involvement is apparent in the progress made by the military. This is confirmed by Joint Task Force (JTF) Lt. Col. Sagin Musa, who said 'the JTF commended these youths for assisting our soldiers and police to arrest these terrorist suspects among people living in the metropolis'.³⁸

However, the Niger Delta militants and the Taliban in the northeast were employed more so for political ends than to undertake vigilante work. For instance, the report of the Ambassador Usman Galtimari Committee, commissioned by the Goodluck Jonathan administration to study the security challenges in the northeast zone, traced the genesis of Boko Haram to private militias in Borno State that were used in the 2003 general elections as political thugs (among other factors). The report observed that the groups were disbanded after the elections and, faced with no visible means of sustenance, easily transferred their loyalty to extreme groups such as Boko Haram. In the case of Niger Delta militants, they were regarded more as cults and gangs in the service of political godfathers.³⁹ Thus, it is not surprising that these groups eventually evolved into insurgents and took up arms against the Nigerian state.

The continued relevance of other groups in the war on terror, especially Hisbah in the north and OPC in the southwest, can be gauged from their defence by the elites and various public commentators in the country.^{40, 41} This came in the wake of the Jonathan administration's decision to ban such

groups in 2013. The banning order was targeted primarily at Boko Haram, a terrorist group whose attacks – including assassinations, suicide bombings and gun battles – have led since 1999 to thousands of deaths among insurgents, the military and civilians.

As such, the moderate Sharia enforcement vigilante groups that have become accepted in most states in the north, have served as a bulwark against the spread of Boko Haram, especially in the Muslim-dominated northwest. Several insurgency group attack plans have been foiled by security agencies acting on intelligence supplied by the people through their vigilante groups.⁴² In the southwest, popular vigilance by the OPC has made it impossible for Islamic insurgents to infiltrate the Yoruba area in spite of the latter's large Muslim population. For instance, local people acting in conjunction with the OPC were able to expose Boko Haram elements in motor parks in Ogun state⁴³ and Ijora Badia in Lagos state.⁴⁴ The other insurgent groups in the country, the Niger Delta militants, have been largely pacified by the amnesty offered to them by the federal government; there are now reports that they are involved in securing petroleum infrastructure and other government installations in the country.⁴⁵

Another group known as the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) aims to serve as a people-driven security arrangement for ensuring that people are active participants in securing their lives and property and protecting the environment.⁴⁶ The group's presence is felt in most Nigerian villages, and its activities involve volunteers and members of erstwhile militia groups.

An advantage vigilante groups have is that they comprise of local people who understand their environment as well as the culture and traditions of the people in their area. This advantage extends to the ease with which they are able to gather information, as they are trusted by the people, unlike regular security forces which have been largely alienated from the people as a result of the centralised nature of their organisations and operations. The groups gather intelligence to aid the operations of police and state security services. This has been openly acknowledged by a military spokesperson commenting on the war against Boko Haram. The spokesman praised local vigilante groups for the assistance they have given the military, saying that if it had had this type of cooperation earlier, it could have tackled the insurgency faster.⁴⁷

The organisation of vigilante groups has drawn extensively from the traditional cultures of Nigeria's many communities, cultures that emphasise a communal form of public security. However, this practice has been modernised: for instance, in Edo state in southern Nigeria, freelance marshals serve as intelligence informants both for security purposes and for securing adequate protection of every street. This network of marshals consists of landlords and landladies (that is, house-owners), community heads, youths

and tenants who are not deemed of questionable character.⁴⁸ The importance of vigilante groups in ensuring security and containing the proliferation of terror groups is recognised even by multinational businesses, with one such organisation providing communication logistics to support the groups' activities in different parts of the country.⁴⁹

The involvement of the former but now repentant militias and vigilantes in the war on terror has opened an avenue for addressing human security challenges at community level. This is reflected in the various empowerment programmes run by some of the states affected by insurgency. For instance, the Borno state government has a programme in place to improve the socioeconomic and welfare condition of the people, under the auspices of Borno Youth Empowerment Programmes (BOYES).⁵⁰ Such programmes include education and skills training, which is the best antidote to terrorism as it reduces the chances of people supporting insurgency. This stands in contrast to the Western-inspired strategy often deployed by the country's conventional security infrastructure, one consisting of the following security agencies: Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Military, State Security Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence, and Nigerian Prison Service.

The implication is that there is widespread acceptance of the indigenous solution to curbing insecurity, given that Nigeria is a country in which African customs and ways of life coexist with modernity. Although there is no clear constitutional role assigned to them in the Constitution of 1999, traditional institutions play an active role in Nigerian society, including the security matters.

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR MILITIA AND VIGILANTE INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

This section examines the challenges and prospects of engaging militias and vigilante groups in community security activities to complement other agencies charged with securing the country and fighting the terror war.

Since Nigeria's return to democracy and the freedom of expression that accompanies it, people have been voicing their dissatisfaction with the country's excessive levels of centralised political control. This is reflected in the demands a number of ethnic and religious groups have made for the right to organise their social and political environment in the way they desire.⁵¹ This has found expression in such areas as policing and maintenance of peace and security.

However, some members of the ruling elite do not encourage community initiatives aimed at mitigating security challenges in the country, because

for them insecurity is a means by which to govern and a continuation of factional politics by other means. For instance, there were allegations that the current governor of Kano state not only recommended to the federal government that it ban the Hisbah group in 2006 during his campaign for the office of Governor, but also kitted out some individuals (referred to as *Yan dabas*) with the group uniform to cause trouble so that the Hisbah group would be portrayed as serving the political ends of the state government.⁵²

Thus, instead of recognising and supporting people's initiatives in providing security, the ruling elites have exploited them for their self-interested ends. Centralisation of the police can therefore be seen as part of the political elite's strategy of making distributive politics less contentious, unlike the situation in the first republic, when the regions could mobilise their security outfits in aid of such contestation. This is what necessitated the shift from regional to federal control of the police.

Nevertheless, the experiences of other countries confirm the need for Nigeria's ruling elite to embrace this complementary security strategy. For example, during the dark decade in Algeria, the elite mobilised the people against the activities of the Islamist terrorists. Similarly, the value of a local and community policing system is brought into relief in the conclusion Stocker and Amberg reach in their account of Switzerland's police, namely that,

cantonal and communal police forces are better able to assess the requirements to ensure safety of local communities. It is important that police officers and police commanders know and understand their environment as well as their communities and are capable of interacting with them.⁵³

The best platform for introducing a sustainable and acceptable communal police system is through the various militias and vigilante groups in Nigeria. The confidence in and support for these groups by the masses is evidence for this argument. This contrasts with the lack of support for the national police-initiated community police, which people have referred to as 'old wine in a new bottle'.

The argument in this chapter centres on the involvement of indigenous people through vigilante groups and repentant militias as a community-based antidote to insecurity. However, the youth who are assisting the soldiers and the police in combating Boko Haram and other security challenges could also transform into violent militia members or even terrorists, since they are accustomed to arms and other deadly weapons. Also, there have been allegations that both the military and vigilante members have committed abuses of human rights in the course of their duties in areas affected by the insurgency and elsewhere in the country. Thus, there is a need

for an institutional mechanism to engage these groups in training and best practices. Such a mechanism would involve a supervisory agency which is in turn under the management of an all-inclusive agency with representation that includes NGOs and civil society groups.

The involvement of vigilante groups and erstwhile militia members in the Nigeria security arena has become the norm. This is despite the reluctance of the conventional security infrastructure, encumbered by an excessive focus on military strategy that has suffered a loss of credibility.⁵⁴ Thus, it has become imperative that efforts be made to encourage these groups through empowerment. This could be done within the context of intervention by NGOs such as community-based organisations and civil society groups. In addition, international organisations too should recognise the critical role the groups are playing in closing the gap between conventional security agencies and the people, especially at grassroots level.

In short, the empowerment of militias and vigilante groups through training and engagement on best practices – along with their encouragement through support from government at all levels, NGOs, international civil society, bilateral and multi-lateral organisations – would go a long way in ensuring a sustainable war on terror and greater security in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion, using Nigeria as a reference point, for the war on terror to be successful and sustainable in Africa, it must be rooted in a people-based security framework. Such an approach would engender local support for counter-terrorism activities, guard against extremism and ensure that a conducive environment is created for addressing the root cause of terrorism. This approach could also safeguard against the usual Western-led prescription of a 'one-size-fits-all' solution that takes little or no cognisance of local peculiarities and challenges in the war on terror.

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Zimbabwe's Gukurahundi Genocide

Beyond the Forgetfulness and Silences of Coloniality

William Mpofo

INTRODUCTION

Genocide as large-scale violence does not only punish humanity in terms of the loss of many lives, but continues to tax men and women in its aftermath when the truth is skilfully erased, silenced or distorted by interested parties. Politicians who perpetrate genocide, along with their intellectual sympathisers in the media and the academy, tend to seek to manage public memory in a way that encourages forgetfulness rather than remembrance of the crime against humanity.

In an insightful discussion of the topology of being and the importance of the geopolitics of knowledge, the Latin American philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres describes what he calls the forgetfulness of coloniality.¹ To Maldonado-Torres, the fact that German philosopher Martin Heidegger opposed Eurocentrism only insofar as it did not privilege Germany as the centre of the world, constitutes forgetfulness of the coloniality of power. Similarly, the fact that Emmanuel Levinas, a Jewish philosopher and survivor of the holocaust, saw only the suffering of Jews at the hands of the Nazis and not the wider suffering of enslaved and colonised people around the world who are not Jewish, bespeaks the same forgetfulness.

Forgetfulness of coloniality refers to that situation in the media and the academies and politics of the world where thinkers, writers and activists are alive to their own oppression but blind to the oppression of others, oppression in which often they are complicit. In a similar vein to Maldonado-Torres' observation about the forgetfulness or ignorance of power, Mahmood Mamdani² poses the question of why, in spite of the similarities in the nature of violence, the United States' (US) atrocities in Iraq were called 'a cycle of insurgency and counter insurgency' and the massacres by militants sponsored and trained by Sudan in Darfur were labelled genocide by the global media and the international academy.

In addition to making this telling observation about the politics of naming genocide, Mamdani notes that a silence accompanies scholarly and popular commentary on genocide, a silence that has to do with the history of genocide, its geography and the agency of the perpetrators and their supporters.³ These silences constitute blind spots that lead to misguided analyses and mistaken conclusions.

Maurice Vambe⁴ has produced scholarly writing about the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe that suffers from the forgetfulness of coloniality of power and the three silences of history, geography and agency identified by Mamdani. In one journal issue, Vambe has two papers. One of them highlights how the victims of the 1961 French genocide in Algeria have kept their memory of trauma alive in spite of the efforts of the French to suppress the memory. In the second paper Vambe celebrates the observation that victims of the Zimbabwean Gukurahundi genocide of 1982-1987 have 'moved on with their lives despite a history of persecution' only '30 years' ago. Vambe is silent as to why the Algerian genocide of 1961 remains memorable, while the Zimbabwean one that ended in 1987 has been forgotten.

Drawing on Maldonado-Torres' notion of the forgetfulness of coloniality and Mamdani's point about the silences that obfuscate conventional analyses of genocide, and using the example of Vambe's writing on the Gukurahundi genocide, the present chapter will use a decolonial prism of analysis to examine the imbrications of coloniality in the history of political violence against the Ndebele people in Zimbabwe. Decolonial analysis allows one to see the Zimbabwean genocide not as a unique and isolated case of political violence but as part of the darker side of a modernity involving coloniality of power and of knowledge.

The chapter notes that while genocides involve soldiers and other militants, as well as leaders who order the violence, in the background – before, during and after the event – there are always scholars, philosophers and other thinkers who use their writing to rationalise and justify the violence. Such thinking and writing, in the view of this author, constitutes genocidism, in that it seeks to provide intellectual support and analytical force to physical violence. Academic, intellectual and journalistic work that offers a defence for and masks crimes against humanity inevitably becomes complicit in these acts of terror and genocide.

DECOLONIAL THOUGHT A THEORETICAL AND INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK

In an enlightening paper, Michael Hardt argues that 'critique has become the primary mode of practicing theory, at least theory conceived as a political

intervention'.⁵ Besides seeing critique as political intervention and a kind of activism, Hardt believes that theory must concern itself with 'fault finding' and provide 'methods to question the truth of authority, [and] techniques to reveal the figures of power that operate in dominant discourses'. More importantly, Hardt insists that critical theory must even adopt the 'Kantian procedures of investigating the limits of human understanding', which is an emphatic suggestion that intellectual critique should never be satisfied with received and given parameters of thinking and knowing.

Hardt sees theory as enabling to the scholar who seeks to accomplish not only 'fault finding' and questioning 'the truth of authority', but contesting 'dominant discourses or ideologies. The scholar can deploy critical theory as a tool for 'investigating the limits of human understanding and judgment.' Most important for the purpose of this chapter is Hardt's point that theory is not limited to the meditative reflexivity of academic endeavour but is a mode of 'political intervention' that seeks to transform lived experiences. For that reason, education itself must provide liberation to minds and empower the oppressed to discard the 'fear of freedom' and 'transform' the world into a better place, in the forceful argument of Paulo Freire.⁶

For the same reason, this chapter adopts decolonial thought as the critical theory that will aid its interventions and guide its judgements in studying the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe as a post-independence historical and political setting. Describing decolonial thought and profiling its genealogy, Gregory Banazak and Luis Ceja note that decolonial critical theory provides a new interpretation but also a creative mixture of other critical theories:

Critical theory has taken a new turn in Latin America; post-colonial thought, post-structuralism, cultural studies, world systems theory and other contemporary theoretical foci have combined with indigenous influences to produce a new form of critical theory called decolonial thought. Through its unique take on power, knowledge, culture, history, human existence and globalisation, this thought aims at elaborating not just another paradigm within the typically modern way of thinking, but a totally new paradigm that shatters such thinking.⁷

This chapter employs decolonial thought as a critical lens because of its 'unique take on power, knowledge, culture, history, human existence and globalisation'. Gukurahundi, as a theatre of political violence set in Zimbabwe, is not removed from globalisation and its historical and political ramifications in Africa. This chapter aims to tease out the local and global causalities of the Gukurahundi genocide.

One of the most vivid descriptions of the condition of the world from the vantage point of decolonial thought comes from Ramon Grosfoguel, who argues that the belief that decolonisation ushered in what has popularly been called a post-colonial world is a myth, one brazenly ignoring the continuing conditions of coloniality in the Global South:

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonisation of the world. This led to the myth of a post-colonial world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years.⁸

Grosfoguel dismisses decolonisation as a myth, believing that the dethronement of juridical colonialism did not eradicate conditions of coloniality and imperialism that still permit pathologies such as ethnic cleansing, genocide and xenophobia (among many other ills) in post-independence settings in Africa and elsewhere in the Global South. In doing so, Grosfoguel challenges post-colonial theory and proponents of the notion of a post-colony.⁹

Defining coloniality as an imperial power structure that continues after the liquidation of juridical colonialism, Maldonado Torres observes:

Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, inter-subjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism.¹⁰

Contrary to those who believe decolonisation undid colonial realities, Torres believes that the political and historical conditions in post-independence settings are conditioned by coloniality as 'power that emerged as a result of colonialism.' He believes coloniality is 'kept alive in books' and in the relations and mindsets of former colonial subjects. This chapter is therefore interested in examining how coloniality, as a power structure incarnated in political and historical factors, allowed the Gukurahundi genocide to take place in post-independence Zimbabwe.

The chapter, furthermore, examines how the forgetfulness and silences of coloniality reproduce themselves in discussions of Gukurahundi by politicians and scholars in Zimbabwe and beyond. Edward Said, in his canonical *Orientalism*, showed how toxic power relations are reproduced in

imaginative and even historical literature.¹¹ In an important discussion, Albert Memmi describes how colonial relations and conditions are naturalised into the lives of the colonised and the coloniser, becoming a reality that does not merely evaporate with political change.¹² In other words, over and above colonialism, coloniality normalises itself into a culture and a way of life.

Frantz Fanon refers to the new rulers who took over from the colonial administration as 'the new colonists'. He vividly describes how they tear a nation apart through divisive leadership, and how 'old rivalries that were there before colonialism, old interracial hatred come to the surface' and are exploited for advantage by power-hungry politicians. Fanon illustrates how coloniality remains after colonialism, perpetuating the politics of regionalism and resurrecting 'old rivalries' of tribalism that existed in pre-colonial times. As if talking specifically about Zimbabwe, Fanon observes:

As far as national unity is concerned, the party will also make many mistakes, as for example when the so-called national party behaves as a party based on ethnical differences. It becomes in fact the tribe which makes itself into a party. This party, which of its own will proclaims that it is a national party, and which claims to speak in the name of the totality of the people, secretly, sometimes even openly, organises an authentic ethnical dictatorship.¹³

Fanon's prophetic description of the political and social conditions which colonialism leaves behind in the former colonies mirror, and to a significant degree, the historical and political conditions that led to the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe.

In 1982, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government unleashed the Fifth Brigade to crush alleged dissidents said to have been aligned to the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) political party. The military operation degenerated into a tribalised onslaught, with non-Shona-speaking people becoming the specific target. The aim of this chapter is to depart from the narrow and at times shallow way in which Gukurahundi has been considered, especially by those writers who harbour overt or covert sympathies for the perpetrators. Most of the writers have worked without solid theoretical frameworks and without the insight of such important decolonial theorists as Fanon, whose conclusion about post-independence leaders in the Global South is as follows:

These heads of government are the true traitors in Africa, for they sell their country to the most terrifying of all its enemies: stupidity. This tribalising of the central authority, it is certain, encourages regionalist ideas and separatism. All the decentralising tendencies spring up again and triumph, and the nation falls into pieces, broken in bits. The leader, who once used to call for

'African unity' and who thought of his own little family, wakes up one day to find himself saddled with five tribes, who also want to have their own ambassadors and ministers; and, irresponsible as ever, still unaware and still despicable, he denounces their 'treason'.¹⁴

True to Fanon's observation, the Zimbabwean government, during and after the genocide, accused the victims of the violence of being enemies of national unity and secessionist malcontents.

Tribalism, just like the racism of Heidegger and the Zionism of Levinas, tends to engender forgetfulness and cultivate a silence that impedes understanding of the true nature of genocide. However, together with other decolonial theorists, Fanon provides an illuminating perspective from which to consider the Gukurahundi genocide and the factors that produced its perpetrators and victims.

Unlike writers such as Maurice Vambe¹⁵ and Urther Rwafa,¹⁶ who seek to deny that ethnic hatred and primitive tribalism were one of the causative factors of the Gukurahundi genocide, Fanon observes that former nationalist leaders, in this case Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party, degenerated into 'new colonists' who retreated into tribalism and political violence, tearing the nation apart and provoking the rise of secessionists and separatists that they later accuse of treason. Recently at the time of writing, Paul Siwela, the leader of Matabeleland Liberation Organisation, had escaped from the country to exile, after facing a possible death sentence for demanding justice for Gukurahundi and freedom for Matabeleland.

As will be discussed below, Vambe and Rwafa are in denial that in the Gukurahundi genocide Mugabe and his party were condoning tribal hatred. The two writers go so far as to condemn the victims of the genocide, the Ndebele people of Matabeleland, for seeing the genocide as the bitter fruit of tribal hatred and autochthonous tendencies of the ruling elite in the post-independence setting of Zimbabwe.

Having fleshed out decolonial thought as its critical framework and demonstrated via Fanon how it allows a fresh and clearer view of the historical and social conditions that produced the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe, this chapter now proceeds to discuss the views of some leading African scholars in examining the genocide as a product of coloniality.

INSIGHTS INTO GENOCIDE IN AFRICA AND GUKURAHUNDI IN ZIMBABWE

While Maurice Vambe acknowledges that 'there is a sizeable literature review on the Zimbabwe genocide from books, magazines and films,' he goes on surprisingly to ignore it and concentrate on what he vaguely calls 'some

independent sources' and 'other private sources'.¹⁷ Avoidance of important sources and the voices of key scholars who have studied genocide in Africa makes Vambe's work – which this chapter is yet to treat in detail – unscholarly and tenuous. Ignoring a vast body of literature on Gukurahundi in itself amounts to forgetfulness and silencing of other voices on the subject.

To avoid such a limitation, this chapter pays close attention to observations by some African scholars on genocide in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. Its interpretations are guided by the critical tool of decolonial thought. It is the bold assumption of this chapter that coloniality, as a global power structure that continues to engender imperial relations, conditions and mindsets in post-independence contexts, enables the occurrence of such tragedies as civil war, coups and genocide in Africa.

In his telling essay, 'When victims become killers', later developed into a book, Mahmood Mamdani,¹⁸ observes in a discussion of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 that three types of silence accompany the many accounts of the genocide. Both in 'popular' and 'academic' narratives, the silence of 'history' and 'agency', together with that of 'geography', tend to cloud any clear communication and understanding of the context and causes of genocide. It is important to examine how these three telling silences have played out in the popular discourses and academic studies of the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe.

There is a loud denial or 'silence' among perpetrators and their academic sympathisers that the genocide in Zimbabwe was partly a product of the 'history', first, of conflict between the Shona and the Ndebele and, secondly, of colonialism by Britain. Mounting a historical analysis of the condition of Zimbabwe, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni writes that 'Zimbabwe is fractured along historical, spatial, political, racial, ethnic and personal lines'.¹⁹ Gatsheni insists that, because of historical schisms, Zimbabwe is failing to weld together 'various ethnicities into one nation and former "natives" and "settlers" into a common citizenship mediated by equality and loyalty to the post-colonial state'. Whether they are denied or acknowledged, aspects of the history of ethnic conflict between the Shona and the Ndebele and those of white settler colonialism ensure that Zimbabwe is haunted by ethnic and racial hatred and division that easily collapses into political violence, such as happened in the Gukurahundi genocide. These are conditions of coloniality, and they relate to a history of conquest and domination that continues to reproduce itself, even among those who have been supposedly liberated, and lead to violence.

Regarding the silence of 'agency', Mamdani notes that 'academic writings in particular, have highlighted the design' of genocide from the political leadership 'from above in a one-sided manner', forgetting the participation of the population that supports the leadership and does not condemn the genocide. Among these supporters are intellectuals and journalists who

allow their critique and thinking to degenerate into spin and denialism. As Mamdani says;

when political analysis presents the genocide as exclusively a state project, and ignores its subaltern and 'popular' character, it tends to reduce the violence to a set of meaningless outbursts, ritualistic and bizarre, like some ancient primordial twitch come to life.²⁰

This silence about 'popular' agency in the Zimbabwean genocide is apparent when denialist writers maintain that Gukurahundi was a project by Mugabe and ZANU-PF, one which did not enjoy the backing or sympathy of some of the people who supported them at the time. By contrast, Mamdani writes:

We may agree that genocidal violence cannot be understood as rational, yet we need to understand it as thinkable. Rather than run away from it, we need to realise that it is the 'popularity' of the genocide that is its uniquely troubling aspect.²¹

While it would be a fallacy to insist that all ZANU-PF members and Shona-speaking people of Zimbabwe sympathised with and supported the Gukurahundi genocide, it would be equally misleading to disregard that most of them did, and some still do, believe it was a deserved revenge against the Ndebele for their alleged pre-colonial violence against the Shona; it is also thinkable that some saw the genocide as the disciplining of a dissident population that was reluctant to support the establishment. On social networks and other online media fora, for instance, there is a growing body of discourse that celebrates the Gukurahundi genocide as having been just desserts for the Ndebele people.

Such 'popular' support is largely denied by perpetrators of the genocide and their journalistic and academic sympathisers, but it has a way of protruding from texts and other narratives in the public domain. Furthermore, support for and veiled celebration of the genocide is apparent even in supposedly well-researched scholarly articles published in leading journals in the global academy.

Geographies of genocide can also be confusing, if not totally misleading, to analysis of genocide. While genocide might manifest itself within a country as local political conflict, other causes and influences could be located elsewhere in the region or around the globe. In elaborating on the 'silence' of 'geography' regarding the Rwandan genocide, Mamdani maintains:

Since the genocide happened within the boundaries of Rwanda, there is a wide-spread tendency to assume that it must also be an outcome of processes

that unfolded within the same boundaries. A focus confined to Rwanda state boundaries inevitably translates into a silence about regional processes that fed the dynamic leading to the genocide.²²

Evidence continues to emerge in support of Mamdani's postulation that external, regional and international factors fertilise the ground locally for genocide in Africa. Regarding the Gukurahundi genocide, similar if not more compelling evidence has been uncovered by research. The genocide might have taken place within Zimbabwe's boundaries, with Zimbabwean soldiers and civilians as the protagonists and antagonists, but the influence of regional and global forces is evident.

In a strongly argued and evidenced paper, whose sources are some de-classified international intelligence documents, Timothy Scarnecchia begins 'Rationalising Gukurahundi: Cold War and South African foreign relations with Zimbabwe, 1981-1983' with the following observation:

Based on a preliminary reading of South African Department of Foreign Affairs files for 1983, Cold War relations between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom helped to provide cover for the Zimbabwe National Army's Fifth Brigade campaign of terror. Similarly, American support for Mugabe's claims to be a pro-Western leader committed to non-racialism helped provide international cover for the atrocities. At the same time, evidence shows high-ranking ZANU-PF officials negotiated with the South African Defence Forces in 1983 to cooperate in their efforts to keep ZAPU from supporting South African ANC operations in Zimbabwe. The Fifth Brigade's campaign therefore served the purposes of South Africa, even as ZANU-PF officials rationalised the Gukurahundi violence in international and anti-apartheid circles as a campaign against South African destabilisation.²³

Scarnecchia's important disclosures testify to Mamdani's argument, in a very strong way, that geographies of genocide overlap territorialities and become entangled in international and global power struggles and politico-economic interests. While the 'nationalist' government of Robert Mugabe was singing anti-apartheid songs and preaching anti-racism by day, by night it struck agreements of solidarity and cooperation with the apartheid regime aimed at destroying the ANC and its own political opposition, ZAPU. On the outside, Zimbabwe, led by ZANU-PF, projected itself as an independent country committed to Pan-Africanism; on the inside, in a typical manifestation of coloniality, it still answered to the call and influence of apartheid South Africa and other global imperialist super-powers.

As will be discussed further later in this chapter, such observations as Mamdani's and the revelations by Scarnecchia effectively demolish the

flimsy arguments made by Vambe and other writers that seek to rationalise Gukurahundi as an overreaction by 'authorities' who sought to counter dissidents. At best, such arguments are puerile; at worst, given the seriousness of the subject of genocide, they collapse into being offensively unscholarly and a waste of intellectual space.

Mugabe, says Scarnecchia, 'received extensive support from the United Kingdom and the US governments, while simultaneously portraying his government as a leading frontline state in the anti-apartheid struggle'. This was clear double-dipping and a dissembling political stratagem that saw Mugabe working with both the apartheid forces and the forces against apartheid, in the process doing their political bidding, while at home perpetuating genocide to eliminate his Ndebele and ZAPU political opponents for good.

It is this forgetfulness and complicity of silence that made Gukurahundi a colonial genocide. Quoted in Scarnecchia is Geoff Hill, who argues that Britain knew about the slaughter of the people of Matabeleland. In the words of the then British High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, Matabeleland atrocities were a 'side issue' and Britain was pursuing 'much bigger' issues that included 'help[ing] Mugabe and his people.' Hill says:

Sir Martin Evans, High Commissioner in Harare at the time, admitted on camera that his instructions from London were to 'steer clear of it' when speaking to Mugabe. 'I think Matabeleland was a side issue,' he said. 'The real issues were much bigger. We were extremely interested that Zimbabwe should be a success story, and we were doing our best to help Mugabe and his people bring that about.'²⁴

Gukurahundi, as a crime against humanity, was carried out by Mugabe and his party with passive and active support from Britain, the US and apartheid South Africa. It can be argued, then, that the global super-powers conspired with Mugabe in Gukurahundi against the Ndebele people. Such a conspiracy fits the definition of coloniality, which Walter Mignolo²⁵ describes as a 'modern-colonial world system' that peripherises the lives of some while centring those of others, in pursuit of capitalist interests of profit and the vampiric extraction of resources.

Under those circumstances, the Ndebele people became the 'unpeople' or the 'wretched of the earth', those who are the orphans of history and who have no protector. As noted, coloniality by definition centralises some people and peripherises others. It creates a skewed world populated by those recognised as 'people' and those seen as dispensable 'others'. Scarnecchia writes that 'the Ndebele were virtually friendless' and available for slaughter.²⁶

Perhaps the most important contribution Mamdani has made to genocide studies, not only those in Rwanda but in Africa at large, is his explanation of how settler colonialism and native binaries were later inherited as relations of difference and a source of conflict by the indigenous people after the dethronement of formal colonialism. He argues:

The crime of colonialism went beyond expropriating the native, the name it gave to the indigenous population. The greater crime was to politicise indigeneity in the first place: first negatively as a settler libel of the native; but then positively, as a native response, as self-assertion. The dialectic of the settler and the native did not end with colonialism and political independence. To understand the logic of genocide, I argue, it is necessary to think through the political world that colonialism set in motion. This was the world of the settler and the native, a world organised around a binary preoccupation that was as compelling as it was confining. It is in this context that Tutsi, a group with a privileged relationship to power before colonialism, got constructed as a privileged alien settler presence [...] by Hutu power propaganda in 1990.²⁷

Colonial relations of 'settler' and 'native' were reconstructed and reproduced among the 'natives' after independence in Zimbabwe. In the Rwandan case, the Tutsi were named 'settlers' and aliens who became candidates for death in the genocide of 1994. Massive propaganda was deployed by the Hutu power movement to define the Tutsi as pollutants and 'settlers' who needed to be removed from the land. Mamdani continues:

I argue that the Rwanda genocide needs to be understood as a natives genocide. It was a genocide by those who saw themselves as sons – and daughters – of the soil, and their mission as one of clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence [...] not a violence against one who is seen as a neighbour, but against one who is seen as a foreigner one that seeks to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil.²⁸

Applying Mamdani's line of thought to the Gukurahundi genocide, similarities and differences emerge in comparison with the Rwandan genocide. The Ndebele, who became the target of genocide, were not the privileged natives during colonialism, as the Tutsi were. In fact, the Shona were, and at some point saw themselves as allies of the colonists.

Howard Handsman,²⁹ an Australian journalist and historian who accompanied the first party of settlers that invaded what is now called Zimbabwe, testifies that in defeating and conquering the Ndebele Kingdom in 1896, Leander Jameson, in addition to his regular troops, had 2000 Shona foot

soldiers as well as Afrikaner mercenaries and some 2000 Batswana soldiers. As in the Rwanda case, the Ndebele have been, and continue to be, seen as foreigners and settlers in their country. In *An ill-fated people*, which has been used in Zimbabwe as a textbook, Lawrence Vambe³⁰ not only bemoans why God allowed the Ndebele to settle in Zimbabwe, but accuses them of bringing disease, prostitution and moral decadence into it.

For Lawrence Vambe, Cecil John Rhodes the imperialist and Lobengula, the king of the Ndebele, were not different as leaders of settlers and invaders. The Ndebele, says Vambe, 'having come to Zimbabwe as fugitives from the violence of the Boers [...] tried to go too far in their predatory escapades and threatened Shona independence'. The Ndebele were marauding settlers, who 'established their capital at Ku Bulawayo (the place of killing) and had firmly established their kingdom in what is commonly called Matabeleland, then started making sorties into the interior'.

In Vambe's book, the image of the Ndebele people as aliens cannot be missed; indeed, hatred of the Ndebele as a people is exhibited throughout it. Vambe concludes one of the chapters by saying, '[E]qually as a Christian, I cannot answer the question why God permitted to happen the whole train of events from the arrival of the Ndebele to UDI.' In brief, Vambe wished the Ndebele did not exist in Zimbabwe. The wish that other people do not exist is normally foundational to genocidal imagination. The physical violence and elimination of populations follow after fantasies of ethnic cleansing and genocide have been entertained.

In Zimbabwe, it is not Vambe alone who believes that 'until the Ndebele and later the Europeans came into the country', the Shona people had a 'life that ran along orderly, civilised lines'. All these assertions of the Ndebele as foreigners who settled in Zimbabwe are in spite of the historical irony that the Shona themselves at some point arrived in what is now called Zimbabwe from the Great Lakes Region or somewhere else (the debate continues). The historical truth that what marked outsiders and insiders in Zimbabwe were colonial borders is forgotten or, if not forgotten, entirely silenced. Mamdani's argument that the Tutsi were first reconstructed as 'settlers' before they were marked for death is therefore convincing and seems to neatly fit the case of the Ndebele, who, even today, live the life of settlers in Zimbabwe.

While it might be thought that writers such as Lawrence Vambe and Maurice Vambe are isolated voices who are not representative of the establishment in Zimbabwe, it must be noted that a vast expanse of literature by other writers suggests that the Ndebele are intruders and hated aliens in Zimbabwe. A document entitled 'For Restricted Circulation: Progress Review of the 1979 Grand Plan', which insists that Zimbabwe is essentially for Shonas, has been widely circulated in Zimbabwe. It states:

The Ndebeles had no legal claim whatsoever upon Zimbabwean sovereignty, just like their earlier cousins (followers of Soshangane), later led by Ndaningi Sithole, that hobgoblin who tried to hijack the struggle. Sithole was foiled and summarily ejected from the party – an act he regretted till his grave. Sithole's errors left the Shangaans a thoroughly confused group, despite the modification of their identity to drift closer to the Shona [...] The truth remains – they are foreigners.³¹

While ZANU-PF has publicly disassociated itself from this document, which is now in the public domain, it is believed that its origins are the ruling ZANU-PF clique. Most Ndebele people, especially cultural and political activists, believe there is a 'Grand Plan' by the ruling Shona-dominated clique that is in perpetual conspiracy against the historical, economic, social and political interests of the Ndebele people. What is at play in Zimbabwe is the resurrection of 'old rivalries' of ethnic conflict that Fanon discussed, as cited earlier in this chapter. The bitter fruit of the colonial heritage of 'settler' and 'native' relations has seen the Ndebele reduced to aliens and subjected to xenophobia in mainstream Zimbabwean political, economic and social life. Arguably, therefore, conditions of coloniality that are punctuated with the existence of those who dominate and those who are dominated, those who believe themselves to be owners of the country and those who are believed to be, and are treated like foreigners and 'settlers', define the condition of Zimbabwe 30 years after the Gukurahundi genocide.

In his monumental contribution to genocide studies in Africa, from Darfur to Rwanda, and including his thoughts on the US's global war on terror, Mamdani has not received a chorus of agreement from other African scholars. He has been viciously debated and even accused of as large a crime as genocide denialism. Most of these accusations were in response to his arguments that the violence in Darfur amounted to 'counter-insurgency' by a state that was reacting to an insurgency and not directing aggression against innocent civilians.

For instance, Kwesi Kwaa Prah, in his tersely written 'The politics of apologetics: Genocide denial, Darfur version', accuses Mamdani of indulging in 'technicist sophistry, tip-toeing around the real issues in Darfur and effectively providing solace' to the perpetrators of the genocide, 'the Khartoum regime' of Omar al Bashir.³² Prah argues that Mamdani seeks to conceal the Arabisation agenda (forcing all black Sudanese to speak Arabic and adopt the Islamic religion) of the establishment. However, taking sides in the Prah and Mamdani debate here, while a potentially interesting venture, will not serve the ends of this chapter. The question that a consideration of Prah raises in relation to the Zimbabwe genocide is whether or not Mugabe's regime had adopted a Shonalisation agenda.

The answer seems to be in the affirmative. In a speech after independence in 1977, Robert Mugabe declared, 'Zimbabwe must be a natural Shona nation'.³³ In addition, it is a well-known fact that during the Gukurahundi genocide, the victims were forced to sing and speak in Shona, and that those Ndebeles who spoke Shona were spared beatings and killing; what is more, women were raped and told they had to give birth to Shona babies. It can be well-believed, then, that Shonalisation was at work. The nationalist regime of Robert Mugabe was at that time inflicting colonial violence on another section of the country, with the genocide being a means of silencing a people categorised as unwelcome foreigners.

It is interesting to observe how the Ndebele, as organised entities and as individuals, have reacted to and continue to live with the genocide and its toxic aftermath. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni makes some important contributions that can enrich studies seeking to probe the condition of Zimbabwe regarding the genocide and its aftermath.³⁴ Gatsheni shows how the Ndebele followed exactly the approach that Fanon, quoted earlier, said marginalised minorities take in reaction to their marginality; that is, they entertain secessionist ideas.

Gatsheni records the case of a former Resident Minister of Matabeleland North, the late Welshman Mabhena, who in May 2007 made giant strides towards the restoration of the Mthwakazi Ndebele pre-colonial state, separate from Mashonaland. Mabhena, backed by Umhlahlo We Sizwe sika Mthwakazi, a Ndebele cultural organisation, wrote a letter to the British Ambassador with the title 'Notice of intent to file an application for the review of the verdict of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Land Case of Matabeleland in 1918'. As quoted in Gatsheni, the letter states:

Your Excellency, you may be surprised to hear that I usually get lost when I come across people who mix up my country Matabeleland with Zimbabwe, because Zimbabwe is a former British Colony that was colonised in 1890 and granted independence on the 18th of April 1980. While my homeland, Matabeleland, is a territory that was an independent Kingdom until it was invaded by the British South Africa Company (BSA CO) on 4 November 1893.³⁵

After the letter was delivered, Mabhena and Umhlalo did file a legal claim against the 'Sovereign of the British Crown'. The case centred on the restoration of the pre-colonial Mthwakazi state and kingdom that must stand as separate from Mashonaland and Zimbabwe. This recourse by the people of Matabeleland to measures toward secession from Zimbabwe should be seen in the terms Fanon mentioned: that is, faced with a tribalist central government which has turned a tribe into a party and a party into a nation, the marginal minorities seek to revive their ancient pre-colonial nation.

This points to a failure in nation-building by post-independence governments who, due to imperialist influence and the trappings of power, turn in to clannists and tribalists at the expense of the nation and at the heavy price of tragedies like genocide and ethnic cleansing. Such interests as the demand by the Ndebele to regain their pre-colonial identity are silenced and their grievances forgotten, as in the manner in which colonialism crushes the colonised.

Ali Mazrui examines how African states had difficulty building strong nations defined by unity.³⁶ He contends that Africa's 'nationalism is a reality that played a part in ending territorial colonialism but nationhood itself (in Africa) remains an ambition rather than a reality'. The question that must be answered is: Why have nationalists in Africa failed to build nations? Mazrui ascribes it to 'ethnic consciousness': 'the greatest enemy of African nationhood is ethnic consciousness'. He argues:

Modern African nationalism was born and prospered under the stimulation of racial solidarity and shared blackness. On the other hand, the struggle for viable modern nations within Africa is considerably hampered by acute ethnic cleavages, often separating Bantu from Nilotes, Ibo from Hausa, and the like.³⁷

Mazrui is right that there is a scarcity of true nations in Africa. He is also right that ethnic cleavages militate against nation-building, especially when dominant ethnicities seek to turn themselves into the nation and in the process marginalise other ethnicities, such that the latter end up remembering their pre-colonial nations or imagining new nations altogether. The essentialism of ruling ethnicities that turn themselves into the Fanonian 'new colonists' provokes the particularism of marginal ethnicities, who resort to ancestral kingdoms and ancient glories for dignity and survival.

However, to blame national consciousness alone for failed nation-building, as Mazrui does, is dangerous, in that it can lead to the unfortunate view that 'for the nation to live, the tribe must die' – a view that is genocidal in essence, insofar it has led to governments attempting to coerce minority ethnicities into the nation by force of arms. Trying to suppress the ethnicity of citizens in the name of nationhood is also a regression into coloniality. Unlike Fanon, who regards the tribalism of post-independence leaders and their parties as reason for the ethnic consciousness and secessionism of minority ethnic groups, Mazrui is silent on the cause of ethnic particularism that encourages secessionist imaginations. Mamdani also demonstrates well how colonialism bequeaths to the post-independence era binary relations that politicise indigeneity and cultivate genocidal impulses under conditions of coloniality, where some citizens are reconfigured as natives while others are viewed as settlers.

The present section of this chapter sought to flag some of the key insights and arguments on genocide in Africa and, by inference and comparison, in Zimbabwe. Clearly, genocide can be understood from numerous perspectives. It stretches across wide geographies, and, far from being the result of isolated factors, arises from an entanglement of forces and interests ranging from the local to the global.

ON THE FORGETFULNESS OF COLONIALITY AND SILENCE OF POWER

Jean and John Comaroff insist that critical scholarship must ensure that 'the history of the future [is] different from the history of the present'.³⁸ This invites critical scholarship to contribute to change and the improvement of the human condition. Scholarship must not be satisfied with easy truths and 'comforting myths' that maintain the world in its genocidal condition but must seek 'to change it.' Changing the world involves taking a hard, critical look at history; it involves what Hardt calls the 'militancy of theory' that inspires revolutionary practices for transfiguring the world. It is through such a contribution to history that scholarship on genocide in Africa must surmount limitations of forgetfulness and silences. Furthermore, critical scholars should analytically distance themselves from complicity with power in the perpetuation of violence and coloniality.

Published in the December 2012 special issue of the journal *African Identities*, coedited by Abebe Zegeye and Maurice Vambe, is a paper by Maurice Vambe.³⁹ The paper is entitled 'Zimbabwe genocide: Voices and perceptions from ordinary people in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces, 30 years on.' In it, Vambe arrives at the conclusion that 'the victims of the genocide' – the Gukurahundi genocide – 'have moved on with their lives, despite a history of persecution'. The same issue of *African Identities* contains another paper written by Vambe on the French genocide in Algeria in 1961: 'French genocide in Algeria: The role of memory in artistic representation of colonial violence in the novel *The Seine was Red* (1999)'. In this paper, Vambe details how French colonial perpetrators of genocide in Algeria attempt to silence their victims and erase their memories of crimes against humanity.

What is interesting is how Vambe believes Gukurahundi victims can move on from the genocide of 1982-1987, whereas the victims of the genocide of 1961 in Algeria still relive their experiences of trauma. It is without a sense of irony, but with forgetfulness, that Vambe seeks to silence the victimhood of Gukurahundi victims and their memory of trauma. Vambe's scholarship here shows that it is partial to the perpetrators to the extent that it conceals rather than reveals the factors that were at play in the genocide.

Vambe makes astonishing claims in the first paper. One is that ‘most of the people who were direct victims’ of the Gukurahundi genocide ‘are now dead’, so most of the responses to Vambe’s research questions ‘could only be stories passed on to younger generations and the stories necessarily carry the perceptions of the present respondents’. This claim indicates denial and forgetfulness of the fact that Gukurahundi officially ended only in 1987, roughly three decades ago. Some survivors of World War I are still alive. Closer to home, the veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation war are still alive and working after a war that ended in 1979.

Vambe seems to be wishing that there are no longer survivors of the Gukurahundi genocide or is just denying and silencing their existence. It is a large falsehood that such a study as Vambe’s of Gukurahundi is ‘complicated because some of the forms of memories of pain from the massacres are lost in the cracks due to the wear and tear of time’. It appeared easy enough to access information about the French genocide in Algeria going as far back as 1961 and to write a full journal paper on it; how complicated could it have been to access information on a genocide whose victims and survivors are within one’s easy reach? It is symptomatic of the forgetfulness of coloniality that an event in the 1960s in distant Algeria can be remembered but the details of a catastrophe in the recent 1980s in one’s own country can be forgotten.

Besides cushioning the perpetrators of genocide from censure, Vambe refers to them as ‘the authorities’ and seeks to deny and forget that the Mugabe regime was partly influenced by tribalism in unleashing the army against civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands. ‘The ZANU authorities’, he writes, made a mistake when they assumed ‘that all Ndebele people supported dissidents’. He condemns the ‘cheap and ethnicised notion which is that ethnicity in itself causes genocide’, saying that ‘it does not, but real or perceived unequal access to resources does encourage conflict that might escalate to genocide’.

According to Vambe, one must ‘search for the contributing factors to the disturbances in Matabeleland through other explanations that do not manipulate ethnicity’. What Vambe is forgetful of, or chooses to ignore, is that the victims experienced the genocide as an attack on their tribe (the Ndebele), their history and their political aspirations as ZAPU supporters.

It may not take small-scale research (covering a little more than 300 people) and a professor, who was at the time of the genocide possibly a fascinated spectator, to impose on the victims the cause of their suffering. By denying the tribalism factor and the deliberate agency of the so-called ‘ruling authorities’, insisting that the victims must ‘search for other contributing factors’ to the genocide than those they already know, Vambe could be seen by implication to be siding with the perpetrators in denying their

culpability and seeking to silence the 'voices' of the victims by suppressing their memory and experience of the crime against humanity. This author and other academic enquirers on Gukurahundi wait for a day when Vambe and other such writers answer the question as to why none of the many Shona people who were in ZAPU leadership structures were imprisoned, beaten or killed during the Gukurahundi era.

That there were 'Ndebele soldiers in the Fifth Brigade, or in the secret service that directed the killing of ordinary people' means to Vambe that the Ndebele people are not 'always angels' and are presumed to be 'demonising Shona people as always demonic and irrational people'. What he stops short of saying, and uses the guise of academic research to conceal, is that as a Shona scholar he writes from a locus of enunciation of the perpetrators. He does not temper the bias of his argument. That locus of enunciation in itself is not criminal; what is, is to impose on the victims of Gukurahundi one's wishful thinking and biased speculations about how they experienced Gukurahundi and what they feel about the crime now. Vambe and others should treat the subject with the humility of distant observers. In the denialism of Gukurahundi's causes and effects, Vambe aligns himself with the perpetrators and provides a vivid but powerless apologia rather than adding to an understanding of the genocide.

One can be forgiven for thinking that Vambe's 'research' might as well be a choreographed exercise to air his genocide-denialist opinions when he claims that 'most Ndebele and Shona people who directly suffered from the authorities' heavy-handedness in dealing with the dissident menace are still bitter'. The slaughter of more than 20 000 civilians by the Fifth Brigade is only 'heavy-handedness' and the violence of alleged dissidents is the 'menace'.

From the testimony of Timothy Scarnecchia presented earlier in this chapter, as well as from Kevin Woods,⁴⁰ a former intelligence operative who was in office during Gukurahundi, we know that ZANU-PF (the ruling authority) was working with some of the 'dissidents', who were supposed to disturb peace and give the Fifth Brigade an excuse to crush the Ndebeles and ZAPU. That some 'Shona people' in Vambe's interpretation came to be victims who 'directly suffered' the Gukurahundi genocide is as difficult to believe as the scandalous work from which he quotes his evidence.

The truth is that Professor Alois Mlambo never wrote the book attributed to him, entitled *The hidden dimensions of operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe*; Vambe did. It is open to debate why Vambe would quote from his own book under the respected name of Mlambo: it could be to massage the bibliography to give an impression to readers and funders that rigorous research was done, or simply to lend weight to highly questionable conclusions which are contradicted by all the available evidence.

Another claim Vambe makes on the basis of his questionable research is that, in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces, 'there are not very hard feelings that can justify the claim that a silent genocide is still taking place'. In addition, he notes that there is no evidence that the people of the region feel that 'Matabeleland and the Midlands should break away from the rest of Zimbabwe'.

This conclusion is flatly contradicted by the fact that, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, leaders of the Mthwakazi Liberation Organisation (MLO) have been on trial in court for 'treason' after calling for Mthwakazi independence; as mentioned, Paul Siwela, the leader of the MLO, had to skip the country to escape treason charges. Moreover, a large body of literature indicates that in Matabeleland and the Midlands the common perception is that Gukurahundi continues today. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni records that 'the proclamation of *Umhlahlo we Sizwe Sika Mthwakazi* has summarised the forms of oppression emanating from Shona triumphalism' in a list that includes the following:

- marginalisation of the elected MPs of Matabeleland;
- instituting a reign of terror in Matabeleland;
- perpetrating ethnic cleansing against the people of Matabeleland;
- translocation of the economic resources of Matabeleland to Mashonaland;
- reserving key jobs for Shona people in Matabeleland;
- depriving the people of Matabeleland of education opportunities; and
- retarding the cultural identity of the intercultural society of Matabeleland.⁴¹

The Ndebele grievances listed above arise from a climate of ethnic hatred and sense of political marginality, and are among the reasons why survivors of the Gukurahundi genocide feel they are not part of Zimbabwean nationhood. No amount of stage-managed research and genocide-denialist scholarship can erase experiences of coloniality that are so dramatically out of kilter with what is supposedly an era of independence.

Vambe is not only forgetful of the feelings of the victims of the genocide, but determined to silence their voices and declare they have moved beyond the trauma. Linda Martin Alcoff has written eloquently about the intellectual and political challenges of 'speaking for others' in representation of support or condemnation.⁴² To speak for or on behalf of others is to claim a power and to dismiss their agency as people who feel and think. In the case of the Gukurahundi genocide, Vambe claims a double power: he speaks in defence of the perpetrators and in dismissal of the feelings of the victims, using specious claims and flourishes of erudition.

Vambe admits that, due to 'suspicion and fear of potential victimisation', in the entire sample area of his research he could interview 'only a little more than 300 people' and that 'all interviewees declined to have their real names and names of their villages' disclosed to the interviewer; they even refused to 'commit their voices to recordings'. A people who have moved on from their trauma would not fear any victimisation, unless the victimisation is still a present reality and not a thing of the past, as Vambe claims. It could therefore not have escaped him, or anyone else for that matter, that the people who were interviewed in this research did not trust the interviewer with their names, their voices, the names of their villages, and their true 'voices and perceptions' concerning their experience of the genocide and its aftermath. As a Shona speaker, who could have been perceived as being sent by the 'ruling authorities' to spy on the villagers, the behaviour of the villagers should not surprise him, nor should it surprise him and others that the views they gave him could have been for his ears as a distrusted outsider and far from the truth.

Indeed, it is the height of 'technicist sophistry', and the depth of denialism, forgetfulness and silencing, for a scholar to use the voices of clearly scared, traumatised and suspicious villagers as a basis for making sweeping conclusions that a people have 'moved on with their lives' after having endured an officially denied genocide, the effects of which are still felt by relatives, orphans, widows and widowers who remain.

Appearing alongside Vambe's papers in the same issue of *Africa Identities* is Urther Rwafa's equally questionable paper, which obscures the issues rather than offering any fresh insight into the Gukurahundi genocide.⁴³ Surprisingly, Rwafa denies Welshman Mabhena's comment that 'ZANLA cadres were taught to hate Ndebeles during the liberation struggle'. This denialism has been demolished by the historian Ngwabi Bhebhe.⁴⁴ Writing about Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the tribal hatred led them to fight in camps and in the bush, Bhebhe comments that it should not surprise the reader that a 'civil war that saw many lives being lost in Matabeleland' happened, as 'these young man and women were taught to hate by their leaders who wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties'.

It is telling that both Vambe and Rwafa seek to forget and silence the existence of tribal hatred as a factor in Gukurahundi. In addition, Rwafa seems to confuse the Fifth Brigade that carried out Gukurahundi with ZANLA, the liberation army which had been trained in China. The Fifth Brigade was a crack unit trained after independence by North Korea – not to fight a liberation war but to attack civilians. Describing the Fifth Brigade as a 'killing machine', Paul Moorcraft notes that it was not a regular unit

but 'created as a special forces group, trained by the North Korean army' and 'marked by its fanatical ideological loyalty to Mugabe and its incredible brutality, which rivalled the atrocities being committed by Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) in neighbouring Mozambique'.⁴⁵

Rwafa's attempt to embellish the excesses of the Fifth Brigade by reducing them to a legacy of their training in China diminishes the damning truth that the Mugabe government deliberately trained a killer unit for the purpose of carrying out genocide. Furthermore, for Rwafa to dignify the Fifth Brigade as having been a national army and not a tribal crack unit is to attempt to recast genocide as a just war, and in the process engage in genocide denialism.

All in all, the calibre of scholarship Vambe and Rwafa show in their writing on Gukurahundi reveals how distant they are from their subject matter. What might competent and prominent scholars be doing in disseminating 'comforting myths' and rationalisations that cushion perpetrators from blame for a crime against humanity, other than exhibiting intellectual complicity in genocide? The two writers reveal sympathy with the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF regime. In their denial of tribal hatred and of the deliberate agency of 'the authorities' to punish civilians using the 'menace' of dissidence as a pretext, the writers seek to silence the voices of the victims, forget their experiences and sustain the falsehood that the genocide was an accident. Such writing is colonial in nature and form, insofar as the writers, under the guise of scholarship, pretend to know better than the victims of genocide and therefore to be entitled to have the magisterial final say on what happened, to the extent of saying that the victims have 'moved on with their lives' when anecdotal evidence indicates otherwise.

CONCLUSION

The Gukurahundi genocide, as studied from a decolonial standpoint and discussed in this chapter, is a product of coloniality that conceals its imperial project through forgetfulness and silence. The manifestations of nationalised tribalism that accompanied the dictatorship of the Mugabe regime, which sanctioned the genocide with 'support' from global super-powers and the apartheid regime, reveal how history, global politics and coloniality are imbricated with each other. The entanglement of 'popular' support for the genocide by a constituency within the country, together with the forgetfulness of scholars who cloud rather than unveil the truth, points to conditions of coloniality that are manifest in how some citizens are cast as Mamdanian 'settlers' and others as 'natives' in a historical context that produces genocidal conflict.

It is the argument of this chapter that while the guns have stopped and the mass killings ended, Gukurahundi continues by other means. There has been no frank debate on the genocide, no apologies or compensation have come from the perpetrators, and attempts have been made to silence the victims. In short, an intellectual Gukurahundi is in progress in the form of denialism and scholarly apologetics. Reconciliation, durable peace and genuine nationhood in Zimbabwe can be achieved only by addressing the forgetfulness and silence that so far have infected the discourse on the Gukurahundi genocide.

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Coloniality and the Challenges to African Solutions to African Conflict Problems

Douglas Munemo

INTRODUCTION

The conquest of Africa by European powers was accompanied by the establishment of brutal colonial administrations that exploited African countries for the benefit of European metropolises. When the wave of decolonisation swept across Africa in the 1960s, most of these countries became independent through armed struggle or mass nationalist protests. Despite the attainment of independence, however, African countries have continued to experience repression, war and political instability, all of which have impeded Africa's development.

The United States (US), Europe and other dominant global players have tried to resolve the conflict on the African continent for more than half a century, but with little success, as evidenced by the disastrous conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda in 1990s and the growing number of refugees and internally displaced persons. Having realised at the turn of the new millennium that Euro-American-instituted and -inspired conflict-resolution mechanisms were not bringing lasting peace, African politicians, diplomats and other conflict managers resolved to craft their own response to the issues on the continent by using the principle of African solutions to African problems (ASAP). It was hoped this new way of thinking by leaders in African peace and governance would culminate in the generation of solutions for African problems by Africans. Nevertheless, in spite of the employment of internally generated conflict-prevention and -resolution mechanisms, Africa continues to be bedevilled by violence, warfare and political instability.

This chapter explores the challenges to the ASAP approach. It acknowledges the existence of various factors that explain why the approach has been ineffective, but views coloniality as the primary reason for this failure. The chapter commences with a brief exploration of the concept of coloniality and its main contours. This is followed by an analysis of how coloniality

acts as an obstacle to the resolution of African conflict problems. Finally, the study advocates decoloniality as the panacea to the challenges that beset the ASAP approach.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Coloniality is an analytical concept developed by the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano to explain the origins of the modern world. It engages with the long-standing distribution of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, which defines culture, labour, inter-subjective relations and knowledge production well beyond the limits strictly of colonial administration.¹ According to Quijano, Europe's conquest of the Americas in 1492 saw the creation of a new social structure in which humanity was ranked on the basis of difference in race.² Lighter-skinned people were perceived as being closer to full humanity, whereas the darker races had their humanity put in doubt. In the social realm, the white race was ranked as superior, while the darker races were seen as inferior, primitive and uncivilised, and were placed at the bottom of the social ladder.³ What emerged with conquest was the construction of a new way of classifying people according to the colour of their skin, a mode of classification that was used to justify the slave trade, imperialism and colonialism.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues that the classification system based on race was informed by what he refers to as Western 'abyssal thinking', which is all about making distinctions.⁴ In his view, an imaginary abyssal line distinguishes the subaltern from privileged whites.⁵ Whites of western European descent assumed a higher social status, while the darker indigenous races were placed at the bottom of the social ladder. This led to the development of a modern global social structure that associates not just whiteness but Christianity, capitalism, and patriarchy with superiority, and the absence of these qualities with inferiority.

The social hierarchy created by coloniality elevated and privileged the white race, granting them control of three key elements of coloniality: authority; gender and sexuality; and subjectivity and knowledge.⁶ The dominance of the white race was extended to cover ethnicity, gender, sexism and masculinity. Gradually the greater part of the world fell under the influence of the power of the white race, giving birth to what Mignolo terms global coloniality.⁷

The forms of domination that characterised colonial rule have persisted long after the end of formal colonial rule. The majority of the developing world continues to experience colonial situations, given that it is still under the domination of the US and Europe, the former colonial powers. This has

prompted Salvatore to refer to coloniality as the persistence of the colonial of the past.⁸

Quijano regards coloniality as more than a residual form of colonial relations, seeing as coloniality can exist even where formal colonial administrations have not been established. The reason is that domination and exploitation along cultural, political and economic lines may occur in the absence of formal colonial administrations.⁹ He argues that the world ought to disabuse itself of the notion that humanity lives in a decolonised era, because everywhere it is engulfed by political and economic systems that are shaped around a colonial capitalist worldview.

Similarly, Grosfoguel maintains that the notion of a decolonised world is one of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century, inasmuch as the end of juridical-political colonisation did not result in the dismantling of a complex matrix of global structures. Euro-American dominance is still evident in various aspects of global life, politics, culture, labour, economics and knowledge.¹⁰ This explains underdevelopment and conflict in the exploited peripheral Global South in relation to development and greater peace enjoyed by Europe and America. This state of affairs, in which the West continues to dominate the South despite the end of juridical-political domination, prompts Mignolo to refer to coloniality as a new form of colonialism – colonialism without territoriality¹¹ – while Quijano alludes to it as ‘independence without decolonisation’.¹²

Coloniality is interwoven with the concepts of colonialism and neo-colonialism. According to Maldonado-Torres,¹³ colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, making such a nation an empire.¹⁴ Colonialism is crude and essentially overt; it is different from covert coloniality, which does not require the existence of formal colonial administration systems in order to survive.

Neo-colonialism is a policy of political and economic domination of a less powerful country by another in which the dominant country does not necessarily assume territorial control. Unlike neo-colonialism, coloniality goes beyond merely focusing on the continuing economic exploitation of the Global South by the industrialised North. It is more comprehensive, as it also looks at the continued domination of the ex-colonised states in the realms of knowledge, power and being.

Coloniality is best understood as a matrix constituted by three main pillars: power; knowledge; and being. Escobar refers to the coloniality of power as a global hegemonic model of power that has been in place since the European conquest of the Americas in the fifteenth century.¹⁵ It is a structuring process in the modern world system, one through which the US and Europe have created an asymmetrical power structure that privileges

the white race and enables it to dominate the global political economy and be epistemologically and culturally hegemonic.¹⁶ As a consequence, most peripheral states and subalternised peoples of the world are still colonial in relation to hegemonic Europe and America.

The coloniality of power explains why and how power is located in the western hemisphere, where the fairer races of the world reside and where powerful states, like Britain and the US, use their economic, political and diplomatic muscle to dominate smaller, weaker nations (that is to say, former colonies) that are dependent on them for various forms of assistance.

There is also the coloniality of knowledge: according to Maldonado-Torres, this pillar of coloniality has to do with the impact of colonisation on the different areas of knowledge production.¹⁷ It is a power structure that privileges knowledge from Europe and America. It holds in high esteem knowledge produced by the white race, while undermining, ignoring, silencing, oppressing and marginalising knowledge from the Global South. This has resulted in the West's epistemic hegemony.¹⁸ The coloniality of knowledge concerns itself with who generates knowledge from where and for what purpose, and with who controls and monopolises this knowledge.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that endogenous and indigenous knowledge has been pushed to the margins of society. He argues that Africa today is saddled with irrelevant knowledge that disempowers, rather than empowers, individuals and communities.¹⁹ Quijano concurs, pointing out that the Euro-American world concentrated all forms of control of subjectivity, culture and, in particular, knowledge under its hegemony, so as to perpetuate imperialism and colonialism in previously colonised territories.²⁰

Lastly, there is the coloniality of being, which concerns the ontological dimension of coloniality and relates to the dynamics of power that discriminate between the different races of the world.²¹ It places race at the centre of the global order, with European people found in the higher echelons of the global social hierarchy and enjoying privileges over non-European people. The ex-colonised people of the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America (darker races in general) are seen as inferior, while the former colonisers of Europe and North America (the fairer races) are regarded as superior, thus perpetuating colonial situations that ascribed an inferior and superior status to the conquered and conquerors on the basis of race.

One can therefore concur with Ndlovu-Gatsheni that the global order, one based on race and inaugurated with the conquest of the Americas in 1492, has not only maintained race as the key element of classification but has been modified. Under this order, race has been hidden away and the order now represents itself as a classification system based on knowledge, power and being.²² The concept of coloniality hence offers a highly promising way of understanding the challenges that have beset the idea of ASAP. This is

so because colonial patterns of power that determine power, knowledge and identity have persisted long after the end of formal colonial rule and had the effect of blocking the path of African solutions to African problems.

COLONIALITY, CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

In the 1950s and 1960s, colonialism came to an end in most African countries, mainly through armed struggle or nationalist protest. With the dissolution of formal colonial administrations, there was hope that Africa would experience peace and development; instead, the continent has been engulfed in violence. Colonialism's systems of oppression and exploitation survived its demise, and these have contributed significantly to the obstacles Africa faces in its quest to find solutions to the conflict situations currently affecting it. For instance, attempts by African states to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been impeded by Western multinational companies that retain control of the country's rich mineral resources long after the end of Belgian and French rule.

The formation of the African Union (AU) sought to ensure the development of Pan-African solutions to African problems. However, like other supranational bodies, the AU is hierarchised, with wealthier and powerful military states at the top and militarily weak and poor nations at the bottom. The continent's dominant states often push through their positions and interests, instead of seeking a more comprehensive approach to the resolution of conflict. For instance, South Africa's decision to attempt unilaterally to protect the government of Bozize did more harm than good in the Central African Republic. South Africa disregarded the fact that Seleka rebels had the backing of Chad, Sudan and other African states wishing the Bozize government to be ousted. Instead of working with these nations towards a resolution of the conflict, South Africa marginalised and antagonised them, which led to an escalation in civil strife in the central African state.

African states have found it difficult to resolve intrastate conflict situations because the retreating colonisers left constitutions in place that did not address socioeconomic inequities and other justice issues. From the beginning of its second decade of independence (1990s), Zimbabwe experienced rising socioeconomic instability, which finally resulted in conflict. This conflict was triggered at the beginning of the new millennium by the government's attempt to find solutions to the country's problems by means of land reform.²³ The genesis of this crisis can be traced, in part, to the imposition of the flawed Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which did not fully decolonise Zimbabwe. The Westminster constitution Zimbabwe inherited as a result of the agreement was tailor-made by the British to serve their own

interests as well as of those of white settlers and American capitalism. It left the country's land and economic wealth firmly in white hands and led to the impoverishment of blacks. The Lancaster constitution thus sowed the seed of future conflict in Zimbabwe by perpetuating imperialist interests through white control of the economy.

From 2007 onwards, the Zimbabwean government sought to use revenue from diamonds to improve the economy and de-escalate the conflict in the state. However, it encountered challenges from imperialists in its endeavour to do so. It could not use diamond wealth to ensure peace, as the Western-influenced and -dominated Kimberley Process restricted the sale of Zimbabwean diamonds for five years, alleging human rights abuses and labelling the gems 'blood diamonds'. Zimbabwe's attempts to sell its diamonds were also curtailed by sanctions imposed on the country by Britain, the US and the European Union (EU).

The need for ASAP will remain problematic as long as some African states entrust their security to former colonisers or foreign armies. Mali has virtually entrusted its security to its former colonial master, France, while Botswana and Kenya host US forces on their territory. These foreign armies are less concerned with the defence of African sovereignty and integrity than with safeguarding and furthering their imperialist interests. One wonders how sustainable peace can be achieved when a former coloniser and oppressor is tasked with bringing peace and security to a population it once brutalised. It is likely that resentment and animosity towards these foreign forces still lingers and could be extended to the government that invites them. On the whole, the presence of Western armies on African soil explains the anti-West sentiments in Africa, particularly in Islamic Africa. These armies complicate the security situation, making it difficult for Africa to find solutions to the dilemma posed by its conflicts.

In spite of the end of colonial rule, African states continue to be influenced by former colonisers in the domains of methodology and knowledge production. The effects of colonialism linger, given that Western tools of analysis, methods and theories are still employed.

This has been noted in the domain of conflict resolution, where the previously colonised states of Africa have sidelined traditional methods of conflict management in exchange for ideologies and methodologies that do not originate in Africa. African states now prefer to employ conflict-management models formulated by international financial institutions, developed countries, the G8 and the World Trade Organisation rather than indigenous modes of conflict resolution. It appears that they elect to employ these Western models because they suffer from an epistemic crisis, one in which citizens discard indigenous modes of development, governance and conflict resolution that focus on community health and restoration, and

instead adopt the coloniser's forms of thought, favouring Western notions of resolving conflict that are alien to their culture.²⁴

For instance, Thabo Mbeki, the former President of South Africa, adopted 'quiet diplomacy' as a conflict-resolution strategy in his role as a Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mediator in the Zimbabwean crisis. This method has its origins in the Cold War era and is foreign to Zimbabwe. 'Quiet diplomacy' was disastrous, as it led to an escalation of the crisis in the country as well as the violent 2008 elections and the flawed Global Political Agreement, which did not offer a pathway to sustainable peace.²⁵ African solutions to African problems are unlikely to succeed as long as African states employ conflict resolution and prevention methodologies crafted by Western states or former colonisers and unsuited to the peculiarities of African conflict situations.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni is sceptical about the appropriateness and sincerity of Western conflict-resolution pedagogies, observing that 'powerful people benefitting from the lack of peace will not teach you how to be peaceful lest their power is eroded'.²⁶ He maintains that former colonisers with economic interests in a particular region rarely give sound, honest political counsel to liberated territories.²⁷ As has been noted, British participation in the Lancaster House peace talks in 1980 was apparently informed more by imperialist political and economic interests than a desire to bring peace and stability to Zimbabwe.

The knowledge Africa continues to receive long after the end of colonial rule has served to weaken its political and socioeconomic fabric. It has not laid the foundation for establishing strong economic and political structures that promote sustainable peace. Political crises and civil strife have engulfed Africa since independence, and are indicative of the troubled peace and reconciliation epistemologies derived from Western powers. Indeed, the coloniality of knowledge has underlain the very strategies, theories and approaches that have been employed in an attempt to find ASAP.²⁸

Africa has been a victim of externally generated pedagogies of conflict resolution that are not informed by any geo-biographical contextual understanding of the continent's history and politics. Ostensible 'experts' from, or educated in, the West are given space to deliver their pedagogy of conflict management and peace-building in Africa. They perceive and analyse African conflict situations through a foreign lens. This militates against the proper diagnosis and resolution of those situations, as the 'experts' lack an understanding of the everyday experiences of Africans.

The quest for ASAP suffers from a crisis regarding the locus of enunciation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni cites Mignolo, who defines the locus of enunciation as meaning the geographical spaces from which academics and intellectuals speak, their ideological orientations, subject positions (that is, their racial,

gender and class identifications), and the historical processes and events that inform their knowledge claims.²⁹ Some African conflict managers who are resident in Africa speak as though they are geographically located in Europe, articulating ideas, beliefs and approaches to conflict resolution consistent with Western modes of conflict resolution; similarly, some Africans resident in London speak as if they are European. This reflects a condition in which Africans have remained mentally colonised in the independence era and been prevented from effectively addressing the conflict that is engulfing the African continent.

Under coloniality, Western-dominated institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank debilitated the capacity of African states to prevent or resolve conflict. For instance, according to Bond and Manyanya, the IMF demanded in 2001 that the Zimbabwean government, involved in the DRC as part of the SADC intervention force, provide it with details of its engagement in conflict as a precondition for funding.³⁰ The information the IMF requested was sensitive and likely to threaten state security. When Zimbabwe did not provide it, the IMF withdrew lines of credit, thus affecting the war effort. Multilateral imperialism therefore curtailed African attempts to resolve the DRC conflict.

In 2002, African states transformed the Organisation of African Unity into the AU. Its objectives are, among others:

- to achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states;
- to recognise sovereign equality and interdependence among member states of the Union; and
- to respect borders existing at independence.³¹

The AU sees the attainment of these objectives as important for the success of ASAP, but some of them are tainted by coloniality. The fourth objective, for instance, is steeped in the colonial legacy of divide-and-rule. It provides a weak platform from which to foster peace, unity and solidarity, as it entrenches wedges between African states. Territorial conflicts in West Africa, northern Kenya and the Great Lakes region in central and east Africa, amongst others, have been the consequence of the failure to redraw colonial boundaries and the AU's decision to retain them regardless of the fact that they are problematic and pose a threat to the prospects of achieving peace.

Another obstacle to ASAP lies in the fact that many African governments have replicated undemocratic styles of governance that are reminiscent of colonial administration. Governments have employed violence as a mode

of governance and an instrument of conflict resolution, deploying state security machinery to persecute and oppress a dissenting population. This replication of the colonial *modus operandi* by independent governments has weakened the efficacy of African-generated solutions in addressing conflict on the continent.

African solutions to African conflict problems are tainted by the West's invisible hand. Solutions seemingly originated by Africans have in fact been crafted and promoted by extracontinental actors. In addition, some African states, while giving the appearance of being fully sovereign, are lackeys of the West, on which they depend for political and economic survival; as a result of this dependence, they lack the leverage crucial for resolving armed conflicts. Often it is the West that prescribes the solutions which African governments embrace and present as home-grown, whereas in actuality the solutions are foreign, detached from the reality of the African situation, and therefore unable to foster durable peace. The power-sharing agreement in Kenya brokered by a leading Ghanaian diplomat and the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, between Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement and Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party, was in actual fact concluded at the behest of the US and EU, which opted to have stability in that country, rather than democracy, as a way of safeguarding their investments in east Africa's strongest economy.

African solutions to problems in Africa are often derailed by conflict between global political powers, whose contestation for power spills over to the African continent. As a consequence, the problems in Africa cease to be purely African – they become global in nature and require global solutions, not African ones. The conflicts in Darfur, Mali, Libya, Nigeria and Somalia are theatres of war not only between African groups but among global political players. Prescribing African solutions to conflict in these regions will therefore not yield the desired results, because Africa lacks the requisite conflict-prevention and -resolution capacity to deal decisively with conflicts on its soil that have their roots in global politics.

Attempts by African states to resolve African conflict situations have also been hampered by the fact that the military hardware, technology and information strategies are owned and controlled by the North. The SADC and AU forces have been unable to deal with rebels bent on overthrowing Kabila's government in Kinshasa, not only because the rebels are backed by Rwanda and Uganda but because, in exchange for access to minerals in rebel-controlled areas, American and European multinational companies supply the rebels with military intelligence, hardware and technology to counter African military initiatives.³²

The AU has been hierarchised to the detriment of effective resolution of conflict. Some states perceive themselves as ontologically denser than others

and bestow upon themselves powers to deal with conflict. A handful of such dominant, wealthier states marginalise poorer and smaller ones that could perhaps provide solutions to Africa's peace conundrum. These hierarchies exist both within the continental body as well as within continental states. Governments that emerged at independence have over the years become imperial in the way they deal with citizens. The poor and downtrodden citizens of the state have been placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy, while the rich ruling elite occupy the top strata. These inequalities are reminiscent of the hierarchies of colonial society and present obstacles to the resolution of conflict on the continent. Additionally, Africans have been trapped in identity politics for far too long, politics accentuated and entrenched by colonialism, which has further divided them along the lines of ethnicity, race, religion and class. This, too, compounds the challenges of the approach of seeking African solutions to African conflict problems.

Colonial powers used the divide-and-rule strategy to conquer and then govern the African continent. Long after the end of formal colonial empires, the ability of African states to solve African conflict is being hindered by divisions sown by former colonial masters. According to Apuuli, in 2011 the AU's Peace and Security Council met one week after the rebellion in Libya. Instead of taking swift and proactive action in Libya, the Council was able only to issue a communiqué spelling out its intention to send a fact-finding mission to the country. The AU was paralysed by disagreement about the conflict-management trajectory to take in Libya. Uganda, South Africa and, to some extent, Kenya supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) intention to intervene, whereas Zimbabwe, Algeria and Nigeria opposed it. While the AU was still undecided about the course of action to take, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973, authorising the use of force to protect civilians caught up in the conflict.³³ This marked the beginning of intervention by Western countries in the Libyan crisis and the marginalisation of the AU in the search for peace in Libya.

The idea of ASAP has failed, too, because many of the current political leaders at the centre of resolving political conflict in Africa are products of coloniality. They were born under colonial rule, schooled by it, oppressed by it and brutalised by it – their thinking, therefore, is enveloped in coloniality. This militates against their being effective in combating coloniality; by commission or omission they find themselves working in service of it.

In the preceding discussion, it has been noted that, owing to the persistence of coloniality in the realms of power, knowledge and being in the post-independence era, the resolution of conflict in Africa has been no small task. This therefore makes decoloniality an imperative if the ASAP paradigm is to establish durable peace.

DECOLONIALITY FOR AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN CONFLICT PROBLEMS

The ASAP approach could produce positive results through the pursuit of decoloniality. Decoloniality is a political and epistemological liberation project that seeks to unmask and resist coloniality. It aims to dismantle coloniality by arguing for a need to radically transform the global power-structure dynamics that privilege the West and exploit and oppress the South.³⁴ It calls for previously colonised peoples of the world to start perceiving themselves and the world in a different light. They are challenged and encouraged to re-order the world in a fashion that enables them to speak, think and act as equals in global interactions, so that colonial matrices of power that define labour, power, culture and race are destroyed.

Decoloniality seeks to shake the very foundations of global imperial designs, which determine the control of power, economy, authority, knowledge and subjectivity that sustain global coloniality. Its mission is the decolonisation of knowledge, power and being and the institutions that create the asymmetrical modern world order in which we live, one which is racially hierarchised, imperialistic, colonialist, Euro-American-centric, Christian-centric, heteronormative, patriarchal and violent.³⁵ Through the project of decoloniality, we may be able to explain how the coloniality of power, knowledge and being has contributed to conflict and violence in Africa.

If African solutions to African conflict problems are to succeed, there is also a need for the adoption of a decolonial conflict-resolution framework and its concomitant conflict-resolution theories, ideologies and methodologies. Moreover, it is imperative that liberated African territories do not permit colonial patterns of power that survived the end of colonialism to continue to bind themselves to the continent. African states should rid themselves of dependency on former colonisers for economic, military and political survival. Such dependency allows Western countries to meddle in African economic and political governance, thereby creating avenues through which they can scuttle peace processes or cause conflict in Africa.

Decoloniality also allows us to understand that the authoritarian modes of governance which have triggered many conflict situations in Africa are a continuation of oppressive colonial rule. It also facilitates an unmasking of the oppression, racism/ethnicism and inequities that exist in economics, politics, knowledge and power in the wider world. Finally, decoloniality inculcates ontological egalitarianism in the face of differences in race, religion, gender, wealth and power. Perhaps the ASAP approach could bring peace to Africa if decoloniality is seen as having the potential to establish a new world order, one with symmetrical power structures that prevent

Euro-American forces from controlling global patterns of power, knowledge and identity – control that currently impedes the ASAP approach from being a success.

CONCLUSION

It has been noted that most of the problems ravaging Africa emanate from outside it; at the same time, the solutions being proffered are predominantly Western-generated or, if African at all, contaminated by coloniality. There is little that is African about either our problems or solutions: the problems are rooted mainly in coloniality, and the proposed solutions have tended to be drawn from the former colonisers and their agents in Africa, or from institutions that they dominate and control. This chapter therefore concludes that coloniality blocks ASAP within the context of conflict and conflict resolution. It submits that the colonial patterns of power that existed under colonialism and which survived it are the *problematique* in the quest for ASAP.

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Being African and Innovative

A Decolonial Perspective

Morgan Ndlovu

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether the non-Western subject can innovate or invent anything new in the age of Western-centred modernity is an important one in the 'African solutions for African problems (ASAP)' discourse. This is mainly because the advent of a Western-centred modernity between the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century brought about a condition of colonality that prevented people of the non-Western world from imagining an alternative to the world constructed by the Western subject.

In this chapter, I provide a decolonial critique of the predicament of the African subject within Western-centred modernity, showing that the 'darker' side of this modernity condemned non-Westerners to a realm of the subhuman. I argue that the idea of finding African solutions to problems faced by Africa today cannot succeed without an understanding of how the modern world system, which gave rise to many of these problems through forms of colonialism, curbed the development of an 'African GENEius'.

THE 'LAGGING BEHIND' OF AN AFRICAN SUBJECT

Although Africa is endowed with an enormous natural resource base, one which for a long time has helped sustain the development of the Western world, the majority of its indigenous people languish in abject poverty. The question that emerges in this situation, therefore, is: How did a people endowed with such a resource base come to be located at the bottom of the hierarchical modern world system, while Europe, which has fewer resources, came to be at the apex? One would expect people originating from the 'cradle' of humankind to be at the top of the ladder of development rather than the bottom.

The nature of Africa's development cannot be understood outside of the impact of European expansion, which served to privilege the sociohistorical experience of the Western subject. The expansion of Western civilisation was accompanied by oppressive and exploitative processes, such as colonialism, imperialism, apartheid and neo-colonialism, which enslaved the African and enabled Europe to construct a world system in which the Western subject was positioned at the apex and the non-Western subject at the base. In a scenario in which people from one part of the world usurp the histories of people in another part of the world, it is difficult for those whose histories have been marginalised or decimated to imagine an alternative world to that which has been imposed on them. Such a situation is complicated by the fact that being on 'the darker side of Western modernity'¹ means that one cannot innovate or invent something new that can be to one's advantage without risking censorship by those who have placed one in that subordinate position.

The question of whether the African subject has the right to exercise epistemic freedom is important when considering the idea of African-based solutions to the problems bedevilling the continent. However, this question cannot be answered without considering to what extent the problems Africa faces today were caused by Africans themselves. This is important because the idea of ASAP cannot be feasible without a proper diagnosis of the source of those problems.

As such, in this chapter I propose a decolonial critique of the question of innovation by the African subject. I begin with an interrogation of the importance of innovation for development in Africa. I argue that the lack of an innovative spirit among the indigenous people of Africa can be traced to the advent of a Western-centred modernity in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, which became a source of problems for the peoples of the non-Western world in general and those of the African continent in particular. I conclude that the discussion of the problem of innovation in Africa requires a shift in the geography of reason² and in the 'locus of enunciation'³ by the African subject, particularly the Western-educated African elite, as this could lead to the emergence of an African genius who would exercise extra-structural agency to outmanoeuvre the snare of colonial matrices of power.

One of the problematic questions within the discourse of development in Africa today is that of the link between colonialism, innovation and development. This question is problematic because it touches on the issue of who is to blame for Africa's developmental challenges – the African subject or the coloniser who interfered with indigenous African conceptions of development. Thus, what has become a problematic question within the discourse of innovation and development in Africa is the question of why Africans are always 'lagging behind' when it comes to innovation.

One of the issues related to innovation is that the concept is often associated with technological advancement.⁴ The conception of innovation as a discrete event involving the development of technical solutions to the challenges of the world is limited because it disregards the fact that innovation is a process that involves social interaction and cannot be measured only in terms of tangible things. In Africa, perhaps one of the most important innovations of recent years was the imagining of inclusive, democratic societies after the demise of juridical administrative colonialism and apartheid – for example, the South African ‘rainbow nation’. In spite of such attempts at innovation in the context of having been colonised for a very long period, the question of innovation as a means of transforming Africa from a follower to a leader and pacesetter remains problematic.

Many factors inform the process of innovation in general, but among the most important are historically generated institutions and patterns of human capital formation.⁵ The crisis of innovation and development in Africa cannot be understood outside the influence of external factors such as colonial domination. This part of the chapter discusses how the four genocides/epistemicides of the sixteenth century laid the foundation for the modern world system and how its advent, predicated on Western-centred modernity, in turn explains the problem of innovation and development in Africa.

The question of whether or not the African subject, particularly black people, possess the right to think as Africans or have the epistemic freedom to innovate beyond Eurocentric ways of knowing and imagining the world is intimately related to how the modern world system articulated the relationship between the Western and the non-Western subject in such a way that the former came to doubt the humanity of the latter. It is this radical doubt of the humanity of the non-Western subject by the Western subject that has led to the idea that people of the non-Western world, unlike those of European origin, are not faced with problems but are a problem people.

This leads to the question of whether or not those who are perceived as a problem have the right to deny that their mere existence is a problem or can provide solutions to the problems they face. This part of the chapter grapples with the inauguration of the modern world system and how the expansion of Western civilisation brought about the problems that non-Western subjects, including Africans, face today. This is important to examine within the context of an attempt by the African subject to develop African-based solutions for problems that face Africa, because without proper diagnosis such well-conceived initiatives are bound to fail.

The history of the expansion of Western civilisation and the birth of what became the modern world system can be understood in terms of what Grosfoguel refers to as the four genocides/epistemicides of the long sixteenth century.⁶ According to Grosfoguel, these were perpetrated against

the Jewish and Muslim populations during the conquest of the Al-Andalusia territory in southern Spain by the Catholic monarchy from northern Spain; against indigenous people during the conquest of the Americas; against Africans, who were kidnapped and sent as slaves to the Americas; and against women, who were burned alive and accused of practising witchcraft in Europe.⁷

These four genocides/epistemicides enable us to understand the genesis of a culture of exterminating those ways of knowing that do not conform to the Western worldview. This epistemicidal culture, I argue, is fundamental to understanding why the people of Africa are today struggling to find solutions to the problems they face.

The colonial conquest of Al-Andalus in the late fifteenth century is important, not only because it preceded other genocides/epistemicides that laid the foundation of the modern world system, but because it took place under the slogan of 'purity of blood'⁸ – a development that marked the beginning of racism as a culture that would affect human relations throughout Western-centred modernity.

The war waged by the Catholic monarchy against the sultanate of Granada (which was the last Muslim political authority in the Iberian Peninsula) can be understood as the foundation of the practice of ethnic cleansing through physical and cultural genocide, since the Jews and Muslims who occupied the Andalusian territory were either killed or forcefully converted to the Christian religion. The cultural conversion, according to Grosfoguel, took the form of 'massive destruction of Islamic and Judaic spirituality and knowledge' through 'turning Muslims into Moriscos (converted Muslims) and Jews into Marranos (converted Jews)'.⁹

While this conquest involved destruction of the memory, knowledge and spirituality of these Muslims and Jews, it is important to note that at this point in history the 'purity of blood' discourse did not question the humanity of the victims in a profound way. It can hence be viewed as a prototype racism, rather than a fully-fledged one. Grosfoguel notes how it was purely a question of religious discrimination on the grounds of having the 'wrong God' or the 'wrong religion'. However, the conquest did give birth to the problematic idea of 'one state, one identity, one religion', which has characterised the modern world system up to the present.¹⁰

The methods of colonisation and domination used during the conquest of Al-Andalus are important because they were extrapolated to achieve the conquest of the Americas. In both cases, genocide of native people took place alongside epistemicide, which included not just conversion to the Christian religion but the burning of libraries and the erasure of memory and knowledge.¹¹ However, Grosfoguel notes that in the conquest of the Americas a dimension was added to the discourse of 'people without religion' – not

within the context of having a 'wrong God' or a 'wrong religion' but of lacking humanity. In the Christian imaginary of the time, lacking humanity was equivalent to lacking a soul.¹²

When Christopher Columbus 'discovered' the Americas on 12 October 1492, he did not see the indigenous people as 'atheists' but as lacking the qualities of being human. Once the humanity of the people he wrongly identified as 'Indians' had been put in question, the possibility of their conversion to Christianity became invalid, as animals cannot be converted. This had implications for the discriminatory practice of Islamophobia and Judeophobia in Al-Andalus, because, after the conquest of the Americas, the question was not about the wrong theology due to the influence of the devil, but about the wrong people, that is, those who are not human enough.

The broader implication of the notion of a 'people without religion' and therefore a 'people without soul' is that it justified enslavement, since it was not considered a sin in the eyes of God to use those perceived as animals for the purposes of labour. In Africa, the idea of 'people without soul' led to the kidnapping, enslavement and transportation of black people to the Americas, where they were used as slave labour on the plantations. According to Grosfoguel, 'Africans were perceived at the time as Muslims and the racialisation of Muslims in sixteenth century Spain was extended to them'.¹³ This constituted a major and significant historical event, because millions of Africans were enslaved and not allowed to practise their cultural beliefs and worldview during their enslavement.¹⁴ What makes the enslavement of Africans unique in the history of human slavery is that for the first time human life was considered dispensable, as those enslaved were not considered human beings.

The fourth genocide/epistemicide that laid the foundations of the modern world system was the conquest of Indo-European women. Although not related to the three genocides/epistemicides already mentioned, the conquest of Indo-European women contributed to the emergence of what Grosfoguel describes as a 'modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal' power structure.¹⁵ The burning alive of women between 1550 and 1650,¹⁶ which destroyed indigenous knowledge mastered from ancient times, was intended to consolidate a Christian-centric patriarchy and destroy autonomous communal forms of land ownership.

Grosfoguel argues that the four genocides/epistemicides of the long sixteenth century gave birth to a modern world system characterised by an entanglement of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation. For Grosfoguel, the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European and the non-European reconfigured global power structures.¹⁷ This structure persists to this day and is fundamental for answering questions of epistemic freedom in Africa. Can those whose

histories have been usurped in this way exercise agency in determining their present and future?

THE MYTH OF DECOLONISATION AND SHIFTING ORDERS OF COLONIALITY

When considering the idea of African-based solutions to problems in Africa, an important question is whether the liberation struggles against colonial domination succeeded in bringing about decolonisation. This question is significant because the agency of the peoples of Africa cannot develop African solutions to problems that confront them under the structure of colonial domination. Colonial administrations constrained rather than enabled Africans' agency and freedom of choice. While it is possible to argue that the classical juridical administrative form of colonialism is no longer in place in the non-Western world, the question remains: Why are the peoples of the non-Western world failing to attain what Gordon describes as the 'concrete manifestations of freedom'?¹⁸

Scholars such as Grosfoguel argue that the idea of decolonisation in the non-Western world is a myth.¹⁹ As Grosfoguel puts it:

One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that elimination of colonial administrations amounted to decolonisation of the world. This led to the myth of a 'post-colonial' world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonisation of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same 'colonial power matrix'. With juridical administrative decolonisation, we moved from a period of 'global colonialism' to the current period of 'global coloniality'. Although 'colonial administrations' have been entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchy of Europeans versus non-Europeans remains in place and is entangled with the 'international division of labour' and the accumulation of capital on a world-wide scale.²⁰

What is meant by Grosfoguel's articulation of the myth of decolonisation is that there is a need to expand the idea of the decolonised world beyond a limited vision of a classical juridical administrative colonialism in order to visualise the colonial system's full architecture. The significance of this is that the illusion of independence can prevent Africans from recognising the presence of other forms of colonialism that make it impossible for them to develop solutions to problems on their continent.

One of the important lenses that could enable the African subject to understand the whole environment of colonial domination within which he or she exists is that of coloniality. Coloniality is broader than that of a singular, classical and juridical administrative colonialism, encompassing different forms of colonialism that affect various aspects of life. Thus, according to Maldonado-Torres:

Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and in so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.²¹

What can be understood from the above articulation of the difference between the idea of 'classical' colonialism and coloniality is that the latter is broader than the former in its vision of the colonial situation. In the context of developing African-based solutions to problems that the peoples of Africa face, this distinction enables the African subject to ask questions about what knowledge and agency informs the idea of African-based solutions to problems that affect Africa. These are important questions, because the coloniser's diagnosis and solutions to African problems could have the effect of perpetuating the exploitation and oppression of Africans.

One of the survival strategies by which coloniality has succeeded in creating an illusion of a decolonised world has been that of shifting world orders. While the modern world system, predicated on the dominance of Western-centred modernity, has remained static since its inauguration in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, coloniality has survived by hiding, that is, shifting the world orders that restructure and prolong its existence. The process of decolonisation that took place during the anti-colonial struggles did not inaugurate a new world system – the colonial system that manifested in the visible juridical administrative sphere merely retreated into those spheres of life where it cannot be easily recognised. These spheres include that of knowledge production, where colonisation affects invisible aspects of life, such as ways of thinking and imagining. Thus, the question of how the shifting world orders serve to reform the

world system requires us to examine the problematics of the relationship between the structure of coloniality and African agency in practice.

The idea of structure and agency is important to the question of how the modern world system survives the anti-systemic attacks that have been developed by the colonised subject, who has been forced to exist on the darker side of Western-centred modernity. Indeed, one of the conundrums of structure and agency, in general, is that the two cannot be separated in practice. Hence, in spite of the differences between the manner in which structures influence the behaviour of social agents, a number of scholars are sceptical about whether or not it is possible to distinguish between structure and agency in practice in explaining change and continuity in social phenomena. According to Sahlins, structure and agency cannot be seen as exclusive alternatives, because culture (structure) is historically ordered and history (agency) is culturally ordered and, as such, there is no radical binary contrast between structure and agency, as they produce each other in action.²²

Thus, in his articulation of how structure and agency construct one another, Abrams asserts that,

[t]he problem of agency is the problem of finding a way of accounting for human experience which recognises, simultaneously and in equal measure, that history and society are made by constant and more or less purposeful individual action and that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history and society. How do we, as active subjects, make a world of objects, which then, as it were, become subjects making us their objects? It is the problem of individual and society, consciousness and being, action and structure ... People make their own history – but only under definite circumstances and conditions: we act through a world of rules that our action creates, breaks and renews – we are creatures of rules, the rules are our creations: we make our own world – the world confronts us as an implacable and autonomous system of social facts.²³

What can be understood from Sahlins' and Abrams' characterisation of the relation between structure and agency is that culture becomes history synchronically and history becomes culture diachronically – a situational synthesis of the two, which Sahlins characterises as the 'structure of the conjuncture'.²⁴ This means that an event can be nothing other than a relation between a particular happening and a structure, either to merely conform to that cultural order or to transform the order in action, so as to produce a 'system-change'.

The difficulty of separating structure from agency is decried by Thompson when he refers to 'the crucial ambivalence of our human presence in

our own history, part subjects, part objects, the voluntary agents of our own involuntary determinations'.²⁵ If structure and agency are so intertwined, the question that needs to be answered is this: How does change occur in a system such as that of coloniality?

According to Giddens, there are circumstances where structure determines social actions and circumstances wherein it fails to do so, thereby letting social agents take the lead in constructing social phenomena.²⁶ Thus Giddens argues that it is wrong to reduce structure to everything and social agency to nothing, because structure is not always a constraint upon action, as it can also facilitate action.²⁷ The double presence of structure as both a constraint and a facilitator of action does not imply that social agency is fully determined by the structure. Rather, as Giddens puts it, social actors are capable of resisting the determining power of the structure through their 'knowledgeability' and their capacity to evaluate their action in relation to structural constraints.²⁸ It means that, in contrast to the reading of structural determination as something that reduces social agents to mere bearers of the structure, there are circumstances wherein social actors have a certain degree of autonomy and manipulative control over the structural conditions for their action.

This point is also emphasised by Torfing, who argues that social actors are neither dupes nor absolute choosers but strategically thinking actors, who, in view of their epistemological capacity, are capable of manoeuvring with a certain efficiency within the limits of the social system.²⁹ In the context of the 'African solutions to African problems' discourse, an imperative question is whether African subjects are aware of the presence of the structure of coloniality in the first place. Without this awareness, the people of Africa cannot outmanoeuvre the constraints placed upon them by coloniality.

By and large, the ability of African agency to outmanoeuvre coloniality also depends on understanding the nature of this structure – is it performative or prescriptive? According to Sahlins, there is a distinction between prescriptive and performative structures in the way that they are 'open' to action.³⁰ Performative orders tend to assimilate themselves to contingent circumstances, whereas prescriptive orders assimilate circumstances to themselves by denying the contingent character of circumstances. In other words, Sahlins' assertion is that performative orders are easily susceptible to change, rearrangement and reconstruction, while prescriptive orders are more likely to reproduce themselves, even within a changed environment.

This analysis of structure leads us to question whether or not coloniality, as a world system, is a prescriptive or performative structure. It is an important question to interrogate because it enables the colonised subject to understand the consequences of his or her action by examining the behaviour of the structure within which he or she operates.

In the case of the structure of coloniality after the demise of juridical administrative colonialism, it could be argued that coloniality remains prescriptive. Even though it uses the salvationist language of human rights, development and democracy, it maintains itself through both physical and epistemic violence. In the case of physical violence, coloniality uses a structure like that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to subdue anti-systemic movements such as Al-Qaeda to maintain Western dominance of world affairs. In terms of epistemic violence, coloniality deploys the structure of the Westernised university, academic disciplines, publications, curricula, citations and the idea of plagiarism, not only to impose its singular and fundamentalist Western worldview on the thought systems of the peoples of the non-Western world, but to commit epistemicide of their indigenous knowledge.

In addition to different forms of violence on the physical and epistemic being of the non-Western subject, coloniality also uses the rhetoric of persuasion through aid provided by such organisations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which serves to hide its colonial agenda. In the epistemic sphere, the rhetoric of persuasion manifests itself through the power of labelling and naming, so as to lead non-Western peoples into believing in the supremacy of Western ways of knowing and imagining the world. Thus, for instance, Islamophobia is maintained through the language of terrorism, since freedom fighters in the context of the Islamic civilisation are labelled 'terrorists', whereas the real terrorists, in the form of Western subjects, are rebranded as human rights defenders and preachers of democracy and peace.

The structure of the coloniality that forms the darker side of Western-centred modernity, or the so-called modern world system, cannot be completely understood without mapping out what Santos defines as a Western form of abyssal thinking.³¹ According to Santos, 'abyssal thinking' is a form of thinking in the West that views social reality as divided into two realms: the realm of 'this side of the line', which is the metropolitan zone, and the realm of 'the other side of the line', which is the colonial zone.³² In this scheme the metropolitan zone is viewed as radically different from the colonial zone. The metropolitan zone is a 'zone of being' that is represented as progressive and governed by 'social regulation and social emancipation'; whereas the colonial zone is constructed as the 'zone of non-being' that can only be governed through 'appropriation/violence'.³³

What typically defines the relationship between the zone of being and the zone of non-being is not only the vertical social hierarchisation of identities informed by race, but the perpetual production within the zone of non-being of subjects who are deceived and crushed by the power of the zone of being. As Fanon put it:

The colonial world is a world cut into two. The dividing line, the frontiers, are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies, it is the policemen and the soldiers who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression ... the policemen and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native.³⁴

What is important about Fanon's articulation of the division of the modern world is that the violence exercised on the peoples of the non-Western world extends to epistemic violence, thereby making it possible to think of the colonial process in terms of 'colonisation of the imagination',³⁵ 'colonisation of the mind'³⁶ and colonisation of knowledge and power.

RELEASING THE AFRICAN 'GENEUS' BY SHIFTING THE GEOGRAPHY OF REASON

Two of the problematic questions about the idea of African solutions to the problems experienced by African people are: 'Who is an African?' and 'What knowledge serves as the basis for the concept of an African-based solution?'

These are important questions to examine, not only because being African is itself a complex phenomenon, but because African-ness is something that cannot be conceived within a limited understanding of either existing within the spatio-historical temporality of Africa or having a particular racial appearance such as being black. Thus, within the context of seeking to develop African-based solutions to problems that affect the continent of Africa, it is necessary to privilege the epistemic location of the subject that speaks and not to assume that whatever knowledge is produced by people who live in the continent of Africa, or who claim to be Africans, is African.

The idea of colonisation of the mind, of knowledge and of the imagination is crucial in understanding where the thinking is located epistemically of those who are tasked with the transformation of Africa using the strategy of African-based solutions to problems that confront the continent of Africa.

As such, borrowing from what Grosfoguel has termed the 'locus of enunciation',³⁷ we can understand that it is possible for a subject located on the oppressed side of colonial difference to view the world from the position of a subject located on the dominant side. This is so because the impact of the

hegemonic Eurocentric worldview of what constitutes knowledge on the part of the non-Western subject is that it decouples the epistemic location of the subject who speaks from his or her social location. Thus, through the idea of 'objectivity', the Western worldview is able to project a neutral, 'point-zero', 'god-eye view'³⁸ knowledge that misleads the non-Western subject into thinking that there are truthful and untruthful worldviews. This is important to understand because in a situation such as that of seeking to develop African-based solutions to problems that affect Africans, it is possible to imagine solutions from the position of the one who caused the problems – the Western coloniser – whose structures of coloniality are still in place.

The origins of the false notions of objectivity and universal truth that have hoodwinked the oppressed subjects to think from the position of the oppressor, thereby working against themselves as they attempt to achieve freedom from the colonial matrices of power, can be traced to the seventeenth century, when René Descartes wrote, 'I think, therefore I am.' This Cartesian philosophy has remained highly influential in the Western ego-politics of knowledge production. Thus, through this Cartesian philosophy, which is in place today after more than 350 years, the 'I' that Descartes did not identify replaced God with a Western subject as the new foundation of knowledge, thereby developing a false notion that the Western subject, unlike the non-Western one, could produce a universally accepted knowledge that is beyond time and space.

What is even more interesting about the emergence of these false notions of universal truth and objectivity is that their condition of possibility was enabled by the conquests and genocides/epistemicides of the sixteenth century. Thus, according to Grosfoguel, Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am' is preceded by 150 years of 'I conquer, therefore I am' – hence the *ego conquiro* is the condition of the *ego cogito*.³⁹ But, as we know, the 'I' in the Western philosophy and sciences is but a provincially-located Western subject. It is therefore important that we reject the idea that the sociohistorical experiences of a few white men who existed outside the sociohistorical experience of being African within the structure of coloniality can inform us on what it is like to be colonised. This is simply because the few Western white men who produce knowledge for the whole world do not share the experience of those who suffered colonialism. As such, accepting their knowledge as the foundation for escaping coloniality would be naïve.

African-based solutions to problems that affect the peoples of Africa do not lie with what is generally perceived to be expert knowledge produced by the Western-educated African elite or in some form of mythical indigenous knowledge untouched by Western modernity; they can be found within the creative spirit of the African subject as he or she reasons from the vantage point of his or her social and epistemic location vis-à-vis coloniality.

However, in order for such an African genius to emerge, it is important for the African subject, who is expected to have been tainted by colonial ways of knowing, to be able to take a ‘decolonial turn’,⁴⁰ by making a shift in the geography and biography of reason. This shift in the geography of reason will not only enable the subalternised African subject within the structure of the modern world system to make an about-turn from colonial ways of knowing which have let her participate in her own oppression, but will also enable her to practise what Mignolo describes as ‘epistemic disobedience’⁴¹ against the oppressive colonial way of knowing. This is relevant when taking into consideration that the colonial education system in Africa was intended to produce a colonial subject who would consent to coloniality.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the question of innovation is important not only to the idea of development in Africa, but to the discourse of finding African solutions to problems that affect the continent. However, in order for innovation to take place and African solutions to problems facing the African continent to be found, there is a need for the emergence of an African genius, who will not only be cognisant of the global power structures that put a constraint on such initiatives but will outmanoeuvre the trappings of coloniality. It will be possible only when this African subject is able to understand that the Western knowledge system that dominates the African academy is one of the key pillars of coloniality – hence there is a need to decolonise knowledge in order to think from the vantage-point of being African within the modern world system.

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The Quest for Gender Parity as an Essential Aspect of Social Development

Restoring the Centrality of the African Woman and Achieving the Vision of African Solutions to African Problems

John W. Forje

INTRODUCTION

CHANGING PERCEPTION

There is now a shared understanding within the development community that development and actions that fail to take gender inequality into account and fail to address disparities between males and females will have limited effectiveness and serious cost implications.

World Bank, 2003

There is an old Burmese proverb that says men continue to play a major part in bringing necessary change and progress to their societies: 'The dawn rises only when the rooster crows.' We all know the scientific reasons why dawn rises and dusk falls, and the intelligent rooster surely realises that it crows because dawn comes and not the other way around. Stated differently, the 'male' is the 'head of the family' and the 'female' is the 'heart of the family'. It goes without saying, apparently, that while the 'head' can slip into a coma, the heart cannot slip into one without the body dying; this should convey a message about the importance women have in our lives. Empowering the female gender is imperative for Africa's sustainable transformation. It also goes without saying that improving gender equality in education and employment has positive, reinforcing feedback effects on gender equality in employment, empowerment and economic development.

Improving the status of the colonies is like improving both the status of women and the well-being of the rest of the world: the colonies, like women, remain essential to the transformation and sustainability of the colonial masters and the male gender. During a parliamentary debate, Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, observed, 'The lady is

not for turning.' Similarly, the African woman, with her vital contributions to the family and nation, is 'not for turning' for egoistic, self-interested and destructive purposes – she stands for constructive partnership that harnesses and enhances her potential to support the quality well-being of the people.

For now, however, the purpose of likening African women to colonial territories is to highlight that they too are exploited by their so-called owners. The paradox is that Western powers colonised Africa, but African men colonise African women. The West, and not Africa, is for turning; the African man is for turning, not the woman. Empowering women to be a part of the development process is thus crucial; equally, the constructive involvement of the Third World is of great importance for sustainable global development and peaceful coexistence.

Given the importance of gender equality to economic development and quality of life, this chapter focuses on gender empowerment, equality, education and employment as vital inputs in the search for African solutions to African problems (ASAP). The persistence of gender inequality in respect of basic rights is a major issue that needs addressing. In this regard, it should be noted that gender equality tends to be weaker in the continent than elsewhere, and that gender equality in education in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East has been consistently below the global average. Moreover, indicators show that gender equality tends to improve with economic development, a point that will be revisited throughout this chapter. The low empowerment of women is one of the factors that has seriously hampered human development in Africa.

It would appear that great strides have been made in Africa in the past few decades, but in view of the statistical trends mentioned above, issues surrounding gender equality and empowerment have to be addressed if there is to be effective, sustainable economic and human development as well as any meaningful application of ASAP. Although there is no region in the world where men and women enjoy equal legal, social or economic

Image 10.1 Poor, powerless and pregnant – an image of a woman's body in the shape of the African continent



Source: *Gender and Development in Brief*,
Special Issue: Gender Myths, September 2004

rights, this does not mean that Africa cannot seek to make a significant difference in this regard; indeed, the challenge should be for the continent to be a pacesetter.

Figure 10.1 The state of gender inequality in the world in 2003



Note: (*) Middle East and North Africa: (+) Latin America and Caribbean: (-) Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Source: World Bank, 2003.

Speaking at the Association for the Development of Education in Africa in 1997, Abdou Diouf, former president of Senegal, stressed that 'only through education will Africans be in a position to address the demands and challenges of this century'.¹ The sentiment was echoed in 2010 by Erastus Mwencha, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission, who said, 'Africa has for some time now, decided to anchor its development on creating new avenues in educating its people.' South Africa's former Minister of Education revisited the point when addressing African ministers of education, arguing that education is not only critical but also a solid foundation for both the reconstruction and development of Africa, and emphasising that the provision of education is an investment in economic development, given that sustainable development calls for adequate and ever-increasing skills and knowledge bases, which are inherently products of education.²

In some countries, girls and women are denied the same nutrition, healthcare and other support that males receive. In a few countries, burning of widows and dowry deaths persist, and female infanticide is still suspected in some rural areas. A new phenomenon – abortion on the basis of male preference – is also now known to occur. For example, of 8000 abortions in Bombay (after parents learned the sex of the foetus through amniocentesis), only one would have been a boy.³

These and other forms of gender discrimination behaviour derive from attitudes and practices that often reflect local traditions and religious beliefs.

The significance of education and economic development as tools for female gender empowerment can no longer be doubted. Economic development also has a positive effect on gender equality, which reinforces constructive and mutually respectful relations between men and women as they work towards developing ASAP. It should be pointed out that female gender empowerment and increases in per capital income lead to a reduction in gender inequality, particularly in the areas of:

- access to and achievement in education;
- improvement in health;
- indexes of legal and economic equality of women in society and marriage; and
- women's empowerment (for example, the right to vote and representation in parliament, government, and top decision-making organs).

According to Easterly, there is a positive relationship between income and gender equality.⁴

RESEARCH APPROACH

The research is based on library search, published documents, personal observations and discussions with people from different social strata, both men and women. The chapter draws to an equal extent on my personal beliefs about the marginalisation of the female gender and the way in which males serve their own interests by shifting position in response to changes in cultural norms. This combination of factors underlies the policies which this chapter advocates for solving African problems.

The research approach, then, is aimed at providing policymakers with the options and information needed to solve the problems that Africa faces today. The chapter is informed by a research process; a sequence of activities is outlined that begins with my perception of and for the study ending with final briefing or conclusion and recommendations. Rossi et al.⁵ opine that research is a mixture of science, craft lore and art:

- the science is the body of theory, concepts and methodological principles;
- the craft lore is the set of workable techniques, rules-of-thumb and standard operating procedures; and
- the art is the pace, style and manner in which one works.

Implied by this mixture, then, there can no more be only what is presented.

The approach offers guidelines where it can and dwells on cross-fertilisation of ideas; cross examining, agreeing and disagreeing for the common purpose of crafting a better way forward for the African woman and society. However, gender inequality in education and employment has negative effects on economic development. Similarly, gender inequality in empowerment and employment generates a selection-distortion factor that operates at the level of the labour force. Gender gaps in employment and empowerment tend to result in a lower average labour force productivity rate than in the absence of such gender inequality in employment.

LOOKING BACK TO CRAFTING A BETTER FUTURE

Since the Third World Conference on Women, Nairobi, 1985, and the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995, the African woman is no longer taking the wrong turn but extending the olive branch of partnership, participation and equality (PPE) to the male gender in order to co-construct a healthy society. Neither Nairobi nor Beijing made her dominant over men; instead she was positioned side by side with them as a complementary partner in the process of development. This epitomises the spirit of ASAP, where males and females work in equal partnership to address common problems for the common good.

From Mexico and Copenhagen to Nairobi and Beijing – including the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, which achieved international recognition (and condemnation) of ‘crimes of gender’ – the status of the African woman has changed. The crimes in question were the mass rapes that were, and still are, used by military forces in ethnic purges in conflict zones in Africa (Liberia, Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan) and other parts of the world. Unfortunately, then, male chauvinism seems not to have changed over time, but no doubt meaningful change will eventually take place, albeit at a snail’s pace, bringing pleasure and pride to men and women alike and advancing their mutual well-being.

In this regard, cross-cultural evidence shows that marital violence is a leading cause of female suicide.⁶ Behind such figures lie oceans of suffering that do not necessarily result in death or major injury and thus remain secret. For example, the tribunal on domestic violence organised by the Centre for Women’s Rights is bringing to light generations of abuse concealed by religious ideologies that extolled ‘female martyrdom’.⁷ Often, such violence against women is blamed on poverty. However, while it is a positive step to locate gender abuse in its socioeconomic context, it also perpetuates the myth that male violence is a deviation from the norm rather than the norm itself that many women and children experience daily.

Similarly, it is often implied that men should not be held responsible for their violent behaviour, since it arises from unemployment and poverty and manifests itself when they cannot manage the feelings of impotence accompanying their social and economic status. This correlation, I believe, has some truth to it, and is yet another reason to eradicate poverty, empower women and narrow the disparity between the sexes. But, by blaming poverty, the argument conceals the fact that there are also some rich and powerful men who beat their partners and abuse their children – and many poor men who do not. If male violence were associated consistently and exclusively with poverty, rather than just with being male, the way to eradicate it would be far more obvious.

African women, then, are in an unenviable predicament. While their participation in the workforce has increased, gender stereotyping and discrimination serve to ensure that they retain the primary burden of household work. Their task has been made harder by a society that clings to the importance of a well-kept home yet at the same time disparages cooking and other household chores as unimportant in comparison to the ‘real’ work of making deals at an office or clocking hours at a factory.

The Human Development Report 2007-2008⁸ outlines the amount of time that women and men (aged 20 to 74 years) spend on average per day doing household chores (cooking, cleaning, caring for children, and so on), resting, socialising and enjoying other leisure activities, and working in market and non-market activities. Generally, women spend more time on domestic tasks and childcare than men, and have less free time. Women also work longer hours than men. Table 10.1 indicates that the largest disparity is in Mexico, where women work on average one and three-quarter hours more than men each day.

Unpaid household chores, performed disproportionately by women, are typically taken for granted by governments, economists and society at large. In most African cultures, children are taught from a young age that men’s role in the family is to provide financially for their wives, children and other dependants, that is, to be the breadwinner. Household chores, by contrast, are seen as a job for women and girls – the nurturers, mothers and homemakers. Yet women and girls’ socially ascribed responsibilities for household chores can undermine their rights and limit their opportunities, capabilities and choices – particularly so in the case of poor women, who are unable to pay for care, and of their school-age daughters. Notwithstanding that education is every child’s right, many girls have to drop out of school to help with domestic activities or the care for siblings if their mothers are sick or working, or to take on care responsibilities in households that are child-headed.⁹

Table 10.1 Gender, work and time allocation (hours and minutes per day)

Country	Year	Total work (A)		Cooking (B)		Care (C)		Free Time (D)	
		W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M
Spain	2002-2003	7,54	6,51	3,22	0,37	0,3	0,12	4,34	5,34
Italy	2002-2003	8,08	6,51	4,02	0,31	0,28	0,11	4,15	5,29
Rep. of Korea	2004	7,3	6,51	2,36	0,2	0,55	0,15	5,03	5,34
Mexico	2002	8,1	6,25	4,43	0,39	1,01	0,21	2,37	3,01
South Africa	2000	6,52	6,01	3,06	1	0,39	0,04	4,08	4,53
Madagascar	2001	7,14	7,03	2,51	0,17	0,31	0,08	1,45	3,15
Notes: W = women; M = men. A: Total work in market and non-market activities B: Cooking and cleaning includes dishwashing, cleaning the dwelling, laundry, ironing and other household upkeep C: Care of children includes physical care of children, teaching, and playing with them D: Includes social life, entertainment, resting, doing sports, arts, computers, and exposure to media									

Source: UNDP, 2007-2008.

Over the years, African women have beaten considerable odds to emerge as important actors in leadership. For instance, two women were heads of African states, and African women have held leadership positions in the African Union (AU) and International Criminal Court (ICC). However, in Africa they still have to surmount formidable legal, regulatory, cultural and economic obstacles in attempts to provide quality leadership in the public sector. The challenges to women's leadership role in this sector are all the more pronounced in Africa, where patriarchy remains a force to be reckoned with. Many constraints will have to be overcome in order to accelerate the kinds of changes that will enable women to advance into significant leadership positions.

Of course, the male will remain the *head of the family*. The African woman on her part is not disputing this but is trying to remove the obstacles and create opportunities that allow women to achieve their full potential, and in so doing raise everyone to a higher economic and social plane. Both sexes need to work together to bring about a win-win situation – one in which, ultimately, the continent's position is enhanced and its sovereignty respected globally. This is the only way African dignity will be restored and respected worldwide, with Africa playing the role required of it. The African woman is the 'spear' or 'lion' of the continent. She is the catalyst for sustainable transformation, as she is the 'heart' of the family, society, nation and continent. She has to be listened to, incorporated in the

development process, and able to share equitably in the fruits or wealth of the continent.

This is a call to complete unfinished business by moving things in the right direction as fast as we can. Gender balance, or equality, is crucial for the effectiveness of ensuring a quality life for all. Indeed, by failing to engage appropriately and meaningfully with more than half of the population, the continent is missing out in the developmental process. The Third Millennium Development Goal (aimed at empowering women) is to be encouraged, but male-chauvinistic ideas that 'women are born to only do house work' or remain at the bottom of the development ladder must first be eradicated. A change in mindset is urgently required, otherwise our best efforts will be in vain. Women should be seen as vital, crucial, critical input elements and partners in the developmental construct of the family, society, nation, continent and the world. Shurmann has argued that, far from it being the case that Africa's problems are insurmountable, the continent has three strong survival factors rooted in its history – family, villages and markets.¹⁰

The family as a social unit is highly valued and women play a key role in sustaining it. However, African women have been oppressed by this institution for so long that their leadership and other qualities remain untapped and largely untested. This contributes to their exclusion from educational institutions, which denies the continent an opportunity to tap their vast human resources. Over the past couple of years, things have been changing fast in this domain. The momentum so far gained must not be lost but inherently accelerated and consolidated.

It is important to address challenges and ensure that the dream of ASAP is realised. Therefore, individuals and society at large must recognise the value of different forms of activities (household chores and public duties), yet without reinforcing the notion that household work is something only women can or should do.¹¹ This requires efforts to radically defeminise household chores and challenge the assumption that household chores are for women and not men. In turn, it entails fundamental shifts in thinking and attitudes concerning the work that women and men do, the roles they fulfil, the conditions under which they work, and the value society attributes to their work.

Equally important is that policies should recognise and affirm that men carry out household chores, and engage them in ways that break down gender stereotyping (men being branded as uncaring, lazy or irresponsible). This could open up new possibilities for men and boys who may be inhibited by cultural norms from playing a more active role in household chores when they feel they should do so, or, indeed, want to do so. It would also help to break down barriers between males and females, as it promotes equality

between the sexes. When men do some of the household chores, they will appreciate work traditionally done by women. People have to do away with entrenched ideas that household chores are a woman's job and that men are unwilling to relinquish their privileges and take on what are seen as low-status duties associated with women.

Nonetheless, by recognising the care that some men provide, we are able to go beyond stereotyped assumptions according to which women always care and men are always resistant. Acknowledging the role that some men play in household chores can itself be an important strategy in encouraging other men to reject gender norms that deter them from involvement in household activities. In addition, it draws attention to the fact that men are not shaped irrevocably by gender norms but can choose to act differently.¹² The question, then, is not whether men can change; it is which policies and programmes best catalyse and support these changes.¹³

The recent global economic crisis has complicated the continent's development efforts; this has certainly taken a toll on both men and women, but more so on women. Despite overwhelming evidence that gender inclusion makes economic, business and social sense, Africa is not closing the gender gap fast enough – in much the same way that the West is not narrowing the economic gap between Africa and itself.

Juxtaposed against this bleak backdrop is the growing presence of women in the public sphere. While this is testimony to women's and girls' increasing access to education, it is equally important to improve their potential for entrepreneurship, job creation and income-earning. Given women's low health and educational status, they are exposed to a multitude of humiliating activities. Improved health and education provides a means of reinforcing their ability to address their vulnerable, devalued status and limit male dominance over them. It is clear that unless the consensus in our society changes in favour of a more dignified, self-sustaining life for women, repressive laws, traditional taboos and other forces are not likely to improve women's quality of life.


In the end, it is not only women who suffer but the entire nation. The success of any development programme and related activities necessitates equality between men and women; where violence, discrimination and male chauvinism persists, there is evidently an enormous gulf between the two. That gulf must be bridged for society to move forward. It is imperative now to increase understanding of how to conceptualise the activities of women and incorporate these in project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Control over land is crucial for women farmers. In sub-Saharan Africa, family holdings pass from one generation to the next with ill-defined rights of tenure, leaving smallholder farmers vulnerable to dispossession and

exploitation. Women are most vulnerable in this context, and their fundamental human rights must be respected. Strengthening food security in sub-Saharan Africa requires the total incorporation of women, who comprise a major proportion of the food supply chain.

Building a food-secure continent necessitates significant transformation will be most effective if it is accompanied by a shift of resources, capacities and decision-making to smallholder farmers, poor communities and women. When women, especially rural women, and other vulnerable groups gain a voice in the decisions affecting their lives and livelihoods, their capacity to produce, trade and use food is materially enhanced. However, women in sub-Saharan Africa have less control of land than those anywhere else (see Figure 10.2).

Figure 10.2 Women have less control of land in Sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else (2009)



Source: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2011.

A new development that risks aggravating these insecurities is the recent international scramble for land in sub-Saharan Africa. One danger is that large-scale investments may displace people without consultation or adequate compensation. In many African countries, where the majority of people work in agriculture, separating them from their land without first creating opportunities in non-farming sectors is likely to increase poverty, unemployment and food insecurity. There appear to be strong, mutually reinforcing links between expanding women's capabilities – through better education, more direct control over resources and a greater say in decision-making – and enhancing food security. Empowering women, who make up almost half the agricultural labour force in sub-Saharan Africa, is a highly efficient way to achieve progress across the multiple dimensions of food security.

If colonial policies were designed to frustrate colonised people, it is disconcerting that postcolonial policies seem to have widened the disparity gap between male and female, doing more harm than good and serving only to stifle progress in order to perpetuate corruption and underdevelopment for the good of external forces. Pro-poor postcolonial policies should place genuine emphasis on seeing women growing to achieve their full potential. ASAP entails mobilising the untapped female workforce and capacity as part of the solution to existing problems. Partnerships between the sexes will deliver prosperity to society; their absence promotes division and underdevelopment, causing tensions in homes, families and society and increasing the avenues by which external forces can exploit the continent.

Africa can transform its current image as the 'problem continent' into that of a 'glorious continent' and 'land of promise and hope'. A community needs to feel 'hurt' to be motivated to develop.¹⁴ Africa, especially its women, has suffered pain for too long: it is time, now or never, to reverse that trend. When communities are neglected and abandoned, people realise they have no choice but to do something for themselves. Under these conditions, community education initiatives can make breakthroughs in encouraging people to take the initiative and engage with the problems of underdevelopment.

The continent can draw valuable lessons from Japan and its 'ready-made work-force of smart, well-educated women'. Removing disincentives and expanding opportunities for women to work are important for economic take-off and sustainability. As such, African governments should seek out 'gender-smart' fiscal policies by examining how taxes and government spending affect equality and opportunities for women to expand their horizons. Conversely, governments should reject policies that reduce incentives for women to work. Policies should be enacted that encourage women to seek out opportunities and which offer incentives for them to be more productive and entrepreneurial. Indeed, the continent cannot afford to leave half of its resources, half of its talent and half of its ideas untapped and still entertain the wishful thinking that it can become an emerging economy by 2020, 2025, 2030, 2035 or any other future date that states have chosen as the break-even point for launch into economic maturity.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EMPOWERMENT AND EQUALITY

The conceptual framework of female gender empowerment and equality is contained within the theory of 'sustainable development' as elaborated from the United Nations (UN) Charter of Fundamental Human Rights by, among others, the Stockholm Conference of 1972, the Brundtland Commission

(1987), the UN Conference on Environment and Development of 1992, the Beijing Platform Declaration and other subsequent policy documents seeking to ensure compliance in the implementation of these resolutions. Building on these resolutions, conventions and declarations, this chapter expounds on the notion of people first – that is, viewing male and female as joined by their commonalities and seeing people as change agents and the subjects and objects of development activities.

Abu-Ghaida and Klasen provide empirical evidence indicating that a country that fails to close the gender gap in education and related areas could experience a decrease in per capita income and hence in living standards.¹⁵ The UN concluded that low empowerment of women is one of the factors that has seriously hampered human development.¹⁶ In the light of this, gender equality and empowerment need to be addressed in the interests of sustainable socioeconomic transformation. Further to this, Dollar and Gatti examine the relationship between gender inequality in education and growth.¹⁷ Hill and King show that gender inequality in education affects the level of aggregate output, pointing out that a low female-male primary and secondary school enrolment ratio is associated with lower gross national product (GNP).¹⁸

It is the case, nevertheless, that empowerment and gender equality have been understood differently by different stakeholders, with the result that these variations in usage have created confusion in the discourse on sustainable development and equality. The concepts of empowerment and gender equality are intertwined with those of impoverishment and sustainable development. The chapter thus emphasises that empowerment and gender equality refer to a multidimensional process in which people identify and shape the factors influencing their lives.

Accordingly, the empowerment approach deals with issues that range from enabling people to examine their social realities to engaging the poor in decision-making processes aimed at eliminating poverty and building accountability as well as equity in prosperity-sharing. A key feature of gender empowerment is enhancing women's participation in education and human capital development. It is argued that political participation is affected by political education: education for girls and women helps to expand the discourse on female equality and political participation.

Therefore, the chapter highlights women's education as an instrument of empowerment and gender parity as a tool both for reversing discrimination and for driving change to ensure sustainable development and quality living standards for all. In addition, the chapter stresses the need for legal and institutional reforms to bring about constructive and comprehensive change in terms of empowerment and equity. This is to underline the importance of transferring otherwise self-serving power to others and forging new initiatives in education.

The need is for a changed mindset that can best be obtained by human capital development and by sensitising society to the iniquities of gender inequality and its consequences for holding back a quality livelihood; by the same token, the positive values of gender equality must be emphasised in any education agenda. Transformative education is an important vehicle for empowerment, creating the conditions for full and equal participation by males and females in development dialogue and decision-making and for enabling them to see themselves as co-creators of a vision of development who share prosperity with each other.

In this regard, the chapter makes it clear that the entry-point for respecting the rights of people, male and female alike, and for enabling them to make choices is respecting indigenous knowledge and holding on to progressive cultural ideas that enhance the genuine participation of male and female as complementary partners in development. This constitutes the operational strategy for sustainable development and equality livelihood.

In sum, the chapter advocates that the process of change towards sustainable development, equality between male and female, and quality livelihood must involve decentralisation, transparency and accountability between those who hold power and those who have none.

GENDER THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

Long into the future, scholars will continue to debate theories about gender equality and sexism. Differences between the sexes are often attributed to the culture of masculine supremacy found in patriarchal societies, where certain activities are considered a male or female preserve and where males predominate over females. Accordingly, the differentiation in role allocation is a by-product of biophysiological differences. Abayomi opines that women guard the home, which includes nurturing offspring. The issue of offspring is an important one in Africa.¹⁹ African men are passionate about it as it concerns inheritance, in which the male child is accorded preference. For this reason, they feel that the woman's place is in the home, caring for offspring.

Although women's responsibility is to take care of the home, they also feature prominently in the public sphere. The transition of African women from 'home care to the public sphere' challenges age-old cultural taboos; male chauvinism and the inheritance factor are seen as counteracting as well as strengthening that process. The Marxist view of the gender question examines the status of women in relation to the economic system and maintains that women's subordination is related to production.²⁰ Women's entry into the public sphere challenges men's dominance and their authority

as the sole provider for the family. Men strongly resist this, hanging on to outdated cultural notions as a defence mechanism for retaining supremacy.

For women to continue their struggle for equality, then, they require education and participation in the political domain as a tool for empowerment. Cultural factors help to shape the roles of women. Therefore, the gendered nature of politics and empowerment can be improved only through political education. The educative process assists people in understanding citizenship in terms of fundamental human rights and voting rights.

Women should be encouraged to become educated and actively involved in the political process. The relationship between the male and female gender hinges on power and the application of such power. Kabeer identifies three kinds of power: 'power to, power over, and power within'.²¹ Some see power as the ability of an individual to influence decisions in the direction she or he desires, even against resistance. Others argue against this restricted definition as the 'power to' decide at an interpersonal level about conflicting issues.^{22, 23} Some groups are prevented from raising issues that are inimical to the interests of the power-holders, who keep these topics off decision-making agendas.

Presently, it is hard for women to interact freely with men in a male-dominated society such as that in Africa. Women find it difficult to convince men to accept their point of view because of an ingrained belief that a woman's opinion is inferior. As for attempting to win personal security from available resources, the patriarchal structure of society makes this almost impossible. Politics is all about power relationships, and as women are far from these sources of power, it is difficult for them to engage in large numbers in the political processes.

ASAP, then, should begin here: with empowerment of females and their integration as partners (not competitors) in the development process. Traditionally, African women are politically disadvantaged due to a lack of productive resources, which includes the challenges of poverty. These constraints, along with a relative lack of time thanks to their involvement in home chores, have impeded women's participation in politics and other development-related activities necessary for transforming a society from a 'backward' one into a 'service delivery' polity.

Butler, Mohanty and Umoh opine that the way in which everyday and formal discourses on political activism, leadership and education reinforce dominant status quo roles and shape the political, social and cultural identities of women cannot be underestimated; conversely, the role of political education in preparing women for political leadership cannot be overemphasised.^{24, 25, 26} Umoh stresses that education is a means by which to make sense of life in general as well as understand the operation of political systems in particular.²⁷ Africa will remain a male-dominated society

for a long time, and as such may not have a bountiful yield in political education.

Other scholars are of the opinion that a critical mass of mutually supportive women should be created as a tool for political education.^{28,29} Such a network is necessary to vocalise the concerns of women, especially at the grassroots level. The UN Conferences on Women, from Mexico to Beijing (1975 and 1995), exhibited the collective activism of women. Africa has to build on the outcome of these conferences in creating a common platform for gender equity to enhance female potential and harness it in the transformation of the continent.

It is only through human capital development and political education that women in Africa and globally will recognise and regain their right to dignity in featuring in society and the public sphere. The few women who have made it into the public sphere – Ngozi Iweala (Nigeria), Banda (Malawi), Johnson (Liberia), Dlamini-Zuma (South Africa) and others – have delivered exemplary performances. On 20 January 2014, Catherine Samba Panza, of the CAR, became the third female head of state on the continent. The recommendation that 30 percent of elective positions be reserved for women is not enough. It still amounts to condonation of the violation of women's fundamental rights. Gender inequality is also observed in the way appointments to important positions in the public domain and corporate bodies are skewed in favour of men. (Following the May 2014 election, Joyce Banda lost the Presidency to a male-elected candidate.)

Although significant changes are taking place, there is still a long way to go to ensure gender parity and women's participation in Africa's socio-economic transformation. The call is for governments and the private sector to formulate gender-sensitive policies, which should, *inter alia*, increase access to education for the female gender and encourage their active participation in the process of societal construction. Arguably, the dismantling of the colonial state by means of pro-people, pro-poor interventions that emphasise ownership and belonging among the downtrodden and marginalised is a necessary precondition for addressing gender-related challenges on a sustainable basis.

The African visionaries' ideal of ASAP should therefore give recognition to the uniqueness of gender equality and the progressive cultural fabric of the African society. The preservation and maintenance of cultural institutions are to be achieved by insulating them from politics and making the female gender a valuable partner in the progressive and comprehensive advancement of African society. The challenge that remains is how to get the female gender from the minus side to the plus side of the development continuum. The role of the state in the African context has to be redefined by Africans, rather than prescribed by those outside it. Here lies the essence

of ASAP: the state must find a new mechanism by which it can accommodate the dual role of male and female as inseparable partners in progress and development. Male-female socioeconomic intercourse remains the best game-changer for transforming the continent.

Bringing the benefits of trade to women is vital for economic growth. Women comprise the vast majority of the world's poor, and efforts to end global poverty cannot succeed if trade and economic policies do not create real opportunities for them. Trade policy impacts on the lives of women in Africa and around the world, often more so than any economic policy tool, including development assistance.

Without gender-sensitive business or networking support, for instance, women find it hard to develop and find markets for their products. Business networking by women is thus crucial for improving their marketing abilities and outreach. In addition, female entrepreneurs, professional women, women's groups and businesses that are co-owned or -managed by women should take advantage of information and communication technologies in order to expand their activities.

Yet in spite of the gender mainstreaming in bodies such as the International Labour Organisation and World Trade Organisation, much of the work so far on gender trade has amounted to piecemeal capacity-building and market-access initiatives for women, which do not challenge mainstream macro policies. The latter policies need to change so as to acknowledge the gendered impact of trade and to promote women's access to resources, employment rights and decision-making roles.

Women could empower Africa if but given the chance. However, their business opportunities are restricted due to a lack of information, training and finance, and this consistently undermines their efforts as entrepreneurs and the potential inherent in their hard work. Few women own land or have access to and control over resources; moreover, they face other gender-specific challenges, such as the pressure of their care giving responsibilities and the associated ideas that their 'proper' role is in the home. Without gender-sensitive business or networking support, women experience difficulty in finding markets for their products and acquiring the skills needed to promote their entrepreneurial and technological capabilities.

As such, trade, trade policy and trade liberalisation have very different impacts on women and men, given their gender roles and unequal power. An understanding of the relationship between gender and trade is critical in the current national development effort and global context, because development interventions can be grounded in precisely such an understanding. Addressing gender-specific barriers to participation in the development process can enhance gender-impact on national, continental and global socioeconomic transformation. In other words, what is central to the idea of

ASAP is putting people – specifically female – empowerment, equality and politics at the heart of development.

Set against this, though, is the rule, often unspoken and reinforced through cultural and religious norms, that the male breadwinner eats first: the woman picks up the crumbs. Gender training should support those men who come with an open mind, but it may not be enough to change those who do not want to lose the material benefits of the present distribution of power.

Such men offer different forms of resistance.³⁰ The most common is to deny women's subordinate status, for example by saying, 'How can women be subordinate, when men worship them as goddesses?' Other men accept women's subordinate status, contending that it stems from female biology or a lack of interest among women in taking advantage of 'equal opportunities' in society.

A few admit that individual men may oppress individual women, but do not accept the existence of patriarchal structures, arguing that it is in fact more common for women to oppress other women than for men to oppress women.

HARNESSING IDEAS CONFRONTING OURSELVES

ASAP is a noble idea that envisions harnessing resources for the collective good of the people. The idealism of this vision calls for nothing less than a total re-evaluation of public policy interventions in order to rehabilitate approaches to the continent's development and set them on a new course.

For ASAP to succeed, a number of reorientation strategies are required:

- moving away from the negative, destructive Eurocentric approach to a progressive, holistically developmental Afrocentric one that is people-centred;
- engaging women more comprehensively and constructively;
- broad-based participatory engagement to ensure that interventions are effective and that proper use is made of resources for the good of the people and with their involvement; and
- ensuring that the female gender does not slide into despair but is supported in showing both continued resilience and greater determination than ever to overcome remaining obstacles, bearing in mind that the last lap of the race is the hardest of all.

It is especially important to remember that nothing worthwhile is ever given to one on a platter: as with the struggle for independence, the struggle

for women's empowerment and gender equality involves effort, sacrifice and dealing with tough challenges. As Donald Kaberuka observes, 'Africa has shown resilience in the face of the financial crisis. And yes, Africa is at a turning point, but do not be mistaken, we are not yet at the tipping point'.³¹

ASAP is still a long way from fruition, given the current state of gender disparity. Africa women continue to experience marginalisation and exclusion: for the past three to four decades, they have reached a turning point in efforts to forge a new political, social and economic contract with the male-dominated continent – but, to echo Kaberuka's words, they are not yet at the tipping point.

Women in sub-Saharan Africa work. Few can afford not to. Nationally representative labour force and household survey data from more than a hundred low-and middle-income countries show that women's labour force participation rates are higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region. In sub-Saharan Africa, women are particularly active as entrepreneurs. However, they are disproportionately self-employed. Women comprise up to 40 percent of the region's non-agricultural labour force, but account for nearly 50 percent of the self-employed – the highest percentage in any region.

By contrast, they represent only one-fourth of the region's employers, a figure that does not vary much with a country's level of development; this is apparent in all other regions, with the exception of the Middle East and North Africa, where there are even fewer women employers (about 12 percent). In general, as a country's income increases, women's share in wage employment rises dramatically.³² Hence, employment in high-return activities is the pathway to economic empowerment for African women and a way to enhance the ASAP approach.

The creation of sustainable gender parity spells the end of an era; and this makes it even more important to look back and learn the real lessons as we seek to heal hatred, division and segregation, and rebuild trust, hope and confidence for a brighter and better Africa tomorrow.

The African woman trembles under the impact of male chauvinism: she is constantly raped; made to labour 18-20 hours daily; subjected to lower salary scales than men; and bears the brunt of cultural taboos and dehumanising acts like genital mutilation. Authentic African culture has never looked down on women; but through greed and self-interest, men polluted this culture with a toxic chemistry that suited the colonial administrators and was used to fuel disparity and division, all the better to aid colonial rule. African leaders, too, bought into this divisive approach, which today necessitates a long walk to freedom – not yet Uhuru, and with things falling apart.

Resisting women's quest for equality, male chauvinism maintains its authority through the systematic use of violence and exploitation. In societies where women are already accessing food, resources and services, violent conflict exacerbates such discrimination and makes it even deadlier. Within the overall scope of a social development strategy, the female gender requires special treatment in order to help offset myriad forms of discrimination.

The idea of ASAP entails acknowledgement of the plight of women and a concerted effort to ameliorate it by means of a comprehensive policy framework of social integration policies. Initiatives aimed at equipping women with skills and entrepreneurial tools are critical for facilitating social integration. More widely, it is necessary to ensure that all sectors of society have access to basic educational opportunities that respect the diversity of Africa's cultures and traditions. It must always be borne in mind, too, that women perform a double role in society, as a pillar of the family and as an economically productive agent.

Over the past fifty years, the African woman has been climbing up the ladder towards full recognition. In this regard, initiatives to support a conceptual, empirical and political network for strengthening development strategies aimed at growth in equity and gender empowerment should be intensified at all levels, and decisions vigorously applied to accomplish the ideals of ASAP.

Although this is not enough and women deserve more, the good news is that, owing to their increasing voice in national matters, women's issues are now raised on the policy agenda more easily and often than before, in addition to which there is strong advocacy in terms of international feminism. Women's representation in parliament is empowering institutions to drive feminist change by introducing gender into debates and other legislative discourse, thereby promoting public acceptance of female engagement with national and international issues.³³ In all, African women's gradual entry into parliament has brought about changes the likes of which have not been seen in Western countries.³⁴

STOP BEING YOUR OWN ENEMY

Women must also take up the challenge of active political participation, stop being their own enemies, and learn to promote the interests of other women – that is, show the Ubuntu spirit towards each other, especially rural women marginalised in urban centres. For now, women tend to be beset by the 'queen bee' attitude, according to which no other 'bee' is welcome. Such a stance plays into the hands of male chauvinism and the relegation of women to the

side-lines of development activities. The more female role-models there are that emerge, the more adequately women's plight will be addressed.

African women should develop new strategic approaches to attain gender equity, rights and freedoms, including:

- new habits of voting irrespective of party-political affiliation – this involves breaking party loyalties and voting across the political divide for the best female candidate/s. This strategy would send a message to party leaders to field greater numbers of female parliamentary candidates;
- building alliances across the political, ethnic and religious divide;
- helping one another, especially the less privileged; and
- joining forces to acquire knowledge, a veritable weapon for empowerment. The 'queen bee' attitude should be redefined as one in which 'queen bees' work with other women as equal partners to give clout to their developmental objectives.

INCREASING WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Gender mainstreaming entails the full incorporation of women and their perspectives in all political and decision-making processes. The UN National Economic and Social Council defines it as,

a process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.³⁵

Over the past two decades or so, the female gender discourse has been increasingly operationalised and mainstreamed worldwide into political representation. For example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a quota of 30 per cent female participation in peacekeeping operations, which highlights a renewed commitment to addressing the vulnerabilities of women in conflict and post-conflict environments. In another example, article 7 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, a treaty adopted in 1979, requires states to 'take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country'.

Looking at the regional situation, the AU is not trailing behind in promoting the role of women in the development process. For instance, most African governments are gradually implementing a quota of 30 per cent female parliamentary representation. However, much remains to be done at state level to attain gender equality. National governments are, to a large extent, not as compliant as they should be in implementing AU and UN resolutions to effect the three-pillar approach of protection, prevention and participation. The latter is a holistic strategy for transformation, one that involves both integration, through the addition of women, as well as agenda-setting, through women's participation as decision-makers in peace processes. This aligns with the argument that, in order to mainstream gender equality, 'women not only become part of the mainstream, they also reorient the nature of the mainstream'.^{36, 37}

The First Southern Cameroon Government, established in 1954, recognised women's important nation-building role by appointing a Special Women's Representative to the Legislative Assembly. It was a symbolic but significant move, and since then, and across the continent, women's voice in governance and decision-making processes has been on the increase. Women constitute 20,3 per cent of parliaments globally and 23,4 per cent of parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa. The statistics in Table 10.2 highlight states where women are well represented in parliament: Rwanda stands tall in the process of affirmative action, inviting others to follow suit.

Table 10.2 Countries with high female representation in parliament

Country	Female Representation	Total Composition of Parliament
Rwanda	45	80
South Africa	172	400
Senegal	40	100
Cameroon	56*	180
* Female representation increased from 25 (2007 elections) to 56 (September 2013 elections)		

By contrast, in Ghana, Africa's beacon of democracy and good governance, women's participation in development is not as encouraging as one would expect. Compared to countries like Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Senegal, it is struggling to keep up. Table 10.3 shows the composition of the Ghanaian Parliament from 1960-2012.

Table 10.3 Female and Male Representation in Ghana's Parliament

Year	Number of Women	Number of Men
1960	10	94
1969	1	103
1979	5	135
1992	16	174
1996	18	172
2000	19	181
2004	25	205
2008	20	210
2012	30	245

Since 2000, and excepting 2008, Ghanaian women have shown growing interest in parliamentary representation. As in other African countries, cultural and economic factors affect the level of representation of minorities and marginalised groups. One such factor is male chauvinism: gender equality remains a sensitive topic in Ghana, despite the country's numerous gender-awareness policies and programmes.

In 2012, 12 African countries (Cape Verde, South Africa, Lesotho, Burundi, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Benin, Gambia and Tanzania) were among 15 countries worldwide rated as high performers in terms of women's representation in political office; by contrast, Madagascar, CAR, Swaziland and others showed a lack of or decline in commitment to women's issues and democratic practices. Gender equality in Rwanda is exemplary, as it has a high proportion of female representation in parliament, superseded only by the Nordic countries.

For Africa to move from rhetoric to action, however, the political leadership must take bold steps to implement gender-related policies. In spite of an impressive record of women's representation in Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, Burundi, Senegal, Tanzania and Mozambique, among others, there is little evidence to suggest that it has altered policy outcomes.³⁸

In Mozambique, for example, women's increased representation has not translated into significant women-centred or feminist policies. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, half of its ruling parties have adopted quotas for gender equality, in line with the 2000 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, but only the African National Congress of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organisation of Namibia meet the gender-parity targets stipulated in the protocol.^{39, 40}

The 2012 Inter-parliamentary Union Report shows that encouraging progress has been made by some African countries, with Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania having moved from the UN benchmark to increase female representation in national legislatures from 18 per cent in 2007 to 30 per cent and above in 2010. On the African continent, Regional Economic Communities have exceeded the AU's quota of 30 per cent women representation in government, with the SADC countries aiming for 50 per cent by 2015 as a means of empowering women.

Despite the progress, there is a need to deal with the disparity between men and women in political representation and decision-making processes. In this regard, what about rural women? Their being represented in parliament is important, but not enough in itself. The urgent need is to expand networks and activities so as to include rural women and other marginalised groups, such as widows and adolescent girls, who are often forced, due to traditional beliefs, to undergo, for example, widowhood rites and female genital mutilation.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ARMED CONFLICT

Similarly, reducing the number of conflict situations will also empower women, since they are the greatest victims in Africa's security architecture. Deconstructing conflict and insecurity is crucial: a holistic attempt must be made to unravel the underlying causes of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment in Africa.

If not, important factors contributing to these problems will be glossed over, thwarting efforts to empower the female gender. The current manifestations of conflict, war and insecurity are essentially the result of state failure, one brought about by a skewed governance system, pervasive injustice, mass poverty, ethnic intolerance, outdated cultural beliefs, corruption, religious bigotry and disjuncture between government, policy and implementation.

Continued armed conflict in Africa jeopardises women's progress towards equality. A gendered system of equitable power-sharing and justice requires political, social, economic, cultural, legal and educational institutions that actualise and underpin it; conversely, paragraph 96 of the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 highlights that the realisation of women's rights hinges on freedom from the abuses associated with armed conflict. It declares that,

[t]he human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including

sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relationships between women and men in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility for sexual behaviour and its consequences.

Ethnic conflict and conflict in failed states affect women more negatively than men.⁴¹ Apart from the growing number of conflict situations and wars, women continue to be victims of gender-based violence during and after conflict. Such abuse takes numerous forms, including rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, forced impregnation, forced miscarriage, forced termination of pregnancy, forced sterilisation, trafficking and forced nudity.^{42, 43}

SHEDDING STEREOTYPICAL GENDER ROLES

Looking for exceptions to accepted gender norms requires giving focused attention to understanding and encouraging men who are already rejecting rigid gender divisions and getting actively involved in household duties, which are commonly regarded as 'women's work'. Such men are often afraid of being ostracised by other men, but they are instead male role-models, needing the support not only of men but women as well: they challenge stereotypes about male-female role divisions and provide positive examples of men and women working together to confront gender inequality.

Acknowledging the role that some men play in household chores is thus an important strategy for encouraging men in general, as well as women, to reject the norms that discourage men's involvement in household activities. This draws attention to the fact that men are not irrevocably shaped by gender norms but can choose to act differently.

What, then, does it take for men to act differently? One approach is to promote critical reflection on traditional gender norms through gender training and community education programmes and campaigns. However, some women feel threatened if men involve themselves in household activities. They believe their space is being invaded and feel disempowered, as if they are losing control of an area of life that has been their domain and a source of identity and usefulness. It is striking that women continue to undertake more household chores than men across all societies. This is driven again in part by gender norms – the culturally accepted ideas about what it means to be a woman or a man in a given society.

How can we challenge these norms and move towards a more equitable sharing of responsibilities between women and men? Raising this challenge

calls for commitment from gender advocates, civil society organisations and the state to make a compelling case for the importance of gender equity and empowerment and thereby generate sustained pressure for action. It also calls for greater solidarity among all working on the full range of female-empowerment issues to build a broad and diverse alliance of organisations and individuals agitating for change.

The Nordic countries have attained a high level of gender equity:⁴⁴ there is no distinction between paternity and maternity leave, with nine months of paid leave being granted after childbirth. This is split into three parts between the mother (whose share is non-transferable), the father (whose share is also non-transferable), and the couple (which can be taken by either the mother or father). In Brazil, several states offer government officials one month of paid paternity leave at the time of birth; under debate is also national law to grant all fathers 30 days of paid paternity leave upon the birth of a child (or adoption).

Initiatives like these send a message to society that it is not only the woman's job to take care of the children and that male and female roles can take a diversity of possible forms. Indeed, such initiatives should also be accompanied by greater attention to gender awareness in the workplace, particularly at the management level, to encourage support for flexible workingroles.^{45, 46} Gender norms typically dictate that men and women's work be different and, moreover, that men's work be valued more and better rewarded than women's. A new mindset, behaviour, attitude and concern is imperative.

The notion of ASAP entails putting appropriate policies in place, gender equality and empowerment being one such area where this is required. As such, developing effective responses means identifying the priorities and strategies that would empower women and ensure gender equity in society. Africa can draw useful lessons from the experience in Brazil, the Nordic countries and other states that make gender empowerment and equity a major policy area.

Furthermore, the continent needs to implement the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995. When the latter was adopted, the term 'gender mainstreaming' came into widespread use. In September 1997, the UN Economic and Social Council defined gender mainstreaming as, 'the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.'⁴⁷ Ideologies claiming that women

should be pure, chaste and virgins until marriage, can lead to female genital mutilation, honour killings, and restrictions on women's mobility and economic or political participation.

Ideas that men should be 'macho' could mean that sexual violence by men is expected rather than condemned. Gender inequalities and taboos around sexuality can exacerbate the spread of HIV and AIDS. But, just as sexuality has repercussions related to poverty, marginalisation and death, it can be enjoyed and lead to fulfilment and well-being, enhancing human relations with shared intimacy and pleasure. In fact, sex can be a place where women escape the pressures of reputation to satisfy their desires to the full, where men let themselves enjoy being vulnerable, and where transgender people affirm their sense of self with lovers who see them as they wish to be seen.

In many societies, violence pervades the lives of women in ways that are blatant and cause tremendous physical and psychological trauma. Overt expressions of violence encompass rape and molestation, domestic violence and battery, dowry-related torture, female genital mutilation, and female infanticide and feticide. There appears to be 'a visible increase in all forms of violence against women, including rape, dowry murder and witch-hunting'.⁴⁸ In his address at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, the UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, recognised the importance of viewing the 'human rights of women as an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights: of violence against women as an intolerable violation of these rights'.

GENDER, TRADE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

ASAP demands equality in trade and entrepreneurship. Industrious as African women are, they are excluded to a large extent from harvesting the benefits of increased trade. The general view is that trade liberalisation will reduce poverty and will do so for men and women equally. However, analysing the concept of trade and the impact of liberalisation policies in terms of human rights and gender tells a very different story.

African men and women's different experiences of trade liberalisation arise from their different gender roles and the different opportunities and constraints they face. This includes inequality in access to and control of economic and social resources (land, credit and information) and influence over decision-making. Moreover, the gendered division of labour means that certain jobs such as cash-crop farming are performed more by men than women. Work centred on the domestic sphere, both paid (housekeeping work) and unpaid (childcare), is generally the domain of women. Poor

trade opportunities for women impact negatively on them and limit their entrepreneurial skills.^{49, 50}

The pressure to produce high quality and quantities of goods for export, together with the need for production to adapt to shifts in global markets, means that there is a growing need for large numbers of flexible workers. Women are disproportionately represented in this sector for a variety of reasons, including the fact that they have fewer employment options and less power than men to negotiate their terms of work. This restricts their ability to claim labour rights and to organise as workers, which may undermine any empowerment gains made due to increased income.

ASAP entails identifying ways to reduce poverty throughout the continent, by ensuring that women are empowered to be economic participants. Discrimination against women or gender inequality is best understood as part of a patriarchal system that subordinates women through social norms that define their place and guide their conduct. This is a system that isolates women within their families and gives men control over most economic activities. Whereas ideal norms stress male responsibility and women living useful and happy lives within the protected space of the home, in reality women and girls face discrimination in everyday life.

Times have changed and society is moving in a different direction, guided by the forces of globalisation. It will be a serious mistake if Africa fails to recognise and incorporate the female gender in this new, global game-changing situation. The most obvious step forward is to enhance and harness the potential of women. Africa cannot afford to leave women behind while the rest of the world moves forward.

CONCLUSION

THE WAY FORWARD

PUTTING THE PATRIARCHAL SYSTEM TO REST

In all parts of the world, there are men who are aware of the straitjacket imposed upon them by traditional notions of masculinity, and who are more open to reassessing their roles and responsibilities.⁵¹

The way forward is to rethink Africa's gender architecture. Setting the myths of gender and development on the broader canvas of the current geopolitical situation forces the recognition that, for all we have achieved, there is a serious struggle ahead. Meeting the challenges of working with difference to bring about more equitable and inclusive development calls for more than re-inventing the myth of global statehood. It calls for care to be taken over terms

for engagement, and a long look to be taken at who benefits from current development practices and what the limits are of the way that development is currently undertaken. It is clear that mainstreaming has not even begun to address these challenges. An atmosphere of solidarity, trust, participation and prosperity sharing must be cultivated in order to find new ways of channelling our convictions to meet today's challenges and with this, the new revised or revamped incentives that we must develop to move ahead.

A number of factors significantly impair the role of women in the development process. The first concerns outdated cultural beliefs that deny people's basic humanity and serve the vested interests of some at the expense of others. In the face of these cultural barriers to development, the call is for changed attitudes and changed behaviour.

Second, there is the acute abridgement of the rights to sustainable living. Third, continued civil strife and wars force the already marginalised into slums and poor habitats. Africa has to continue building a holistic policy approach of bridging the gap between male and female to truly realise the ideal of ASAP:

- There must be an infusion of democratic ideals into the gender empowerment agenda. There is an urgent need to create a sustainable framework that could counteract existing discriminatory attitudes towards women. It is also necessary to provide socioeconomic facilities and continue the capacity-building of the population.
- Women should not be treated as subordinates but must be included in the development process as equal partners in transformation.
- In addressing the divide between male and female in societal transformation, there is a need for collaboration, participation and responsibility sharing at all levels.
- Gender empowerment should not be seen as a threat but as an asset in accelerating the transformation of the continent into a service delivering community.
- An institutional framework needs to be created that is based on people's cultural values and that can manage their grievances.

The toll of gender disparity on the African economy is enormous. Scarce resources that could have gone into infrastructure development are channelled into efforts to ensure security. What is needed is to address Africa's gender challenge by introducing democratic ideals into the gender empowerment and equality process. To achieve this, the root causes of female gender inequality and discrimination must be addressed directly. The likely impediments to this are festering male chauvinism, cultural taboos, competition and rivalry that tend to undermine collaborative efforts at female

empowerment. Women cannot develop holistically when more than 50 per cent of their population is excluded, a population that is productive and endowed with vast untapped potential.

In an increasingly competitive world, Africa cannot afford to continue holding on to outdated cultural taboos that only impact negatively on the sustainable transformation of society and the equity agenda. The government must give closer attention to corruption and poor governance. Balanced development would greatly assist in supporting the agenda of gender empowerment and equality, and thereby realising ASAP.

Despite the progress made in certain respects in recent years, the mainstreaming of gender considerations as part of ASAP remains a largely ad hoc undertaking, and continues to take place in the absence of a broader commission-led guiding framework or implementation plan. To ensure that gender considerations are meaningful and effectively mainstreamed within the policy framework of national governments and the AU, some of the following actions could be taken at national, regional and continental level.

ASAP entails equality of opportunity. This must be achieved through upgrading the physical, mental and spiritual conditions of the marginalised group. More importantly, women and the poor must be empowered to participate equally in development and prosperity-sharing. It is important to highlight female role models who have managed to overcome obstacles in achieving their goals. It should also be noted that adversity can be a source of motivation and strength. These role models could be a source of inspiration to others to achieve their full potential and exceed their own expectations. Such rare qualities should be positively harnessed and enhanced to further the development orientation of the continent.

Beyond the empowerment of the female gender and the poor are economic and social policies and related activities necessary to uplift all in society. The development process calls for improved social interaction. That is why men and women were created to cohabit till death them do part. Sustainable interaction, participation and responsibility sharing enhances and harnesses female participation in the solutions of economic and social problems, and in the political process. Women have higher emotional intelligence than men and tend to look at family and community first before pursuing their own success.

This chapter advocates for constructive change at the community, local, national, regional and continental levels, and argues that the holistic participation of both sexes would enhance the effectiveness of the policies and programmes designed to improve the well-being of all in society. Only then will we be able to talk proudly of ASAP. The conclusion of this chapter, like many others before it, is hopeful that change will come, though this change will be challenging. It is also an appeal to the African male world

to commit itself to promoting full respect for human dignity, to achieving equality between women and men, and to recognising and enhancing the participation and leadership roles of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, and in development.

In the last fifty years, development in Africa has focused on building male capabilities and has often failed to direct resources rationally and scientifically. Male dominance has failed to produce the required results. It is time for change. Women are not staging a female coup d'état, but stretching out a hand of cooperation, compassion, humility and partnership and reconciliation, and letting past mistakes rest in peace, as they look forward to a better tomorrow through complementary activities – a point that Wageh and Olowu make clear.⁵²


Africa needs strong governments and institutions that foster good governance, empower females and ensure participation and benefit-sharing. Interventions must address the root cause of the problem, which entails a thorough re-examination of the issues in the context of unequal gender relations. We all have a crucial role to play here. From our vantage points, we should be in a position to sensitise society, traditional rulers and government to articulate forward-looking policies that eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and promote policies that enhance gender equality. An intervention strategy must establish from the outset that witch-hunting and disparity is a gender and violence issue, and not merely a result of superstitious beliefs or a community's culture. Once this is clear, it will be easier for community members to accept change, have a positive, progressive mindset and not feel threatened.

It should be noted that the prevailing level of education among the population has a statistically significant positive effect on gender in the labour market. Education, in general, tends to broaden one's awareness of cultural and social norms that exist in other societies and, in many of these societies, especially in industrial economies, females are entitled to the same freedoms and opportunities that are extended to males. Given the evidence that improved gender equality in education and employment leads to a higher level of economic development and improved well-being, the focus of this chapter's argument is that reducing gender inequality in education and employment and empowering females will lead to rapid growth and improved living standards for the family and the overall progress of society. It goes without saying that economic development itself tends to lead to improvement in gender equality in the labour market.

At this juncture, it is imperative that improving gender equality and ensuring female gender empowerment will initiate a cycle of positively reinforcing feedback between gender equality in employment and economic development, leading to further improvements in both. Seeking African

solutions to African problems entails bringing females from the minus side to the plus side of the development continuum. Figure 10.3 depicts the impact and necessity of education, gender equality and economic development leading to a sustainable quality of life for people and society.

Figure 10.3 Education, gender equality and economic development



In a world in which unequal gender relations are the norm, male chauvinism, gender violence, discrimination against and persecution of women and viewing women as low-class citizens epitomise the tragedy of gender disparity. Culturally and socially, interventions to overcome these acts against humanity are critical and will require short-term, medium-term and long-term commitments by all in society. African women are the hope for the future economic transformation of the continent in a number of inter-related ways:

- **Women** help with economic growth. Economic growth would be much higher if more women were in paid employment.
- **Women** provide a better balance of risk and reward to business and finance. The existing 'male' culture of reckless financial risk is at the heart of under-development of the continent. Mixing the genders can help reverse current male chauvinism, generate greater sales, higher returns on equity, and higher profitability.
- **Women** are the next 'emerging markets'. Women control a greater share of discretionary consumer spending.
- **Women** invest more in future generations, creating a powerful ripple effect. They spend on health and education, building human capital to fuel future growth and savings to finance it.
- **Women** are agents of change. Women tend to be more open to diverse perspectives, sponsor and develop new talent and are more inclined to encourage collaboration. Diversity in different forms creates a cradle of ideas and innovation.

The future of the African continent depends on a fundamentally different mindset among the male gender to partner with women. Partnership, cooperation and gender balance is a silver bullet for achieving sustained growth and stability. The values, voice and contributions of women would make a world of difference for ASAP. The continent cannot afford to leave half its resources, talent and ideas untapped and expect to develop into a service-delivery society. Finding ASAP entails:

- avoiding waste;
- removing discrimination;
- expanding opportunities for women to be integral partners with men in development; and
- engaging men in gender equality.

How can development practitioners encourage men to adopt a more 'gender-equitable' masculine identity?

There is need for cutting-edge policy strategies and action plans. The AU and African countries are called upon to make gender equality issues an integral part of the continent's growth, development and transformation strategy. Presently, Africa is confronted with a lot of unfinished business. The continent is challenged to move in the right direction and to move faster. Embracing gender equality is the right step to take in fulfilling the ideal of ASAP. The challenges of growth, job creation, gender equality, good governance and inclusion are closely interlinked with the realisation that ASAP remains an imperative that needs a new mindset. Therefore, walking the tight-rope towards gender equality requires drastic change at many levels, including attitudes, relationships, institutions and legal frameworks.

Africa must urgently find answers to certain questions. Why do some nations takeoff into rapid economic growth, while others stand still or decline? What forces, present in some societies, have been absent in others and hence prevent the rapid growth of African countries to advance toward industrialisation and quality services delivery? The answers to these and other questions are linked to varied interrelated historical, geographical, economic, structural, philosophical, religious, socio-cultural, political and behavioural factors.

This chapter has examined some of these perspectives holistically and advanced pragmatic recommendations for the way forward. It started by looking at the marginalisation of women, addressed underlying issues and discussed policy actions for alleviating the problem.

The Africa woman is no longer for turning but for uplifting to higher heights and has a key role to play in the sustainable transformation of Africa. Promoting the role of women is a necessity that the continent cannot

afford to bypass. Meeting the challenges of the continent requires uplifting 'democracy' from the dungeons of 'democracy'. We have reneged on the promise of democracy and social cohesion. A national and continental identity has not been reinforced using state institutions, civil society and political leadership. Rather, we continue harping on the notion of diversity, which has resulted in internalisation of difference, where difference is measured in a chauvinistic manner. Such a vague national identity, which embraces all identities and offers nothing tangible as its definition, does not offer a sense of belonging, let alone cohesion.

Existing chauvinistic attitudes deprive and deny the female gender from being a contributor to the transformation of the continent. Chauvinistic attitudes dehumanise women, preventing them from enjoying their fundamental human rights and liberties and preventing the continent from being a serious competitor in the global arena. The male stereotype that farmers are men must be put aside. Of course, counter-reactions from feminists create counter-stereotypes, such as that of the African woman farmer and her lazy husband. Such images have been important in changing ideas about gender and channelling more resources to women. However, some such images have been exaggerated and put beyond question, resulting in 'gender myths'. Gender myths are a powerful tool for positive change, but also bring with them risks and dangers.

MYTHS OF AFRICAN WOMEN – STRIDING TOWARD FREEDOM

We live in a world of gender stereotypes. We are surrounded by messages about women being weak and men being strong, about women being better carers and men being better at earning money; a world in which everyone is supposed to be heterosexual and married, or wants to be. These ideas are all too familiar, although the content of each stereotype varies from place to place. 'Gender myths' provide a series of images of women and men that encourage us to understand what they do, or do not do, in particular ways.

Setting the myths of gender and development on the broader canvas of the current geopolitical situation forces recognition that, for all we have gained, there is a serious struggle ahead. The challenges of working with a difference to bring about more equitable and inclusive development calls for more than reinventing the myth of global sisterhood. It calls for care to be taken over terms of engagement, a long look to be taken at who benefits from current development practices and what limits there are to the way in which development is currently being done.

We live in an era of constructive change. With or without myths, we are simply human beings searching for constructive partnership, directing our different capabilities towards a common goal in enhancing our existence

on planet Earth. We need innovative approaches and strategies to change attitudes and behaviour and ensure development for the good of all – male and female. We are challenged to construct a better life for all, not a *bitter* life for all.

This chapter was written to inspire the people of Africa and the African Diaspora to embrace the positive revolutionary spirit for radical and constructive mindset change, to address poverty, underdevelopment, marginalisation and corruption, and to engage in the good fight to create quality livelihood for all. It is time to revisit the initial promise – no more slavery, forward to independence, no more backward journey into colonialism – and fulfil the rising expectation in the New Africa. The African I am, the African We Are and should no longer find ourselves in the ugly space within the global context. Once a peaceful continent, the pride of every African, the continent is now in total disarray, with war spreading like wildfire from all four cardinal points, from Cape to Cairo, from Banjul to the Horn. It looks like anarchy has replaced dictatorial regimes. We should avoid fragmentation.

Frantz Fanon notes: 'National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallisation of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and the most obvious result of the mobilisation of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been. These faults that we find in it are quite sufficient explanation of the facility with which, when dealing with young and independent nations, the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state.'

We are called on to come to grips with existing realities and to move forward. Although political readjustment usually takes place slowly, this should not deter us from taking the first step on the long journey we have embarked upon. We need to change our mindset to take Africa into a brilliant new period of political creativeness at a strategic moment and not remain the people and continent that walk in darkness which is a microcosm of the whole of people's long and bitter struggle toward a better future, a struggle of which the history of the African is an outstanding example. Let us all be committed to face the battle of immediate concern to all Africans that befits the dignity of the people constantly marginalised, excluded and disregarded. This is the time to put an end to brutality, corruption, and maladministration, de-humanisation of people, bureaucratic inefficiency and destruction. We have to break down the walls of mental colonisation and underdevelopment, and open the gates of African Unity, Pan-Africanism, African Renaissance, development and quality welfare to all.

It is time to speak the truth to ourselves and to those in power, especially our leaders, who have failed to have the simplest courage of their convictions about the rise of a brave new Africa at ease with itself. This is

a continent constructed within the ambit of African Unity, African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism with the potential to overcome all odds. It is with these ideals in mind that our political, social, cultural and economic diversity can be harnessed for the progress of Africa ;it is with these principles that the potential of women in transforming Africa can be effected; it is with this light that we can bring to an end the conflicts impeding the progress of the continent. It is only by a strong conviction in cross-fertilising our ideas and deploying our knowledge properly that a better and progressive continent can be constructed. Based on these commitments and convictions, we can advance the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SOME SUGGESTED INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

ASAP entails looking back to correct mistakes and taking appropriate action in order to look toward to crafting a better future. Seen with this perspective we need drastic measures now to acknowledge certain realities and to exert our strength and necessary measures to attain envisaged goals. In light of this backdrop, the following short-term, medium-term and longer-term strategies are recommended, which may help to reduce the threat to women and narrow existing inequality and disparity gaps between the sexes in society, leading to ASAP:

- Empowerment of the female gender is not an option: it is a necessity. For economic, political and moral reasons, we have to act now and decisively. This has been an unfinished agenda for the past 50 years and must be the first priority as the AU enters its second 50 years of existence.
- Gender mainstreaming should also be enforced through gender quotas and should be used alongside genuine transformation that seeks to empower women in political parties and in all spheres of government.
- Political parties have to genuinely transform to empower women and reflect the value system of the society in which they exist so that they can articulate the views, needs and aspirations of that society.
- Intervening from the perspective of atrocities against women: It is the place of all to approach the problem by removing superstitious beliefs. We are not likely to make significant breakthrough, since the main issue is that of a woman's low social status. Any intervention

that concentrates on preventing atrocities against women and so also focuses on other forms of violence might be more acceptable.

- Today's developed societies are considered developed because they attained that status by successively incorporating into their development agenda and implementation processes the elements of gender empowerment and equity which fostered greater social cohesion and stability. There is no historical example of a polarised society that became stable and successful. Africa should create the right, not the wrong, history.
- Africa does not lack resources. If we put together private and public resources to ensure a proper relationship between the female and male sexes, and exhibit good management skills, there is no doubt that Africa has more than enough to develop properly and transform itself from a backward entity into a service delivery society for the good of all.
- Forming support groups for women: Efforts should be made across the divide to form support groups for gender parity and to save women who are branded as witches and who are often in danger of being killed and face severe forms of torture and other dehumanising treatment. Therefore, it is vital to strengthen women's groups to provide this crucial support mechanism.
- We have passed the stage of legislation and policy formulation. Now is the time for effective, efficient, holistic implementation processes for the continent to benefit from the full capabilities and ingenuity of women.
- Advocating a more gender-sensitive form of administration: Successful advocacy will increase women's participation in families, and in village, local, provincial, national, regional, continental and world-wide administrations, thereby increasing their status in society. Sensitising people at all levels to gender issues is vital in the process of attaining gender equality.
- Human capital development and quality health services: In order to tap the special potential of women, it is essential that access to quality education and healthcare is provided.
- The African woman is a precious diamond that must be treasured, protected and honoured, to ensure the sustainability of ASAP.

- It is important to recognise that sexual rights are both a health and a violence issue. It is vital to see the connections between well-being and ill-being, wealth and poverty, integration and marginalisation, and the significance of sexuality in political struggles.
- Incorporating gender into development planning and other related policy activities: Programmes that promote women's participation and leadership will ultimately be more effective in communities and enable women to rise above their subjugated state.

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Impediments to Development and Integration in the Central African Subregion

Some Reflections

Nicasius Achu Check

INTRODUCTION

The European powers that gathered in Berlin in 1884-1885 had two things principally in mind: to avoid a European conflagration on the continent, and to exploit Africa's raw materials for the burgeoning European economies. In contrast to this, and on the basis of what can be gleaned from popular literature, the acquisition of territories on the African continent has been ascribed to a wide range of other motives, from simple heroism to the desire for political dominance over other European powers and the vaunted 'civilising mission' on the continent.¹ The mad rush for African territories also has been seen as economically motivated, as the colonial enterprise was profit-driven and necessary for the survival of the capitalist system.

Indeed, given the rapid pace of decolonisation in the 1960s, there were questions as to whether or not the capitalist system would collapse. The strengthening of the capitalist system after the 1960s points, however, to the success of neo-imperialism, which is aimed at undermining development initiatives in Africa. In many instances this was literally the case, in that colonial powers retained economic control over their former colonies.² The situation is catastrophic in former French colonies, where France still controls their economic and financial policies.

The slow pace of economic development in former colonies in the postcolonial era has necessitated theorising about and questioning the relationship between the developed and the developing world. However, the triumph of national liberation movements, socialist revolutions and struggles for economic independence, especially in the 1970s and more importantly in 1994 with the dawn of democracy in South Africa, has in many respects produced a counter-attack by imperialist forces.

The triumph of these neo-imperial forces has introduced a new form of domination, one masquerading as dependency on the former colonial masters. The assumption is that a patrilineal relationship can help analyse the dependency theory, where the strong partner in a political or economic relationship ensures that the weakened one remains weaker and is a source of vital ingredients for the stronger partner. This analogy could help explain the uneven and limited development in the Third World. This limited development overshadowed the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s, which instilled in the minds of African nationalists the promise of social and economic growth. Kwame Nkrumah's doctrine of 'seek ye the political kingdom and the rest will follow' was difficult to realise, as Africa was still at a 'traditional stage' in the 1960s and yet to attain the preconditions for economic take-off and the 'age of high mass-consumption'.³

The post-World War II era saw significant changes in development thinking, particularly in Europe and Africa. In Europe, there was a surge in studies dealing with social change and development strategies that promote economic prosperity. This period also saw the World Bank (WB), International Labour Organisation and major commercial banks involved in promoting economic growth on the African continent, which, at that time, was synonymous with development.⁴

The emphasis was on changing the face of Africa's primary economic sector with more radical, modern ways of meeting basic economic needs. In Europe, the Marshall Plan was aimed at rebuilding the industrial infrastructure of European economies that had been battered by the war. Large injections of capital were made into major economic sectors, and subsidies in the agricultural and industrial sectors became the norm in many European economies. The idea was both to ensure that Europe was not dependent on the United States (US) for most of its economic needs and that the US could maintain a free market outlook in the Western world.

CONCEPTUALISING DEVELOPMENT ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

The conceptualisation of development in Africa was premised on understanding the continent's social formations. It has been argued that the boundaries African countries inherited after colonialism were largely artificial, and that the Organisation for African Unity's (OAU) principle of the inviolability of African boundaries served to legitimise this artificiality. The reality, though, is that ethnic entities cut across international boundaries, creating challenges for any development project based on the idea of a nation-state. The situation is aggravated by the fact that productive forces in most parts of the continent are still very much artisanal in nature. Chachage

maintains that what prevails in Africa are neopatrimonial relations, which – due to instability, corruption and maladministration – impede productive economic activity and cause economic decline.⁵

However, in the early 1960s the newly independent African states began to grapple with the question of the right formula for development thinking. Many defined development as economic growth, and industrialisation became a race to catch up with the West or meet standards set by Western institutions.⁶ Many African economies therefore adopted the modernisation concept that was primarily aimed at deficiencies in poorer countries and concerned with ways to overcome them. The modernist borrowed largely from the biological scientist, who believes that the development process should follow a more natural course. The domestication process was, to an extent, seen as Westernisation in disguise. The idea was to ensure that developing economies developed like their Western counterparts, whose example seemed to provide a blueprint for the rest of the world.⁷

The modernisation theory viewed traditional societies in terms of negatives: unchanging, not innovative, not profit-making, not growing. It argued that traditional social formations should be disregarded and that people, especially those in Africa, should embrace technology and scientific innovation. Capitalism, it argued, is the right formula for countries to adopt in order to develop and be respected in the global arena. Innovation and technological growth became self-sustaining in western Europe, because they were embedded in the capitalist system.

The capitalist system, it should be recalled, requires competition, with profits being increased by lowering costs and increasing turnover and revenue, which (everything being equal) could be reinvested in order to make more profit. The modernisation theory suggested that the accumulation of wealth and expansion of investment spurs growth and development.⁸ One important aspect of this theory is its reliance on variables such as individual freedom, a multi-party democratic process, elections and the rule of law. The task of the Third World, modernists argue, is to transform itself from tradition to modernity.⁹

Structuralism, as a concept for development, focuses on structural factors that impede the economic growth of developing countries. Much like the modernisation concept, the structural approach emphasises the need for developing countries to transform from mainly agricultural and subsistence economies to a modern urbanised manufacturing and service economy.

Unlike modernisation theory, however, structuralist theory involves major government intervention in the economy to jump-start the industrial sector. The aim is to create an environment in which the developing economy is less reliant on imported goods from developed economies.

Inward-oriented development is achieved by levying taxes on imported produce, thereby encouraging local companies to expand and garner a bigger share of the market. State intervention in the economic sector is highly encouraged in the structuralist economic model: trade amongst the least developed economies would help create economies of scale to enable them compete with foreign competitors, and they would thus need to be protected until they are able to compete in the free market.

The neoliberal economic development model has been the model most preached to African economies in the postcolonial political dispensation. Developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the neoliberal model was premised on the free market system where demand necessarily influences the supply of a commodity in the market. Proponents of this model include Adam Smith and John Keynes, who discouraged government intervention in the economic sector. The 'invisible hand' described by Adam Smith ensures that free trade is ultimately to the benefit all of society.

Neoclassical development theory, as the neoliberal economic development theory is also known, became a buzz-word in the early 1980s with the election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in Britain and the US, respectively. The main preoccupation of the neoclassical theorists was the pre-eminence of market forces and the disengagement of the state from the economic sector. Among the implications of neoclassical development theory, especially for developing countries, were the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) that the WB forced on many developing economies. Some of the important measures that these countries had to attend to were:

- reducing government spending;
- privatisation;
- trade liberalisation, currency devaluation and the abolition of market boards; and
- retrenchment in the public sector.

The Washington consensus, as these measures became known, were to be taught and implemented in most Third World economies. The bottom line, though, is that these measures have not improved the lives of people in the Third World but instead pauperised many economies. The devaluation of currencies, retrenchment in public sectors and drastic cuts in salaries have led in fact to a reduction in the net income of many in the Third World.

Despite the popularity of these models of development, postmodernist thinkers have developed several alternative models Africa could adopt.¹⁰ The first is the post-development economic model. According to post-development scholars, the goal of improving living standards rests on arbitrary

claims regarding the desirability and possibility of that goal. Post-development theorists argue that the model is Eurocentric and based on a Western model of development that may be unrealistic or undesirable for most Third World economies.

Sustainable development also became an important model in the 1990s as the devastating effects of climate change became evident. This model seeks to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development can be separated into environmental sustainability, economic sustainability and socio-political sustainability. The important aspect of this form of development is sustainability.

Another area of development thinking relates to the human development model. The main area of concern of this model is to steer clear of the normative developmental process while borrowing from other disciplines, such as ecology and sustainable development welfare economics, in order to optimise the overall human capital in an economy.

Given these various models, the question is: Which African economies have been able to implement them and with what degree of success?

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORIES

Nkrumah noted that the challenge facing countries emerging from colonialism was to transform economies based almost purely on producing and trading raw material into productive units capable of undergirding a superstructure of modern agriculture and industry.¹¹ Most African postcolonial economies inherited societies with a massive dearth of the technically skilled labour needed to assist the development process in which the newly decolonised states were engaged. Postcolonial economies were characterised instead by subsistence farming, mono-crop production and extractive industries that were under the influence of financial and commercial monopolies.¹²

Nkrumah observed that there is no universal pattern for industrialisation which could serve as a definitive model for new nations emerging from colonialism. Because the colonists had confiscated most factors of production, especially land, Nkrumah resorted to the time-tested African model of socialism as the way to proceed. According to him, the African socialist model is premised on the assumption that public goods are equally individual resources, meaning, therefore, that the resources of a country should be equitably allocated to every citizen. This requires full employment, good housing and equal opportunity for education and cultural advancement to the highest level for all people.¹³ The idea is that:

- the price of goods must not exceed wages;
- house rentals must be within the means of all groups;
- social welfare services must be open to all; and
- educational and cultural amenities must be available to everyone.¹⁴

This model implies that production for private profit deprives a large section of the population of the goods and services produced. To fulfil these promises which Nkrumah and his peers had made to the African people, African socialism was considered the only alternative. It assumes public ownership of the means of production and use of those means to fulfil people's needs.¹⁵

Those who believed in Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist thinking and way of doing things adopted this development model soon after independence. Houphouët Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Amadou Ahidjo of Cameroon and many other African leaders adopted the African socialist model. Farmers were urged to belong to cooperatives, while the government was ready to employ people in the civil service and in public corporations.

In southern Africa, Julius Nyerere experimented with another form of African socialism, commonly referred to in Tanzania as *ujamaa*. Soon after independence from Britain in 1964, Nyerere noted that the Tanzanian citizenry was not well equipped to advance the development of the country. As such, he introduced the *ujamaa* system, which in Swahili primarily means a communal or family way of life. It was an attempt at restructuring the Tanzanian countryside and, on a broader scale, society, in a communal socialist fashion. Nyerere reasoned that abolishing private ownership would itself constitute a powerful stimulus to improving productivity.¹⁶

One of the central elements of the *ujamaa* system was the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). The RDA thrived on the bottom-up approach in development thinking. It was a people's initiative aimed at slowly developing and strengthening existing social patterns and techniques of production with the goal of cooperation and self-reliance.¹⁷ After three years of experimentation, the Arusha Declaration on *Ujamaa* was signed. According to the *ujamaa* principle, the basis of life in the rural areas and villages should be living together, working together and sharing the proceeds. The *ujamaa* project was not just an ideological project, but also a rural development strategy that would work to modernise Tanzania's economy through traditionalisation.¹⁸

Ujamaa never had any lasting impact on the lives of ordinary Tanzanians. It is understood that by 1971 about six per cent of the population lived in *ujamaa* villages. Thus, very few villages saw the need for communal farming or production. As a result, Nyerere dissolved the RDA and so ended one of the most inspiring African-born initiatives to alleviate the plight of the African masses. The rigidly centralised village system and a severe

drought in the early 1970s compounded the already dire socioeconomic situation of the country.

To save face, Nyerere introduced the villagisation development model. This policy required all Tanzanians to be resettled into registered villages.¹⁹ Given the failure of the *ujamaa* project, many Tanzanian peasants believed that the villagisation project would also fail. Thus, many refused to be co-opted into the villagisation process. Thousands of people even moved to towns in defiance of the project. A militia was created in 1971 to force people to resettle in villages, and when this failed, the military was brought in as well.

The aim of the villagisation programme was to form communal cooperatives through which farming and participation in major developmental projects would be carried out by the village. The basic tenet for the villages was self-help and self-reliance.²⁰ The main task of government was to train agricultural officers, health personnel and cooperative officers and put them at the disposal of the *ujamaa* villages. As part of this project, funds were allocated, dispensaries and water tanks provided, and schools given priority in terms of staffing and equipment.²¹

However, Nyerere's mission of prioritising rural development in Tanzania failed. It should be noted that in every economic system, individuals are motivated to work by the incentives of the system. In the case of the *ujamaa* and the villagisation project, the incentive system was not well thought-out and people drifted away from it. Material incentives, which were the prevailing norm in the *ujamaa* and villagisation projects, have a far less important role to play when it comes to stimulating growth and sustenance.²² It is rightly assumed that the still-born project of *ujamaa* and villagisation was a result of this incentive scheme, which failed to attract many Tanzanian peasants to the rural areas.

THE CENTRAL AFRICA SUBREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

There are two principal drivers of development in the Central African sub-region: France and the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). The 1884-1885 Berlin Conference confirmed France's occupation of what are today countries of the CEMAC zone, save for Cameroon which was annexed by Germany. The German presence in Cameroon was brief, as it was defeated by a combined Franco-English force in 1916. France took total control of all the countries in the region after the Versailles Treaty of 1919 and instituted an ambiguous yet functional development agenda.

The post-World War I era saw the intensification of cash-crop production by the French, a tradition the Germans started in Cameroon, with extensive

coffee, cotton and cocoa plantations being established in most areas of the country. The Second World War disrupted the cash-crop economy, and post-1945 initiatives to revive the sector met with resistance, as attention was turned towards preparing most of the colonies in the region for self-government. The principal political development that had a significant impact on the development trajectory of the region post-1945 was the 1958 French overseas referendum. It was aimed at determining which of the French colonies wanted to remain in the French Commonwealth and which wanted self-governing status. Only Guinea Conakry in West Africa voted to be self-governing, while the other French colonies voted to remain in the French Commonwealth.

This important political development suggests that France should have set the development agenda for all the countries that remained in the French Commonwealth. Little attention was paid to self-determination, and France continued to pursue aggressive policies of assimilation and integration. These policies were generally aimed at integrating the inhabitants of all the French colonies with French culture and its political philosophy. Because France did not prepare the colonial territories for independence, little interest was shown in developing the colonies. Post-independence French colonies continued to rely on France for their monetary and economic policy development and implementation, partly because all the former French colonies still used the franc as their currency, along with a common central bank controlled by France. This effectively left these colonies' economic development up to the whim of France.

The presidents of the countries in the Central Africa subregion had to rely on the economic projects included in the now famous 'five-year development programmes' which all the countries in the region adopted at independence. The intention of the five-year development programme was to identify priority development projects to be embarked upon in any given five-year cycle. Priority projects included the construction of dams, roads linking farms to markets, hospitals, health centres and schools. Human capital development was also given much importance, but local politicians had little say in this. Funding for higher education was insufficient, and most students left the country on undergraduate and graduate scholarships.

At the end of each five-year development programme, an evaluation was conducted and new targets set for the next programme. This form of ad hoc development thinking continues under the one-party-rule system and is occasionally interrupted by military takeover, as has happened in countries such as Chad, Central Africa Republic and Equatorial Guinea.

An independent developmental agenda was proposed in the mid-1980s by the new president of Cameroon, Paul Biya. Communal Liberalism, as his new developmental approach was called, was aimed at rallying Cameroonians,

mostly in the rural areas, around common development projects. The role of chiefs and governors in the various provinces was important in identifying projects that the community could prioritise and carry out. The state would play a minor role in managing these projects. In the years after the publication of the new development concept in 1987, MIDENO, WADA, SOWEDA, UNVDA and SEMRY were created. Their main goal was to harness local resources in the development of communal lives. The economic crisis of the 1990s greatly affected the desired outputs of these projects, and they have not turned out to be the vehicle of development which their initiators had hoped they would be.

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT THINKING

Liberalisation of the political arena in the 1990s compounded the economic crises that many countries of the subregion were experiencing. The devastating effects of climate change and HIV/AIDS were particularly felt in the developing world, mainly because they lack the capacity to mitigate these difficulties. The Rio Earth Summit in 1992 and several other UN-sponsored conferences culminated in the Millennium Summit in 2000, at which the Millennium Declaration was adopted.

The Declaration asserts that every individual has the right to dignity, freedom, equality and a basic standard of living (which includes freedom from hunger and violence), and it encourages tolerance and solidarity. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were developed to operationalise these ideas by setting targets and indicators for a 15-year period. The goals are:

- Eradicate extreme hungry and poverty;
- Achieve universal primary education;
- Promote gender equality and empower women;
- Reduce child mortality;
- Improve maternal health;
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases;
- Ensure environmental sustainability; and
- Global partnership for development.

Though the targets set for the achievement of these goals were ambiguous, many development economists think the consensus on them and their widespread use by governments, donors, civil society, business and the media reflect a fundamental shift in ideas, not only about the purpose of development, but how the concept of poverty is defined.²³ The overwhelming

acceptance of the MDGs also indicates a shift in ideas about the purpose of international cooperation for development. The new approach is people-focused, compared to the old notion of the international community supporting nations in tackling global poverty. This people-centred approach departs from what modernist thinkers see as differentiated treatment by global actors towards developing countries in terms of trade, transfer of technology and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).²⁴

Negotiations at the World Trade Organisation have not been pro-poor and have tended to favour the West. Similarly, huge agricultural subsidies and advanced technology have also skewed the development field in favour of the West. In the arena of climate change negotiations, transfer of technology from northern to southern countries has been a major concern. Southern countries are experiencing difficulty in mitigating the effects of climate change on their environment due to a lack of technology. An aggressive approach in transferring technology would help equip Global South countries to engage on an equal footing in development thinking and policy implementation. Because Global South countries are prone to political instability, FDI has been merely trickling in; instead, investment is concentrated in areas where future returns are ensured. As a result of all these challenges, development thinking has shifted towards developing an individual rather than a country-specific approach. Development was therefore focusing more on 'bread and butter' issue rather than on the macroeconomic fundamentals of a particular country.

The effects of the SAP, which aims at reducing government engagement in the economy, may well be at the centre of the new approach to development thinking. The acrimonious relationship between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WB regarding the implementation of the SAP has led to some people thinking critically about the way forward in developing the Global South. Major donors and multinational organisations needed to formulate a new development strategy to build a more cooperative international effort. The MDGs were therefore a strategy through which NGOs, the IMF and the WB could speak with one voice at the 'development table'. Although this has not really led to any breakthrough in development thinking, the fact that human development meets are receiving results-based management is commendable.²⁵

While progress on the MDGs still needs to be assessed in the coming years, major role-players in the international development arena have been looking ahead to the post-MDG scenario. Before such strategies were implemented, the Higher Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, was implemented to relieve poor countries of the burden of loans. The HIPC, which emerged from the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, is based

on the assumption that the neoliberal market option is not helping poor countries to get out of debt. The idea is to stabilise the HIPC by cancelling the repayment conditions and creating avenues through which the money meant for repayment can be channelled to development projects. The policy framework in which the HIPC funds are allocated is the Poverty Reduction Strategic Programme.²⁶

In Africa, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of the 1980s and the one of the early 1990s call for two important issues to be addressed before Africa can develop. The first is the integration project, and the second, trade amongst African countries. Championed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, these plans were premised on the understanding that Africa's growth and development are political projects that need to be handled by African leaders at the highest level.

The central idea in the LPA was for subregional organisations to champion the integration debate: once countries at the subregional level have been properly integrated, the region as a whole can start integrating all the countries on the continent. Inter-country trade was to be the overall catalyst to jump-start integration and development. The AU has for years encouraged inter-country trade, but it should be noted that only six per cent of trade on the African continent is between African countries, making the envisaged integration of people at grassroots level difficult to achieve.

Global South analysts such as Claude Ake and Albert Hirschman have problematised the global consensus on economic development thinking. Hirschman contends that every aspect of development, including government, private sector and institutions, depends on an understanding of the development process as an inducement mechanism rather than a lack of prerequisites.²⁷ The focus, Hirschman notes, should be on capital, entrepreneurial and managerial ability and human capital development, rather than on natural resources. The idea was to pay attention to the attitudes and value systems that favour the emergence of the required economic activities and personalities.²⁸

Ake, on the other hand, advances the notion that economic development should be viewed in terms of an equilibrium scheme whereby most of the things produced by an economy must be consumed by that same economy, or have a ready market for the goods, in order to avoid dumping. Overproduction, especially in Africa, where most countries produce plenty of perishable foodstuffs without there being a ready market for them, creates disequilibrium and could hurt the economy in the long run if it is not properly addressed.

In *Development and Democracy in Africa*, Ake argues that African political elites should combine democratic governance with new community-based development initiatives that emphasise self-reliance and are

designed to build Africans' self-esteem by giving individual communities the opportunity to set and work towards their own economic goals.²⁹ He maintains that Africa's marginalisation in the post-Cold War era is a blessing in disguise that could spur community action and put the region on the path to self-reliance. Development, Ake notes, is both a process and an end-result. He writes that Africa's development policies have been determined externally by bilateral donors, thus preventing African development projects from acquiring the domestic legitimacy they need in order to take root. The situation has been aggravated by the authoritarianism of African despots, civilian and military.³⁰

Ake's interpretation of development is in line with what Southeast Asian countries have embarked upon in the post-1945 era. They have privileged indigenous efforts at development and resisted outside interference in their economic and monetary policies. Half a decade after 1945, these economies have proven that looking inward is preferable and can spur development, even under the most outrageous dictatorships or authoritarian systems. Why have African governments not followed the advice of Hirschman and Ake and copied these best practices of Southeast Asia?

CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION IN THE SUBREGION

The growth rate of countries in the Global South suggests a process of rapid market expansion driven by world demand for primary products. The tendency of developed economies to have these products cheaply and readily available has turned them over time into producers instead of consumers. The domestic market in developing economies still needs to be fashioned in such a way that it can complement markets in developed economies. The thinking here is that investment induced by complementarities drives market expansion and the development process.³¹

Equally, though, neoliberal orthodoxy has been blamed for the ineffective economic environment in several southern countries. Joseph Stiglitz, a noted critic of neoliberalism, argues that this doctrine is too simplistic and relies principally on accounting frameworks and a few economic indicators, such as inflation, money supply, interest rates and trade deficits, which makes its universal application problematic.³² He also maintains that the assumption that the competitive equilibrium theorem is universally applicable in developing countries is false. He objects to overreliance on inflation data, insisting it is not conducive to long-term economic growth.³³

Such criticism from someone who was at the head of the WB's economic division could not have come at a better time. It puts into question several WB-prescribed economic growth strategies. The focus is for developing

countries to claim ownership of policies if they are to be sustainable in these countries. It is argued that if these policies are to be implemented in developing countries, these countries should be part of policy formulation and implementation. In this regard, a notable challenge to the neoliberal model is that it is a foreign concept and will struggle to take root in most Third World countries.

Closely tied to the foreign origin of economic models is the lack of political will amongst African leaders who lack the will to implement what they themselves have proposed. Several five-year development programmes have not been realised in Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR) and Congo-Brazzaville. Despite the economic crisis of the early 1990s, these programmes were immediately side-lined in favour of new political agendas. The leaders focused more on maintaining their grip on state power than the economic development of their countries. The fact that the LPA was never strongly supported by African leaders and led to disappointing implementation is regrettable, given that it was conceived by Africans.

The location of large corporations and industrial complexes has a significant bearing on communities. It is a given that once a large corporation is situated in an area, other important secondary companies crop up in the vicinity, thus ensuring social and economic development. In the Rhine and Detroit industrial zones in Germany and the US, respectively, large secondary industries and towns emerged, offering the local economies a much-needed boost. The problem with African economies is that they are far removed from major manufacturing centres and thus only able to attract foreign investors who are interested in exploiting primary commodities with a high value per unit weight.³⁴ African economies, and particularly the economies of the Central Africa subregion, are based on primary commodities, which are in all respects labour-intensive. The primary goal of most foreign investors in this type of economy is to maximise profit, with most of the profits not being ploughed back but expatriated. As a result, this has made the economies perpetual producers rather than consumers of capital, a predicament which, were it reversed, could spur development and alleviate the plight of the local people.

One of the main aims of the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 was to ensure that European powers acquired cheap raw materials in Africa in order to service the large industrial complexes in Europe. More than a century after this landmark conference, the aims of major Western powers have not changed. Africa and many Third World countries are still regarded as the source of raw materials, a place where cheap labour can be procured and cheap products manufactured for Western markets. However, the type of natural resources a country has limits or facilitates the setting up of certain industries and the development trajectory that the country will eventually take.³⁵ In Africa

generally, and the Central African subregion in particular, countries are endowed with important natural resources, which, if well-managed, could see their present underdeveloped status shift to developing status.

Chad, for example, has huge deposits of crude oil, and in 2013 produced more than 560 000 barrels of oil per day. If the funds accruing from the sale of this vital commodity are properly utilised, it could drastically change the country's economic fortunes within a decade. Similarly, Equatorial Guinea is perhaps the country with the largest crude oil deposits in the region, producing more than one million barrels of oil a day. With its small population, the country should have surpassed many developed economies within a decade of oil production commencing. Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon and the CAR have enormous timber, coffee, cocoa and agricultural resources. These primary products have not been used in ways that benefit the local economies; instead, Western multinational corporations have been exploiting and exporting them.

Again, most of this is done under the watchful eye of political elites who perhaps owe their continuous stay in power to these corporations. The role played by Elf-Serepca in protecting the Omar Bongo administration in Gabon and the reinstatement of Denis Sassou Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville is well documented. To compound an already disastrous economic situation, the numerous military and economic agreements that countries of the subregion signed with France soon after independence in 1960 provided France with the option of first refusal regarding most of the resources in the region: in other words, a commodity can be exported to another country only if France does not want it. In response to this stringent economic measure, most of these countries have resorted to leasing large expanses of land to American and Chinese companies, with very little economic benefit for the local population. The Herakle Farms debacle in Cameroon is a case in point.

With all this foreign interference in the development trajectory on the continent, what has the premier African development framework – NEPAD – done to redress the situation? One of the main drawbacks of the NEPAD framework is its structural foundation. First, NEPAD developmental projects are Africa-wide, which spreads its financial resources thinly. NEPAD conceived of Africa as a country, negating the notion that there are 54 countries on the continent and that any developmental initiative needs to take this into account. The failure of NEPAD to be the vehicle for development on the continent stems from the discontinuities in African state formation. The fact that Africa is not a mono-ethnic or mono-lingual entity creates challenges, given that any effective developmental framework needs to consider all these differences – which is not practically possible. Religious, cultural and social differences in African state formation have hampered any genuine effort at developing the continent.

This artificiality stems from the fact that the geographical spread of a particular ethnic group is not determined by international delimitations. It would be an anomaly to engage in, say, hydroelectric dam construction in Rwanda while ethnic Tutsis in eastern Congo do not even have food to eat. The anomaly stems from the traditional and sacred relationship between the Tutsis in Rwanda and those in eastern Congo, but, the particularities aside, numerous examples of this kind are found throughout Africa.

Another notable challenge to development on the continent is the fact that more than 97 per cent of the NEPAD budget is donor-funded, making it practically impossible for NEPAD to carry out projects without adhering to the usual over-controlling, and sometimes ludicrous, demands and specifications set out by the donor. The adage of 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' applies in this scenario, as most donor agencies have their own objectives and aims, which are not always to the good of the continent and its people.

During the 2013 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, African finance ministers came up with a plan to finance NEPAD and development projects by taxing every airline ticket to the continent at least US\$10. Considering that more than 30 million people visit the continent every year, the tax would have been a ready source of reliable and steady funding for Africa's developmental projects. The plan was nipped in the bud by some African tourism ministers, who argued that it would reduce the number of tourists in their countries, considering that a major share of FDI is from tourist spending. The African Development Bank is also a donor-funded agency, its main objectives being to facilitate the procurement of funding for major projects on the African continent. Africans are, therefore, their own worst enemy when it comes to seeking ways in which development projects could be funded.

At the 2012 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, African leaders stated that 'the AU should be provided with adequate and predictable resources, to enable it to fund its programmes, thus reducing the dependency on external resources in this regard'. The summit also approved in principle a report submitted by the High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the AU. It requested that the Commission submit to the Conference of Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning, for their urgent consideration, concrete proposals on financing and modes of implementation, including exploring increased assessed contributions by Member States.

Compounding an already dire situation is Africa's lack of technological and human capacity to effectively carry out development projects of the continent. The issue of the 'brain drain' is critical, as most Africans who went to study abroad on African government scholarships have decided to remain abroad, while those who do return find it difficult to fit into African societies as well as to find work suited to their qualification and

pay demands. Therefore, most return to the West, where they are offered lucrative contracts by multinational corporations. For example, there are more Nigerian doctors in New York State than in the whole of Nigeria. This is a problem African leaders need to correct. It is not just about the pay: some of these doctors have been heard discussing the working conditions in African countries. The idea is to allow them to work on the continent for a few months every year, while maintaining their permanent jobs in the West.

The Corruption Perception Index of 2012 paints a bleak picture of African countries, particularly those from the Central Africa subregion. Transparency International believes corruption destroys lives and communities, and undermines countries and institutions.³⁶ Because most investment budget in developing countries eventually ends up in private pockets, major infrastructure projects are not contemplated; in areas where the budget is allocated, it ends up in private individuals' bank accounts.

Though many have questioned the concept of corruption, especially in an African context, there is a strong feeling amongst the African citizenry that unless proper measures are taken, corruption could reduce any economic and political gains Africa has made since independence. It is reported that Sani Abacha embezzled more than US\$10 billion in less than five years in office. Subsequent Nigerian administrations have been struggling to repatriate this wealth to Nigeria. In the Central Africa subregion, ill-gotten gains have been the subject of great debate amongst NGOs and policymakers, with several French NGOs accusing leaders in the subregion of stashing their country's wealth in France. Though a systematic study has not been carried out to determine the exact amount embezzled by these leaders, conservative figures indicate it is more than US\$25 billion.

In the last decade, about 12 African countries experienced a form of conflict or were recovering from it. Whether these conflicts are resource-based, ethnic, religious or post-election violence, the bottom line is that they eat deep into the meagre resources of several African countries. The destruction of physical infrastructure and effects on the morale of the people are enormous. In some cases, such as what happened in Rwanda in 1994, the scars are profound and will take generations to erase.

When conflict is considered together with the scourge of disease, Africa stands to lose on the development index. Communicable diseases and some treatable diseases have been a major drain on the resources of developing countries. A large portion of the budget of these countries is dedicated to procuring medicines and to preventative measures to keep the population healthy. A healthy population would certainly contribute to the productive sector of the economy and, as such, contribute to raising the country's living standard.

Because most countries on the continent are poor, they tend to be inward-looking, negating some of the important recommendations of the LPA, which call for inter-regional trade and for subregional organisations to be the building blocks on which the eventual unity of the continent will be anchored. Unlike in Europe, where iron and steel brought the European continent together, Africa lacks those pull factors. Moreover, Africa lacks a credible leadership capable of championing the cause and course of integration on the continent.

CONCLUSION TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN AFRICA

Africa has followed a long and tortuous route to attaining a sustained developmental trajectory. This route has been signposted with important developmental concepts that have either been ignored or had their promoters unscrupulously removed from the scene. The consensus on the MDGs among governments and civil society organisations is a clear indication of a shift in development thinking, thus necessitating a change in direction as it is obvious that most countries will not meet these goals at the time of writing.

The post-2015 agenda needs to take cognisance of the specific realities of individual countries. One US dollar would, in some African countries, sustain a family for a day; in others, it would be enough to buy a loaf of bread, if bread is available. The one-size-fits-all developmental concept needs careful reconsideration in view of these country-specific realities. What Africa needs right now is what Lesay calls the post-Washington consensus developmental agenda, which departs from the neoliberal orthodoxy. Lesay maintains that a sustained economic development model should embrace more actors acting in concert in developmental efforts.³⁷

This form of broader engagement in the development thinking is what many have termed the 'developmental state' concept of development. The concept takes into account the health, education, environmental protection and citizens' participation in the democratic processes of a country.³⁸ Thus, government participation in the development process is recognised and encouraged.

In this respect, the role played by the governments of Asian countries in their economic miracle is worth recognising. The government of South Korea was able to challenge the privatisation advice of major financial institutions by creating one of the most efficient steel plants in the world.³⁹ By ignoring the recommendations of the WB and the IMF, the Asian 'tigers' were able to engage with the way industrial policies were formulated, thereby intervening in trade, regulating financial markets and investing in human capital.

Stiglitz suggests that in order to build a vibrant developmental economy, states should concentrate on the fundamentals, which include economic policies, health, education, roads, law and the environment, leaving some of the major projects to be championed by the private sector, with government contributing to a public-private partnership in developmental endeavours.⁴⁰

The developmental state phenomenon is all the more appealing in view of the limitations of the neoliberal orthodoxy. The collapse of major financial and industrial companies in the US in 2008 and the subsequent government bail-out of these companies makes the case for the developmental state convincing. Within the developmental state scheme of things, foreign aid and donor money should be channelled via dedicated government programmes to ensure that spending is controlled and that the disbursement of any money is preceded by a meticulous project proposal, with clear guidelines on methodology, the various implementation phases and the expected outputs.

In order for such developmental thinking to take root, the democratic processes should be respected and citizens' participation in the electoral process encouraged. Moreover, a continent-wide approach should not be encouraged; instead, individual countries should be given the necessary support in subscribing to this thinking.

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Global Politics of Knowledge Production and the African Development Trajectory

The Imperative of Epistemic Disobedience

Tendayi Sithole, Samuel Oloruntoba and Akhona Nkekena

INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to reconceptualise Africa in the realm of knowledge production and to problematise the trajectory of development on the continent. In other words, it interrogates the intricate link between the global politics of knowledge production and the persistent problem of underdevelopment in Africa. The notion of the global is held up for scrutiny, which proceeds from the basis that it is nothing but a façade and the provincialisation of Euro-North America. It is in the context of this geopolitical configuration, one which denies or, at best, rationalises away the existence of knowledge production in Africa, that this chapter makes its main arguments.

Linked to the epistemic violence which denies Africa any form of subjectivity is the illusion of a ‘common history’, one according to which African knowledge production should be subsumed in a monolithic universalism such that there is nothing particular about it. This creates the condition in which African subjectivity is actually a construct of ‘African-outside-Africa’, the very form that amounts to coloniality of knowledge. African knowledges are inferiorised and often, in order to be considered as legitimate, they must derive from thought systems from Euro-North America and not from Africa.

For instance, even though there are archives in the North that speak correctly to African conditions, some of the theories which have been used to explain the socioeconomic and historical conditions in Africa are bereft of local experiences and accurate interpretation of the continent’s history. In this regard, anthropologists, philosophers and novelists, such as Hegel, Kant and Conrad, who claimed that Africa had no history before colonial intrusion, presented arguments that deviated from the reality.

The necessity of shifting the geography of reason to counter such ahistorical and racist opinions is as urgent as ever. However, it cannot

be realised without a political commitment to elevate the status of Africa through knowledge production that incorporates indigenous knowledges.

THE GLOBAL WHOSE KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IS IT ANYWAY?

It is pertinent to note that there is no 'global knowledge', as there is no such thing as the 'global' if that is said to pertain to the entire world. What constitutes the 'global' is often actually the locality of the Euro-North American empire. An idea that relates to the whole world, with all its diversity, cannot be reductive or homogenising but should incorporate a collection of different perspectives of the world. This means that the notion of the 'global' is frequently a deception in that it excludes other parts of the world. Unfortunately, when the conception of knowledge is attached to it to suggest some form of 'global knowledge', the notion is particularly deceptive as it is often wrapped as a gift, under the spell of a deceptive term called the 'universal'. The configuration of the world is said to be 'universal' under the auspices of 'global knowledge', the very meaning of which suggests the knowledge is singular rather than plural; furthermore, if it is constructed as superior, then everything that has to do with knowledge production is presumed to gravitate towards it.

There is a tendency towards conformity, in terms of which the global south is moving under pressure in an attempt to catch up with modernisation and globalisation. Africa, too, as part of the global South, has been caught up by the spell of universalism, and 'catching up' has been declared a matter of political, social and economic urgency. This drive to conformity is fuelled by the need to appear to belong, to demonstrate adherence to a standard, or ascension to a pedestal of success, determined by the Euro-American forces of domination and hegemony. The aspiration to mimic the Euro-North American episteme is reactionary and, at the same time, psychologically fatal. It is reactionary to the extent that Africans, whose essence of being has been repeatedly denied, abused, usurped and reconditioned, are under duress to prove that they can aspire to and achieve a level of development that has been set as the universal standard. However, in pursuing this ideal, the continent's political leaders, as well as elements of the intelligentsia, find themselves caught in a web in which they must validate notions that cast doubt upon, or entirely deny, their ability to reflect as thinking beings on the ends and needs of their people.

This psychological aspect of conformity relates to what Fanon and Memmi call the problem of the colonised.^{1,2} According to Maspero, the problem involves an identity crisis – that is, a situation that was orchestrated

by the systemic violence, deprivation, intimidation and, of late, subtle manipulation of the same powers that deny the being of the African.³ Here, conformism arises from a feeling of being incapable of doing anything unless it has the approval and support of so-called partners in development. Adedeji shows how futile it is for African leaders to adopt this infantile way of thinking when he warns that those forces to which they look for support and development are in Africa only to continue their plunder, exploitation and expropriation in a different guise: imagining that these powers genuinely support attempts at meaningful development on the continent reveals ignorance of the racist philosophies that informed the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.⁴

Grosfoguel argues that knowledge production in the Euro-North American hegemonic formation constitutes a 'point zero', an ultimate, non-negotiable so-called 'truth'.⁵ It assumes the character of a 'god's-eye-view', and functions as a form of power and control in the modern world. It is a historical discourse that prioritises Western knowledge and disregards knowledges from other parts of the world, particularly Africa. That is to say, alternative ways of working towards knowledge, and which could indeed create new forms of knowledge, are discounted. This explains the hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that have informed Western philosophy and sciences in the modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world system, a system which for the past 500 years has assumed a universalistic, neutral, point of view.⁶

As such, African knowledge production is put in a compromising situation which necessitates that it must 'catch up' with the Euro-North America episteme, doing so by adopting epistemological frameworks drawn from the latter in order for it to become more Euro-North America. However, the attempt to catch up with the so-called global is proving impossible. The impossibility is likened by Mkandawire to running while others walk.⁷ This is so precisely because Africa is rendered marginal, if not non-existent, in the global politics of knowledge production. The complexities around knowledge production in Africa can be seen in how the curricula of African universities are designed. Although the tenets of university education demand that the knowledge imparted should incorporate knowledges from other parts of the world, the situation becomes problematic (as in the case of Africa) when the knowledge is centred not on the continent's sociohistorical experience but that of Euro-North America.

What is at issue, then, is that Africa must produce its own knowledge, and for this to happen, there is a need for epistemic disobedience. As matters stand in the so-called global configuration of knowledge, the intent is to continue to develop Europe and North America at the expense of Africa and the global south at large. We return to this point later when we analyse the fault lines of the global politics of knowledge in terms of the concept of

coloniality/modernisation. The conception of the global is, in fact, a Euro-North American phenomenon, but one constituted in a dialectical relation with the alterity of the 'Other'. The occlusion of the 'Other' leads the major contemporary thinkers of the 'centre' into a Euro-North American fallacy in their understanding of modernity. It goes without saying that the configuration of global knowledge production is provincial in its essence: thus, its guise of universal applicability should be exposed.⁸

Emphasising Mignolo's argument and drawing from Alcoff, we argue for a newly revised and reformulated language of liberation where knowledges of all kinds are produced. Alcoff refers to this as an epistemology for the next revolution.⁹ Investigation of the political nature of knowledge production must include how authority and authoritativeness are repudiated and how the production of theory mirrors the production of social inequity, with the latter understood as something which is masked by so-called global knowledge production and its claim to scientific merit, objectivity and neutrality. In short, while knowledge production is projected as being apolitical, it is in actuality intensely political.

Euro-North American knowledge production is informed by power structures that operate through the universalisation of this knowledge. In their arguments, Grosfoguel and Mignolo engage with the global politics of knowledge production by using the global power structure as a framework to critically analyse the positionality of the knowledge that Africans produce in Africa to advance the development of the continent.^{10, 11} Given that the global politics of knowledge situates Euro-North American knowledge at the centre and as the 'objective' knowledge that disregards all other knowledges, it is important to understand this positionality in the context of Africa and African development.

A first step in this regard is to provide a critical definition of what positionality is and what it entails. Anyidoho defines it as something that refers to the identities of the researcher in relation to the researched.¹² She corroborates Walsh's definition of positionality, and argues that positionality refers to contextualised and relational locations such as nationality, ethnicity, race, class, education, religion, family affiliation, ideological leanings, epistemological perspectives and philosophical orientations.¹³ Positionality is 'contextualised' because it takes account of the circumstances in which knowledge is produced, and 'relational' because it concerns both the subjectivity of the researcher and the subjectivities of others. Positionality is an important concept for understanding global politics since it has implications for the nature of the knowledge produced and how it is received; for example, knowledges coming from certain parts of the world are deemed just and superior, whereas others are regarded as unscientific and inferior.

ON EPISTEMIC VIOLENCE

Epistemic violence is fraught with the implications of the projection of Euro-North America epistemology as global and universal. This violence naturalises the myth of Western supremacy over the rest of the world, supremacy which is naturalised through questioning the humanity of Africans.¹⁴ The effect of such condescension is to make the notion of Euro-North American superiority so ordinary and taken for granted that it seems natural to regard those outside this geographical locale as inferior. The Euro-North American global structure is informed by binarism and hierarchisation which keep the imbalances of power and the colonial legacy intact. These imbalances are asymmetrical power relations, and the binaries are such that the power structures still maintain the superiority and inferiority complexes inaugurated by colonialism. These are the very forms of epistemic violence that exclude, marginalise, demonise and even eliminate other epistemes that diverge from their idea of modernity.¹⁵

Gayatri Spivak, who has had a great impact on cultural studies, critical theory and colonial discourse analysis, calls this fault line the 'worlding of the West as world'.¹⁶ She argues that this naturalisation occurs through a disavowal of the history of imperialism and the unequal balance of power between the 'First' and 'Third' Worlds. The outcome is a discourse of modernisation in which colonialism is either ignored or placed securely in the past, such that we think it is over and does not affect – and has not affected – the construction of the present situation.¹⁷

Euro-North American domination of knowledge production constitutes epistemic violence because it projects a supposedly inclusive vision of a global 'common history', whereas in actuality it erases the subjectivities of others by predicating Euro-North American subjectivity as the beginning of all things and hence the basis of history. By contrast, the positionality for which this chapter advocates, is that of decolonial subjectivity. In this conception, African subjectivity is privileged as the point of entry for ensuring that knowledge production is grounded in African existential experience. Without having to debunk the history that provides the genealogy of the universalisation of knowledge – right from slavery, colonialism, mercantilism and imperialism – what is argued here is a trace of genealogy of knowledge from the concept of coloniality, an outcome of the historical hardships of Africa which still plagues Africa even today. This concept of coloniality has opened up the possibility of reconstructing and reinstating silenced histories, repressed subjectivities, inferiorised knowledges and languages. The notion of a 'common history', however, does not challenge understandings of modernity and the structures underpinning it, structures which are sustained by coloniality.

The development of Africa therefore remains a complex trajectory given the context of global politics of knowledge with which it uses its context to 'advance' its development. This means the development trajectory of Africa operates under a 'spectre of irrelevance', as Mkandawire puts it.¹⁸ The progress Africa has made generally as far as development is concerned does indeed leave nothing to be desired. The minimal desire is in the context of how Mkandawire identifies the senses of looking at development. He identifies three ways of looking at development:

- as a vision, description or measure of the state of being of a desirable society;
- as a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods; and
- as consisting of deliberate efforts aimed at improvement and made by various agencies, including governments, and organisations and social movements.¹⁹

Mkandawire is scathingly critical of development, or 'catching up', as a repressive metanarrative that privileges certain forms of knowledge while denigrating local ones. Similarly, Escobar argues that development has been a disaster: instead of bringing about the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development has produced its opposite – massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, and untold exploitation and oppression.²⁰

This is particularly relevant to Africa in view of aid conditionality and structural adjustment programmes. The most astute criticism of developmentalism, which can be found in Mkandawire,²¹ focuses on the Truman version of development and maintains that, in so-called development efforts, Euro-North America is entrusted with the task of transforming Africa into its own image; given the differences in historical conditions and social relations of production, it is an exercise in futility to attempt to shape development experience in Africa into the mould of what obtains in Europe. It is, in other words, imperative to give due consideration to the African context, especially with regard to the important issue of knowledge production.

AFRICA-OUTSIDE-AFRICA THE COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is always situation- and context-specific. Grosfoguel articulates the notion of the locus of enunciation.²² According to him, what matters in terms of the locus of enunciation is the enunciation, not the enunciated

– that is, the African subject, who is usually frozen as the object rather than the subject of knowledge. The coloniality of knowledge is so pervasive that to think outside it is something fundamentally opposed to what the global order conceives as normalcy. Therefore, *Africa-outside-Africa* is a ‘normalcy’ to be expelled, and doing so will require the adoption of new ways of thinking and doing by African subjects.²³

The vantage-point of African subjectivities is enunciated to understand multiple forces of oppression which are militating against African’s knowledge production. For this to be understood properly, it is important to note that the locus of enunciation of African subjectivities can be problematic if the subject is geographically located in Africa, but engages Africa from the loci of the Euro-North American subjectivity. This strengthens the coloniality of knowledge, in that it often reinforces the multiple forces of oppression bearing upon Africa. Where ‘theory [is] still located in the North while the subject [or object] [is] located in the South’, the situation does not amount to ‘thinking for the African’.²⁴

The locus of enunciation, as Walsh observes, is about thinking and speaking from geopolitical and historical locations.²⁵ This affirms the importance of African subjectivity as a mode of self-understanding. This is informed by colonial difference, which guides the reflection and offers a lens through which to view the world. Mignolo elaborates on the point as follows:

The enunciator doesn’t name an existing entity but invents it. The enunciation needs an enunciator (agent), an institution, for not everyone can invent the anthropos, but to impose the anthropos as the other in the collective imaginary, it is necessary to be in a position to manage the discourse (verbal, visual, sound) by which you name and describe an entity (the anthropos or the other) and succeed in making believe that it exists.²⁶

Grosfoguel also adds that,

[t]he fact that one is socially located on the oppressed side of power relations does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from the subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world system consists in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the one in the dominant position. Subaltern epistemic perspective[s] are knowledge[s] coming from below that produce a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved.²⁷

This clearly demonstrates the fact that there is no such thing as objectivity, the Euro-North American myth according to which knowledge is divorced

from a detached subject who aims to gain truthful knowledge. Everything is situational and embedded, and the locus of enunciation determines on which side of the global system or formation the knowledge is allied. The coloniality of knowledge should thus be understood geopolitically. According to Mignolo, it 'rests in the depositor, warrantor, creator and distributor of universal knowledge'.²⁸ The sole purpose of modernity is to serve the interests of the empire. As Walsh states, the sites of knowledge which are necessary for other regimes of truth are repressed, marginalised, disciplined and destroyed.²⁹ What should be militated against is the monolithic conception of truth. It is a conception according to which truth is universal and tied to Euro-North American epistemic practices: these are held to be absolute, while epistemic practices falling outside this conception of truth are disregarded as inferior.

The coloniality of knowledge hence creates mechanistic narratives which seek to dominate over and discard other subjectivities that differ from its own. As Walsh points out,

[t]o speak of the geopolitics of knowledge and geopolitical locations of critical thought is to recogni[s]e the persistence of a Western hegemony, that positions Eurocentric thought as 'universal', while localising other forms of thought as at best folklore.³⁰

Santos submits that knowledge is not conceived in abstractions but in practices and interventions – that is, knowledge is a political project.³¹ Knowledge is not created, produced and socialised for its own sake but to serve particular ends; in the political project of modernity, this is to organise the world and to ratify the marginalisation of Africa in the realm of knowledge production, thereby producing the very antithesis of development.

As Santos further contends, knowledge is '[e]mbedded in different Western and non-Western cultures'.³² By privileging knowledge from the Euro-North American episteme while excluding knowledges from the many other worlds, the coloniality of knowledge affirms the subjectivity of Africa-outside-Africa. This creates a condition in which those who are on the periphery are meant to be entirely dependent for knowledge on those who are in Euro-North America. The peripheries are not allowed to construct knowledges themselves but must imbibe Euro-North American knowledge. It is obvious, therefore, that having knowledge production with its posture of the global and development trajectory of Africa is something that is caught in the cul-de-sac in that they are alien to Africa and coloniality will not allow Africa to take a detour in its own terms, rather than those dictated by the whims of coloniality.

In other words, knowledge produced in Africa to further the development aspirations of the continent will be subverted and discountenanced. The position of being in Africa-outside-Africa thus works to the advantage of Euro-North America: the position leads to an inferiorisation of Africa, which in turn makes it necessary and desirable for Africa to look to the outside for a supposedly reliable route to development.

A corollary to this argument is what Adebayo Adedeji, the former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, calls the development merchant system, under which the Western powers, working in concert with multilateral institutions like the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund, devised a development system that they expect African countries to follow.^{33, 34} As Adedeji argues, the development merchant system has frustrated Africa's efforts to chart an endogenous path of development.

AFRICA-WITHIN-AFRICA SHIFTING THE GEOGRAPHY OF REASON

It is here that the locus of enunciation matters – that is, thinking from where the subject is located.³⁵ A shift in the geography of reason is necessary as it underscores the importance of the locus of enunciation. The geography of reason affirms that 'the location of terrain has shifted, that the most recent systematic mutations might suggest new directions of the situated politics of knowledge making'. The shift of the geography of reason is the positionality of Africa-within-Africa, which essentially means that the standpoint is Africa. Indeed, Africa's position should be examined in terms of the locus of enunciation of Africa, not that of the empire – that is, Euro-North American global imperial designs. These imperial designs are the constitutive parts of modernity, which in turn is the constitutive part of coloniality.

Africa is an ex-colonised zone, and the zone inhabited by the African subject therefore should not be understood merely as an object of study but as a geopolitical location with its forms of knowledge and regimes of truth. Such coexistence does not imply being integrated in globally designed systems, the very sites of epistemic violence and racism; it implies that Africa coexists in its own right. In other words, Africa should be understood not as a region but an epistemic space. It is in these epistemic spaces that counter-hegemonic discourses exist, discourses which question the very basis of modernity and its concealment of its darker side. Within these spaces, the psyche and worldview are grounded in Africa first and foremost – and, in particular, on Africa as something thought not from the outside but from within. But knowledge production and the development trajectory

in Africa have been experimented upon, only to be disrupted internally or externally.

In their foundational, and combative, phases, the universities of Dar es Salaam and Makerere offered examples of projects that engaged with the notion of Africa as a locus of enunciation and geography of reason in order to address a plethora of challenges. However, the intellectual purity and potential of these sites of epistemic revolt for advancing knowledge production in Africa was interrupted by political elites, who demanded that universities become the stooges of government and propagate its developmental plans. This led to the destruction of the universities as the infrastructure of knowledge production and as centres of development.³⁶ Nevertheless, it is from these two universities, among many others, that such intellectual luminaries as Walter Rodney, Mahmood Mamdani, Archie Mafeje, John Saul, Jacques Depelchin and Issa Shivji emerged.³⁷

The series of difficulties that Dar es Salaam and Makerere University faced meant that knowledge production was under siege. The assault from the state, along with pressure from the WB for the commodification of education, made the universities divert from their foundational focus.³⁸ The radicalised nature of thought at these institutional sites had given new impetus to the production of knowledge and, of course, to an endogenous development path motivated by the betterment of Africa and the healing of wounds inflicted by colonialism. Social science in particular was fraught with debates that stood to push the frontiers of thought and which were informed by epistemology, radical politics and the search for context-specific knowledge production.

It was against the backdrop of such debate that the Council for the Development of Social Sciences in Africa (CODESRIA) – today still a force in Africanist thought – emerged within this shift in the geography of reason to privilege Africanist scholarship, notably so through the establishment of its journal *Africa Development*. This bears eloquent testimony to the introduction of a new school of thought, one driven by African intellectuals concerned about the continent's plight and seeking to combat the imposition of colonial epistemology.

The shift of the geography of reason entails that knowledge production is not undertaken for its own sake but is grounded in the existential conditions of society. This means that knowledge production located in the geography of reason of Africa is intrinsically linked to the continent's development trajectory. Furthermore, understanding Africa-within-Africa by means of causing a shift in the geography of reason implies that African knowledge production should not just be a name but involve commitment to, and practice of, the struggle to privilege Africa.

ON EPISTEMIC DISOBEDIENCE

To take a position within the realm of global knowledge production is only deemed acceptable if it is not a challenge to its hegemonic formation and naturalisation. As argued earlier, however, there is no such thing as the global, if its logic of operation is taken to revolve around the Euro-North American formation to the exclusion of other worlds: in other words, the notion of the universal is the façade for the localism of the global. For the global to be accepted, though, it must not only serve the interests of the majority rather than the few – it must not deny the local either.

In view of the failure of Euro-North American epistemology to facilitate socioeconomic and political development in Africa, it becomes imperative for Africa to engage in what Mignolo refers to as epistemic disobedience. This is a negation of the Euro-American episteme and the idea of the universal that privileges the Euro-North American geography of reason. Epistemic disobedience is rooted in ‘the dense history of planetary decolonial thinking’.³⁹ As Comaroff and Comaroff elaborate:

In the faux egalitarianism of these neoliberal times, it is easy to become mired in trivial arguments over whether ‘meta-narratives of modernity’, or Theory, removes from ‘others’ the capacity to present themselves or to determine their own futures. All this while the masters of the market, and powerful political pragmatists, fashion new modes of extraction and explanation.⁴⁰

Epistemic disobedience is not disobedience for its own sake but the emergence of African subjectivity in the realm of knowledge production and the development of strategies and discourses cognisant of African agency. Epistemic disobedience seeks to create an intellectual environment where African scholars have the latitude to criticise, choose, (re)define, create, change and exchange ideas as to what constitute appropriate and feasible development strategies for the continent. These are essential in the realm of knowledge production and development as they will not only foster intellectual confidence and pride, but lay the foundation for reflection and self-criticism.

Epistemic disobedience is unavoidable, given the complexity of the African sociohistorical experience in which there are multiple subjectivities that differ even while they have the interests of Africa at heart. This is not to be confused, of course, with the existence of decadent subjectivities which are obsessed with the idea of the global while being silent on the possibilities of Africa having its own modes of knowledge production and a trajectory of development that does not border on maldevelopment. In their view, everything from the global should be followed, and Africa should move to the

global. They say nothing about the global moving to Africa, and take the sociohistorical conditions of Euro-North American locations as applicable to Africa, believing that everything Africa does should be in line with these conditions. From their warped perspective, Africa does not exist and cannot emerge. This is symptomatic of an absence of imagination that in no way assists Africans in facilitating knowledge production and development in Africa.

Essentially, Africa is expected to comprise itself of decadent subjectivities and, on that basis, submit to the whims of the global configuration. However, epistemic disobedience opens up a terrain of African subjectivities that argue for the progress, and not the regress, of Africa. This epistemic revolt, stemming from African subjectivities, is necessary and it is the insurrectionary standpoint that matters. Such a standpoint is predicated on what Ndlovu-Gatsheni calls the six core concerns of African subjectivity: African self-rule, self-regeneration, self-definition, self-understanding, self-knowing and self-articulation.⁴¹ For this to come into being, epistemic disobedience should assume the form of a politics of necessity.

HORIZON AND FUTURES IS ANOTHER AFRICA POSSIBLE?

The challenges facing the continent are too numerous to be addressed by a fixed solution. The mere fact that Africa has been monolithised as something reducible to an entity has enabled the Euro-North American hegemon to see itself as the only paragon of virtue, with the future of Africa depending on it. In this scheme of things, Africa is not allowed to develop on its own terms, and the Africa that is possible is still Africa as it is – Africa in the clutches of Euro-North American dictates. The solutions and prescriptions that are offered are not ones embedded in African subjectivities but those of Euro-North America. Another Africa, one fundamentally different from how it is currently understood, is not mentioned, except to say that the current condition of the continent needs to be fixed.

Is it not important to imagine another Africa? This would be an affirmative project carrying great optimism. However, the space to imagine and recreate another Africa is highly limited in the context of the subsisting neo-colonial reality. The project of recreating another Africa must be rooted in what Maldonado-Torres refers to as ‘the decolonial attitude’, one which,

demands responsibility and the willingness to take [into account the] many perspectives and points of views of those whose very existence is questioned and produced as dispensable and insignificant.⁴²

This means African subjectivity needs to decolonise itself and not be clouded by either pessimism or naïve optimism predicated on the expectation that Africa will be rescued externally. Thus, it is essential to state that '[t]he decolonial attitude is thus a simultaneously ethical, theoretical, and political form of consciousness'.⁴³ Even though the future seems impossible for Africa, Africa's horizon and futures are indeed possible. These possibilities arise from the need to break the mould of coloniality and to chart the terrain of decoloniality – the need, that is, for the unmaking of the world as it is in order to make a world that many other worlds can inhabit.^{44, 45}

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the influence of the hegemony of Euro-North American epistemic systems on knowledge production and development strategies in Africa. It was argued that Euro-North American power has denied Africa its capacity to generate indigenous knowledge as well as development strategies. Operating within asymmetric relations of power, the Euro-North American episteme has positioned itself as the centre of knowledge with a monopoly over what constitutes acceptable knowledge for development in particular and existence in general. Euro-American global imperial design is informed by binarisms and hierarchisation that keep the imbalances of power and the colonial legacy intact. These are the forms of epistemic violence that exclude, marginalise, demonise and even eliminate other epistemes that diverge from what is unilaterally construed as modernity.⁴⁶

In countering this ahistorical notion, it was argued that Africa must engage in epistemic disobedience. Such disobedience will help to allow sufficient time for the development of endogenous knowledge that privileges Africa's archives, ideas, histories and methods in knowledge production and development.

That being said, there have been many calls for African knowledge production and development. However, there is no way that African subjectivities can emerge if Africa is not grounded within itself and armed with a decolonial attitude: suffice it to say that this is the positionality which should always be maintained. Liberation and total freedom in form and substance, rather than rhetorical emancipation, should be at the heart of Africa's knowledge production and the constitutive basis of the search for inclusive development.⁴⁷

Another world is possible for Africa, one where many other worlds fit: Africa is not about 'the future' anymore but futures, plural, where the horizon is not a mirage but a reality. It is within this context that Africa's developmental aspirations can be realised for Africa, in Africa.

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Science, Technology and Empowerment

A Pan-African Approach

John Trimble

INTRODUCTION

Much has been said about the failure of African states, African leadership and plans to develop Africa. These failures are a direct result of imperialist aggression and neo-colonial cooperation. This trend of failures will only end when the Pan-African movement takes charge and builds a force to unify Africa under scientific socialism. To accomplish this, a roadmap for Pan-Africanism is needed. A roadmap for the future must find its starting point in the past that best exemplifies the theory and practice of Pan-Africanism. This roadmap construction effort must pick up the banners of the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945 and the All African People's Conference held in Ghana in 1958.

These two events set the tone for the major contributions to Pan-Africanism made by Amilcar Cabral, Walter Rodney, George Padmore, C. L. R. James, W. E. B. Du Bois, Robert Sobukwe, Thomas Sankara and Presidents Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure. They all realised that socialism was integral to the future of Africa. Also, each of them realised that revolutionary political parties are the necessary vehicles for Africa's transformation into a unified socialist nation. Strong revolutionary mass-based political parties, with a vision that extends beyond country borders, are needed to bring Pan-Africanism to fruition.

Pan-Africanism, as an objective, is defined as the total liberation, unification and development of Africa under scientific socialism. As Kwame Nkrumah pointed out in the final sentence of the concluding chapter of *Class struggle in Africa*, Pan-Africanism will 'advance the triumph of the international socialist revolution, and the onward progress towards world communism, under which every society is ordered on the principle of – from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'.¹

The revolutionary African intelligentsia must develop a programme and strategy of political activism to advance the objective of Pan-Africanism. They must convince the masses of the correctness of this strategy and, with the support of workers and communities, organise mass support for these programmes and strategies. As part of the African intelligentsia, the author attempts to address the need for such a programme and strategy in this study.

Political activism is one category of material reality. The work done on African Liberation Day (ALD), or organising to cancel International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt as a down-payment on reparations, is both an act of culture and a case of political activism. Work done to build the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS) to isolate Israel and seek to end United States (US) drone attacks on innocent people are also activism efforts. Ideological development and political consciousness are of an immaterial nature and therefore belong to a different category than political activism. The application of categorial conversion to the examination of political activism, such as ALD, demonstrates how consciousness and ideological gains arise from revolutionary activism.²

An appreciation of these immaterial gains should further individual and collective commitment to political activism. There has been insufficient effort to link popular culture and ideological development to political activism in a roadmap capable of mobilising the people of Africa. There has also been insufficient effort to link technological developments with activism. The exponential growth in information and knowledge in the twenty-first century presents a wide range of technological possibilities. The premise of this study is that the application of a scientific methodology to the study of the current milieu will assist in developing and justifying a comprehensive roadmap for mobilising Africans for Pan-Africanism.

BACKGROUND

In any movement, both theory and practice must be constantly assessed and refined in an effort to use science to advance the theory needed to direct the social forces of the revolution and to advocate for the development of particular techniques and technologies. To advance the Pan-African movement, the dialectic between theory and practice is designed to address the scientific development and implementation of an activist strategy, as well as a coherent approach to advocating the study, development and application of technology. There is a concern that the insufficient level of political activism in the Pan-African movement is due to the low level of scientific analysis in developing strategy and the low level of technology innovation in long-range thinking.

These concerns arise from two experiences. First, within the Pan-African movement some contest the use of historical materialism to clarify an understanding of the contentious nature of capitalism and the antagonistic relationship between all capitalist forces and the workers, peasants and their communities. The failure by many to understand the primacy of class struggle has led to the failure to recognise the need for the total destruction of capitalism and to prepare actively for the socialist process that will lead to world communism.

This contestation within the broader Pan-African movement has led to intellectual confusion, as spokespersons for civic and community formations fail to understand the need for a revolutionary political party. At a minimum, a political party is needed to seize state power. Practically, a continental, if not a global, political party is needed to bring Africa together and fight off imperialism and neo-colonialism. These spokespersons have adopted positions that abandon much of North Africa, instead of calling on forces to support Palestinians and others in the struggle against the Zionist state of Israel.

These same intellectuals have rejected both socialism and communism. Some claim that capitalism can be adapted to build Africa. Most of these intellectuals call for an alternative to both capitalism and socialism. After more than 40 years, none has provided an analysis of why socialism/communism will not work and what this other path should be. They have an intellectual obligation to the people to be clear and precise on this alternative. This study attempts to use scientific methodology to define a socialist/communist agenda of activism that is unique to the African milieu. It hopes to serve as an example to encourage other intellectuals (even those who reject socialism) to present science-based activism strategies designed to transform society.

The second experience is dealing with the role of technology and techniques in advancing revolution in general and the Pan-African movement in particular. Appropriate technology is technology that will empower people. This includes physical technologies, as well as organisational techniques and practices. Appropriate technology promotes the utilisation of local resources, as well as skills development in local communities. This is important in empowering a broader population. Empowerment must address the basic needs of people first, but it must also constantly advance quality of life. Capitalist world domination directly affects the determination of resources allocated to technology and science. In particular, capitalism uses its financial dominance to channel resources to technology that maintains and increases the grip that a small minority has on world resources.

It is essential that intellectuals use their access to university resources to play a revolutionary role in educating not only students, but communities

about the potential that techniques and technologies offer to empower people, improve the lives of the most oppressed and reverse the trend of the increasing gap between the wealthy one per cent and the global masses.

In order to take full advantage of both these experiences, historical materialism and categorial conversion must be applied to the social, economic and political realities of Africans in Africa and in the diaspora. The focus must include a careful scientific examination of how Africa's resources are used and who benefits from them. Extensive research has detailed how the colonial process followed by neo-colonialism has led to the current situation, in which Africa's resources are, in the main, owned and controlled by foreign corporations, capital and individuals.³ There is always a need to update these earlier studies to account for the most recent dynamics, such as neo-liberalism;⁴ this chapter is only a step in this direction. What is unique is the effort to link activism with appropriate technology in a combined agenda.

Technology plays a critical role in resource extraction and conversion. How these technologies are developed, deployed and controlled across Africa are key to productivity and wealth distribution. How Africa prepares its next generation of scientists, engineers, innovators, policy-makers and intellectuals to contest the direction and nature of technological development will play a significant role in Africa's ability to regain control of its resources.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Many claim that, unlike politics and economics, science and technology are neutral. However, this is far from the truth. The knowledge we seek and our efforts to organise this knowledge determine the direction of scientific development. This work requires resources. Science is developed through investigation, experimentation and observation. These efforts require laboratories, equipment, libraries and, critically, human resources. As science advances, more resources are needed to further advance it. The advancement of science requires funding to supply the buildings, equipment and people to organise the advancement. As long as capitalists control global resources, they will insist that the agenda for the advancement of science and technology is organised and funded for their benefit. Therefore, neither science nor technology is neutral.

In this era of the knowledge society, brilliant technologies are having a truly historical impact. These technological advances have led to exponential growth in global trade. As Buckman observes:

A major innovation that ended up radically altering global trade was the development of containerization on ships [...] A byproduct of the fall in shipping costs was the emergence of the global product – which has different parts produced and marketed from a number of countries around the world.⁵

Such technological advances have contributed to a significant increase in labour productivity in all sectors – agriculture, mining, finance, industry and services. A major contributor to this increase in productivity is information and communication technology: computer-based technology has penetrated all sectors. This point was emphasised by Bynjolfsson and McAfee thus:

Now comes the second machine age. Computers and other digital advances are doing for mental power – the ability to use our brains to understand and shape our environments – what the steam engine and its descendants did for muscle power. They're allowing us to blow past previous limitations and taking us into new territory.⁶

The twenty-first century can be considered the Knowledge Age. The billions of connections provided by the Internet have made possible the creation, exchange and manipulation of trillions of pieces of data and information on a daily basis. This will only grow as the Internet of Things connects trillions of devices, ranging from household appliances to industrial sensors.^{7, 8} The advances in computational techniques to process this onslaught of data, information and knowledge will generate new knowledge and insight that will lead to new innovations, processes and organisations.^{9, 10}

APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY

The challenge is to direct technology development so that it benefits the broader population. Appropriate technology is technology that empowers people. It is particularly sensitive to cultural expressions and local resources. It fosters sustainability and ecological balance.^{11, 12}

Innovation is key to identifying and spreading the use of appropriate technology. Some believe that '[c]oming up with an innovation is like growing fruit, and exploiting an innovation is like eating the fruit over time. Another school of thought, though, holds that the true work of innovation is not coming up with something big and new, but instead recombining things that already exist'.¹³ Most innovation is used to advance the interests of those in control of wealth, natural resources, industry and global finances. Technology policies are needed to enforce a more humanistic emphasis regarding technology development and dissemination.

Socially relevant computing is a critical area of appropriate technology. Several projects have promoted computing efforts that emphasise citizen involvement and contribute to a higher quality of life for the powerless and poor. Trimble highlights workshops and curriculum development efforts, that define and promote socially relevant computing.¹⁴ One emphasis on socially relevant computing is computing that attracts the interest of students. However, the more prominent emphasis is on computing that serves the community.

Some efforts have focused on the use of WIMAX technology, cloud computing, data analytics and the spread of the Internet of Things as sources of computing breakthroughs that contribute to socially relevant computing. Various approaches using computer-based decision support systems have been employed to aid local communities, assist the most disadvantaged and improve the quality of life of the poorest people and communities. Computer-based decision support systems have been in use for several decades. As Liberatore and Nydick explain:

Decision technology is the application of decision-support modelling and computer software to problems in business, government, and other organizations. It is a value-added activity dedicated to improving the quality of the decision-making process. The benefits of decision technology include identifying and valuing potential problem solutions and offering penetrating insight into the problem's structure and interrelationships.¹⁵

With the spread of Internet access and the exponential growth in computational power, the potential of decision support systems has expanded tremendously.

E-GOVERNMENT, E-GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY

E-government is the use of information systems and knowledge management by government agencies and government officials to improve the communications and decision processes in which they are involved. E-governance involves information and knowledge systems that allow citizen involvement in governmental processes. This includes citizens' access and input to government decision-making processes. It also includes electronic access to government services such as social security and passport information.

Satyanarayana explains that in e-government, constituents are seen as passive recipients of information communication technology (ICT) tools and innovation.¹⁶ The focus is the work of government officials and the communication between government entities. In e-governance, ICT is used in systems to ensure wider participation and deeper involvement of

citizens, institutions, non-government organisations and companies in the decision-making process of governance. ICT empowers e-governance to provide iterative communication in real time across vast geographic distances among governance stakeholders. This is not possible in traditional governance processes.

Both e-government and e-governance use a range of decision support systems. This is a particularly important area of research and development because it can facilitate citizen awareness of government operations, increase citizen involvement, improve government accountability and enhance government transparency.

METHODOLOGY

The theoretical tools used in this study are historical materialism and categorial conversion. Historical materialism has its roots in dialectical materialism.¹⁷ Categorial conversion builds on dialectical and historical materialism and originates from the unique experiences of the African revolution.¹⁸

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Historical materialism has been used as a tool to provide political, economic and social analysis of the various modes of production, but has focused on capitalism. This critical framework provides an examination of the complementary and contradictory connection between the productive forces (labour and means of production) and relations of production (technical relations and relations of economic control). Economic control is concerned with the control of the production process and the wealth it generates. The tension between the forces of production and relations of production heightens with an increase in the skills, knowledge and experience of the work-force. This is driven, in large part, by advances in tools, machines, techniques and technologies that compose the means of production. This tension is ultimately controlled by the choice of techniques and technologies.

Previous work used historical materialism to analyse how technological development is directed, on a global scale, to maintain power relations.¹⁹ This current work uses historical materialism to help point the way to changing these power relations by advancing a roadmap of activism. Insight gained through applying historical materialism to recent developments in Africa points to the need to focus on understanding and applying appropriate technology on a continent-wide basis in Africa. Particular attention will be paid to decision support systems as justification for the thesis of this chapter.

CATEGORIAL CONVERSION

Categorical conversion is perhaps the most complex of Kwame Nkrumah's contributions. This theory recognises the primacy of matter as the basic category of reality, but affirms the importance of the derivative categories that emerge from qualitative changes in matter and all material circumstances.²⁰ Categorical conversion is a scientific principle that can be demonstrated through the physical sciences and social sciences. However, the most significant contribution of categorical conversion is through its application to social circumstances in an effort to gain ideological clarity.

Nkrumah's contributions are well documented by a diverse set of scholars. Birmingham points out that Nkrumah was the first African statesman to achieve world recognition.²¹ Nkrumah's secretary, June Milne, has documented many of his contributions in his final years in Ghana and Guinea,²² while Soviet scholars have recognised his application of historical materialism and class analysis.²³ A number of African leaders held Nkrumah in high regard as a philosopher and thinker. As Amilcar Cabral writes in his 'Homage to Kwame Nkrumah':

President Nkrumah, to whom we pay homage, is primarily the strategist of genius in the struggle against classic colonialism. He is the man who created what we might call 'African positivism', to which he himself gave the name positive action.²⁴

Categorical conversion, due to its complexity, is perhaps the least discussed of Nkrumah's contributions.²⁵

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND CLASS ANALYSIS

Engels presents the term 'historical materialism' to designate a worldview of the course of history.²⁶ This view seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggle of these classes against one another.


Every mode of production has a given set of forces as well as unique relations of production. The forces of production have two main categories:

- (i) means of production (tools, machinery, factories, power grids, water systems, communication and transport systems, and so on); and
- (ii) labour power (the people at work and the skills, knowledge and experience they possess).

The relations of production have two major expressions:

- (i) technical relations that facilitate the production process – how people relate, communicate and cooperate to produce during the work experience; and
- (ii) economic relations – who has control over the means of production, labour power and products of production.

Figure 13.1 Tension between forces of production and relations of production



Source: Author

Figure 13.1 shows how the tension between the relations of production and forces of production constantly create an imbalance.

A social group which shares the same relations of production forms a class. Broadly speaking, classes have been divided into exploiting classes and exploited classes. Sekou Toure refers to these two groups as the anti-people's class and the people's class.²⁷ 'Class struggle is a fundamental theme of recorded history. In every non-socialist society there are two main categories of class, the ruling class or classes, and the subject class or classes'.²⁸ To attain a more profound understanding of the contradiction between the forces and the relations of production, one must dig deeper in analysing and defining class groupings in society – historically and currently.

Class analysis requires an examination of the current class divisions, the tension between classes and the impact on one's expression or suppression of humanist, collective and egalitarian tendencies. A continuous assessment of how the forces of production can be directed to shift the relations of production, and to better empower and organise the people most committed to change and the mass of oppressed people, must be a principal goal of class analysis. Cabral notes:

The foregoing and contemporary reality enable us to state that the history of one human group or of mankind goes through at least three stages. In the first, corresponding to a low level of productive forces – of man's mastery over nature – the mode of production is of a rudimentary character; private appropriation of the means of production does not yet exist, there are no classes, nor, consequently, is there class struggle. In the second, when the raising of the level of productive forces leads to private appropriation of the means of production, the mode of production is progressively more complicated; conflicts of interests are provoked within the dynamic socio-economic whole, the eruption of the phenomenon of class and hence of class struggle is possible, as the social expression of the contradiction in the economic field between the mode of production and the private appropriation of the means of production. In the third stage, once a given level of productive forces is reached, the elimination of private appropriation as the means of production is made possible and is carried out; the phenomenon of class, and hence of class struggle, is removed and new and unknown forces in the historical process of the socioeconomic whole are unleashed.²⁹

The world is dominated by the second stage. Private ownership in industry, agriculture, mining, banking and other infrastructure tends to increase disparity in wealth ownership. Banks and other financial institutions have used their wealth in a 'stick and carrot' approach to dominate poorer countries – this is imperialism at work. Nowhere is this manipulation greater than in Africa. A legacy of colonialism is that Africa is divided into more states than any other continent. Another legacy is a structure of economic dependency on former colonial powers and the dominant capitalist power – the US. Africa's division into 54 non-viable states makes imperialist manipulation easier. A well-developed Pan-African strategy is needed to overcome this oppressive situation.

Across the world, poorer countries have sought to use education to improve their situation. A larger educated population could use science and technology to improve a nation through industrialisation and innovation. The most educated, skilled and innovative individuals in poorer countries find that there are many more financially rewarding opportunities outside their country. This has led to a 'brain drain'. A reduction in the number of talented, highly trained workers makes industrial advancement more difficult. Many cross-border workers send money back to their countries of origin. This has increased in recent years, with a larger number of higher paid foreign workers and the spread of electronic fund transfers.

Africa is the fastest growing continent. It is also increasing the number of students at universities at a faster rate than anywhere else. However, job opportunities in Africa for technically trained personnel do not match the

opportunities available to Africans outside their country of birth. This has resulted in a large number of technically skilled Africans relocating to other countries in Africa or moving to the diaspora.

This increased mobility of skilled Africans must be used to further the Pan-African strategy. The skills and experience as well as the financial resources gained from employment outside one's country of birth must be used to assist in Africa's overall development. There is a need for a Pan-African call for skilled Africans to return to Africa. A forceful, organised call of this nature could reverse the brain drain with the return of Africans born in Africa and Africans born outside of Africa who want to contribute to Africa's development. As Mwamwenda points out, the '[b]rain drain can be reversed and combated, as many advocates have articulated. African professionals must be recruited for retention using recruitment incentives such as relocation expenses, loans for housing and for starting businesses'.³⁰

An activism movement that demands continental citizenship for Africans across Africa, as well as all people of African descent in the diaspora, will aid in this process. It will serve to inspire and educate a broader African population about their right to seek opportunity anywhere in Africa. This demand for continental citizenship for Africans will demonstrate to non-African communist movements that Pan-Africanism is at the forefront of moving to internationalism.


APPLYING CATEGORIAL CONVERSION

In an effort to combat idealism, many activists and theorists over-emphasise materialism. While material realities are primary, they are not the only realities. Consciousness and ideology, as categories emergent from experience, are important in waging revolution. Nkrumah recognised this: 'By categorical conversion, I mean such a thing as the emergence of self-consciousness from that which is not self-conscious; such as the emergence of mind from matter, of quality from quantity'.³¹

Many writers and activists have applied dialectical and historical materialism to analysing social reality.³² They are effective tools of analysis. Categorical conversion expands what dialectical and historical materialism have to offer. Both dialectical and historical materialism deal with the quantitative changes that take place in matter and how a leap or qualitative change leaves us with a new material reality. However, historical and dialectical materialism do not deal effectively with the by-products of this quantitative and qualitative transformation – namely consciousness and ideological development. This omission results in limitations in the efficacy of the use of dialectical and historical materialism by activists.

Trimble has applied categorial conversion to the struggle to institutionalise ALD, and demonstrates its significance as a theoretical tool of the African revolution.³³ At the same time, this analysis provides evidence of the importance of the ALD process in the broader Pan-African struggle.

Figure 13.2 Culture-activism-ideology influence diagram



Source: Author

Culture belongs to a different category to ideology and activism. Figure 13.2 shows that all three are related and each influences the other. Nkrumah, Toure and Cabral have all pointed out the significance of culture in the national liberation process. Culture emerges from the struggle of men and women:

At every moment of the life of a society (open or closed), culture is the result, with more or less awakened consciousness, of economic and political activities, the more or less dynamic expression of the type of relations prevailing within that society ... The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation, on the ideological or idealist level, of the material and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated. Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of history, by the positive or negative influence it exerts on the evolution of relations between man and his environment and among new or human groups within a society, as well as between different societies.³⁴

African culture is grounded in the shared historical experience of a pre-colonial traditional Africa. Colonialism and imperialism have splintered Africa into more than 50 states with hundreds of borders that divide Africa. However, the African struggle against colonialism, chattel slavery and racism is a shared experience that has resulted in a rich, diverse culture. Revolutionary African ideology is shaped by this culture and Africans' historical activism. In turn, this ideology directs the advancement of African culture and Pan-African activism.

Ideology is a set of ideas that guides an individual or organisation's action. Common ideological principles are needed to derive and agree on

shared strategy, programmes and activism. The application of the principle of historical materialism identifies:

- (i) private ownership of massive resources as the backbone of capitalism that allows for super-exploitation of the poorer masses in all countries operating under capitalism; and
- (ii) finance capital through organisations like the World Bank (WB), IMF and Paris Club asserts control over poorer countries, maintaining the imperialist relationship for the major capitalist countries.

Categorical conversion identifies the importance of looking beyond the material forces in tension and emphasises ideological development and cultural integrity.

As Cabral points out, culture is a weapon of revolution and must address the following:

Development of a *people's culture* and all aboriginal positive cultural values; Development of a *national culture* on the basis of history and the conquest of the struggle itself [...]; Development of the technical and technological *scientific culture*, compatible with the demands of progress.³⁵

To achieve this compatibility, appropriate technology must be developed and widely utilised. An agenda that promotes technology to empower people must use the popular culture of the people as its base. This technology drive must first address the basic needs of the people and their communities. A shift in the direction of technology development requires an educational shift. Educational institutions must be the space for shifting the teaching and learning process to promote appropriate technology.

The reality of our Knowledge Age places particular importance on ICT in the further development of appropriate technology. The connection that ICT has to all sciences, industries and organisations is growing steadily. An effort must be made to ensure that this developmental path promotes socially relevant computing. Globally, governments are the largest generators of data, information and knowledge constructs. As Prabhu notes, 'Governments are the single largest takers of people's earnings and the providers of a variety of services to citizens, including dispensing information'.³⁶ This reality sets the tone for governments' increasing use of information systems and information technology. These systems and technology must be used to provide an e-governance agenda designed to promote democracy and empower citizens.

REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMMES AND ACTIVISM

Today, despite political independence, Africa is super-exploited. African labour is over-worked and under-paid in all corners of the planet. Africa's natural resources are being stolen at an increasing rate under the guise of free trade. It is known that Africa is the richest continent on the planet in terms of mineral resources, yet Africans get little benefit from them. Africa's minerals are ripped from the ground and sold in a raw state at ridiculously low prices. The so-called developed countries call it the market system and free trade. For Africa, it is nothing but a giant rip-off!

These so-called developed countries exalt capitalism as the ideal economic system. However, it is capitalist control of global production processes that allows a handful of greedy people to make money from African labour and resources. This handful has written the laws and hold the title deeds to the land and factories. They own the media and control the most powerful militaries. They control the banks and all international institutions, like the IMF. This small group of people use their control over these resources and institutions to dominate and exploit the masses.

The task of justice-loving people is to change this system of inequality. However, the change cannot be gradual. The change cannot be simply one of reform. The change cannot be simply a seat at the table of capitalism. Revolution is a drastic transformation; so, for revolutionaries, the change can only be a drastic change! The change must be the complete destruction of capitalism on a global scale. The fight to destroy capitalism must present a clear alternative. One cannot be truly anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist unless one presents a clear, coherent alternative.

Scientific socialism is the historical alternative to capitalism. This is a process of empowering the masses by putting an end to the private ownership of the capitalists. The farms, mines, factories and banks must be owned and controlled by the people, and profits must be used to advance the quality of life of the masses. Society must be organised so that people contribute based on their ability and receive based on their contribution. This is a process that must be accompanied by intense political education on a mass scale. This process must both explain all aspects of the socialist transformation process as it unfolds and at the same time further develop the socialist process (after carefully assessing its successes and problems).

A process of global socialist transformation is needed to end capitalist and imperialist exploitation. Africa will play a pivotal role in this global socialist process. Today, Africa is divided into 54 individual nation-states. This division was the design of colonial powers. Today, in the stage of neocolonialism, this division of Africa continues to serve the interests of capitalism, which is dominated by the same colonial powers. This balkanisation leaves

each state vulnerable and subject to bullying by imperialists. The narrow nationalism of post-colonial Africa is a barrier in our continued fight for national liberation. True support for national liberation in Africa requires active support for a unified Africa. Only a unified Africa can push back imperialist aggression and its neocolonial presence in Africa. All socialist and communist forces need to recognise and support African unification as a step toward global internationalisation.

This task of organising revolutionary forces globally is necessary for Africa's salvation, but it is also needed to force global change. The super-exploitation of Africa is the lynchpin that keeps the engine of capitalism running. The rip-off of Africa's mineral resources, the exploitation of the best farming lands in Africa, and the wage slavery suffered by Africans across Africa and the diaspora, bring massive profits to the global engine of capitalism. Built on centuries of racism, it provides white privilege to millions of white workers, who blindly think that their success and privilege are their rightful reward from the successes of capitalism. This white working class in South Africa, Europe, Australia and the Americas will wake up only when people of colour break the shackles of the racist super-exploitation of imperialism around the globe.

The Pan-African movement and all Pan-African political parties must see their major task today as being to mobilise, agitate, educate and organise people to one end – a truly liberated, unified Africa under scientific socialism. It is only a scientific socialist system that will end racism and economic injustice. This requires an end to private property as we know it. The wealth that is in the hands of a few must be transferred to the masses. No individuals should be allowed to own banks, factories, mines or farms in Africa. The transfer of this wealth to the people requires a revolutionary process that can only come about through the coordinated action of revolutionary Pan-African political parties on a global scale. Committed activists must engage in discussion to develop and refine a revolutionary political programme. This programme must be a global offensive on several fronts. The following offensives are recommended.

Confronting finance capital

Capitalism and imperialism use their global financial network to control prices, wages and credit. This is nothing short of financial blackmail. The major capitalist countries dominate and control global trade. They control the prices and quantities of goods exchanged – and therefore the profits. The multinational corporations based in these countries control the wages of workers globally. In January 2014, platinum miners across South Africa went on strike, demanding a living wage of US\$1 200 a month. The mining

companies insisted this was impossible, yet the same companies pay miners in Australia an average annual wage of US\$110 000, and comparable wages are paid to miners in Canada and Europe. The same imperialist forces set the price for platinum, even though the largest reserves of platinum are in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

This unjust system serves to force more debt on Africa. Globally, countries are operating using credit. Capitalist countries control this process and are able to accumulate trillions of dollars in debt. However, these same capitalist countries limit Africa's access to credit. This is a barrier to truly fair trade and limits many potential development projects.

Capitalist countries use the monies they claim Africa owes as both a carrot and a stick. They decide when to restructure and cancel loans and when to deny further credit, based on the level of neo-colonial cooperation or the degree to which a state opposes their neo-liberal agenda. The leading structures in this unjust financial manipulation are the WB and the IMF, headed by the US and Europe, respectively. These agencies' decisions to extend credit, deny loans and demand loan repayments can force a country into financial upheaval. To make matters worse, private banks and individual investors follow the lead of the IMF and WB in denying or advancing credit.

To combat this, Africans must stop all payments to the IMF, the WB, the Paris Club and other capitalist international banks. This must be seen as a down-payment on reparations due to Africa for damage from the slave trade, slavery, colonialism and imperialist manipulation. The reparations movement calls on former colonisers and countries that benefitted from the enslavement of Africans to pay the descendants of the enslaved and colonised for damages done to their ancestors. The reparations movement has been most active in the diaspora, making legal claims against the US³⁷ and Britain.³⁸ The movement recognises that repair requires more than financial restitution. Reparations require cultural upliftment that promotes indigenous rights and the African personality.

In an offensive against imperialist finance capital, Africans globally must demand cancellation of the debts claimed against African countries by all international financial institutions. Why should Africa pay these loans? The countries collecting loan payments are the ones that owe Africa trillions of dollars. The global call for debt cancellation must be linked to the ongoing struggle for reparations worldwide.

Controlling Africa's resources

Foreign military dominance has disrupted Africa's development since the African slave trade. This military dominance continued through the period

of African colonialism. In this post-colonial phase, foreign military intervention has caused disruption across Africa – from Somalia to Libya and the Central African Republic. There must be a call for the immediate removal of all foreign military bases on African soil. The drones flying out of Africa and killing innocent women, children and men must stop now! There must be a call for one African military command that draws on all Africans across Africa and the diaspora committed to socialist transformation. This African military must be a force of peace and stabilisation. It must be trained to aid in natural and man-made disasters and must be dispatched to assist in times of flood, drought and other disasters.

In his *Handbook on Revolutionary Warfare* (1969), Nkrumah calls for the building of an all-African army to wage the needed armed struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism. This would be an army dedicated to fighting to liberate the whole of Africa. It would not recognise colonial boundaries and would serve all Africans. There is a need for an All-African political party that practices revolution and holds its main objective to be the total liberation and unification of Africa under scientific socialism. From Nkrumah's times until today, there has been a plethora of political forces in Africa and the African diaspora struggling against imperialism and supporting the unification of Africa. Nkrumah recognised that these parties, armies, movements and other formations must be brought together, and called for an All-African Committee for Political Coordination:

The formation of a political party linking all liberated territories and struggling parties under a common ideology will smooth the way for eventual continental unity, and will, at the same time greatly assist the prosecution of the all-African people's war. To assist the process of its formation, an All-African Committee for Political Co-ordination (AACPC) should be established to act as a liaison between all parties which recognize the urgent necessity of conducting an organized and unified struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism.³⁹

This task remains one of Africa's most important challenges. Consolidating the various organisations, political parties and liberation movements concerned with the liberation of Africa and the empowerment of Africans requires a shared vision and strategy. Controlling Africa's resources requires organisation at all levels. Political independence was just the first step organisationally. Military control requires replacing all foreign military with an All-African army that is committed to Pan-Africanism. One task of the Pan-African movement is to work to build AACPC. Part of this process is to build African united fronts wherever possible. These united fronts must engage in activism that supports the transfer of Africa's resources to the people.

The fight for the immediate implementation of a large-scale land and resource reclamation process across all parts of Africa that are still subject to significant land ownership by colonial descendants must be an essential part of Pan-African activism. The land reclamation process initiated by Zimbabwe must be refined and extended to ensure that the ownership of farms, plantations, mines, factories and banks across Africa are in the hands of the masses of Africans. This will mark a step toward ending the private property relationship of capitalism.

Africa must fight to control its food resources and access to medicines. The so-called patent rights of pharmaceutical, agricultural and chemical multi-national corporations are a sham. They are nothing but another form of imperialist (private property) exploitation. It is a violation of human rights to keep medicine and food from those in need. These imperialist laws should not be honoured. Health care and food security are a human right that must be fought for and provided to the masses.

Africa must fight to control its forests, wildlife, lakes, rivers and abundant resources. Control over these resources will allow Africa to contribute to bringing our planet into ecological balance. For over a century, the imperialist countries have raped mother earth, polluting the air, the rivers and oceans. Capitalism's quest for profit has led to such levels of destruction of natural resources and pollution that the planet is on the verge of catastrophic climate change. Africa will suffer more than any other part of the world.

The world must recognise that, in order to stop destructive climate change, a drastic change is required that can only come with the end of capitalism. It is a global challenge to link climate justice to the necessary destruction of capitalism and the development of scientific socialism. Africans must join an international effort, led by the historically underdeveloped and colonised countries, that calls on the developed countries to pay for the damage done to mother earth caused by the industrialisation processes of imperialist expansion.

Colonial borders – the world and Africa

Borders established by European colonialism shape most of the world today – from the Americas to Australia and across Africa. The most recent case of colonialism creating new borders and evicting native citizens is the ongoing expansion of Israel. The effort to deny the history and culture of the indigenous people of Palestine is a continuation of the strategy used to create North America, Australia and New Zealand. A global movement was built to oppose and end settler colonialism in Africa. The anti-apartheid movement connected with the liberation movement to successfully defeat European colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa.

Today, apartheid lives on in the colonial state of Israel. We have an obligation to the whole of humanity to expose the racist nature of Zionism and its expansionist policy. In 1948, Israel was established by stealing Palestinian land, making it the last European settler colony. Since then, Israel has continued to expand, by seizing additional territory and each year building new settlements on Palestinian land. Israel is just the most recent case of European settler colonialism. Consistency requires opposing settler colonialism everywhere. A global movement must be built to oppose and destroy Zionist settler colonialism. This has started with the call for boycott, divestment and sanctions to be imposed on Israel. Africans must play an active role in joining and helping to organise and enforce these measures on Israel.

Most importantly, a Pan-African activist agenda must call for an opening of all borders across Africa. A massive amount of financial and human resources is wasted at hundreds of border checkpoints across Africa. These monetary and human resources should be used in a productive and constructive manner to produce food, process Africa's raw materials, provide health care and education and, in general, increase the quality of life across Africa. Opening the borders is a step toward continental citizenship. Continental citizenship should be open to all Africans across Africa and the diaspora. Universal citizenship could start with Africa. This citizenship requires an allegiance to the whole of Africa, an allegiance to build one Africa. This one Africa must take the path of scientific socialism.

Under scientific socialism, local communities and a continental government committed to humanism and egalitarianism would control Africa's resources. Production would be organised to improve the quality of life of the masses, while emphasis would be placed on helping the poorest communities. Without restrictive borders and passports, people could easily move to communities that most need assistance. This path of scientific socialism is the process that will bring about a truly global community, where humankind contributes based on ability and receives based on needs. This global community is a qualitative advance over communalism. It is the communism of our future.

MILIEU FOR ORGANISING

This revolutionary strategy of Pan-African activism must take place across Africa and in the diaspora wherever Africans are living and working. The call to implement this strategy would reach a global community most effectively through initially:

- (i) organising youth, students and African intelligentsia through university communities; and
- (ii) building ALD into a global institution that connects ideology, political education, culture and activism.

ALD was established in 1963 to celebrate the victories in the struggle for African liberation, while at the same time calling for organisation and activism to intensify this struggle. In 2013, Africa celebrated the fiftieth year since the OAU declared 25 May 'African Liberation Day'. The organising of ALD must be institutionalised as a process for mobilising and organising Africans globally. ALD should be organised across Africa and the diaspora to address the positions listed above, as well as local and regional projects. It must bring Pan-Africanists together to assess work and further develop organising strategy. It should also serve as a space for Pan-African forces to engage with other anti-imperialist forces.

The revolutionary African intelligentsia must examine the current milieu and assess all forces in contention, with the task of providing the analysis needed to develop a sophisticated revolutionary political programme capable of most effectively advancing the African revolution. This is the process of applying dialectical materialism, historical materialism and categorical conversion to the study of socio-political and economic realities. The revolutionary intelligentsia must be engaged in consistent political education if it is to serve as a true vanguard in the process of building a mass movement and mass political parties. This must be a collective process of study and work, theory and practice, with each building on the other. The process must constantly refine our theory and sharpen our practice.

The task of organising a Revolutionary African Intelligentsia will take activists to the universities and colleges to organise our youth and students, with particular emphasis on organising women. The past 30 years has seen phenomenal growth in the number of African universities. Nigeria went from three universities at independence to 110 universities in 2012. Today, Kenya has 53 universities and Tanzania has 40. University enrollment in Ethiopia went from less than 1 000 students in 1950 to over 420 000. Mwamwenda notes:

There are numerous reasons why Africa is investing so many billions of dollars in tertiary and university education. Higher education is a public and social good, which develops, advances, preserves and disseminates knowledge and provides stimulation for intellectual life. Moreover, it develops physical and intellectual skills to foster self-reliance and problem-solving at various levels of human endeavour.⁴⁰

Students are studying and training to be productive citizens in an Africa of the future that they will shape. Their study and training must take on a Pan-African focus. It is the responsibility of the current African intelligentsia to spend time on the campuses to engage our students to commit to revolution. Across Africa, as new universities are opening, the curriculum must direct students to a Pan-African agenda.

The university curriculum must provide the science and technology training that promotes innovation and a people-centred development and deployment of techniques and technologies. This curriculum must be consistent with Cabral's 1979 call for scientific culture, compatible with the demands of progress. Appropriate technology must be infused in the curricula of existing and new universities across Africa.

The above is a global plan. There must also be local and regional plans. The organising of students and youth must focus on serious political education in order to prepare revolutionary cadres to organise all sectors of workers and local communities in a calculated manner, which takes into account the particularities of each community. Those who know the particular needs of their local community must develop plans to address those needs.

The plans must be of a revolutionary nature, not simply reformist, and must call for empowering the masses of each community. These plans must connect these communities to the Pan-African movement and revolutionary Pan-African political parties and educate and organise our communities so that they become committed to the goal of a unified socialist Africa free of exploitation. Organisers must use the latest technologies and techniques to most effectively implement these international, regional and local plans.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This study shows that the application of historical materialism and categorical conversion is useful in developing a strategy for advancing the Pan-African movement in a revolutionary fashion. The use of these ideological principles to examine the current milieu can prove helpful in connecting the reality of Africa today with a brighter future, made possible by a clear plan of activism.

Historical materialism highlights the role of private property in maintaining capitalist oppression, and the role of finance capital in maintaining imperialist and neo-colonial oppression. The proposed activist agenda addresses processes to eliminate the insidious role of finance capital, as well as to end capitalist ownership. Historical materialism also indicates that changes in the forces of production can heighten class struggle and help bring about revolutionary change. Empowering the broader African


population through education and the promotion of appropriate technologies can generate the required shift in the forces of production.

Categorical conversion provides insight into the importance of ideological development and cultural expression in ending oppression. Cultural expression is an important component of the educational process and it must be emphasised as the African education system is extended and given a more Pan-African perspective. Categorical conversion accounts for the consciousness that arises from revolutionary activism. This consciousness-raising process must be planned and anticipated. The ideological development that will then result from the proposed Pan-African agenda of activism will provide more revolutionary cadres to further develop and refine the activist agenda needed to bring about Pan-Africanism.

Additional work is needed in connecting historical materialism, categorical conversion and revolutionary activism. The best test of this theoretical study is to put the various activism strategies into practice and assess the outcomes. Further study of each alternative activism strategy should be linked to appropriate technology and techniques that can most effectively implement each strategy. Advances in information communication technologies make possible the use of a range of computer-based decision support practices that could facilitate strategy implementation. This requires further study.

The use of appropriate technology helps empower citizens and communities. This process of empowerment is a key component of the forces of production that apply pressure on capitalist relations of production. This pressure is class struggle. Figure 13.3 shows how appropriate technology, socially relevant computing, decision support systems, e-governance and e-government are related. A study of the various areas of appropriate technology and their impact on transforming society is beyond the scope of this paper.

Figure 13.3 Linking AT, SRC and DSS to e-governance and e-government



Source: Author

Socially relevant computing (SRC) is an important part of appropriate technology (AT), and decision support systems (DSS) are in turn an important element of SRC. The use of DSS in e-government and e-governance can be critical in transforming society toward socialism, if used to promote humanism, democracy and egalitarianism. Emphasis is placed on e-governance,

because this is the use of information science and technology to connect citizens in terms of governance processes. E-governance can provide better access to services ranging from social security, passports and visas to health care. This can be empowering to citizens. E-governance can provide transparency concerning decisions made by government, thus forcing more accountability. Future work will study how e-governance can be pursued while capitalism is still dominant. The major contribution of this continuous research is applying historical materialism and categorial conversion to the elaboration of a Pan-African organising strategy that involves the development of the range of appropriate technologies.

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Sustainable Pastoral Livelihoods at a Crossroads

Broken System Resilience and Institutional Disenfranchisement
among the Borana Oromo of Southern Ethiopia

Boru Shana Gufu

INTRODUCTION

The livelihood of pastoralist communities depends largely on rearing livestock. Pastoralism is practised in a sensitive and uncertain environment, characterised by highly variable rainfall distribution, spatially and temporally, which often results in long, dry periods.¹ Pastoralism as a means of livelihood has lasted centuries as an adaptable response to often harsh and unpredictable grassland environments. Based on mobility and flexibility, the pastoral system seeks to optimise the use of livelihood resources to maintain well-being and security in the face of highly delicate agro ecological settings.^{2, 3, 4, 5, 6} Nevertheless, pastoralist societies are facing a worse threat to their livelihood now than at any point in the past.⁷

For Borana pastoralists, it is an urgent priority to address concerns about livelihood and factors affecting the resilience of their pastoral system. Currently, the livelihood of the Borana pastoralists of southern Ethiopia is under threat from recurrent shocks, drivers of change, and marginalisation from political and economic processes.⁸ Various authors have argued that there is increasing tension around livelihood in the Borana lowland.^{9, 10, 11, 12, 13}

Despite proliferating research and development interventions on their livelihood, Borana pastoralists continue to be vulnerable. Questions of their long-term resilience to external shocks, internal disturbances and factors affecting sustainability have yet to be fully addressed. These circumstances, which may be regarded as a 'missing link', are apparent from the present state of livelihood crisis in which Borana pastoralists are trapped. They find themselves in desperate need of emergency relief due to a lack of resilience and a disrupted institutional environment. Resilience – the pastoralists' capacity to maintain internal change and withstand external disturbances – is the term through which sustainability in the Borana pastoral system needs to be analysed.

Resilience depends, on the one hand, on elements within social and ecological systems that enhance continuity and, on the other, elements that bring about change and revival.¹⁴ However, what is lacking is an attempt to examine social and ecological factors shaping Borana pastoral development. This means that there is a failure to differentiate between issues of vulnerability and resilience, which often leads to a vague discussion of sustainability.

Thus, studies such as Berhanu's,¹⁵ along with development interventions among Borana pastoralists, tend to focus on short-term coping mechanisms rather than addressing those mechanisms which will enhance livelihood security on a long-term basis (resilience). A failure to understand the interaction between social and ecological factors hindering livelihood resilience in the Borana pastoral system has led to inappropriate ways of tackling them. Sources of building resilient pastoral households and its dynamics are poorly addressed, while the available responses are often poorly designed and unplanned. Thus, it is arguable that a comparative analysis of ecological and socio-political forces affecting livelihood vulnerability has been neglected. Above all, sustainability is viewed in terms of analysing the current state of vulnerability context and resilience.

Resilience needs to be examined with reference to the institutional environment in which various stakeholders are connected and are able to build the capacity of Borana pastoralists to withstand unpredictable socioecological changes. New strategies need to be designed by pastoralists and formal agencies to ensure the resilience and sustainability of the Borana pastoral system.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

GENERAL OBJECTIVE

The main purpose of this research is to address the current livelihood crisis in the Borana pastoral system and the forces affecting the resilience of the pastoral system.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

More specifically, the study aims to:

- explore the current vulnerable state of the Borana pastoral livelihood;
- examine the institutional environment, capacity and willingness to address this vulnerability;

- examine the dynamics in livelihood strategies and the challenges to local livelihood resilience; and
- evaluate sources of innovation and the development of new coping and adaptive strategies within the Borana social system and the formal agencies that have been created to enhance their resilience.

THE STUDY SITE

This study was carried out in three Pastoral Associations (PAs) of Yaballo district, Southern Ethiopia. The study site stretches 575 km south of Addis Ababa. The case study included the Dida Hara, Dida Yaballo and Harweyyu PAs, representing both former rainy and dry season grazing areas. Over the past few decades, these areas have experienced a wide range of development intervention intended to enhance the livelihood adaptability of those living there. The study units reflect a variety of strategic livelihood responses to recurrent shocks, climatic trends, institutional dynamics and policy changes relating to the traditional pastoral system. The PAs are fully inhabited by Borana pastoralists, who are settled in arid and semi-arid agroecological zones.

The Borana Oromo is pastoralist society living in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. In Ethiopia they number about 500 000.¹⁶ The society's kinship system is patrilineal, consisting of 18 spatially and temporally coalesced clans. The clans are organised into two exogamous halves known as *Sabbo* and *Gona*, which have reciprocal social and economic ties. Borana society is structured according to age and generational class. Five generational classes alternate every eight years in assuming ritual and political duties.¹⁷ The Borana people are distinctive for their unique customary institutions of self-rule – the *Gada* system – and the accompanying indigenous social insurance schemes, known as *Buusaa Gonofaa*. These traditional democratic institutions of self-rule have been shaped by external factors, particularly the pastoralists' increasing integration with a wider exchange system.¹⁸

Borana territory comprises nearly 10 percent of Ethiopia's landmass and is made up of arid and semi-arid ecological zones.¹⁹ Rainfall is historically bimodal, with the main rainy season being March to May (*Rooba Gannaa*) and a second short rainy season occurring between September and October (*Hagayya*). The average annual rainfall is below 500 mm, but with a pattern of significant difference across space and altitude. There are two wet seasons in the Borana lowland and two dry seasons: a long dry season (*Bona Hagayyaa*) and a short dry season (*Adoolessa*).²⁰ However, current evidence shows significant changes in climatic conditions and increased unpredictability in the agro ecological system.²¹

SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK, VULNERABILITY AND RESILIENCE

In the course of conducting this study, the process of data collection and analysis was captured using the Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework (SRLF) developed by Scoones.²² The core purpose of this framework, according to Scoones,²³ is to show how, in different contexts,

sustainable livelihoods are achieved through access to a range of livelihood resources (natural, economic, human and social capital) which are combined in the pursuit of different livelihood strategies (agricultural intensification or extensification, livelihood diversification and migration).²⁴

Central to the framework are analyses of the range of formal and informal organisational and institutional factors influencing sustainable livelihood.

While in this study the model is applied to Borana pastoralists, it allows for an understanding of pastoralist systems more generally and their resilience in the face of a multitude of factors exposing the vulnerability of that livelihood. The framework shows that a sustainable and resilient pastoral system depends on elements that provide continuity and elements that allow for change. This framework focuses on the capacity of the Borana pastoral system to tolerate stresses that occur due to changing socioecological systems.

METHODS

This study was conducted in 2012, with fieldwork undertaken in the three Borana pastoral systems. The sites were selected because they had experienced profound ecological changes and institutional and development intervention over the last four decades.

The study employed a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative data collection technique took the form of a survey that covered 86 sample households in the three pastoral systems. This method aimed to gather information on demographic information, household livestock holdings, crop cultivation methods, and household responses to livelihood shocks and stress. Qualitative methods were also used, such as key informant interviews, observation, focus group discussion (FGD), and case studies. These participatory methods were employed to collect information on the causes of the pastoral system's vulnerability and the factors affecting its resilience.

FINDINGS

THE NARRATIVE OF VULNERABILITY AND RESILIENCE IN THE BORANA SOCIOECOLOGICAL SYSTEM

The framework this study employs reveals two aspects for understanding sustainable livelihood adaptation in the Borana pastoral system: vulnerability context and resilience. In other words, the Borana socioecological system is dynamic: it is constituted by forces driving change in the pastoral system and forces shaping sustainable adaption in the face of changing circumstances. Thus, the chapter focuses on examining the nature of this dynamic interplay and its implications for a resilient pastoral livelihood.

VULNERABILITY CONTEXT: SHOCKS, STRESS AND ASSETS

This section examines the factors leading to the vulnerability of the Borana socioecological system. Vulnerability here has two aspects: external shocks and stress driving changes and the internal decline of the asset base. These two elements will be analysed on the basis of qualitative information.

Shocks and stress: the underlying drivers of changing socioecological systems

The Borana pastoral system is highly dynamic. Empirical information shows that it is experiencing two forms of stress. The first relates to ecological changes, the second stems from sociopolitical systems. Ecological conditions will be examined first.

One of the fundamental shocks triggered by change in the ecological system is the appearance of new patterns of drought. It is among the most disastrous shocks affecting the main asset base of pastoral households. Focus group participants in Dida Hara and Harweyyu PAs ranked drought first among ecological shocks and stress in terms of its drain on livelihoods. Interviews with key informants indicate drought as the key factor responsible for livestock reduction over the last three *Gada* periods (1992-2012). One of the most striking issues about drought, as noted by key informants, is its increasing severity and unpredictability across time and space. The reality is that the drought cycle has changed suddenly, leaving no time for human, animal and physical elements to adapt.

In accordance with the *Gada* system, Borana pastoralists believe in the cyclical nature of drought, which assumes eight years for a power transition. This helps them develop a traditional early warning system that anticipates the likely occurrence of good and bad seasons. Drought cycles now take not more than two to three years to reappear and their spatial

coverage is increasing, while traditional early warning systems are failing to anticipate them.

There is another aspect of the recent drought in the Borana lowland. Whereas five to 10 years ago, when drought would occur in a particular district, the pastoral groups would move their herd to a region which was better off, at present, this is not possible as the drought affects all the regions at once. Changes in drought patterns have therefore brought about significant changes in patterns of herd mobility. This has knock-on effects. For example, key informants suggested the commencement of cross-border mobility is due to a lack of any sort of improvement in the Borana land.

This has exposed the pastoral groups to multiple pressures, such as animal diseases and raids by other ethnic groups. They live in a foreign environment in conditions of extreme insecurity. In this light, new changes in the drought scenario suggest a need to review regional and national border policies if the livelihood security of the mobile pastoralists across the borders of neighbouring countries is to be safeguarded.

Another new ecologically driven aspect of stress is increasing bush encroachment. Unlike drought, which is a stochastic event, bush infestation generates gradual and irreversible stress on the pastoral livelihood. Across pastoral settlements, vegetation change is a typical cause of the degradation of rangeland, as the land covered by thorny bushes increases at the expense of traditional nutritious grass species. This forces herders to range further in search of pasture for their cattle, in the process reducing the possibility of rain-fed cultivation as an alternative livelihood activity.

Discussions with male elders of pastoral groups revealed that the reason for bush expansion is the ban placed on bush burning by government since the Derg regime. Traditional bush burning tactics might have reduced the current level of stress if these measures had been encouraged by government and aid agencies right away. Despite a move towards bush clearing or thinning by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in certain Borana regions, loss of pastureland to bush coverage is accelerating. Moreover, there are major disagreements among interventionists about whether to selectively clear, thin or burn the area covered by the bush. It is regrettable that none of the parties follows customary methods of burning.

Despite some relative improvements in combating animal disease, it remains an ecological shock contributing to the vulnerability of the Borana. Increasing climatic variation is producing forms of animal disease not previously known to pastoralists or animal experts. Thus, even though many people today have greater awareness about animal health, the loss of livestock to disease, due to lack of access to animal health services, remains a major stress on the Borana.

The vulnerable situation of Borana pastoralists has also been shaped by forces embedded in sociopolitical processes. While ecological changes are not mutually exclusive from sociopolitical changes, pastoralists perceive sociopolitical forces to be the prime cause of their increased vulnerability.

Key informants and FGD participants view changes resulting from sociopolitical sources to be irreversible once they have taken place, but consider it possible to regain their losses from drought through various stock rebuilding mechanisms. For Borana pastoralists, the shocks caused by sociopolitical forces recur and last longer than ecological forces, which strike once and then tend to not return for a while. As one Borana *hayu* said, 'If drought come about, we may know how to deal with it, but when our resource use rights are jeopardised we have no chance to act in response. What else we can do?' These socioeconomic and political forces, which are discussed below, include poor governance, weakening of customary institutions, market risks and population pressure.

In this regard, tenure risk (which involves unsuitable governance and weakening of customary institutions) is at the centre of the Borana pastoral system crisis. A significant blow to livelihood lies in changes in the resource governance system. Until now, Borana pastoralists have not had a governance system which suits their livelihood, as they have been incorporated into the sedentary state structure of the Ethiopian governments. Numerous studies on the Borana system have identified short-term shocks, such as drought, as the primary cause of the dwindling pastoral system. However, recent intervention by aid agencies and the government continues to focus on other less severe livelihood problems, neglecting the issue of resilience, which is the bedrock of a sustainable pastoral livelihood.

In the Dida Hara grazing system, recent developments in the pastoral governance system have brought about 'settlement arrangement activities', which tend to settle pastoralists in order to reduce the costs of delivering services to them. This means that the formerly scattered encampments which were settled according to the varying nature of pasture and water resources have been assembled into a rigid administrative unit called a *kebele*. This, in turn, means all prerogatives of resource governance which were under the rubric of the customary management system have been taken over, curtailing their mobile lifestyle and exacerbating their vulnerability.

Another factor undermining the livelihood of Borana pastoralists is associated with market risk. The market is the most viable way through which pastoral households can bolster themselves and accumulate wealth as a form of insurance against hazards and stress; it also allows them to access credit, food, grain and other basic necessities. Yet Borana pastoralists are on the horns of a dilemma, both in terms of the availability of local markets and information about those markets.

FGDs with male elders at three PAs revealed that volatility in livestock prices, asymmetry in market information, increasing prices of consumer goods, and the proliferation of untrustworthy local brokers are making the sale of livestock a risky enterprise. Among the study community, the sale of livestock by households is for the most part to obtain grain and other consumer goods, especially during the dry season. During this time, the price of grain skyrockets and the pastoralists' purchasing power declines considerably. Drought and the market are thus regarded as having a mutually reinforcing impact on livestock-based livelihoods.

Population pressure is another stressor affecting the livelihood of pastoral households. Even though studies view population pressure as an internal problem resulting from increasing human and animal populations, key informants emphasise that increasing population is not in itself the problem but rather *becomes* a problem due to the tenure crisis, market risk, bush invasions and other non-pastoral interventions. Therefore, population pressure is not a result of increased household livestock holdings, but of expansion of farming, market risk, and the growing numbers of wild animals under shelter of thorny bushes.

In the course of analysing the relative severity of these shocks and stressors, a participatory model based on pairwise ranking was utilised in the three pastoral systems. This ranking shows that the crisis in pastoral livelihoods is primarily related to shocks and stresses caused by sociopolitical factors (such as weakening of customary institutions). The FGDs at all PAs revealed that supporting customary welfare and resource management institutions is a crucial step towards securing livelihood assets and ensuring resilience. Prioritising shocks and stressors may overcome the problem of 'blindfolded' intervention such as watershed developments, which are divorced from the immediate needs of pastoralists. However, it is essential that initiatives to improve the resilience of pastoral livelihoods take into account locally felt needs when prioritising which shocks and stresses to address.

Livelihood asset vulnerability and lack of trade-offs: risk factors

At present, an asset-based approach to understanding poverty and vulnerability in the pastoral context is preferred to the former approach based on household income. The issue here is whether the assets controlled by pastoral households are adequate to produce the desired livelihood outcome or adaptation.²⁵ Similarly, in the case of Borana pastoral households, one of the essential self-securing mechanisms against risk in a fragile socioecological system is accumulating food stocks and other kinds of marketable assets to bolster livelihood resilience. In spite of this, important livelihood

assets are meagre and vulnerability is increasing among Borana pastoralists. Analysis in this regard illustrates the current state of five categories of asset base (natural, human, social, physical and financial) in the Borana system, in the face of mounting shocks and stressors.

Borana natural assets include rangeland and its constituents such as water, trees and livestock. Rangeland is regarded by Borana pastoralists as a major natural asset, and functions as a base for livestock production. It allows a temporally and spatially flexible grazing system between dry and wet seasons for various herds. It also serves as a bedrock for mobile herds from various corners of Borana land. However, increasing ecological and sociopolitical pressures have reduced formerly vast grazing areas to small pieces of land used for multiple purposes.

Many factors are responsible for the shrinkage and degradation of rangeland: bush encroachment, expansion of drought, reserves fenced by individuals and communities, rapid expansion of agricultural land, and increased human settlement on grazing units that were previously used as a corridor for camp herds (*loon foora*). But the primary cause of rangeland degradation is sociopolitical rather than ecological, as affirmed in FGDs in the pastoral systems that were studied. The sedenterised model imposed by the state is a major factor. The settlement arrangement scheme and watershed development scheme are current government projects that are aggravating the alienation of pastoralists and the degradation of grazing land.

Another crucial natural asset that is in critically short supply due to external pressure is water. Key informants reveal that key sources of water are still the traditional ponds and shallow wells in corners of the grazing area. But water points are drying up due to flooding during the rainy season and the increasing frequency of drought. Water scarcity is going from bad to worse as time goes by, contributing to miserable living conditions. Pastoral households are now forced to walk dozens of kilometres in search of water for human and animal consumption.

The primary cause of declining water resources is the weakening of the customary management system, which is responsible for mobilising clan networks for rehabilitating water points. Inconsistent intervention, lack of timely response and lack of connections between formal agencies and customary institutions are failing in this rehabilitation work. Evidence shows that the weakening of traditional management systems has led to the proliferation of encampments around water points, which used to be strictly regulated through the *mada* council or *jaarsadheeda*.

Another highly versatile asset is livestock. Among the Borana, livestock is the bedrock for social, financial and natural capital, and is an essential part of social networks. It is the basis for trust, support and cooperation

among pastoral households through customary stock friendship and the compulsory redistributive system. In a strictly ethnographic sense, livestock plays a crucial role in various communal rituals, ceremonies and rites of passage that facilitate continuity and identity in the Borana sociopolitical realm. Livestock is the sole asset by which to access the market, credit, non-pastoral consumer goods and other household demands that require money. The sale of livestock and its products is a source of livelihood diversification through trading and the trading off of pastoral goods. In spite of this, the livestock economy is currently in an uncertain state as household status has significantly declined over the last three *Gada* generations.

The second category of asset at risk among Borana pastoralists is human capital. Among the most valuable forms of capital of Borana pastoralists are the skills and knowledge applied through customary institutions to optimise management of volatile natural resources in their rangeland. These managing entities (*Jaarsadheedaa*, *Jaarsa Maddaa*, *abbaherregaa* and *ab-baguyyaa*) set regulations and appoint individuals to supervise the careful use of water and pastures in order to support grazing patterns. However, these institutions are currently failing in their duties. Their management of water points is disturbing mobility patterns, as too many people have been allowed to settle around permanent water sources. As a result, old traditional water wells are diminishing due to a breakdown in the traditional management style. Other manifestations of failed management include the expansion of privet enclosures and inappropriate settlements and the introduction of sedentary governance structures.

The third asset base that is deteriorating due to pressure from shock and stress is social capital embedded in customary welfare institutions for self-help and wealth redistribution. The Borana pastoral system is redistributive. It has a social insurance mechanism that is integral to helping poor households adapt to shocks and stress. Examples include the *Buusa Gonofaa*, *Dabaree* and *Makkala-Kaatoo* institutions. Today, these institutions are undergoing considerable transition. There has been a decline in the social capital base and an increase in destitute pastoral households, which dropout of livestock production due to a failing clan network system. Typical elements that sustained the system (such as frequent clan meetings, trust and cooperation) have deteriorated because the traditional *miiloo* has been replaced by the state apparatus of *kebele*. Clan meetings have been politicised by government authorities, which consider them to be organised against the will of the government.

Another major form of internal decline emanates from the lack of physical assets such as a market centre, roads and other infrastructure. These assets are as scarce as education and health services. Borana pastoralists are reluctant to discuss these kinds of assets due to their being extremely

upset by their absence. People often walk many kilometres to access water and take their animals to market. The main cause of this is sociopolitical marginalisation, which often downplays what pastoral communities identify as their most urgent needs. Thus, while the pastoralists' need for a market is increasing, conditions necessary to boost a market economy remain inadequate.

Evidence based on a participatory community model illustrates how changes in socioecological systems are putting pressure on the Borana's dwindling asset base, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Stressors such as the weakening of customary institutions, drought, market risk, bush encroachment, population pressure and animal disease are external factors causing a decline in the asset base. A combination of external pressure and internal decline is resulting in increasing destitution, unplanned mobility, aid dependence, lack of food, and insecurity. This highlights the vulnerable status of Borana pastoralists, whose available assets are inadequate to respond to external sources of stress.

RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD ADAPTATION IN THE BORANA PASTORAL SYSTEM

Another way of understanding the Borana socioecological system is to analyse forces shaping short-term and long-term responses to their increasing vulnerability. These responses can be separated into three social components:

- availability, willingness and ability of institutions to support resilience;
- access to livelihood strategies and their ability to help pastoralists respond to multiple risks; and
- the availability of new coping tactics and sources of innovation inside and outside the pastoral system.

Institutional environment, capacity and willingness to respond to vulnerability

This study found that human actions dominate the Borana socioecological system and that the system's adaptability is primarily dependent on the management function of social components (formal and informal institutions). Despite their pervasive presence in the Borana pastoral system, local institutions are unable to manage resilience strategies, with the result that vulnerability has increased. This study identifies three fundamental reasons for this institutional failure.

First, power dynamics between institutional entities are creating confusion and conflict in resilience activities at micro levels. The Borana pastoral

system has a number of institutions with various rules and norms, which mediate access to livelihood assets and manage different livelihood strategies. In Borana society, rules and power are based on the *Gada* system: decisions are made after consensus has been reached through dialogue, and various social institutions provide a balance of power. In spite of this, the encroachment of differential power relations and the application of conflicting rules are undermining the effort to harness household adaptive strategies on a long-term basis. Borana pastoralists are now in a state of confusion about whether to abide by the traditional governance system or submit to approaches towards resource governance and social structure envisaged by government and aid agencies.

The source of this tension, in fact, is the state apparatus, which acts in a way that damages the long-term needs of the local people, instead of serving the needs of constituents – needs that have little bearing on a dryland livelihood system. State norms and rules not only impose themselves on traditional institutions but dictate avenues of relief work and aid support provided by NGOs and funding agencies under the government's Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2009.

Community elders have questioned whether informal/customary or formal institutions will provide the best structure to augment local initiatives to address the Borana's increasing vulnerability. However, it was found that no single model can provide an optimal adaptation strategy unless changes in power relations, the nature of institutional arrangements, and the outcome of local actions on livelihood activities are taken into consideration. Regardless of progress being made by the Ethiopian government in applying a decentralised approach intended to support development endeavours, the bottom line is that Borana pastoralists have yet to establish a suitable form of governance which will make resilience of pastoral livelihood a top priority.

The second cause of institutional paralysis in the Borana system stems from weak capacity and unwillingness to respond to increasing vulnerability. Even where the right policies are in place, there are difficulties in implementing them due to weak institutional capacity at multiple levels. In the Borana pastoral context, things are more unpredictable, because there are no appropriate policies that capture pastoralist concerns. This study identified three important aspects of weak institutional capacity in the Borana lowlands. These are:

- Inefficiencies that result from a focus on price (source of funds). What is neglected are structural issues (clan alliance, kin support, and social collective value), which play a larger role in shaping resilience endeavours.

- Infectiveness in mobilising pastoralist communities to ensure resilience. This means they fail to understand that the burden of withstanding shocks and stress is likely to fall on individual households (intra-household bargaining). Persisting with the obsolete top-down planning and implementation approach is another manifestation of ineffective institutions. This manifests in two ways: first, failure to understand and represent pastoralists' needs or adaptive strategies; and second, failure in communicating information through the appropriate structures.
- Lack of accountability and willingness to respond to Borana vulnerability by formal institutions. This involves political issues being given priority over the felt needs of pastoralist households. This can be explained in two ways: first, the absence of a political structure which represents pastoralist voices; and second, the absence of appropriate incentives for those who represent pastoralists. As a result, kebele-level state officials tend to be more committed to their responsibilities to the state than to their fellow community.

In addition to power upheaval and capacity failure, another issue that leads to the institutional breakdown in the Borana pastoral system is the lack of an enabling environment or norms and rules that guide the dynamic functioning of institutions. One major problem is the way in which state policies constrain the operations of actors in the socioecological system. Local government is the 'maker and shaper', while traditional organisations and civil society organisations are 'choosers and users' of state regulations.

Dynamics of livelihood strategies, access and its implications for household ability to respond to shocks and stress

The sustainable livelihood framework employed in this study shows that access to livelihood strategies is an important component of ensuring resilience among Borana pastoralists. The Borana pastoral system includes pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods and requires finding a balance between livestock, pasture, water, human population and rainfed agriculture. Analysis of livelihood strategies among Borana pastoralists focused on three kinds of changes:

- change in livestock production figures;
- the ability of households to diversify their livelihood; and
- changes in household livelihood trajectories.

Thresholds for livestock production: A foundation for building resilient pastoralist households

Among the Borana, livestock rearing is a crucial livelihood strategy, but it is showing cracks. Households' ability to rear livestock has been jeopardised by two factors: changes in mobility and grazing patterns, and a decline in household livestock holding.

Herd mobility is crucial for enabling pastoralists to take advantage of opportunities. It is a source of both creativity and continuity, laying the ground for sustainable pastoralism. A key source of creativity in this context is versatile customary entities, which are characterised by flexible decision-making processes and spatial flexibility across agroecological zones. Despite a current move by aid agencies and researchers to recognise the value of opportunism, persistent changes in mobility and the grazing system continue to disrupt productivity and continuity among Borana pastoralists.

Disruption in flexibility is easy to observe. For example, households in Dida Hara PA (92 per cent), Harweyyu (93,3 per cent) and Dida Yaballo (96 per cent) opted for settling around water points rather than searching for better pasture. This was hardly possible when customary management was vibrant. Moreover, household mobility history shows that 53,8 per cent, 83,3 per cent and 90 per cent of households in Dida Hara, Harweyyu and Dida Yaballo, respectively, have lived in permanent encampments for more than 10 years. This illustrates that permanent settlement tends to be a strategy that leaves households with few other options, as they can only partly rely on pastoralism and must seek occasional relief aid.

Increasing sedenterisation has resulted in the deterioration of conditions necessary for livestock production, such as grazing pastures, water, and veterinary services across three *Gada* periods, as the sample households in the three PAs show. The state's prohibition on cross-border mobility has reduced the flexibility of herds within grazing units. Confinement to inferior grazing pastures has resulted in declining animal numbers and reduced income. Households have given up mobility and settled around permanent water points, making a living off animal rearing in the traditional dry season pastures. This, in turn, has resulted in exacerbated degradation around homesteads, the loss of dry season units, increased pressure during drought and declining social capital.

Another facet of declining livestock productivity is dwindling household livestock-holding thresholds, which is a clear symptom of a failed resilience mechanism. Wealth accumulation through diversifying and maximising herd size is the most viable option for pastoral households to adapt to risks in their socioecological system. This is because with relatively few numbers of herds it is not possible to produce adequate milk, meat, cash, household investment in food and other basic needs, and household

engagement in restocking schemes. In view of this, surveys covering 86 sample households in all PAs studied were conducted to calculate livestock owning over the last 12 years, taking the end of three *Gada* periods as a point of reference.

At all three PAs that were studied, a persistent reduction in livestock shows increasing poverty, given that the level of wealth is determined by household herd size. In other words, households with larger herds are more likely to invest in alternative livelihood activities, thereby capitalising on their ability to respond to the vulnerability context. Hence, compared to *Gada* Boru Madha (1992-2000) and Liban Jaldessa (2000-2008), 88,5 per cent, 83,3 per cent and 86,7 per cent of households in Dida Hara, Harweyyu and Dida Yaballo, respectively, indicated that their ability to withstand shocks and stress is worsening over time. Three per cent, 11,5 per cent and 6,7 per cent, respectively, mentioned no change.

Livelihood diversification: thresholds for trade-offs

The study's findings reveal that livelihood diversification among Borana pastoralists is more embedded in livestock owning where there is little option for credit services that could serve as capital for engaging in alternative livelihood activities. Thus, few households are engaging in activities other than livestock rearing. The household tendency to diversify livelihood activities was estimated in three PAs, based on average income earned from their activities. Sources of income include:

- the sale of livestock and livestock products;
- crop production;
- trading (livestock and livestock products and petty trade);
- employment (permanent and casual labour);
- renting property in town;
- remittances; and
- services (traditional healing, sale of traditional medicine, and so on).

Households in Dida Hara derive their income largely from livestock production (87 per cent). Despite expanding farmland, crop production generates only 9 per cent of income. Other significant sources of income are trading in livestock and livestock products, occasional petty trade (eight per cent), employment (two per cent) and property rentals (two per cent). Crafts and traditional healing services are practised only by a few households. Though livestock dominates the household economy, it is not producing adequate returns in terms of income. This is perhaps related to ecological unpredictability and market risk.

Similarly, in the Harweyyu pastoral community, livestock comprises a significant portion of household income: 91 per cent. In this pastoral system there is little diversification of income sources: husbandry is relied on as a viable risk-aversion strategy. Farming that began during the *Gada* period of Boru Madha contributes only three percent to household income. Thus, Harweyyu households are highly vulnerable, and there is a need to enhance diversification by reducing market risk and addressing sociopolitical marginalisation. Households in Dida Yaballo derive much of their income from livestock (49 per cent) and crop production (26 per cent). Employment (eight per cent), trading (eight per cent), rental (five per cent), sale of forest products (two per cent) and remittances (two per cent) are second-level income generation activities.

While diversification is a crucial tool to enhance household resilience, the decline in livestock owning is making this difficult. Household livelihood diversification is thus leading to negative adaptation, because as livestock bases decline, pastoralists who ‘drop out’ tend to engage in non-productive livelihood activities such as farming or selling charcoal and fuel wood. Crop failure is commonplace. With regard to rain-fed agriculture as a source of diversification, 80,8 per cent, 70 per cent and 93 per cent of households in Dida Hara, Harweyyu and Dida Yaballo, respectively, mentioned crop failure during the last two long rainy seasons; they are therefore reluctant to place hope in farming. Thus, diversification is not producing creativity but competition among livelihood strategies – for example, between farming and livestock production. This indicates that livelihood diversification among Borana pastoralists is risk-driven.

In the same vein, analysis of households’ livelihood strategies reveals dynamic trends in the study area across three *Gada* periods (1992-2012). Two trajectories were analysed: one that showed resilience and another showing vulnerability. The resilient households were those that were able to diversify sources of income via livestock-based activities such as trading, which includes both livestock and petty trade around pastoral encampments. These households’ resilience is due to increased diversification based on sale and investment in livestock and its products (a benchmark for building resilience). The vulnerable households are those that depend on unreliable livelihood activities; they cannot meet even the daily need for household food. Examples of these activities are the sale of fuel wood, charcoal and animal forage (these can be viewed as a sign of broken resilience).

Developing coping strategies: new challenges demand new responses

In the sustainable livelihood model, resilience in the Borana pastoral livelihood is viewed in terms of creating new tactics or mechanisms for coping

with shocks and stress. This section examines sources of innovation within both the Borana traditional system and formal agencies (NGOs and government) in order to enhance system identity and continuity.

At present, pastoralist households have not adopted new coping strategies. The old adaptive strategies predominate, including:

- accumulation of herds during the wet season and reducing them during the dry season;
- splitting and diversification of herds;
- selling and slaughtering of animals;
- sale of forest products;
- reducing food intake; and
- reducing spending on non-food items.

Another established coping tactic is institutional and welfare based, and involves stock restitution and redistribution, enhancing a household's insurance network by giving animals to relatives. However, the traditional Borana system shows that old tactics are being eroded and no new tactics have been introduced over the last three *Gada* periods.

Accordingly, households in Dida Hara (73 per cent), Harweyyu (73 per cent) and Dida Yaballo (86 per cent), respectively, indicated an absence of new tactics, while 96 per cent, 86 per cent and 93 per cent of them, respectively, affirmed that they had dismissed the old tactics. This lack of innovation manifests in the following ways:

- a lack of new collective action within the pastoralist system;
- a lack of new rules for natural resource management and social welfare;
- the lack of a new early warning system;
- the lack of new initiatives to enhance forage productivity; and
- the development of community-based organisations.

Thus, as traditional sources of innovation and continuity diminish, adaptive strategies available to households are reduced. As a result, the Borana social structure is losing its identity and its ability to innovate. Negative adaptive tactics are pervasive as internal creativity becomes sluggish.

Another way of analysing resilience according to the livelihood model employed in this study is looking at the capacity of formal agencies in implementing resilience enhancement projects at the pastoral community level, in terms of preparedness, coping, recovery and adaptation to shocks and stress.

In the Borana region, external initiatives that deal with resilience are inadequate. Indeed, existing initiatives are mainly led by indigenous and

international NGOs, while government and private sector agencies are largely divorced from activities intended to build a resilient pastoralist community. While there are numerous donor and humanitarian agencies capable of implementing projects relating to the livelihood of Borana pastoralists, many of these initiatives revolve around short-term emergency responses and often come in the aftermath of major shocks and stress. Emergency relief from NGOs and the government's productive safety net programme is only extended sporadically, serving a nominal role in many instances. It has been found that there is often a huge gap between early warning of a crisis situation and an early response.

Although NGOs and state agencies possess better capacity than traditional institutions to generate new coping and adaptive strategies, the tendency to focus more on short-term shocks than on long-term stress is paralysing the move to build resilience.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This study brought to light a context of increasing vulnerability and compromised resilience among Borana pastoralists. Quick-fix responses to the resilience challenge are counter-productive. What is needed are dynamic responses to the multiple factors causing this vulnerability.

Policies, programmes, projects and activities are needed to enhance the sustainable livelihood adaptation of the Borana. These initiatives must address the drivers of vulnerability while securing access and control over the available asset base. Assets must be built in a way which would facilitate the autonomous functioning of the pastoral production system led by flexible customary entities. Tenure risk must be tackled through discouraging agriculture and boosting trade-offs between rangeland, pasture, water, livestock, customary welfare institutions and natural resource management entities. Good governance is that which puts customary institutions at the forefront of decision making on issues concerning asset vulnerability at local, regional and national level.

The Ethiopian government has to re-evaluate the suitability of its policies and programmes in the pastoral context and integrate resilience issues into policy planning and implementation. Taking into account the pastoralist need for mobility and communal harnessing of crucial resources, supporting the role of customary institutions is a vital step towards building a resilient pastoralist community.

Power relations should be shared between formal and informal institutions, and structural symmetry or balance must be achieved through creating mutually beneficial strategies. It would be beneficial to increase

the representation and engagement of pastoralist groups in the power-bargaining process and to discourage inappropriate land use. Building the capacity of formal and informal institutions is critical for making resilience activities effective, efficient and accountable. Government has to ensure favourable working conditions for multiple institutions. It has to stop imposing policies and instead mobilise collective action by civil society and local communities. A participatory process of designing development strategies would increase social involvement.

It is essential to address market risks, such as price volatility, untrustworthy brokers and information asymmetry, in order to help those pastoralists who have 'dropped out' resume their place in a livestock-based food production system and avoid risky livelihood diversification. It is vital to stop initiatives that settle pastoralists in the middle of grazing systems. This may enhance stock rebuilding, which is crucial to enhancing households' ability to respond to matters affecting their vulnerability. Diversification must start with income sources in the pastoral production system (herd diversification, increased sale of animal products, fattening of animals, and so on). Controlling risky diversification by controlling farming and market forces is a critical move towards resilience.

Repairing dysfunctional traditional adaptive tactics, and creating new resilience enhancement initiatives that combine methods by formal agencies and pastoralist communities, would help strengthen continuity and identity in the Borana pastoral system. NGOs, governments and donor agencies have to be financially, ideologically and structurally flexible enough to track dynamism by putting in place reliable early warning and early response mechanisms to shocks and stress. There is a need to bridge the huge gap between early warning and early response.

If these resilience goals are to be addressed, a forward-looking attitude needs to be fostered among researchers and aid agencies by taking full account of pastoralists' immediate and long-term needs.

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The African Union and Mediated Peace in Africa

A Case of Political Unrest in Burundi

Eric Blanco Niyitunga

INTRODUCTION

Scholars of international mediation continue to ponder the fact that Burundi relapsed into political unrest after the African Union (AU) brokered the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) in 2000¹ and thereby brought the conflict in the country to a stop. More widely, from Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia and Libya, through to Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in central Africa and Zimbabwe and Madagascar in southern Africa, it would appear that neither AU peacekeeping missions nor AU-negotiated peace agreements have succeeded in clearing pathways to democratic governance and sustainable peace.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the ethnic strife that emerged in the 1960s both intensified and altered in character, changing from interstate conflicts into intrastate or intercommunal ones, a transition that to date has left African states experiencing a number of intercommunal conflicts. In view of the failure in the 1990s of the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) and the international community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, a situation coupled with the failure of the Somalian state, African states decided to intensify efforts to the problems facing the continent. Thus, the AU was established, with the aim of finding African-originated and -owned solutions to the problems confronting Africa and so making peace and security a reality on the continent.

Among those problems are intractable conflicts and wars, fought mostly within the state; poor governance and leadership; military and civilian coups ('civilian coups' referring in this context to changes African leaders make to state democratic constitutions to enable themselves to retain power for life); deepening poverty and famine; terrorism; xenophobic attacks; human trafficking and smuggling; migrations of refugees; and the spread of infectious diseases.

Set against this backdrop, the AU's peace settlement for Burundi in 2000 is acknowledged as a case that dealt with the conflict in an African way. As Curtis observes, in this instance African mediators offered an African solution to an African problem.² However, the recurrence of political violence in Burundi, triggered by President Pierre Nkurunziza's bid for a third term in power and the way the AU is currently handling the crisis, is evidence that the AU mediated a 'peace postponed' rather than durable peace.

The conflict was left unresolved because the AU mediators who facilitated the mediation process failed to tackle its root causes. Scholars have argued that the AU-mediated peace for Burundi was a success because it resulted in a situation of calm and stability in the country, but the truth of the matter is that it was a failure because the conflict was left unresolved. As Gurses and McLeod argue, there is a danger that mediators might help the parties to stop fighting for a certain period, yet without actually resolving the dispute.³

It should be understood, of course, that successful mediation in a conflict does not help disputant parties create a perfect society. The point is that a successfully mediated peace should help parties resolve conflicts by addressing their root causes and at least establishing principles that lead to reconciliation, democratic governance and rule of law. As conflict is endemic in society, a successfully mediated peace establishes preventive and transformational mechanisms that help disputant parties to anticipate a conflict and deal with it peacefully before it escalates into violence.

The recurrence of political violence in Burundi is not just a national but a regional and global problem. It may be argued, as Curtis does, that the crisis was misunderstood as an ethnic conflict and that the AU mediators thought it would be resolved by offering a deal based on ethnic political power-sharing.⁴ However, this is a superficial interpretation. The wounds of the Burundi population were left unhealed and the antagonists did not have their contentious differences settled: indeed, it is arguably the case that the solution the AU proposed to the crisis aggravated it rather than resolving it.

According to Gurses and McLeod, a successful mediation process that ends a conflict should help disputant parties reach a mutual, comprehensive agreement that not only stops the open fighting but provides incentives for both sides to live together peacefully under the rubric of good governance and the rule of law.⁵ Moreover, it should also heal the wounds and trauma suffered by the people.

This chapter argues that the recurrence of political conflict in Burundi after the AU brokered the peace agreement exposes the AU's ineffectiveness as an African agency capable of providing African solutions to African problems (ASAP). The key question the chapter sets out to answer is: To what

extent is the recurrence of political violence in Burundi not a peace sacrificed but an expression of a failed African solution to an African problem?

To this end, the chapter examines the AU-led mediation process in the Burundi conflict that ended in an ethnic power-sharing in 2000. It explores the anomalies and mistakes the AU mediators overlooked and made which led them to leave the conflict unresolved. Burundi's relapse into conflict was triggered by four factors related to the mediation process:

- the lack of gender parity;
- the lack of local ownership;
- the failure to include Conseil National pour la Defence de Democratie-Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) and Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu-Forces National de Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL); and
- lack of the cultural awareness on the part of the mediators.

In order to prove these contentions, the chapter offers a general assessment of the AU-mediated peace by examining the APRA for Burundi, the mediation itself, the actors who participated in the process, and factors related to the dynamics of mediation.

To conceptualise the arguments and address the central question, the chapter is structured into three main sections. Section one consists of a literature review. In this section, the concepts of mediation and culture are defined and the debate about culture is situated within the context of the AU-mediated peace for Burundi. The second section consists of an analysis of the AU-mediated peace and the APRA for Burundi. This helps uncover mistakes committed by the AU mediators. The subsections thereafter offer a detailed analysis of the APRA, particularly the anomalies within it that made it impossible to bring about democratic governance based on the rule of law and respect for human rights. It is argued that the relapse into conflict in Burundi was unavoidable because of the issues left unresolved.

The chapter concludes by asserting that the political unrest in Burundi is by and large not a 'sacrificed peace' but a failed African solution to an African problem. The chapter recommends that in order for the AU to offer sustainable mediated peace, there is a need to deploy professional mediators who are equipped with mediation skills. Those mediators should be men and women who are not only experts in practice but academics in the field of mediation and conflict research. Moreover, the AU should recognise that culture has a profound impact on mediation and its outcome and that the deployed mediators thus should be cultural interpreters who are as much aware of their own cultural understandings as of those of the disputants.

DIPLOMACY, MEDIATION AND CULTURE

As an instrument of diplomacy and foreign policy, mediation has become almost as common as conflict itself.⁶ Berridge defines it as 'a special kind of negotiation designed to promote the settlement of a conflict assisted by the presence of neutral third party'.⁷ Slaikeu goes further to define mediation as 'a process through which a third party assists two or more disputant parties in working out their own solution to a conflict'.⁸

Notably, these definitions put an emphasis on the role of a third party that helps the disputant parties solve their conflict, but they fail to indicate the nature and composition of that third party. Bercovitch and Houston note that a third-party mediator may be an individual, organisation or state, and cannot be a direct party in the dispute.⁹ It should be remembered that the role of the third party in a mediation process is defined by its skills in bringing disputant parties to the table and facilitating negotiations and dialogue between them.¹⁰

Galtung and Webel, for instance, view mediation as the 'intervention of a third party unfamiliar to the conflict, trustable, unbiased and intending to be neutral'.¹¹ Smith and Smock contend that mediators should have a concrete understanding of the nature, context and actors of the conflict in which they are required to facilitate negotiation.¹² It is pertinent to note that Galtung and Webel maintain that a mediator must be 'unfamiliar' with the conflict. However, this understanding is problematic in that it creates gaps that undermine the probability of a successful mediation process in African conflicts. This chapter argues that while the mediator should not be one of the parties to the conflict, he or she should be familiar with the conflict and its context.

More important, though, is the fact that none of the above definitions considers the impact that culture has on the mediation process either positively or negatively. Hence, this chapter adopts Sgubini's definition of mediation because it is one which acknowledges cultural differences between both mediators and disputant parties. She defines mediation as a 'tool that helps to bridge the gap between differences, and this requires knowing and respecting the culture of people that you meet'.¹³ So, in the context of mediation in Africa, 'culture is understood as a set of values and beliefs, acquired from learning, experiences and social upbringing, which creates implicit social rules or a code of ethics and behaviour within a specific group'.¹⁴

It should thus be noted that the failure of a mediator to understand the conflict from a scholarly point of view and to recognise the force of cultural differences between the mediator and the disputant parties jeopardises the mediation process. The failure can be an immediate breakdown of the actual

mediation process, or the signing of an apparent peace agreement that fails to tackle the root causes of the conflict; in the latter case, it would mean the conflict has been postponed, making a relapse of violence probable.

Africa is, as Mazrui shows, a continent richly varied in its cultures and peoples.¹⁵ In this vein, Savage argues that the goals and focus of a mediation process differ according to the culture of each participant. She further argues that a critical element of effective mediation is the mediator's ability to understand the different goals that are shaped by culture, and to forge a process which satisfies the participants' varying goals.¹⁶

The question that emerges, then, is whether the AU mediators in Burundi considered the cultural differences among themselves and between the parties, particularly as this was a multiparty mediation process, that is, a process conducted by several mediators who came from different cultural settings. Did all mediators in this case have the same culture? Did they have the same culture as the disputant parties? Were all acculturated in the mediation process and in the Burundian culture?

These are important questions that help in analysing the AU-mediated peace for Burundi and the APRA in order to uncover anomalies in the Arusha Agreement that led to the recurrence of political violence in Burundi – violence in which hundreds have died and which has caused a flux of refugees in the central and east Africa regions. This chapter argues that the AU has never taken seriously the impact of cultural dynamics on a mediation outcome or peace accord.

In this chapter, 'culture' is understood as socially transmitted values, beliefs and symbols that are generally shared by members of a social group.¹⁷ It may be understood as the cumulative deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving.¹⁸ In the context of the AU-mediated peace, culture has not been given adequate attention, yet it affects the way people understand and respond to conflict. Carnevale argues that culture has the potential to affect parties' preferences and agendas during a mediation process, so it should be taken into consideration by mediators.¹⁹

Anthropologists have taken different approaches to understanding the essence of culture during mediation, but have been unable to reach consensus.²⁰ Vivello argues that the 'totalist' versus 'mentalist' debate centres on whether culture includes all aspects of people's lives or only people's thought processes.²¹ Kroeber highlights nevertheless that there is wide agreement that culture affects people's values, beliefs, perceptions and behaviour.²² Ting-Tooney argues that both individual and cultural differences contribute to differences in values, beliefs, perceptions, and behaviours.²³ Handwerker

maintains that culture is constituted within the cognitive frameworks of individuals, where many factors, such as their experience, socioeconomic status, occupation, gender and religion, can come into play.²⁴ Davidheiser notes that disputes and peacemaking cut to the core of shared values and norms, which are essential components of culture.²⁵

Accordingly, in order to help disputants reach a mutual settlement and to make a mediation process successful, any mediator must be familiar with the conflict in respect of which he or she intends to facilitate mediation. Furthermore, when conducting peace talks, mediators should be aware of their own culture and that of the disputants, and refrain from imposing their culture on the disputants. Mediators deployed to facilitate peace talks should also have professional skills that enable them understand the conflict and interpret cultural references during a mediation process.

In this regard, it can be argued that a science of mediation would include an in-depth understanding of communication (both verbal and non-verbal), psychology, anthropology and history. Anthropologically, mediation requires that mediators must identify and analyse the cultural patterns of the disputants and the ways in which these patterns are linked to core issues that led to the conflict. Docherty contends that the mediation process in peace-making involves a comprehensive effort of identifying patterns or types of cultures of the disputants and studying a large group of cultures where the conflict took place.²⁶ Salacuse explains that the goal of identifying types of cultures, or developing cultural profiles, before conducting a mediation process is to inform mediators about these communication patterns and support their efforts with cautionary advice about how to communicate in a particular cultural context or with someone from a certain culture.²⁷

Augsburger suggests that all cultures have conflicts but not all cultures see the same problems as conflicts, nor do they make the same assumptions about how human beings should respond to conflict.²⁸ As most conflicts are embedded in culture, any mediator must therefore be able to identify the cultural values and issues that are at stake in the conflict they are called on to mediate. It is essential to note that any brokered peace should be defined by parameters that accommodate and reflect the disputants' culture.

Augsburger describes culture as a complex and powerful construct in society.²⁹ It is important to understand that culture consists of many unwritten rules and patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, rules and patterns that are acquired and transmitted mainly by means of languages and symbols.³⁰ Jandt notes that every social unit consists of multiple cultural groups defined by a range of factors such as age group, gender, language, ethnicity, spiritual beliefs, values and education.³¹ As such, Stringer and Lusardo explain that in the context of a mediation process,

[c]ultural differences may not be the actual source of a dispute, but these differences sometimes play a crucial role in the outcome of mediation [...]. A mediator who is aware of these subtleties and is sensitive enough to act accordingly is most likely to succeed in helping parties with different cultural backgrounds achieve a satisfying resolution to their dispute.³²

Culture influences people to think and behave differently to one another; it shapes their differences in perspective, differences which, if not managed carefully, can result in misunderstandings and even violent conflict. Thus, it can be said that culture tremendously affects the conduct of a mediation.

A case in point is the AU-mediated peace that halted the conflict in Burundi. The process was initially conducted by a single mediator, but due to failures stemming from the complexity of the conflict, it turned into a multi-party mediation process. It is important to note that these mediators had different cultures, did not have a similar understanding of the conflict, and took different approaches to the mediation process. One can say that a mediator's cultural background affected the process to a large extent, in the sense that the use of force during the process became inevitable in order to avoid open failure. For example, the imposition of sanctions against the then Burundi government, carried out with the support of the mediator, undermined the confidence the Tutsi had in the mediation process.³³ The use of force also undermined the mediators' credibility in the eyes of the disputants.

It is argued here, then, that during a mediation process in African conflicts, mediators should resist the use of force or sanctions because it weakens the mediation process. Likewise, it leaves the conflict unresolved in that it undermines the trust and confidence the disputants have in the mediators and induces fear in them as well.

In seeking to understand how culture affects a mediation process, Siew makes it clear that, from a social and psychological viewpoint, the perception that a culture is superior or inferior has a significant influence on the parties' identities, power relations and levels of confidence during the mediation process.³⁴ Furthermore, Essed demonstrates that such identities could be a result of a person's skin colour, religion, language, accent, gender or sexual representation.³⁵ In turn, Davidheiser argues that social systems are made of norms, values, and behavioural patterns that, if not taken into consideration by mediators, are likely to reduce the chance of a mediation process being successful.³⁶ The fact that Burundi is a French-speaking country and the AU mediators were from English-speaking countries meant that the language barriers between the mediators and the disputant parties had an unrecognised cultural impact that affected not only the mediation process but the outcome. A lack of culturally relevant mediation training

essentially defeats the core mediation principles of forging a balance of power and facilitating respectful peace talks and negotiation processes.³⁷

ANALYSIS OF THE AU-MEDIATED PEACE AND THE APRA

The APRA was a comprehensive peace agreement reached by the disputant parties in the Burundi conflict and facilitated by AU mediators. A peace agreement is a contract reached by disputants who agree willingly to be bound by it with the intention of resolving their conflict and establishing principles to enable them to build sustainable peace and security. Yawanarajah and Ouellet understand peace agreements as the contracts intended to end a violent conflict and constructively address it.³⁸ The focus on sustainable peace implies that successful mediation should address the underlying causes of the conflict and put in place principles that prevent its recurrence.

Since conflict is endemic in society, a peace agreement should, moreover, enable disputant parties to establish early warning mechanisms to help them detect a looming conflict and deal with it before it becomes violent. As happens with peace agreements that fail to lead to sustainable peace and security, the APRA for Burundi did not address the conflict's underlying causes. At key junctures, the AU mediators turned a blind eye to issues of gender and culture in the mediation process. In addition, the AU has not considered the mediation process as a specialised task that requires professionally trained mediators.³⁹ The AU-brokered peace agreement neither sought to resolve the conflict, nor prevent its resurgence.

The following sections analyse the anomalies in the APRA in order to understand why the AU-mediated peace for Burundi was a failure.

LACK OF GENDER PARITY IN THE MEDIATION TEAM

The mediation process that led to the signing of the APRA lacked gender parity, on the side both of mediators and of the disputant parties. There was no woman among the mediators or among those who represented rebel groups and political parties. In the search for ASAP through mediation, the AU has never appointed a woman as a chief mediator. The culture of overlooking the role of women in the mediation process in Africa should be addressed. Theresa de Langis argues that during mediation processes, women have the ability to change the nature of the dynamic and thereby affect the outcome of negotiations, given the unique experience and expertise they can bring to the table.⁴⁰

Although women did not participate in the Burundi peace talks, women from civil society and local organisations were involved in the

post-mediation phase of implementing the APRA. One can argue that it was an awkward move to involve them at this stage, seeing as they did not participate in the negotiations. Women must be involved right from beginning, in the pre-mediation phase. Involving women in the preparation process helps all parties understand what the conflict is about as women have a vested interest in equalising power and are more apt to identify with the parties in conflict and the marginalised groups.⁴¹ Anderlini notes that women bring mediating and negotiating styles or experiences to peace talks that are different to those of men, and at times when fresh perspectives and approaches are sorely needed.⁴² Maxwell argues that 'male and female mediators are equally effective at reaching an initial settlement, but female mediators are more effective at mediating binding settlements'.⁴³

De Langis observes that in many cultures women are positioned as peacebuilders in their families and communities, in that they use more collaborative and cooperative approaches than men do; during mediation, these approaches can smooth the way for the resolution of a conflict by helping disputants to sign an all-inclusive peace agreement.⁴⁴ In Burundian culture, women are believed to be the pillars of social cohesion and prosperity, with society's survival depending on them. This crucial point is emphasised by De Langis, who argues that in all societies 'women are dependent upon collaboration for our survival, and so we build bridges to create alliances'.⁴⁵

In a mediation process women are both inclusive and conclusive, patient and persistent, and typically more open-minded than men. These characteristics enable women to address the emotional and psychological trauma of conflict, which, if left unattended, can prove to be one of the most destructive spoilers of a peace agreement. Indeed, the International Peace Institute (IPI) report states that women's involvement in mediation ensures that a more durable and robust peace is achieved.⁴⁶

This chapter argues that if the AU had involved women in the mediation process, they could have helped the disputant parties reach a political solution that went beyond the settlement of the conflict. This solution could have enabled peace that lead to rule of law and democratic governance. The AU has not understood the role women play in the mediation process. Instead of appointing a woman as a chief mediator to facilitate the current political turmoil, it appointed President Museveni, whose credibility and mediation skills are open to question. Hence, it should be noted that in the process of finding ASAP through a mediated peace, the AU must understand the role women play, and therefore appoint them as chief mediators.

LACK OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP

The other factor that has led to the failure of the AU-mediated peace for Burundi is the fact that disputants were deprived of their freedom to own the mediation process. Nathan argues that in any peace talks, disputants must have the full freedom and final word on how they negotiate and on what terms they settle; both sides must find an alternative to stalemate and destruction.⁴⁷ Allowing the disputants to have freedom during mediation enables a mediator to listen to the disputant parties' wishes and therefore help them reach political agreement. By listening carefully to disputant parties, a mediator is able to understand contentious issues, cultural issues embedded in the conflict, and the level of animosity among the disputants. A mediator is also able to learn about and understand the disputants' culture. He or she should make sure that any lasting solutions are found within the cultural perspective of the disputant parties.

In short, allowing disputant parties to own the process has a significant impact on the resolution of a conflict. However, in the case of the AU-mediated peace for Burundi, this was not the case. AU mediators threatened disputant parties and coerced them to come to the negotiating table, a move that prevented them from owning the process. Instead, the AU mediators owned the mediation process. They resorted to forcibly calling for all the militia groups to stop fighting and consider negotiations as their way out. This was done through targeted and smart sanctions, which means that rebel groups did not give any consent.

The use of force threatens a mediation process because it leads to mediators losing the confidence and cooperation of a party against whom it threatens or applies sanctions or military force.⁴⁸ It is argued, furthermore, that the use of force destroys the mediator's credibility as an honest peace broker and makes the mediator a party to the conflict, undermining the peace talks and to a large extent hampering the probability of reaching an all-inclusive peace agreement.⁴⁹ This was basically the case in the AU-mediated peace for Burundi. The use of force and threats to make militia groups come to the negotiating table, and the use of force during the mediation process, not only reduced the disputants' confidence in the credibility of the mediator but also affected the mediation outcome. As a result, the disputants failed to take the mediation process and the APRA seriously.

A further reason why disputant parties can fail to take the mediator and mediation outcome seriously stems from the nature and credibility of the mediator. The AU has used former heads of state in numerous mediation processes on the continent. However, they lack the professional expertise in mediation research that could help them assess and enhance the conflict's 'ripeness' and so persuade parties to consider mediation as a key to

unlocking the political deadlock. In the case of Burundi, the mediators – Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, a former OAU chairperson, Ambassador Fall, Ambassador Leandre Bassole, and the late president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere – lacked the expertise necessary to guide the disputant parties out of their stalemate. Here, it became a case of the tail wagging the dog, since the parties persuaded the mediators to follow their wishes, and so instead of mediators helping the parties, they themselves became a problem to the mediation process. Their presence basically hampered and complicated the entire mediation process.

At the moment, the AU's appointment of mediators is based by and large on the past or present political office which an individual held or holds. The success of a mediation process, however, is not dependent on the mediator's influential position but rather on his or her expertise. The appointment of President Museveni of Uganda as chief mediator in the Burundi conflict was ill-judged, given that he is a man who has been in power for more than three decades and has changed the constitution to remain in power for life. With Museveni as the chief mediator, Pierre Nkurunziza and his followers are by and large going to take his mediation role as a joke.

What Pierre Nkurunziza and Yoweri Museveni have in common is that they were chiefs of rebel militia groups, had killed people, violated human rights and are still acting as dictators. Moreover, they all have changed their country's constitutions so as to vie for a third term in power. The difference is that while President Pierre Nkurunziza has been widely criticised and pressurised by the regional leaders and international community as whole, President Museveni is free and remains uncriticised.

It is unfortunate, then, that the AU continues to view mediation as guesswork, which is why no attention has been paid to selecting qualified mediators with academic expertise in mediation research. As Susskind and Babbitt observe:

Many times the leaders of by-standing countries are tapped to play mediator roles because of their acceptability to the parties rather than their prior mediation experience. While all experienced diplomats understand at least the rudiments of mediation, most are not skilled in the art or science of the process.⁵⁰

Moreover, it is essential to note that the AU continues to lack coherent policies and principles to guide the selection of qualified mediators. The same mindset accounts for a propensity to appoint career politicians into the diplomatic corps in African polities. Nathan argues that mediators who fail to take seriously the needs and concerns of disputants in turn cause those disputants view them and the mediation outcome with the same lack

of seriousness.⁵¹ This is why the CNDD-FDD political party and its followers disregarded the APRA and violated the Arusha peace accord, making further political violence inevitable. Local ownership of a mediation process is crucial, and requires adapting peace talks to local cultures and norms.

FAILURE TO INCLUDE KEY GROUPS IN THE MAIN MEDIATION PROCESS

Another surprising factor that led to the return of conflict in Burundi is the fact that the political parties CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL were left behind during the mediation process that led to the signing of the APRA.

This is confirmed by the Arusha Agreement document. On its first page, where all the political parties that participated in the mediation are mentioned and where their binding signatures appear, the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL are absent, even though they are two active rebel groups that, with their military wings, have a majority of local Burundian support – which is why they were engaged in the fight against the then Tutsi-controlled regime. Devon Curtis also confirms that the two groups were not called upon to participate in the mediation process, nor did they sign the Arusha Agreement.⁵²

Even those political parties that participated in the mediation process and put their binding signatures on the APRA did so with many reservations. There are two reasons for this. First, the parties did not own the process and define the terms and conditions of the settlement. Second, their culture was undermined by the mediators who participated in the process. Therefore, the agreement in itself had discrepancies and failed to reflect the parties' interests and those of people they were representing. It can be argued that the current regime under the CNDD-FDD leadership is not answerable to the APRA, as the party was not involved in the process and did not sign the Agreement and is therefore not bound by it.

Why did the AU mediators overlook these two active rebel groups during mediation? It can be argued that, because the AU views mediation as guesswork which does not require professionalism and expertise, it deployed mediators who are not experts in the field of mediation. This point is captured by Nathan, who argues that 'it would therefore be a mistake to appoint retired heads of state and other national leaders to the Panel of the Wise solely on the grounds that their profile and stature will ensure their credibility with parties in conflict'.⁵³ This mistake was obvious in the Burundi conflict, in that the conflict had many rebel movements and actors.

One can see that due to lack of professionalism in the mediation research, the deployed AU mediators did not know which strong rebel movement to call first and which one to call later. A related reason is the failure to understand the disagreements between the CNDD and CNDD-FDD, and

PALIPEHUTU and PALIPEHUTU-FNL political parties. CNDD-FDD separated itself from CNDD in 1997, while PALIPEHUTU separated itself from the PALIPEHUTU-FNL in late 2000. As a result of a failure to understand the dynamics of the Burundi conflict and which rebel group to call first, the AU mediators persuaded CNDD and PALIPEHUTU to join the peace talks. This was a fatal mistake, because these rebel groups were less influential in the conflict and had no followers in the country.

It is therefore appropriate to re-emphasise the argument that the APRA was fundamentally flawed and still faces a number of crucial challenges.⁵⁴ Hence, the conflict was left unresolved and postponed.

The CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL rebel groups were, however, involved later in post-mediation phases during the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. It can be argued that in a post-mediation phase, when a peace agreement is brought down to local level, there are several small mediations that engage with local people to enable them to buy into and implement the agreement. It is important to note that if the signed peace agreement overlooked certain issues in the conflict during the major mediation process, its implementation becomes problematic. Sometimes this failure leads to a relapse of political instability and deadly violence. The AU mediators disregarded the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL during the mediation process and resorted to using force to compel these rebel groups to join the process. It was understood that if these rebels could remain active, the process of implementing the Arusha Agreement was going to be difficult. Only at this point did the mediators understand that a peace agreement would be achieved by only involving those who were still fighting.

So, force was used to compel them to come to the negotiating table. Wolpe argues that CNDD-FDD was not willing to join the negotiations because it wanted to fight and capture the entire country.⁵⁵ Even when their leader was elected in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the party continued killing people it considered a threat to its interests. When the party, under the leadership of Pierre Nkurunziza, saw that its second term in power had elapsed, it mobilised its followers to remain in power by force if necessary. This is the reason why in Burundi today anyone who is seen as interfering with the party's interests by opposing its third-term bid is quickly dealt with.

The situation has led to many smaller-scale mediations that are not captured anywhere in the APRA. However, such smaller-scale mediations in the post-mediation phases are unable to make a mediated peace sustainable if the major issues have not been addressed in the main mediation process. The implementation of the APRA in the post-mediation phase was basically rooted in the main AU-led mediation process in Arusha.

LACK OF CULTURAL AWARENESS BY MEDIATORS

Culture has a powerful impact on the conduct of the mediation process. Culture can also hasten the mediation process if mediators understand it and take it into consideration. Thus, mediators should be able to assess a conflict to understand its cultural dynamics. However, in the Burundi case, the conflict was neither triggered by culture nor fuelled by different cultural perspectives among the people, since all Burundians have the same culture, language and lifestyle. The three tribes – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa – share a lifestyle and mother tongue, Kirundi. The problem originated with the AU, which mandated several non-professional mediators to mediate in the conflict.

While Burundian culture recognises a woman as a source of social cohesion and community survival, the AU saw it as unnecessary to give women a role in the mediation process. This move went against Burundian culture, as explained above. However, Burundi is not the only case in which the AU failed to appoint women; it continues to appoint men as chief mediators, which means that this agency has not yet understood the important role of women as mediators in peace processes. Research by O'Reilly and Ó Súilleabháin finds that women should be involved in peace negotiations and agreements because they generate a set of structures and direction for post-conflict reconstruction and politics that have an impact on the life of society as a whole.⁵⁶

In the Burundi case, the AU mediators did not take into consideration cultural factors. Sgubini argues that when conducting mediation process with diverse parties, a mediator must recognise cultural differences between the parties, as well as between himself or herself and the parties.⁵⁷ The AU understood that the conflict is ethnically oriented and overlooked its cultural dimensions, and yet ethnicity and culture are inseparable. All the mediators who facilitated the mediation process lacked the necessary training to work with people from different cultures. The two tribes fighting against each other during the Burundian conflict shared cultural norms. To understand their culture and the impact it had on the process was an easy task. The complications came about due to the AU mediators' failure to understand the disputant parties' culture and how this failure affected the entire mediation process.

In the Burundi case, it is important to note that while the disputant parties came from a French cultural background, the mediators' background was English. The French culture that shaped the perspectives of the disputants and the English culture that had shaped the perspectives of the mediators collided at the negotiating table. The collision had both a direct and indirect effect on the mediation process and its outcome. This is

because in every society people learn their language through culture, and this means that culture and its norms are basically transmitted or passed on through language. It is therefore argued that the recurrence of today's political violence in Burundi is a result of the inability of AU mediators to understand the local culture and how culture can affect a mediation process. This justifies the argument that the APRA brokered by AU mediators failed to take into consideration the effects of culture on mediation process.

CONCLUSION

The resurgence of political violence in Burundi is, as many have warned, leading the country towards a genocide. It is not a failed peace: it is a reflection of the inability of the AU to offer workable African-originated solutions to African problems. The AU mediation process that led to the signing of the APRA was flawed and had many anomalies and inconsistencies. Culture and gender disparity have never been given the attention they should, both during the mediation process and in the implementation phase. Cultural bias has the potential to affect the mediation process and hamper efforts to achieve sustainable peace and security in a society. The AU should refrain from understanding mediation as guesswork but rather see it as an academic endeavour. Mediation processes should be conducted by mediators who are experienced scholars in the field of mediation and understand both the negative and positive impacts of culture on the process. Such mediators should be able to allow the disputants to own the mediation process and define the terms and conditions of the settlement.

This chapter recommends that the practice of deploying non-professionally trained mediators who know nothing about mediation and who are not cultural interpreters should be avoided. The AU should avoid deploying mediators who are selected simply because they are former heads of state or occupy an influential political position. Undoubtedly, this is a root cause that prevents the AU from offering workable ASAP. During a mediation process, a mediator stands between disputant parties who hate each other. The task of a mediator is first of all to reduce tension and animosity between them and then help them to reach a mutual agreement that brings stability. A mediator does this by understanding the cultural dynamics between the disputant parties and of the conflict itself.

The chapter has argued that women are the most talented at this task and therefore should be appointed as chief mediators. It was argued that the current political violence in Burundi is a result of a failed African solution to an African problem, in that the conflict was left unresolved by the AU mediators and its resurgence was inevitable. It should be noted that the

CNDD-FDD regime and the determination of Pierre Nkurunziza to secure a third term in power as president did not sacrifice any peace in Burundi but instead reignited a postponed conflict.

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The Mantra of African Solutions for African Problems

A New Perspective in Continental Conflict and Security Management

Ferdinand O. Ottoh

INTRODUCTION

The mantra 'African Solutions to African Problems' (ASAP) opens the debate on the capacity or capability of the African state and its leaders to manage security challenges on the continent arising from armed conflicts, insurgency and terrorism. Historically, this call for Africans to take charge of their own destiny predates the independence of the majority of African states. As far back as 1900, the Africans in the diaspora began a movement known as Pan-Africanism. Notable among them were Sylvester Williams and W. E. B. Dubois (of Jamaican extraction). The subsequent formation of the Universal Negro Improvement Association by Marcus Garvey was also intended to raise a new consciousness about African history and culture. This was the guide in the decolonisation process in Africa and in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Union (AU).

African leaders are beginning to rekindle the old spirit of Pan-Africanism which opposes colonialism, imperialism, racism and exploitation. Leaders are also no longer comfortable with the overbearing influence of Western powers in their internal affairs. This re-awakening consciousness among African leaders is a demonstration that Africa has come of age and thus that it should be able to solve its own problem without relying on Western powers. However, the paradox of Africa as a continent strategically located on the globe with abundant natural resources is that it lacks capacity to manage these resources. In the words of Ali Mazrui, 'Physically, Africa is the most central of continents in geographical location, but politically and militarily it is probably the most marginal'.¹

The continent is endowed with abundant natural and human resources, but is fragmented and lacks technology and a credible military capacity. In Ali Mazrui's 'In search of Pax Africana' he explains Africa's capacity for self-pacification. He poses a fundamental question: 'Now that the

imperial order is coming to an end, who is to keep the peace in Africa?’² The idea of self-government implies, above all, self-policing. The logical conclusion of decolonisation lay in Africa’s ambition to be its own policeman. Mazrui argues therefore that in conceptualising Pax Africana, ‘it is not enough that Africa should have a capacity to police itself; it is also vital that Africa should contribute effectively towards policing the rest of the world’.³

This chapter is divided into several parts. The foregoing serves as an introduction; the second part provides conceptual analysis; and the third part lays the theoretical foundation for understanding the mantra of ASAP. This is followed in the fourth part by a critique of the concept of ASAP. The fifth part assesses ASAP in terms of the management of conflict and security, while the sixth examines the operational gaps in the application of ASAP. The seventh part examines the AU’s role in finding solutions to the Libyan and Malian conflicts, and this is followed by the conclusion.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The concept of ASAP connotes different things to different people, and it therefore has varied interpretations. One is that it refers to an African renaissance that combats the tyrannical forces of neocolonialism.⁴ This requires commitment by African leaders to take absolute control of the continent and entails an abhorrence for foreign influence in Africa. Indeed, ASAP has become a new way of thinking about the best way for Africans to face the myriad problems on the continent themselves rather than relying on Western powers.

Moreover, ASAP recognises the uniqueness of African societies in terms of their colonial history, heterogeneity and the daunting challenges confronting them. In this respect, it also means that Africa should not only design its agendas for peace and security but own the processes for creating such agendas and implementing them.⁵ ASAP is a call for African states and leaders to take charge of their affairs on the continent. For instance, as Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa, said,

It is critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations ... We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It is an African responsibility, and we can do it.⁶

ASAP implies that Africans share a responsibility to help one another solve problems anywhere on the continent. From the African renaissance

perspective, ASAP creates the impression that Africa is a united continent and has the capacity to speak with one voice.⁷

However, the mantra of ASAP is not restricted to security and conflict management but extends to the area of economic development. African economies have been conditioned by external factors in the past. African states did not join the global capitalist economy of their own free will but were forcefully integrated into it. Africa has no power to determine the direction in which the global market is moving; its future continues to be dictated by outside forces and events. In the spirit of a renaissance, Africa wants to dictate events in the international economic system and, most importantly, be in charge of the commodity market, as it is endowed with abundant natural resources.

We can summarise the concept of ASAP in three broad themes:

- foreign powers should not assist Africa;
- Africa should be consulted by foreigners in finding solutions to its problems; and
- foreigners should not intervene in Africa's internal affairs.

It all boils down to an 'I can do attitude' and pride. Despite that desirability of this initiative, African leaders have failed to realise that Western powers are no longer willing to provide some crisis management assistance, because the number of conflicts in Africa has increased since the end of the Cold War. Western powers have shown a reluctance to continue supplying aid as before, a phenomenon that has been described as donor fatigue.⁸

According to Garuba:

It has suddenly become fashionable to preach the gospel of leaving Africa to Africans, [...] that the time has come for Africans to be left to evolve their own home-grown initiatives towards contending with their plethora of seemingly intractable problems.⁹

In view of the daunting challenges posed by conflict situations on the continent, it is argued that many African states continue to suffer severe deficiencies in terms of their capacity to respond to conflicts that ravage the region.¹⁰

Conflict is,

a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religion, socio-economic, political or others) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.¹¹

Evans and Newnham refer to conflict management as '[a]ny situation where a conflict continues but where its worst excesses are avoided or mitigated. Conflict management would in particular, seek to avoid or terminate violence between parties'.^{12, 13}

Crisis is understood simply as 'a perceived turning point in relationships between actors, or between actors and their environment'.¹⁴ The term crisis management refers to 'the attempt to control events during a crisis to prevent significant and systematic violence from occurring'.¹⁵ According to Baylis, et al., 'crisis management is concerned ... with the procedure for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand'.^{16, 17}

Security is conceptualised as 'the physical, social and psychological quality of life of a society and its members both in the domestic setting and within the larger regional and global system'.¹⁸ In a subjective manner, security measures the absence of fear, anxiety, tension or apprehension of being in danger of losing life, liberty, and property and core values. It is said that a nation is secure to the extent that it is in a position not to lose core values, life, property and liberty, and if it wishes, to deter aggression or win wars when they are unavoidable.¹⁹

An attempt has been made to redefine African security. African security should be considered beyond the bounds of traditional maintenance of military strength to ward off aggression against the state or the expansion of an apparatus of internal security to ensure domestic order.²⁰ There is a general notion that African security problems can be attributed to the ingrained psychology of a generation of rulers who guarded their ruling power at all costs within the artificial boundaries created by former colonial powers.²¹ The Kampala document was adopted by African leaders in Kampala, Uganda 1991 when they launched the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa. The document states that,

The concept of security goes beyond military consideration. It embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights.^{22, 23}

This document offers some useful principles that could suggest new ideas to address African security challenges. These are:

- the principle of conflict prevention and containment;
- a common framework and collective continental security;

- the principle of good neighbourliness and peaceful resolution of conflicts; and
- national and continental self-reliance in certain strategic areas covering military and non-military, including popular, participation in national defence vital for Africa's security.²⁴

To meet these challenges new institutions, mechanisms, and instruments must be put in place at both regional and global levels. It is this thinking that has led African security architecture to be designed in a way similar to the United Nations' (UN) collective security arrangement.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING

There are two emerging schools of thought on the management of African security problems. These are the cultural revival and modernisation schools, which attempt to locate African problems in the abandonment of rich African culture by Africans as a result of colonialism.²⁵ The cultural revival school argues that revival of African culture will crystallise in total independence and freedom from the shackles of Western imperialism. Kwame Gyekye's moderate cultural revivalism is a call for a reconsideration of traditional African heritages to see which are still valuable and applicable to present realities.²⁶ This does not imply retrogression. Instead, Africans are being asked to look retrospectively in order to remodel Africa into a developed society.²⁷

The modernisation school opposes the cultural revival school on the ground that the continual recourse to the African past is not only retrogressive but dangerous in terms of the overall development of the continent politically, economically, culturally and socially. The argument is anchored on the reasoning that breaking away from the past will help to rejuvenate the spirit of Africa. In other words, in this era of globalisation the continent should be moving with new trends rather than being trapped in its old culture.²⁸

Without entering the argument among African scholars about modernisation theory, the point is that both the cultural revivalist and modernisation school's views cannot be dismissed out of hand. Liberating Africa entirely from an oppressive and undemocratic governance system should be the focus instead of sloganeering about the African Renaissance and ASAP.

The theory of hegemony gives another perspective on the discourse of ASAP. Antonio Gramsci's discussion of hegemony is not our concern, but it is worth pointing out that an aspect of his work deals with social relations, the balance of class forces and the mechanism of domination, coercion,

consent and leadership.²⁹ Gramsci describes hegemony as 'a relation not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organisation of consent'.³⁰ The term describes the dominance of one nation over another.³¹ Hegemony can also mean 'the exercise of power by a superior actor accompanied by participation, which is a result of consensus'.³² Hegemony implies the superior position of one state based on hard and soft power. State hegemony, therefore, is an important element in effective conflict resolution since it involves application of strategy, the exercise of power, the striving for consent, and the articulation of interests.³³

The realist theory of hegemonic stability was inspired by Gramsci, who argued that the capitalist class has the apparent ability to co-opt especially the working class into a 'grand coalition' under its own leadership by convincing them that its own interests coincide with those of society as a whole.³⁴ The theory explains that under anarchy a hegemon can secure peace and stability between states.³⁵ Critical International Relations, championed by Robert Cox, defined international hegemony as 'the formation of a coalition of top-down forces activated by a common consciousness in which those at bottom are able to participate'.^{36, 37} In international relations, a hegemon establishes norms of behaviour which give that hegemon a dominant voice in international institutions. Hegemony requires that one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing inter-state relations, and is willing to do it.³⁸ Thus, hegemonic governance involves a state or states occupying a superior position in the global system.³⁹

Drawing on these descriptions of hegemons and hegemony, we can now attempt to identify possible candidates among AU members that have the capacity to play a hegemonic role in Africa. Ten countries have been identified as potential hegemons: Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia and Libya.⁴⁰ However, countries torn apart by civil war, such as Sudan (at least until quite recently), Angola and the DRC, cannot easily exert power over others.⁴¹

The problem, therefore, is that African countries lack the capacity or the will power to act as hegemons. Egypt is a potential hegemon and may be able to play a hegemonic role, but may not be eager to do so because its interests lie elsewhere.⁴² Other candidates, such as Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Libya, cannot excel in all dimensions.⁴³ Nigeria has continued to play a hegemonic role in West Africa in the area of conflict management through ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Sadly, with the upsurge of ethno-nationalist movements in the south-east, south-south and northern regions of the country – in particular, religious fundamentalism under the aegis of Boko Haram in the northern region, Niger Delta militancy, and Biafra agitators in the south east – the country may not be

able to sacrifice its dwindling resources on the resolution of conflict on the continent.

Nigeria is also confronted with problems of corruption, unemployment and bad governance; the North African countries of Egypt and Libya are still going through turbulent political crises, with the waves of popular protests.⁴⁴ These North African countries are politically aligned to the Arab League rather than to the AU. Thus, they do not consider themselves as black Africans, let alone as shouldering the burden of leadership on the continent.⁴⁵

South Africa is a promising candidate as a hegemon because of its economic and military power. However, one difficulty it would have in playing this role lies in the Mbeki government's foreign policy of quiet diplomacy.⁴⁶ This was eloquently captured in his speech to the South African parliament on 18 February 2003:

I [...] assure our neighbours and the peoples of the rest of Africa that the government we lead has no great power pretensions. We claim no right to impose our will on any independent country. We will not force anything on anybody ...⁴⁷

ASSESSING APSA AS A FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT

During the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Rwandan genocide, Africa saw the new approach of the West towards Africa, that is, it was abandoning Africa to grapple with its own problems. This situation made it imperative for African leaders, governments and people to explore new approaches and evolve new mechanisms that would enable them to take their destiny in their own hands. The international community failed to deal decisively with the genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s and state collapse in Somalia. This partly explains why African leaders felt Africa should find its own solutions to its problems.

The OAU has been impotent in addressing some problems on the continent in the past. The OAU Charter contained the provision to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states. This came to be translated into the norm of non-intervention.⁴⁸ With the transformation of the OAU into the AU, there was a policy shift to ensure it would become an effective mechanism to deal with the numerous problems confronting the continent. Thus, the notion of non-interference was replaced with that of non-indifference, meaning that AU member states should be concerned with events happening in their region.⁴⁹

The Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 established 17 key institutions for peace and security. The Act gives the AU the responsibility of playing a protective role in situations involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The principle of Responsibility to Protect in Africa (R2PA) explains that ‘when sovereign states are not able to protect their citizens in a period of armed conflict, the international community as a whole has a responsibility to protect civilians from massive human rights abuses’.⁵⁰ Generally, states have a shared responsibility to protect their citizens from massive human rights abuses. According to the UN, ‘R2P means the responsibility to issue warnings, generate effective prevention strategies and, where necessary, to mobilise an effective response’.⁵¹

It was in pursuance of the objectives of the Constitutive Act of the AU that the AU Peace Security Council was established as a legal institution of the union through a protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, entered into force on 26 December 2003.⁵² The Protocol provides a comprehensive agenda for peace and security that includes conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices, intervention, humanitarian action and disaster management.⁵³ ASAP has influenced the emergence and gradual consolidation of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), *a priori* more interventionist. This security structure conceived by African leaders is faced with political, logistical and operational constraints, coupled with coordination and complementarity problems between African governments and regional or international agencies.⁵⁴

The AU adoption of the APSA as a framework for conflict and security management has been demonstrated in a number of peacekeeping operations in regional and continental organisations.⁵⁵ These include the pioneering operation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the early 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which sent the MICOPAX (the former FOMUC) to Central African Republic and AU missions to Burundi (AMIBH), Comoros (MIOC), Somalia (AMISOM) and Darfur in conjunction with the United Nations (UNAMID).⁵⁶

The process was articulated within the framework of APSA with the following structures:

- policy-making (the Peace and Security Council (PSC));
- two military structures (the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC));
- a centre for analysis and data collection (the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS));

- an advisory body on outside mediation (the Panel of the Wise); and
- a special peace fund to finance operations (the Peace Fund).

Notably, the PSC and ASF are two of the major instruments of the APSA. In the operationalisation of APSA there are functioning systems in the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanism playing a key role in the provision of peace and security.

THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL (PSC)

The PSC is the most critical and visible institutional component of the AU's peace and security architecture. It was established by the first summit of the AU in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. It is the standing decision-making organ – equivalent to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.⁵⁷ It is meant to act as a collective security and early warning instrument for timely and efficient responses to existing and emerging crisis situations in Africa. The PSC is charged with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property.

It comprises 15 member states of the AU, which are elected on the basis of equal rights. Ten are elected for a two-year period and the remaining five are elected for a three-year period on the principle of equitable representation of the five regions: North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa.⁵⁸

Even though the PSC is the single-most powerful institution within the peace and security architecture of the AU, it works in consultation with the Chairperson of the AU Commission. It:

- undertakes peacemaking and peacebuilding functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred;
- authorises the mounting and deployment of peace-support missions;
- institutes sanctions wherever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member state;
- implements the common defence policy of the AU;⁵⁹
- follows up on progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by member states;
- supports and facilitates humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict or major disasters; and
- coordinates and harmonises continental efforts in the preventing and combating terrorism.⁶⁰

In addition to the PSC Protocol, the peace and security architecture includes the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, adopted by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005; and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted by the Second Extraordinary Session of the Union, held in Sirte, Libya, in February 2005. The PSC is supported by other institutional arrangements, including the Commission of the African Union; a Panel of the Wise; CEWS; ASF; and a Special Peace Fund.

CONTINENTAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (CEWS)

The CEWS was established as one of the key pillars of the ASAP within article 12 of PSC Protocol. Article 12 specifies that CEWS should consist of an observation and monitoring centre (to be known as 'Situation Room' at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), which is linked to the early warning mechanisms of the regional economic communities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action.⁶¹ The aim is to facilitate anticipation and prevention of conflicts on the continent.

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF)

The first Assembly of the African Union, held in Durban, South Africa, in 2002, adopted the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC that included provisions on the establishment of the ASF and a MSC as well as other instruments. Article 13 of the PSC provides that,

an ASF shall be established. Such force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary components with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at an appropriate notice.⁶²

The ASF consists of five Regional Standby Capabilities. The regional brigades are the East African Standby Force (EASF), the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the SADC Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic Community of Central African States (FOMAC) Standby Force. The role of the ASF is to provide peacekeeping forces on high-level readiness capable of rapid deployment in response to requests by the UN or the AU or a given region.⁶³

THE PANEL OF THE WISE

The Panel of the Wise is one of the key pillars in operationalisation of APSA. The idea behind this initiative is to draw on Africa's rich tradition of bestowing peacemaking duties on the elders because of their wisdom. The Panel's composition and mandate is contained in Article 11 of the Protocol establishing the PSC. It consists of five highly respected African figures from diverse backgrounds.

The Panel's role is to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent.⁶⁴

However, the Panel's mandate is twofold: to support the PSC and Chairperson in their peacemaking efforts and to act independently on issues it deems significant to the enhancement of human security on the continent. From an operational perspective, the Panel can act at the request of the PSC or the Chairperson of the Commission or, most importantly, on its own volition.⁶⁵

THE PEACE FUND

The Peace Fund was established as one of the key pillars of the APSA under article 21 of the PSC Protocol. It is meant to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The Peace Fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of AU, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from member states and from other sources within Africa, among them the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund-raising activities.⁶⁶

THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES/MECHANISMS (RECS/RMS)

This is another key building block in the AU peace and security architecture. The five ASF regional brigades are being established under the auspices of regional economic communities like ECOWAS, the SADC and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).⁶⁷ The RECs and RMs are a critical component in the operationalisation of the ASF. The AU's relations with the RECs and other RMs are elaborated in article 16 of the Protocol establishing the PSC.⁶⁸ The RECs and RMs for conflict prevention, management and resolution constitute an integral part of the APSA. At the regional level, efforts are being made to establish similar structures to the Panel of the Wise.

GAPS IN THE OPERATIONALISATION OF APSA

The issue of sustainability is a major operational gap of the APSA because it depends on partner support. This is partly explained by the fact that recruitment of staff at the AU is constrained by the 'Maputo structure', which limits the number of personnel that can be hired through its regular budget. This raises the question of sustainability, predictability and flexibility in its operation.⁶⁹ The RECs/RMs recognise and accept the principle of subsidiarity in their relationship with the AU, but there is less clarity on its application. Some RECs/RMs argue that the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing agency but rather play a coordination role.⁷⁰ There is also a general feeling among the RECs/RMs and other actors that the APSA is not coherent or comprehensive enough in its current configuration.

There is a mismatch as the architecture assigns a leading role in conflict prevention and resolution to RECs and RMs below the AU, as well as to member states.⁷¹ The argument is that the important APSA components like the CEWS and ASF, with its five regional brigades, rely on institutional pillars in the different regions of the continent. There is an absence of a political framework for effective peace endeavours in several regions, yet the AU relies on regional organisations for the provision of troops and security.⁷² A wide range of security-related issues are not captured in any of the APSA components. For instance, the APSA did not address the aspect of governance of security forces through Security Sector Reform (SSR) on the continent, the rising tide of terrorism, piracy, disaster management, post-conflict reconstruction and broader governance issues.

There is also limited coherence between the APSA components of the AU and the RECs, particularly with the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the regions.⁷³ The issue of partnership between AU, RECs and external multilateral and bilateral actors raises the questions of sustainability, predictability and ownership.

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the five components of APSA are not fully operational. The key challenge has been that progress towards establishing an effective AU crisis management capability has been mixed, primarily due to lack of funding, insufficient resources, inadequate capacity and a lack of political will.⁷⁴

THE AU AND THE LIBYAN AND MALIAN CRISIS

Events in two North African countries (Tunisia and Egypt) that came to be called the 'Arab Spring' triggered the rebellion in mid-February 2011 in Eastern Libya against the government of Muammar Qaddafi. The AUPSC

met one week after the rebellion broke out and issued a communiqué spelling out its intention to send a fact-finding mission to Libya. As the PSC was preparing itself to respond to the threat from Qaddafi forces to crush the rebellion, the UNSC passed a resolution 1973, authorising the use of force to protect civilian people.

The PSC failed to act decisively as there was no mission dispatched 'urgently'. The UN Charter recognises the existence of regional arrangements to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, provided the actions to be taken are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (article 52(1)). Besides, regional bodies are enjoined to make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council.⁷⁵ The failure by the PSC to establish a fact-finding mission immediately therefore paved the way for the UNSC to take action before the AU could intervene in the Libyan crisis. The failure of the AU to act swiftly allowed the UNSC to seize the initiative. On 26 February 2011, acting under Chapter VII, the UN passed Resolution 197, which precluded the AU from being the lead organisation to deal with the situation in Libya.⁷⁶

Without being judgmental, it is clear that the Libyan crisis exposed the fissures between AU members and thus the failure of the organisation to show a united front on the matter. It has been generally observed that the AU members were divided. Some accepted UN Resolution 1973 in principle (Uganda, South Africa, and to an extent Kenya); the other position, supported by countries such as Rwanda, supported the NATO attack on Libya. The third position, advanced by countries such as Zimbabwe, Algeria and Nigeria, opposed NATO's operation in Libya and viewed it as a case of Western countries using the UN to get rid of the Qaddafi regime. In a nutshell, these varied positions showed a lack of unified purpose and the inability of the AU to intervene effectively in the crisis.

In the case of Mali, with the outbreak of the secessionist rebellion and military coup, the AU and ECOWAS imposed political, economic, and diplomatic sanctions on the illegal regime in Mali and mobilised international support to refuse to recognise both the separatist Azawad state and the military junta. Nigeria, which is a pillar of ECOWAS and has the military, financial and political capability to intervene, could not do so due to an internal political crisis. It was difficult for the Nigerian president to order the armed forces to undertake a peacekeeping operation without the approval of the National Assembly.

The AU-ECOWAS International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was not able to deal with the crisis in Mali, hence the invitation extended to France Malian authorities. The European Union's (EU) involvement was limited to providing training and financial and logistical support for Malian

and African forces, stressing the importance of African ownership of efforts to resolve the crisis.⁷⁷

From these two crises, it was very clear that the talk of ASAP has not been backed with the resources it demands from African states. There is no doubt that the AU has performed creditably in intervening in more crises in Africa than its predecessor, the OAU.⁷⁸ The apparent failure of the AU to act swiftly is attributable to one factor: its inability to raise sufficient financial and human resources for its operations. For instance, in Darfur, Sudan, when the AU decided to send a 7 000-strong Observer Mission, the total budget for the force (US\$26 million) was funded by international donors (from the EU and the UK).⁷⁹ In the end, because of the inability of AU member states to raise the required funding, the AU was forced to submit to UN intervention in the crisis by the establishment of the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

In 2007, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was first deployed by a decision of the AUPSC and subsequently supported by UNSC Resolution 1744. It was observed that a number of countries agreed to contribute troops to the mission, including Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, Burundi and Uganda, but Nigeria and Ghana later became reluctant to do so on the grounds that the mission was a substandard one, that is, not at the level of a UN peacekeeping mission.⁸⁰ Malawi failed to contribute to the mission because of internal politics.⁸¹ AMISOM suffered from a lack of funds and, but for the support of the EU, the mission would have failed to be deployed in the first place.⁸²

CRITIQUE OF ASAP

The challenges that some countries face (such as Somalia, the DRC, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali) are a stark reminder of the absence of a hegemonic power on the continent. It is argued that sovereignty does not entail the right of leaders to rule their people in any way they like, but instead requires that leaders be responsible and responsive to the needs of the people. Taking this argument further, African leaders tend to define and pursue interests that are diametrically opposed to the interests of their states.

It is against this backdrop that this chapter argues that ASAP, as a new approach to continental security and conflict management, is not a wishful thinking but it is an idealistic vision that will take years to realise. From the varied interpretations and explanations of ASAP, it is clear that Africa has inadequate financial and technical capacity to solve its myriad problems. It can be argued that some of these problems are fundamental and would make it difficult to realise this vision. In African states there continues to be bad governance, endemic corruption and a high rate of unemployment.

These are fundamental problems that need to be resolved to guarantee stability on the continent.

The principles and objectives of the AU's security policy are contained in the Constitutive Act of July 2002. Prior to the adoption of the Constitutive Act, several processes had been initiated to establish a collective African security regime. The AU is also poised to promote democracy and good governance. Thus, in 2007, an African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was adopted. Section three of the Charter upholds the democratic principles of representative government, separation of powers, transparent and fair political processes, and indicates a total rejection of any unconstitutional changes of government.^{83, 84} As commendable as these provisions may be, however, there are some major impediments.

First, the United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, specifies the role of regional organisations as involving 'the pacific settlement of local disputes' as well as 'enforcement action under UNSC authorisation'.⁸⁵ This provision makes it impossible for the AU to take action even on a humanitarian basis without UN Security Council mandate. If the AU decides to do otherwise its action would be illegal under international law, no matter how legitimate it might appear.⁸⁶

The provision goes on to explain that regional bodies like ECOWAS and the SADC cannot take military action without UN Security Council authorisation. African regional bodies suffer the same predicament when confronted with internal armed conflict. Inasmuch as no African state wields the prestigious veto power, any military action would be impossible without the support of the five permanent members of the UNSC – the United States, Britain, Russia, France and China – which wield a veto vote.

Second, notwithstanding the UNSC power to veto any military action by regional organisations, it has been observed that there has been a proliferation of regional organisations on the continent. This poses a huge challenge to conflict resolution. ASAP is still an ideal and not a reality because of African states' apparent lack of power to coerce the involvement of other states. There are certain elements of state power that are critical in providing the necessary leverage for effective conflict resolution, including military might, economic capability and technological know-how. Without these key elements, it is difficult to manage conflict on the continent. In addition, in the economic sphere, Africa's share of global trade stands at less than four per cent.⁸⁷

Third, in view of the economic predicament of most states on the continent, it makes it difficult for AU peacekeeping to be carried out efficiently and promptly. This accounts for the reliance of the continental body on foreign forces or the international community. Even the so-called political and logistic support that the AU is expected to provide always falls short of

expectation. This poses a challenge to conflict and security management. Relying on foreign donors to fund peace support operations in Africa is an outright contradiction of ASAP.

Fourth, despite numerous attempts to resolve conflicts in African countries such as Burundi, the DRC, Somalia and Sudan, these conflicts have not ended.⁸⁸ This is why the philosophy of ASAP is questionable and needs to be interrogated in view of the apparent incapability of the AU to address such conflicts politically and militarily. One can begin to question the relevance of ASAP to the AU and other regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, SADC and even the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), in addressing the myriad problems in Africa.⁸⁹ The chapter has argued that APSA is more or less an interventionist commitment and is based on the philosophy of ASAP, which to all intents and purposes still remains a mere dream.

The popular view among Africans is that African states and their leaders lack the political will to chastise those leaders who have been responsible for Africa's problems. Most of these leaders mismanage their resources and the economy. Questions that beg an answer are these: Do these leaders want the outside world to fold its arms and watch African people suffer internal colonialism? Is the African way of doing things in conformity with acceptable international standards?

The AU's conflict-resolution mechanism of mediation and reconciliation could not be actualised in view of the fact that the so-called mediators may not always be objective and maintain neutrality and impartiality.⁹⁰ Arguably, most African leaders have formed an alliance among themselves, especially the dictators, making it difficult to resolve conflict in Africa through the AU. According to Ferim, 'Long-serving African dictators such as Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Paul Biya of Cameroon have consolidated their grip on power to an extent that it becomes difficult for new African leaders to condemn their regimes'.⁹¹ The slogan of 'African problems solved by Africans' will embolden dictatorial leaders to act without qualms and with impunity. Some of these leaders will hide behind the guise of sovereignty to perpetuate atrocities ranging from bad governance to corruption, high-handedness and abuse of the fundamental rights of citizens.

Despite all these criticisms of ASAP, it is still commendable that Africa's dream of controlling its destiny has finally come of age. Perhaps the failure of the international community to avert the genocide in Rwanda, to resolve the conflict in the DRC, to save Somalia from collapse, and to intervene in the Libyan uprising were genuine reasons why African leaders thought it more reasonable and politically expedient to manage Africa's security problems in their own way. ASAP also reaffirms African states' commitment to the concept of an African Renaissance, and NEPAD. There is a need for

the peace and security policies of various African regions to be integrated in a unified framework. Such integration should not disrupt the sovereignty of the regions but instead make these policies complementary.

It was against this background that at its inception the AU decided to establish the African Peace and Security Architecture. This chapter has analysed the five components of the APSA and identified gaps in their operationalisation.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have identified three key themes in the way the concept of ASAP is understood: foreign powers should not assist Africa; Africa should be consulted by foreigners in finding solutions to its problems; and foreigners should not intervene in Africa's internal affairs.⁹² This paradigm shift in support of indigenous solutions is a challenge to Africa. It is obvious that Africa cannot solve all its problems alone. This partly explains why critics have argued that there is a wide gap between ambitions, plans, organisational set-up and actual accomplishments. The AU is often described as a 'club for dictators', just as its predecessor, the OAU, was referred to as a 'toothless bulldog'. As derogatory as these terms may be, the AU has championed various programmes and efforts at conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

AU member states lack the financial wherewithal to carry out their responsibilities, especially as these relate to conflict and security management. In our globalised and interdependent world, no nation can guarantee its own security. Therefore, the notion of shared responsibility and burden-sharing between the AU and the UN needs to be clarified. It is not about Africa priding itself on being capable of solving its own problems while lacking the capacity to coordinate peace and security activities between the AU and the RECs, on the one hand, and the UN on the other. Africa has neither the military resources nor the political clout to solve its own problems or to intervene in conflict situations without the support of external forces. In order to reduce excessive reliance on external actors in solving African problems and allow for a real 'Africanisation' of security, there is a need to strengthen AU capacities.

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Identity and Diversity for African Unity and Renaissance

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Modern societies are defined by the construction of identities, which differentiates one group of people from the other. While there is a common origin for the whole of the human race, human societies have been differentiated – as a result of colonialism and imperialism – on the basis of race, geography, language, ethnicity, culture and, to a large extent, religion. Beyond the natural features that distinguish various groups of people, identity is a form of social construction in which more powerful groups dominate the less powerful ones.

Africa is defined by multiple identities in terms of race, culture, language, ethnicity, religion and socioeconomic categories. Many scholars have grappled with the definition of who is an African.^{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} While some refer to a continental Africa, which includes all the African states, others argue that Africa should be interpreted to mean the blacks on the continent. However, most Western references to Africa are to sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, there is a differentiation between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Identity manifests or crystallises in the form of a relation. Here we are concerned with the problem of two distinct identities that have different historical and cultural ontologies. We are concerned with the relation of Africans originating from Africa and those that have become Africans after migrating from outside Africa.

Despite its rich history and being the cradle of human civilisation, the continent of Africa has been the site of unimaginable violence, disorder, marginalisation and exploitation for centuries. Scholars have argued that the violent encounters between Africa and other parts of the world that led to the slave trade, colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism caused serious structural dislocations and affected the realisation of the developmental potentials of the continent.^{6, 7} For instance, in what he refers to as the curse of Berlin, Adebajo describes how Western imperial powers like France, Germany, Britain, Belgium and Portugal divided African countries

among themselves at the Berlin Conference of 1884/5.⁸ The fallout of such arbitrary divisions includes conflicts, wars and stymied development. As many have argued, the violence that came with colonialism continues to this day.⁹

The dark history of conflict and wars in Africa has been interspersed with heroic achievements such as ending official colonialism, increased access to social and physical infrastructure and some semblance of economic development. It is these changes in the fortunes of Africa and its people that provide a strong basis for the anticipation of a renaissance in which the dignity, pride and past glory of the continent are fully restored.^{10, 11, 12}

However, the fragmentation of the continent along linguistic, religious, geographical, ethnic and, to a certain extent, racial lines, continues to hamper the realisation of Africa's potential. Since political independence, it has been particularly challenging to manage ethnic diversities within the geographical borders of most African countries. Tribalism, ethnicity and racism continue to characterise post-independent African countries that experienced settler and non-settler colonialism.

The Pan-Africanist Movement on which African countries rode to independence has been undermined by narrow nationalism and the bondage of boundaries.^{13, 14} Although the African Union has continued to put in place programmes of action to promote Pan-African unity, consideration of national interests by political and intellectual elites has undermined these programmes' progress. The recourse to paper sovereignty, in which domestic politics trumps continental solidarity, has further exposed Africa to marginalisation by other parts of the world. The need for a Pan-African identity has been advocated by both African politicians and intellectuals.¹⁵ Construction of such an identity requires a collective understanding and appreciation of the uniqueness of Africans in relation to other parts of the world as well as the distinctness of African nationalities in relation to each other.

Questions have arisen about how unity can be achieved in Africa. Chinweizu focuses the question on the proper definition of Africa within the broad debates that have taken place among leading political thinkers and actors in Africa.¹⁶ To start with, the essence of unity to the restoration of the dignity of the black race has been identified. For instance, Nyerere argued that without unity there is no future for Africa and that although unity may not make Africa rich, it will make it difficult for Africa and its peoples to be disregarded and humiliated.¹⁷ Prah argues that 'the ideal of African unity is premised on the notion that the emancipation, development and prosperity of people of African descent can be achieved only through the unity of the people'.^{18, 19, 20}

But the nature and dimensions of this unity have been a subject of varied interpretations and perspectives. According to Chinweizu,

[t]here is no agreement as yet on the constituency for the much desired unity. Some, like Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and Cheikh Anta Diop have advocated a unity of the entire continent of Africa, a unity that would include the Black Africans and the Arabs in the African continent. Some, like Nnamdi Azikiwe and Yoweri Museveni, have advocated a unity of all who now reside on the African continent – Blacks and Whites, including the Arab and European colonial settlers. Yet others want the unity to be between the Black Africans and their Diaspora in the Americas; and still others want the unity, whatever its form or forms, to be between the Black Africans in Africa and the Blacks worldwide, excluding the European and Asian settlers on the continent.²¹

The lack of agreement on what constitutes an African identity has prevented this identity from being leveraged to advance development of the continent. For too long, Africans south of the Sahara have related with other parts of the world on the basis of human brotherhood and sisterhood, trust as well as respect. On the contrary, the rest of the world, especially Arabs and Europeans, has treated Africans as mere objects whose utility lies in satisfying the base instincts of the powerful. The disdain in which Arabs and Europeans held Africa resulted in hundreds of years of enslavement in the most brutal and inhuman conditions, in colonialism and in its present-day manifestation in the form of coloniality of power, being and knowledge.²²

The institutional and systemic racism being played out in the West and Asia against blacks through physical assault, racial profiling, mass incarceration and socioeconomic exclusions are manifestations of the prejudice against Africans. The fact that such practices continue in the age of democracy and so-called civilisation makes the construction of an African identity necessary and urgent. Once the identity issue is settled, it becomes necessary to have a programme of action that can lead to building both economic and military power, not just for the sake of prestige but to ensure a balance of power against belligerent nations and groups. Building black power will require black consciousness as well as critical thinking.²³ Being conscious of one's identity is a prelude to action aimed at protecting such an identity.

As the history of liberation on the continent has shown, the road to African renaissance and development does not lie in struggling against external forces on the basis of artificially contrived borders, specially designed linguistic differentiations or taking solace in class comfort. What is required is a Pan-Africanist consciousness which is underpinned by cross-national and cohesive organisation, mass mobilisation of people at grassroots level, and bold, imaginative, visionary leadership. Achieving this remains a very lofty goal, but importance and necessity cannot be overemphasised in the light of our past and present realities.

Therefore, regenerating Africa for African solutions to Africa's challenges also entails that the issue of African identity gets resolved. As the chapters in this volume indicate, Africa's renaissance requires a multidimensional strategy and a comprehensive agenda in the context of Pan-Africanism.

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Regenerating Africa: Bringing African Solutions to African Problems

It has been long overdue to address the principal problems that Africa continues to have. How to bring real African solutions to these problems remains unresolved. Palaeontologists have discovered that Africa is the origin of humanity. Africa has also experienced the commodification of its humanity through slavery, colonialism and apartheid. The African continent has been influenced by a mélange of races, cultures, religions, ethnic nationalities making the project of how the differences can be managed to forestall conflict and promote the unity of the current 54 states to turn the cacophony of noises into a single voice that can protect Africa a difficult challenge. This book on *Regenerating Africa: Bringing African Solutions to African Problems* addresses why Africans must come together and try to address their own problems. They must look back to the spiritual, struggle and knowledge heritage to re-imagine and innovate a new Africa with leadership, governance, systems and institutions that can address the security and well-being, the employment, social inclusion, poverty eradication and the equality of the people. In fact the key problem to find solution is how to Africanise those that originated from Africa and those that became settlers with different racial, cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic variations. How to manage inter-African relations? How the settlers from the colonial legacy, the apartheid legacy, the Arabs in Africa and the varied tribes within Africans can all share being Africanised above all else is a real challenge to bring lasting solutions to Africa's enduring problems. This book is one of the few books that addresses the real problems Africa continues to face by suggesting solutions which policy makers and all Africans must learn and never ignore but use to advance a free, united, renascent, proud and dignified independent Africa in this unpredictable time the world is going through. The contributors address in the book how African solutions to African problems in the current global context to create a sustainable African future can be thought, designed and engineered to advance the well-being of people and nature for all. The African Unity for Renaissance series of conferences that over 10 partners contributed to run is the true source for generating the quality papers that have been peer reviewed to constitute the contributions in the book to make African solutions to African problems in reality and not just in talk.

